

MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS IN TRANSLATION

# THE CONIMBRICENSES

SOME QUESTIONS ON SIGNS

TRANSLATED WITH AN  
INTRODUCTION & NOTES

BY

JOHN P. DOYLE

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESS

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MEDLÆVAL PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS IN TRANSLATION

No. 38

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by

John P. Doyle

Saint Louis University



MARQUETTE  
UNIVERSITY

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PRESS

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To Mary Gale  
with love and gratitude



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## Foreword

### A NEW DETERMINATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES

In the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century recovery for the history of philosophy of the Latin “middle ages”, one detail escaped the notice of the scholars and philosophers involved in the task, namely, the fact that from its very beginnings with the work of Augustine, Latin thought made use of a fundamental notion that had no precedent in ancient Greek philosophy, to wit, a general notion of sign as common to the two orders of nature and culture.

In recovering the development in Latin of philosophical thought after the 5<sup>th</sup> century collapse of the Western Roman Empire, scholars generally approached the matter in terms of the loss to the Latin West of access after Boethius to the Greek heritage in philosophy, and of the various attempts to pick up again the threads of the Greek heritage, beginning especially with the 12<sup>th</sup> century arrival in Latin of the complete Aristotle. This arrival undergirded curricular development in the universities of the “high middle ages,” when Aquinas lived and wrote, and was followed by the recovery of Plato and the knowledge of Greek after the 15<sup>th</sup> century conquest of Constantinople by Islamic armies. Byzantine scholars fled to Italy with their Greek treasures of learning to feed the brilliance of the Renaissance.

In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the “scholastic realists” had supported theological condemnation as heretical of the proposition that the earth moves around the sun, a sentiment reinforced by the resonant symbolism (in which this heretical proposition was involved) of public burning of Giordano Bruno in 1600, condemnation of the work of Nicolaus Copernicus in 1616, and trial followed by life-imprisonment of Galileo Galilei in 1633. How better to reinforce the plausibility of Descartes’ opinion that the history of medieval philosophy was a waste of time? As modern science and mainstream modern philosophy developed apace over the next centuries, interest along with knowledge of the Latin Age fell into a deepening oblivion, from which scholarship did not begin to rescue it much before the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.

By the time we reached the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, “medieval philosophy” had regained a place of honor in the academic curriculum, and the history of the period in relation to the recovery of the Greek heritage was well established. The central figure of Aquinas in the 13<sup>th</sup> century was variously viewed, some wishing to stress his dependence on the recovery of the works of Aristotle, others wishing to stress rather his originality vis-à-vis Aristotle, particularly in the development of metaphysics. Also well-established was the emergence after Aquinas first of Duns Scotus then of William of Ockham as foci in the

development of alternative currents in the mainstream of later Latin scholasticism. But between Ockham and Descartes scholars were inclined to agree that there lies only “a philosophical desert.”<sup>1</sup>

There were specialized scholars who knew better. Those who had actually entered upon that “least known period in the history of Western philosophy”<sup>2</sup> knew first-hand that the closing centuries of the Latin Age were “more like a dense tropical rain forest than a desert,”<sup>3</sup> easier to get lost in than to find a way through. It was one thing, and important, to point out, as Kristeller conspicuously did,<sup>4</sup> that the literary activity of the later Latin scholastics “has been badly neglected by modern historians,” and that the “merits and limitations” of their writings requires “a new direct investigation of the source materials” to replace repetition of such antiquated judgments as that expressed by Matson in his “new” history. But actually to access and interpret those source materials directly was a task so arduous as to daunt all but a few. So the standard picture of the “middle ages” as a development, essentially, from Augustine through Aquinas to Ockham, was able to persist.

Foremost among that isolated band of researchers who, by millennium’s end, had actually undertaken the arduous task of accessing, reading, and interpreting in English the primary sources of late Latinity has long been Professor John P. Doyle, translator and editor of the work before us. Up until now his work has been familiar only to the most specialized of scholars, who have marveled at the lucidity of his translations of Suárez, Vitoria, and other late Latins, and treasured his brilliant, if isolated, studies of particular aspects of late Latin thought (such as the crucial but long-forgotten development of the doctrine of “supertranscendentals” just after the time of Galileo, Poinset, and Descartes). Now, with this presentation of the work of the *Conimbricenses*, in its original tongue as well as in scholarly English interpretation, Professor Doyle emerges from the shadows of philosophical archeology to present us with one of the major pieces in the puzzle of how to see the Latin Age of philosophical development as a whole in its own right, not merely as a lengthy footnote to or development in function of the ancient Greek heritage.

When Augustine opened the 5<sup>th</sup> century with his proposal of sign as a general notion superordinate to the division of being into natural and cultural (or into *ens reale* and *ens rationis*, as the medievals would put it), his ignorance of Greek prevented him from realizing that the proposal was a novel notion, not a self-evident one. By treating it as self-evident, we can see in hindsight, Augustine anticipated the huge controversy over *nominalism*, the signification of general terms, that would develop in later Latin centuries, first in the early 12<sup>th</sup> century time of Abaelard, then as a mainstream focus in and after Ockham. For how is it possible that there can be a notion of being common

to creations of nature and the work of the mind itself in, as Peter Berger famously put it,<sup>5</sup> the “social construction of reality”?

More importantly to the purpose of the present work, Augustine also set in motion a line of speculation in philosophy that would pick up the ancient Greek heritage in its original discussion of the idea of relation as a mode of being. But the crossing of this line of speculation in Latin times with the general notion of sign could not be reduced to a simple development, however novel, of the Greek heritage. With his proposal of sign as a general notion, Augustine unwittingly launched the first Latin initiative in philosophy, one whose development would, in being traced, lead to “a new determination of the middle ages.”<sup>6</sup> In this new determination, the “middle ages” appears simply as “the Latin Age,” an organic whole from the time of Augustine to the time of Galileo and Descartes, when the work of a student of the Conimbricenses, John Poinset,<sup>7</sup> demonstrated that the general notion of sign finds its ground in the doctrine of relation as indifferent in its own being to provenance now from nature alone, now from mind alone, now from both together, first from one then from the other, separately or conjointly.

Sign as a speculative theme in philosophy was made inevitable by Augustine’s ignorant proposal. In this respect, indeed, we may regard his ignorance of Greek as a “felix culpa,” for in leaving the justification of the notion of sign to his Latin progeny he handed us the single most unifying theme under which the whole development of Latin philosophy so far can be viewed. With the general notion of sign, we not only begin with Augustine, as do the heretofore standard treatments of “medieval philosophy”; not only do we pick up in full the work of Boethius in translating the logic of Aristotle and standardizing the terminology for the Latin discussion of relation; not only do we pick up the full discussion of nominalism both early and late among the Latins. With the general notion of sign we have placed in our hands a theme that was only beginning to be developed as such in the lifetime and work of Thomas Aquinas. This theme, the theme of the sign as the universal instrument of experience and thought, a theme at once ontological and epistemological, carries us from the high middle ages right down to the end of the Latin Age in the early modern period of Descartes and Locke.

The problematics of the sign are clearly identified but not reduced to thematic unity in the writings of Aquinas himself. After Aquinas, the trail of the sign leads us through the work at first of authors otherwise familiar, such as Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham. But after Ockham this new trail, the way of signs, veers off in directions heretofore unexplored by general historians of philosophy, including medieval philosophy. The trail of the sign leads us into the work of authors known, but not mainly for their discussion of sign, such as Pierre d’Ailly and Dominic Soto. The path leads

thence into later work of authors celebrated in their day though since all but forgotten, such as Pedro da Fonseca, the Conimbricenses, Francisco Araújo, John Poinset, and still other later Latins yet to be studied anew.

In this development of the doctrine of signs, the Conimbricenses work is doubly significant. First, the treatise here presented is a missing link to the work of Poinset and other later Latins mentioned (and elsewhere studied) by Professor Doyle, such as Christoph Scheibler and Bartholomew Keckermann. Second, this treatise is also a missing link in understanding the postmodern development of semiotics after C. S. Peirce, who took from the later Latins in general and from the Conimbricenses specifically his celebrated central doctrine of sign as consisting in an irreducibly triadic relation.

Doyle's work, thus, with this invaluable edition, emerges from the shadowy margins of scholarly research done for its own sake into the spotlight of mainstream contemporary intellectual developments. This work marks a major contribution both in semiotics and in the general history of philosophy. For the Conimbricenses on signs is a part of the whole of the Latin Age, the "medieval period" separating ancient Greek thought, first from modern philosophy, and now from the postmodern development wherein the lost Latin centuries between Ockham and Descartes are recovered and restored to their rightful place as an organic part of the overall medieval development. This development began indeed with Augustine but, after all, neither wholly culminated in Aquinas nor terminated in Ockham. For the outstanding contribution made in this edition before us, no longer only professional academicians are in Professor Doyle's debt, but all the students of philosophy and intellectual history in general. This work is a major piece in the puzzle of what happened to philosophy between Ockham and Descartes, and ensures that Professor Doyle's scholarship will receive the wide appreciation it deserves.

John Deely  
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22 April 2001

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Wallace I. Matson, *A New History of Philosophy* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), p. 253.
- <sup>2</sup> John Herman Randall, Jr., *The Career of Philosophy*. Vol. 1: *From the Middle Ages to the Enlightenment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. vii–viii.
- <sup>3</sup> John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding* (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2001), p. 364.
- <sup>4</sup> Paul Oskar Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought* (New York: Harper, 1961), p. 134.
- <sup>5</sup> Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1966).
- <sup>6</sup> Otto Bird, in a manuscript evaluation report dated 27 August 1997 that he authored for the University of Toronto Press.
- <sup>7</sup> John Poinset, *Tractatus de Signis* (original publ. 1632; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).



# Introduction

## 1. The Conimbricenses

The *Conimbricenses* were late sixteenth and into the early seventeenth century Jesuit philosophy professors at the University of Coimbra.<sup>1</sup> There they taught in the College of Arts, which in October, 1555 King João III of Portugal had placed under the direction of the Society of Jesus.<sup>2</sup> Chief among them were Emmanuel de Goes (1542-1597), Cosmas de Magalhães (1551-1624), Balthasar Alvarez (1561-1630), and Sebastian do Couto (1567-1639).<sup>3</sup> Although not usually numbered among the *Conimbricenses*, their confrere in the Society, Pedro da Fonseca (1528-1599),<sup>4</sup> had promoted the novel idea of a philosophical *cursus* authored by the Jesuits of Coimbra.<sup>5</sup>

Fonseca himself, called in his own time the ‘Portuguese Aristotle,’ was one of the four first Jesuits teaching philosophy at Coimbra in 1555.<sup>6</sup> He was also one of 12 members of the Society selected in 1581 by the Jesuit General, Claude Acquaviva (d. 1615) to elaborate a plan of studies for the Jesuits themselves, the famous “*Ratio Studiorum*.”<sup>7</sup> A first draft of this *Ratio* was presented in 1586 and, after comments from the schools of the Society, it was, with changes, adopted officially in 1599.<sup>8</sup> In the meantime, Fonseca had published an introduction to logic<sup>9</sup> plus commentaries on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*,<sup>10</sup> both of which were excellent but not directly suitable for a philosophical course to implement the *Ratio Studiorum*.<sup>11</sup> More to that end was the systematic course in philosophy produced by Fonseca’s Coimbra colleagues between 1592 and 1606 in the form of eight treatises of commentary on the works of Aristotle.

Used particularly but by no means exclusively in Jesuit colleges, these commentaries had broad influence throughout the seventeenth century in Europe, North and South America, Africa, India, and the Far East, including both Japan and China. In this last connection, the main bibliographer of the Society of Jesus, Carlos Sommervogel, S.J. (1834-1902), cited the seventeenth-century Jesuit polymath, Athanasius Kircher (1601-1680), to the effect that by his time the Coimbra commentaries had been translated into Chinese.<sup>12</sup> In the notes accompanying the following translation we will mention one of these translations, which was made in the early seventeenth century<sup>13</sup> principally by Francisco Furtado, S.J. (1584-1653) and Li Chih Tsao (1565-1630), who was a Christian convert and friend of the famous Matteo Ricci, S.J. (1552-1610).



## 2. The Works of the *Conimbricenses*

In the order of their appearance, the *Conimbricenses*' treatises were: (1) *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae* ('Commentaries of the Coimbra College of the Society of Jesus on the Eight Books of the *Physics* of Aristotle the Stagirite'), 1592; (2) *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in quatuor libros de Coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae* ('Commentaries ... on the Four Books of the *De Coelo* of Aristotle'), 1592; (3) *Commentarii Collegii... in libros meteorum Aristotelis* ('... on the Books of the *Meteorology*'), 1592; (4) *Commentarii ... in parva naturalia* ('... on the *Parva Naturalia*'), 1592; (5) *Commentarii ... in libros Ethicorum ad Nichomachum* ('... on the Books of the *Nichomachean Ethics*'), 1595; (6) *Commentarii ... in duos libros De Generatione et corruptione* ('... on the Two Books, *On Generation and Corruption*'), 1595; (7) *Commentarii ... in tres libros De Anima* ('... on the Three Books of the *De Anima*'), 1595; and (8) *Commentarii ... in universam dialecticam Aristotelis* ('Commentaries ... on the Whole Logic of Aristotle'), 1606.

Although their authors are not individually mentioned in the volumes themselves, we do know that Goes began the publication with his own commentaries comprising volumes 1, 2, and 3. On his death, Magelhães published Goes' commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima* and appended to it Alvarez's treatise on the soul separated in death from the body.<sup>14</sup> Then Couto in 1606 published the logic commentaries which had their remote origin thirty years back in lectures by Fonseca.<sup>15</sup> Some testimony to the worth of the *Conimbricenses*' volumes may be gleaned from the fact that, including their first printings, the eight treatises up to 1633 went through 112 editions in Portugal, Germany, France, and Italy!<sup>16</sup>

The method employed in the *Conimbricenses*' volumes was threefold: summaries, explanations, and questions. To clarify this, let me say that medieval commentaries on Aristotle and other texts were basically of three kinds:<sup>17</sup> summaries or 'paraphrases' of the text, 'expositions by way of comment' (*expositiones per modum commenti*), and 'expositions by way of question' (*expositiones per modum quaestionis*). The first kind was illustrated by the work of Avicenna (980-1037)<sup>18</sup> and among Christians, by Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280).<sup>19</sup> The second was the method favored by Averroes (1126-1198) in his long commentaries on Aristotle<sup>20</sup> and by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274).<sup>21</sup> The third method may be found in the *Quaestiones subtilissimae* ('Most Subtle Questions on the Books of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle') of Duns Scotus (1266-1308).<sup>22</sup> In this third method, customary questions which were occasioned by the text were raised and answered. The *Conimbricenses* mainly used this last method, but they also summarized and gave a literal commentary on the text of Aristotle.

### 3. The Commentaries on the Logic of Aristotle

Appearing in 1606, the *Conimbricenses*' own logic followed a logic spuriously attributed to them which had been published in 1604 at Frankfurt, Cologne, Hamburg, and Vienna.<sup>23</sup> Most likely based on Fonseca's lectures at Coimbra which had been attended by Gaspar Coelho (1552-1593), "who apparently sold his notes to the publisher upon leaving the [Jesuit] Order,"<sup>24</sup> this spurious logic was denounced by the *Conimbricenses* themselves as both fraudulent and inaccurate.<sup>25</sup> Their own work, emerging first at Coimbra and then, with a Greek text of Aristotle added, in 1607 at Lyons,<sup>26</sup> was intended to set the record straight. For the most part it did that, although its often cryptic style, its numerous printing errors, and the habit of its principal editor, that is Couto, to write usually in the editorial first person plural but sometimes in the first person singular, betray some haste in its production. Despite that, however, the work overall is an excellent and well unified production.

Through its two main parts, following the style of Fonseca's commentaries on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, the authors have reviewed the individual works of the *Organon*. For each of these, in the Lyons edition they give the principal parts of Aristotle's text in Greek, translate it into Latin, paraphrase and explain its doctrine, and then comment on it by raising questions which it had occasioned among the Scholastics of the sixteenth and earlier centuries. Their understanding both of Aristotle and the Scholastic tradition before themselves is evident, as is also the character and depth of their own philosophical interests.<sup>27</sup>

### 4. The Treatise on Signs

A good example of this last is furnished by their commentary on the first chapter of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*. Entitled *De signo*, ('On the Sign'), this commentary runs over 60 pages. While some treatment of signs at this place in Aristotelian commentary was customary among the Scholastic doctors of the Middle Ages, these pages of the *Conimbricenses* represent the first really major seventeenth century treatise on signs.<sup>28</sup>

The work raises five principal questions: (1) On the nature and conditions common to signs; (2) On the divisions of signs; (3) On the signification of spoken words and of writing; (4) Whether concepts are the same among all and whether spoken words are different; then (5) Whether some concepts in our minds are true or false, and others devoid of truth and falsity.

Along the way there are sub-questions about the essence of a sign, the possibility of something being a sign of itself, signs as natural or conventional (or in their language "by institution"), signs as formal or instrumental, signs as actual or aptitudinal, the relations involved in signs, and truth in signs. This last occasions discussion, within Question 5, of truth in connection with all three operations (conception, judgment, and reasoning) of the human intel-

lect. Such discussion and others like it show the *Conimbricenses* to be aware of many epistemological, psychological, metaphysical, and theological questions which can be raised with regard to signs and signification. In this they also display an understanding of the breadth and scope of semiotics itself.

While readers can explore the following translation on their own, some of the items it raises should not be missed. Thus, in different ways the *Conimbricenses* mention such things as language, syntactical speech, laughing (voluntary and involuntary), nodding, coughing, persons talking in sleep, persons lying, and persons voicing words without thought. They consider the signification of negative words, of syncategorematic words such as 'if,' nonsense words like 'Blictri,' and words like 'chimera' and 'goat-stag' to which no real things correspond. They are interested in the signs involved in writing and reading, especially voiceless reading. Coupled with a short discussion of the physiological bases of speech and hearing, they treat the relation between deafness and an inability to speak or communicate. Relying on Herodotus' account of King Psamittachus, who deliberately reared children with animals to see what language they would naturally speak, as well as on an account, from Jesuit missionaries at the court of Akbar the Great, Mogul of India, of a similar experiment conducted by that prince in 1596, the *Conimbricenses* consider the question of a natural primitive language and touch upon the language of what amount to feral children.

Probably also relying on accounts of Portuguese Jesuit missionaries, they briefly speak of the difference between written languages which they say directly signify things (they mention hieroglyphics, as well as Chinese and Japanese characters) and those which use an alphabet to immediately signify spoken words and then, through those words, things. Connected with this they touch on the signification of arithmetical numbers as well as the signs of astronomers. Topics occasioned by the Bible are the language of Adam and Eve, the language of Adam giving 'proper' names to the animals, the sign of Cain (which following St. Jerome they regard as a tremor), the rainbow given to Noah, and the phenomenon of different languages at the Tower of Babel. In the area of what comes later to be called *zoosemiosis*, they mention Aristotle's study of the song of birds, and they discuss the formation of words by parrots and magpies as well as different kinds of communication among brute animals. Against a general background of optics, they discuss images as signs, especially images in mirrors. While not fully expressing their semiotic theory, one revealing sentence is this: 'There is nothing which leads to the cognition of anything else which cannot be reduced to some sort of sign.'<sup>29</sup>

### 5. Some Influence of the *Conimbricenses*

The *Conimbricenses*' treatises were widely influential in the seventeenth century. As was mentioned, they went through 112 European editions and were even in part translated into Chinese. Indeed, they followed Portuguese ensigns and Jesuit teachers not only to China, but also to farflung places like Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, India, and Japan.<sup>30</sup> In particular, the *Conimbricenses*' sign theory was read by most and reproduced by many Jesuit philosophers of the period.<sup>31</sup> For example, in the next generation, the Lisbon Jesuit, Balthasar Tellez (1596-1675) followed their doctrine on signs and acknowledged his debt to the *Conimbricenses*.<sup>32</sup> Earlier echos of their sign doctrine (which recall: came from lectures thirty years before its publication) may be heard in the great Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617).<sup>33</sup>

We may also add other Jesuits, such as Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1651),<sup>34</sup> Antonio Rubio (1548-1615),<sup>35</sup> Roderigo de Arriaga (1592-1667),<sup>36</sup> and Francisco de Oviedo (1602-1651).<sup>37</sup> None of these is a lockstep follower of the *Conimbricenses*. At times they are even at odds with them. At other times, they go beyond them to explore items such as customary signs, moral being (*ens morale*),<sup>38</sup> the role of signs in law, the role of wordmakers such as kings or republics, the consent of the people required for the acceptance of language, children learning language, the changing meaning of words, obsolete words, as well as such things as speaking to oneself, to animals, or to absent persons. Nevertheless, the Coimbra influence remained broad and deep. In the pages of these and other Jesuits, formal signs, the extension of the definition of a sign past that given by St. Augustine, the language of Adam, the possibility of signs being signs of themselves, spoken and written words, hieroglyphs and pictograms, words spoken by parrots, and a host of other topics appear again and again in the wake of the *Conimbricenses*.

Beyond Jesuits, the *Conimbricenses* were read by most others in the Catholic university tradition. Of these, perhaps the most important was the Portuguese Dominican, John Poinso (a.k.a. John of St. Thomas [1589-1644]), who followed their curriculum at Coimbra, where he received his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1605.<sup>39</sup> Poinso's own *Cursus philosophicus*, departs in style from the *Conimbricenses* and yet may still be said to broadly imitate them.<sup>40</sup> Part of Poinso's *Cursus*, his important *Tractatus de Signis* ("Treatise on Signs") has been recently published with an English translation and commentary by Professor John Deely.<sup>41</sup> As Professor Deely has shown, the extension of the doctrine of signs beyond St. Augustine plus the concomitant doctrine of formal signs, which are at the heart of the *Conimbricenses*' doctrine, are central to Poinso's semiotic theory.<sup>42</sup>

The *Conimbricenses* were also influential across lines of seventeenth-century religious division. For example, their treatise on signs was basic to a similar

treatise by the Lutheran Professor of Philosophy at Giessen, Christoph Scheibler (1589-1653), who among other things adopted the mirror image doctrine of the Jesuits of Coimbra. For him, like them, the image in the mirror is a formal sign which, according to both optical science and Aristotelian physics, is not itself known even as it leads to the knowledge of the thing whose image it is.<sup>43</sup>

From his early education during nine years (1606-1615) at the Jesuit College of La Flèche, René Descartes (1596-1650) was familiar with the *Conimbricenses*.<sup>44</sup> He later declared that of the textbooks he had studied with the Jesuits he “remembered only the *Conimbricenses*, Toletus [Francisco de Toledo (1533-1596)], and [Antonio] Rubio.”<sup>45</sup> The *Conimbricenses* were also familiar to G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), who has cited their commentary on Aristotle’s logic.<sup>46</sup> Baruch [Benedictus de] Spinoza (1632-1677) too was aware of and probably influenced by the *Conimbricenses*, although perhaps only indirectly through the Reform Protestant Scholastics, Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1629) and Adrian Heereboord (1614-1653).<sup>47</sup>

In the first half of the seventeenth century, the Jesuits of Coimbra were also well known in England. Their Logic (along with that of Burgersdijk) was recommended at Emmanuel College in Cambridge in the famous list of Richard Holdsworth (1590-1649).<sup>48</sup> It was similarly recommended at Oxford by the Queen’s College don, Timothy Halton (1632?-1704), in 1652,<sup>49</sup> the year John Locke (1632-1704) entered Christ Church.<sup>50</sup> Their treatise on signs was certainly known at Oxford either immediately or through Scheibler whose *Opus metaphysicum* was in 1637 re-printed there and bound with a metaphysical work by a Fellow of Queen’s College, Thomas Barlow (1607-1691),<sup>51</sup> who later authored “A Library for Younger Schollers” in which he also recommended the Logic of the *Conimbricenses*, who were among, he wrote, “some Authors, which to mee (& possibly may to others) seeme of more necessary use.”<sup>52</sup>

An interesting sidebar to their English connections is provided by the publication at Liege in 1688 of a three tome “Course” (*Cursus*) in Philosophy, authored by Augustinus Laurentius, S.J. [Augustine Lourenço (1633-1695)], who is identified on its title pages as being of Portuguese origin, having taught in the Jesuit college in Lisbon, and “now preacher (*concionator*) for Catherine [of Braganza (1638-1705)], the most serene Queen of Great Britain.”<sup>53</sup> Laurentius’ treatment of signs runs over 112 quarto pages in his first tome.<sup>54</sup> It opens up referring to the *Conimbricenses* and acknowledges them explicitly many times after. Beyond that, Laurentius’ own fuller sign doctrine everywhere follows that of the Coimbra Jesuits, at times reproducing their teaching verbatim. Thinking of the short life of Laurentius’ impressive work, which appeared in the year of the “Glorious Revolution” that put an end to the

Catholic Restoration in England, one can only wonder about “what might have been.”

Across the Atlantic, the *Conimbricenses* were read at seventeenth-century Harvard College,<sup>55</sup> for which Cambridge, and specifically Emmanuel College, had furnished the model<sup>56</sup> and in which Burgersdijk and Heereboord were standard texts at least up to 1723.<sup>57</sup> The New England Puritan Divine, Increase Mather (1639-1723), is on record acknowledging his liking for the *Conimbricenses*, albeit his greater liking for “truth.”<sup>58</sup> And his son, Cotton Mather (1663-1728) owned a copy of their commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle.<sup>59</sup>

In nineteenth-century Harvard, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), whose impact on modern semiotics is undeniable, was very familiar with the *Conimbricenses*.<sup>60</sup> In at least one passage, Peirce has referred explicitly to their *Commentaries on the Whole Logic of Aristotle* and has called them commentators “than whom no authority is higher.”<sup>61</sup> Most certainly, he was familiar with their sign doctrine and while he gives no indication of adopting their views, his various thoughts on signs can at times suggest their earlier thinking.<sup>62</sup>

## 6. The Text and the Translation

For the Latin text in this volume, I have relied upon two editions of the *Conimbricenses’* commentary on the *Logic of Aristotle*. Both were published in 1607, one at Lyons and the other at Cologne. The Lyons volume contains a text of Aristotle’s Greek, its Latin translation by John Argyropoulos (ca. 1415-1487),<sup>63</sup> together with the *Conimbricenses’* own summary and explanation, plus their questions relating to it. The Cologne volume, which was recently reprinted by *Georg Olms Verlag*, has all of this with the exception of the Greek. Since my own first access was to the Lyons edition, I used this as my basic text and corrected it whenever necessary from that of Cologne. This may explain the fact that my footnotes to the Latin text generally favor the Cologne reading over that of Lyons.

As mentioned above, the *Conimbricenses* utilized all three methods of commentary on the text of Aristotle. In what follows, I have given their summary and literal explanation of Chapter One of the *De Interpretatione* plus their questions on it. I did first think to omit their literal commentary inasmuch as it hews so close to Argyropoulos’ translation as to be almost meaningless without that. However, in the end I included it, if only to give as full a picture of the *Conimbricenses’* method as possible. I did not give the Greek. It was not in their first edition at Coimbra in 1606 and, apparently, they themselves allowed it to be dropped from the Cologne edition. I did, however, check the

Lyons Greek against a modern critical edition<sup>64</sup> and found only minor differences between the two.

The Latin text in the present volume conflates the two editions mentioned. Since that of Lyons furnished the base, the page divisions are taken from it. While at times I did paragraph the translation in slightly different ways, I have made no attempt to structure or punctuate the Latin in any way other than that in which I found it. What punctuation it does contain is quite unreliable. Periods are used where a modern author would use commas, and *vice versa*. Colons and semi-colons are employed without much consistency. Modern quotation marks are not used, but in lieu of them there are brackets. In the Lyons text there actually is a combination of brackets and parenthesis signs, which I reduced simply to brackets. In both texts, at times “u” and “v” were used interchangeably. Where necessary I changed one to the other in accord with more modern orthography. I did something similar by expanding ampersand (&) in both texts to “et.” Again, in my final Latin text I have used endnotes in place of what originally were marginal glosses. These same glosses appear in the translation as italicized headings for different paragraphs.

The translation itself aims to be as literal as I can make it while striving for readable English. At times, I have made small concessions to the latter without calling them to the reader’s attention. Perhaps the most frequent of such concessions would be changes from a passive voice in Latin to active in English or making a double negative in Latin into a positive in English. Again, on a number of occasions I expressed the antecedents of pronouns which the *Conimbricenses* had left unexpressed. When I did supply something of substance which was not explicit in the Latin I enclosed it in square brackets. When I translated a word in a particular way which might raise some question I gave the Latin in parentheses. There were also times in which I supplied quotation marks and italics which were not in the original text. Comparison of the English with the Latin texts will show these.

Some words and phrases did raise special difficulties. Perhaps the most important of these was “*signa ex instituto*,” which I translated as “signs by institution.” Doing so, I rejected the temptation to render it as “conventional signs.” My reason was to allow for Sacraments which for the *Conimbricenses* were instituted by God but which certainly were not conventional signs. Connected with the word and concept of institution was another quasi-synonymous word, “*impositio*” or “imposition.” Depending on context, I normally translated this as equivalent to institution.

Still another problem was posed early by the words “*respectus*” and “*dispositio*.” My first inclination was to translate them as “relation.” However, as I got further into the treatise I saw the *Conimbricenses* making an explicit distinc-



tion between *respects*, *conditions* or *dispositions*, and relations. This then I also made in my English version.

Yet another word was “*consignificatio*.” The English cognate would have been “consignification,” which would have literally rendered it as derived from “*consignificare*.” However, the context called for a translation of “marking,” “impression” or “concomitant impression,” which would relate the word not so much to “*consignificare*” as to “*consignare*.” This then was how I translated it.

On the general character of the text, Pinharanda Gomes in his recent book on the *Conimbricenses* has remarked the “elegant and lively style” of their Latin. It has, he tells us, despite the influence of ecclesiastical Latin, an air of Renaissance humanism, controlled by writers who had learned their trade from Cicero and Quintillian.<sup>65</sup> My experience supports this. At the same time, the Jesuits of Coimbra are Scholastics and their writing reflects the highly technical and bookish tradition to which they belong. On numerous occasions they cite Aristotle, St. Thomas, St. Albert, and Duns Scotus, as well as a host of other Scholastic authors and Church Fathers. But beyond that, they mention many non-Scholastic authors such as Herodotus, Virgil, Pliny, Seneca, Cato, Aulus Gellius, Solinus, and Galen, as well as authors closer in time to themselves such as Julius Caesar Scaliger, Agostino Nifo, and Marsilio Ficino. In this connection, they usually cite contemporaries as “more recent [authors]” (*recentiores*). This is a device which I have often met in seventeenth-century Scholastic writers and which seems the equivalent of the medieval practice of citing contemporaries anonymously as “certain ones” (*quidam*).<sup>66</sup>

While I did not attempt to track down these “more recent” authors, I did check the *Conimbricenses’* explicit citations of authors by name and have with few exceptions found them accurate. On some occasions, I was unable to obtain a copy of a cited work, for the reason that libraries would not photocopy it. At other times, when I could not verify citations, for example: of Alexander of Aphrodisias commenting on the *De Interpretatione* or on the third book of Aristotle’s *De Anima*, I would guess that the *Conimbricenses* had access to works which are no longer extant. But there is always the possibility that they were simply using collections of texts, or “*florilegia*,”<sup>67</sup> which were then circulating among schools and students. However, either way, it will not subtract from their achievement.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For much of what is in this Introduction, see John P. Doyle: “*Collegium Conimbricense*,” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 2, pp. 406-408; “The *Conimbricenses* on the Relations Involved in Signs,” *Semiotics 1984*, (New York, 1985), pp. 567-576; and “The



*Conimbricenses* on the Semiotic Character of Mirror Images,” *The Modern Schoolman*, 76, n. 1 (November, 1998), pp. 17-31.

- <sup>2</sup> Cf. Severiano Tavares, “Centenario do Colégio das Artes, 1548-1948,” *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, IV (1948), 115-119, esp. 118.
- <sup>3</sup> Severiano Tavares, “O Colégio das Artes e a filosofia em Portugal,” *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, IV (1948), pp. 233-4; also cf. Marcial Solana, *Historia de la filosofía española. Época del renacimiento (siglo XVI)*, tomo tercero, Madrid: Asociación Española para el Progreso de las Ciencias, 1940), pp. 366-71.
- <sup>4</sup> On Fonseca, see John P. Doyle, “Fonseca, Pedro da (1528-99),” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London and New York: Routledge: 1998), vol. 3, pp. 688-90.
- <sup>5</sup> On this, see M. dos Santos Alves, “Pedro da Fonseca e o ‘Cursus Conimbricensis,’” *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, XI/XII (1955), pp. 379-489.
- <sup>6</sup> Cf. Pinharanda Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses* (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua, 1992), p. 23.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>9</sup> First published at Lisbon in 1564 and re-edited 51 more times by 1625, Fonseca’s logic was adopted as a textbook, especially by the Jesuits, throughout Europe, America, and the Far East.
- <sup>10</sup> With its first volume appearing in 1577, Fonseca’s *Commentary on the Books of Aristotle’s Metaphysics* contained a critical Greek text which he had himself established from the best available manuscripts and printed editions. Through the first volumes, in a right hand column matching the Greek to the left, he gave a Latin translation. An explanation of the text followed each chapter and then commentary on most of the chapters through the first nine books of the *Metaphysics*. Published after Fonseca’s death, books ten, eleven, and twelve gave the Greek and Latin plus the explanation, while books thirteen and fourteen give only the text in the two languages.
- <sup>11</sup> Cf. Pirahanda Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 45.
- <sup>12</sup> See Carlos Sommervogel, ‘Coimbre,’ in *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jesus*, vol. 2 (Bruxelles: Oscar Schepens, 1891), col. 1278. Sommervogel mentions Kircher as his source. For Kircher himself, cf.: “Even though the Chinese do not have a knowledge of speculative science which can compare with that of the Europeans, nevertheless, they are most capable, as is clear from the philosophical course of the *Conimbricenses* which has been translated into the Chinese language, the subtleties of which they have easily understood, in such way that they cede nothing to ‘ours’ [i.e. the Jesuits].” (*Esi Sinae non eam obtineant Scientiarum Speculativarum notitiam, ut cum Europaeis comparari queant, earum tamen sunt capacissimi, uti ex Cursu Philosophico Conimbricensium in Linguam Chinicam converso patet, cujus subtilitates ita facile comprehenderunt, ut nostris non cedant; ...*) Athanasii Kircheri, *E Soc. Jesu, China monumentis, qua sacris qua profanis, nec non variis naturae et artis spectaculis aliarumque rerum memorabilium argumentis illustrata, auspiciis Leopoldi Primi Roman. Imper. semper augusti, Munificentissimi Mecaenatis*, Pars V, *De Architectonica*, ..., Praefatio (Antwerpiae: Apud Jacobum à Meurs, 1667), p. 212.
- <sup>13</sup> Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque ...*, vol. 3 (1892), col. 1068, gives a date of 1631-2.
- <sup>14</sup> It may be noted that Balthasar Alvarez was also after the death of Francisco Suárez (1617) the editor of some volumes of his *Opera omnia*, including Suarez’s *Tractatus*

*de Anima* ("Treatise on the Soul"); cf. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque ...*, vol. 1 (1890), col. 222.

- <sup>15</sup> For this, see Charles H. Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries: II, Renaissance Authors* (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1988), p. 98, and Severiano Tavares, "O Colégio ...," p. 234.
- <sup>16</sup> Cf. Pinharanda Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, pp. 113-115.
- <sup>17</sup> On the methods of medieval commentary, see esp. Martin Grabmann, *Methoden und Hilfsmittel des Aristotelesstudiums im Mittelalter*, (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1939), pp. 17-54; and D.A. Callus, *Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford* [from *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 29 (1943)], London: H. Milford, 1944.
- <sup>18</sup> See, for example, *Avicenna Latinus. Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*, I-IV, édition critique de la traduction latine médiévale, par S. Van Riet, Louvain: E. Peeters and Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977.
- <sup>19</sup> See, e.g. Albertus Magnus, *Metaphysica*, I-II, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 16, ed. Bernhard Geyer, Münster im Westfalia: Aschendorff, 1960-64. Also see, Georg Wieland, *Untersuchungen zum Seinsbegriff im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Grossen*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, Neue Folge, Band 7 (Munster: Aschendorff, 1992), p. 11.
- <sup>20</sup> For example, cf. Averrois Cordubensis, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros*, recensuit F. Stuart Crawford, Cambridge, MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953.
- <sup>21</sup> See, for example, S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. M.R. Cathala, O.P., Taurini: Marietti, 1950.
- <sup>22</sup> See Joannis Duns Scoti, *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, in *Opera omnia*, (Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639), vol. 4, pp. 497-848.
- <sup>23</sup> The unsigned article, "Conimbricenses," in the *Enciclopedia universal ilustrada europeo-americano* (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1907-1930), vol. 14, p. 1279, says that the publisher was Froben and the year of the volume's appearance was 1594. I have not been able to verify this.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 95 and 98. Lohr suggests that this volume stems from a course given by Fonseca; cf. *ibid.*, p. 151. For the ascription ultimately to Fonseca, also cf. Severiano Tavares, "O Colégio das Artes e a filosofia em Portugal," *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, IV (1948), 227-238, esp. 234.
- <sup>25</sup> See Friedrich Stegmüller, *Filosofia e teologia nas universidades de Coimbra e Evora no século XVI* (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1959), pp. 97-8.
- <sup>26</sup> Cf. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque ...*, vol. 2, col. 1273.
- <sup>27</sup> Intended for all the commentaries, the following remarks are very fitting with respect to the logic: "Na verdade, cada um dos *Commentarii* substancia-se num exercício de liberdade enciclopédica: todas as teses conhecidas sobre um determinado problema, ou questão, ou artigo, são chamadas à colação. Seguidamente, expostas e descritas. Seguidamente, confrontadas umas com as outras, formulando-se várias seqüências de tese/antítese, ou várias cadeias de *sim e não*. Cada tese é deduzida segundo o esquema lógico. Arguida e/ou refutada, e/ou confutada, e/ou corroborada. Exercendo a liberdade de pensamento, cada um dos estudantes podia, ao menos na mente, formular o silogismo que refutasse a tese oficial, ainda que, do ponto de vista institucional, o não devesse fazer; mas podia fazê-lo, enquanto se limitasse a filosofar." Pinharanda Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 68.

- <sup>28</sup> On this see Stephan Meier-Oeser, *Die Spur des Zeichens* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), pp. 174, and 184-5.
- <sup>29</sup> Cf. the following text at Question 2, Article 3.
- <sup>30</sup> For some of this, see Pinharanda Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, pp. 111-113. Also see, James Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 108, who mentions a Jesuit College in Mozambique from 1610 to 1760. It is a moral certainty that the *Conimbricenses'* *cursus* was used in this college.
- <sup>31</sup> Cf. "Os Conimbricenses foram a norma do pensamento filosófico das escolas da Companhia de Jesus, tanto em Portugal como na Europa, ..." See note 30, Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 109.
- <sup>32</sup> Cf. P.M. Balthazare Tellez, Ulyssiponeni, Societatis Jesu. In Conimbricensi Academia Publico quondam Philosophiae nunc Theologiae Ulyssipone Primario Professore, *Summa universae Philosophiae*, Pars I. in Logicam. Disput. IX. Sect. I, n. 2 (Ulyssipone, apud Paulum Craesbeeck, 1641), p. 77.
- <sup>33</sup> Cf. e.g. F. Suárez, *Tractatus de divina substantia*, Lib. II, Cap. 25, n. 34, in *Opera omnia* (Paris: L. Vivès, 1856-66), vol. 1, p. 156; *ibid.*, caps. 31-32; vol. 1, pp. 181-193 (although here we should note that Suárez has adopted an Augustinian definition of a sign, rather than that favored by the *Conimbricenses*; see *ibid.*, cap. 31, n. 14 [p. 185]); *De Angelis*, II, c. 26, vol. 2, pp. 234-43; *Tractatus de Anima*, Lib. III, Cap. 2, nn. 14-22 (vol. 3, pp. 619-21); *De Vitiis religioni contrariis*, II, c. 9, nn. 7-18 (vol. 13, pp. 514-517; and *Commentarii et disputationes in tertiam partem D. Thomae*, q. 70, a. 3, disp. 1, sect. 3 (vol. 21, pp. 18-23; *ibid.*, q. 70, a. 8, disp. 2, sect. 1 (pp. 31-38).
- <sup>34</sup> *Disputationes de universa philosophia, Logica*, Disp. VIII, De Signo (Lugduni: L. Prost et H. Roville, 1624), pp. 106-111. On the semiotics of Hurtado in relation to Locke, cf. Esther Caruso, "L'arbitrarité del segno in Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza e in Locke," *Akme*, 34 (1981), 237-287.
- <sup>35</sup> *Logica mexicana*, Pars II (*In lib I de Interpretatione*), cap. 1 (Lugduni: Sumptibus J. Pillehotte, 1620), pp. 463-68.
- <sup>36</sup> *Cursus philosophicus, Logica*, VI, (*De doctrina Aristotelis ΠΕΡΙ ΕΠΙΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ seu De Interpretatione*), disp. 13 (Parisiis: Apud Jacobum Quenel, 1637) pp. 158-65
- <sup>37</sup> *Integer cursus philosophicus, Logica*, Controversia VIII, De Signo (Lugduni: P. Prost, 1640), vol. 1, pp. 136-141.
- <sup>38</sup> For much of the development of the notion of moral being in Scholasticism and modern philosophy after, see Theo Kobusch, *Die Entdeckung der Person: Metaphysik der Freiheit und Modernes Menschenbild*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1997.
- <sup>39</sup> Cf. Pinaranda Gomes, *João de Santo Tomás na filosofia do século XVII* (Lisboa: Ministério da Educação, 1985), p. 26.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.
- <sup>41</sup> Cf. *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsett*. Interpretative Arrangement by John N. Deely, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
- <sup>42</sup> See e.g. John Deely, *New Beginnings: Early Modern Philosophy and Postmodern Thought* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994): pp. 58-9, 136-7.
- <sup>43</sup> Cf. Christoph Scheibler, *Opus metaphysicum*, Duobus libris, Lib. I, Cap. 24, Tit. 4, Art. 4, Punct. 2 (Giessae Hessorum: Typis Nicholai Hampelii, 1617), vol. 1, p. 803.
- <sup>44</sup> Cf. Tavares, S. and Bacalar Oliveira, "Conimbricensi," *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, I, Firenze: G.C. Sansoni, 1967. Col. 1591. For some probable influence of the

*Conimbricenses* on Descartes, cf. Étienne Gilson, *René Descartes: Discours de la méthode*, texte et commentaire (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, 1947), pp. 89, 209, 271, 416, and 430.

- <sup>45</sup> Cf. "... je ne me souviens plus que des Conimbres, Toletus, et Rubius." Epist. 207, 30 Sept., 1640, à Mersenne, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery (Paris: L. Cerf, 1897), III, p. 185.
- <sup>46</sup> Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, herausgegeben von der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Sechste Reihe, *Philosophische Schriften*, Erster Band (Darmstadt: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1930), 6, 80, and 89; cf. *ibid.*, Erste Reihe, *Allgemeiner Politischer und Historischer Briefwechsel*, Fünfter Band (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag and Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1970), 441.
- <sup>47</sup> For this, see J. Freudenthal, "Spinoza und die Scholastik," in *Philosophische Aufsätze. Eduard Zeller zu seinem fünfzigjährigen Doctor-Jubiläum gewidmet* (Leipzig: Zentral-Antiquariat der deutschen demokratischen Republik, 1962 [originally published in 1887]), pp. 83-138, esp. p. 92.
- <sup>48</sup> Cf. Harris Fletcher, *The Intellectual Development of John Milton* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1961: vol. 2, 623-664. For more background, also see: William T. Costello, S.J., *The Scholastic Curriculum at Early 17th Century Cambridge*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958.
- <sup>49</sup> See Queen's College (Oxon.) MS, 518, as cited by W. Henry Kenny, S.J., *John Locke and the Oxford Training in Logic and Metaphysics*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (St. Louis University: St. Louis, MO, 1959), p. 35.
- <sup>50</sup> For some of its influence on Locke, cf. E.J. Ashworth, "'Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?' The Scholastic Sources of Locke's Theory of Language," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 19, no. 3 (July, 1981): 299-326. Locke's own declaration that semiotic (σημειωτική) should be the third main branch of science is well known; cf. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, collated and annotated by Alexander Campbell Fraser (New York: Dover Publications, 1959) vol. 2, 461-2.
- <sup>51</sup> *Exercitationes aliquot Metaphysicae de Deo. Quod sit objectum Metaphysicae. Quod sit naturaliter cognoscibilis, quousque, et quibus mediis. Quod sit Aeternus, et Immensus (contra Vorstium) et quomodo, etc.*, Oxoniae: Excudebat Guilielmus Turner, 1637.
- <sup>52</sup> *A Library for Younger Schollers,' Compiled by an English Scholar-Priest about 1655*, edited by Alma DeJordy and Harris Francis Fletcher (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 1.
- <sup>53</sup> See: *De triplici ente cursus philosophicus in tres tomos divisus*, auctore P. Augustino Laurentio Societatis Jesu Lusitano terenensi, olim in Collegio Ulyssiponensi Societatis Philosophiae Professore, nunc Serenissimae Magnae Britanniae Reginae Concionatore, Leodici Eburonum: Apud Guilielmum Henricum Streel, Suae Serenissimae Celsitudinis Typographum, 1688. On Lourenço, cf. Sommervogel, *Bibliothèque ...*, vol. 5 (1894), col. 36. On Catherine, cf. Hebe Elsna, *Catherine of Braganza: Charles II's Queen*, London: Robert Hale, 1967. For a few remarks on the *Cursus*, see Francisco Rodrigues, S.J., *História da Companhia de Jesus na Assistência de Portugal*, tomo terceiro, vol. 1 (Porto: Livraria Apostolado da Imprensa, 1944), pp. 168-9.
- <sup>54</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, *Logica*, Tractatus III, vol. 1, pp. 269-281.
- <sup>55</sup> See the discussion of Holdsworth's list of recommended readings in Samuel E. Morison, *The Founding of Harvard College* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), pp. 67-77.

- <sup>56</sup> “If we would know upon what model Harvard College was founded, what were the ideals of her founders and the purposes of her first governors, we need seek no further than the University of Cambridge.” S.E. Morison, *The Founding ...*, p. 40. Also cf.: “Harvard and the colleges which one after another were patterned upon it sprang up under the inspiration of Cambridge —of the Cambridge, that is, of the spiritual brotherhood, particularly of Emmanuel, the most Puritan of the Cambridge colleges.” William Haller, *The Rise of Puritanism* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 302.
- <sup>57</sup> Cf. the Harvard Programme of 1723 as given by Samuel E. Morison, *Harvard College in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936): vol. 1, pp. 146-7; also see pp. 190-1, 225, 233-4, and 252. On the influence of Burgersdijk and Heereboord, particularly in ethics, at Harvard in this time, cf. Norman Fiering, *Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth Century Harvard: A Discipline in Transition* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 87-102.
- <sup>58</sup> Cf. “Our friends are Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the *Conimbricenses*, Suarez, Ramus, Descartes, but truth is more a friend.” (*Amici nobis sunt Socrates, Plato, Aristoteles, Conimbricenses, Suarezius, Ramus, Cartesius, sed magis amica veritas.*), as quoted by J. Ferrater Mora, “Suarez and Modern Philosophy,” *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 14 (1953), p. 540. The sentence is not original with Mather. It is first stated in these exact terms in an official letter from the University of Groningen, dated September 18, 1651; cf. Paul Dibon, *La philosophie néerlandaise au siècle d’or*, tome 1, *L’enseignement philosophique dans les universités à l’époque précartésienne* (1575-1659), (Paris/Amsterdam: Elsevier Publishing Company, 1954), p. 189; for the *Conimbricenses* at the 17th century University of Leyden, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 49, 59, 95, and 113.
- <sup>59</sup> Cf. Morison, *Harvard College in the Seventeenth Century*, vol. 1, p. 226.
- <sup>60</sup> Cf. e.g. *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*, vol. 2 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 71 and 117; *ibid.*, vol. 4 (1986), p. 509.
- <sup>61</sup> Cf. “Owing to the neglect of fallacies by the more scientific logicians, it is not easy to cite many who define the fallacy correctly. The *Conimbricenses* (than whom no authority is higher) do so (*Commentarii in Univ. Dialecticam Arist. Stagir., In lib. Elench., q. i, art. 4*); ...” in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 1 and vol. 2, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1978), 2.613; cf. *ibid.* 2.361.
- <sup>62</sup> Cf. e.g., Peirce: “... including under the term ‘sign’ every picture, diagram, natural cry, pointing finger, wink, knot in one’s handkerchief, memory, dream, fancy, concept, indication, token, symptom, letter, numeral, word, sentence, chapter, book, library, and in short whatever, be it in the physical universe, be it in the world of thought, that, whether embodying an idea of any kind (and permit us throughout to use this term to cover purposes and feelings), or being connected with some existing object, or referring to future events through a general rule, causes something else, its interpreting sign, to be determined to a corresponding relation to the same idea, existing thing, or law.” *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2 (1893-1913), edited by the Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 326. For Peirce’s various definitions of a sign, see *ibid.*, pp. xxx, xxxv, 13, 272-3, 326, 410, 477, 478, 482, 497, 500, and 544n22. On connections of the semiotics of Peirce, John of St. Thomas, and the *Conimbricenses*, see esp. Mauricio Beuchot and John Deely. “Common Sources for

the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poincaré,” *The Review of Metaphysics*, 48 (1995), pp. 539-66.

- <sup>63</sup> On Argyropoulos, see *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, edited by Charles B. Schmitt and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 808.
- <sup>64</sup> Cf. *Aristotelis Categoriae et Liber de Interpretatione*, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Oxonii: E Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1949), p. 49.
- <sup>65</sup> Cf. “O estilo latino dos Comentários é elegante e vivo. Apesar da influência do latim eclesiástico, há um arfar do latim renascentista, dominado por escritores de humanidades, que haviam aprendido Cícero e Quintiliano.” P. Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, p. 71.
- <sup>66</sup> On the “quidam” of the Middle Ages see: Martin Grabmann, *Neuaufgefundene Pariser Quaestiones Meister Eckharts und ihre Stellung in seinem geistigen Entwicklungsgange: Untersuchungen und Texte* (München: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1927), pp. 18-19; reproduced in: Martin Grabmann, *Gesammelte Akademieabhandlungen* (Paderborn/München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 278-9.
- <sup>67</sup> On *florilegia*, cf. H.M. Rochais, “Florilegia,” *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), vol. 5, pp. 979-80. Rochais has remarked that “a separate study, or monograph, on florilegia has not yet been undertaken.” This is as true now as when Rochais was writing. He himself did something quite valuable toward an overall study when (on p. 979) he listed various terms by which florilegia are designated in catalogs of manuscripts and printed works. Also see the earlier article by Thomas Oestreich: “Florilegia,” *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 1913), vol. 6, p. 121. For more recent research on medieval florilegia, see Mary A. Rouse and Richard H. Rouse, *Authentic Witnesses: Approaches to Medieval Texts and Manuscripts*, esp. chapters 4-7 (Notre Dame, IN: University Notre Dame Press, 1991), pp. 101-255. For philosophical *florilegia* in the Middle Ages, cf. Jacqueline Hamesse, “Les Florilèges philosophiques du XIII<sup>e</sup> au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle,” in *Les Genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales: Définition, critique et exploitation. Actes du Colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve, 25-27 mai 1981* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1982), pp. 181-91.



**Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu  
In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae. Secunda pars  
Lugduni: Sumptibus Horatii Cardon, 1607**

**Summa quaestionum et articulorum  
qui in secundo tomo continentur**

**In libros de interpretatione**

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**Book 1**

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## *Aristotelis De interpretatione*

### Caput primum

#### *De signis*

Primo definire oportet, quid nam sit nomen, et quid verbum, deinde quid negatio, quid affirmatio: quid Enunciatio: quid denique oratio sit. Ea igitur, quae in voce consistunt signa sunt affectuum, qui in anima sunt: et ea, quae scribuntur, notae sunt eorum quae in voce consistunt. Atque uti non eaedem sunt apud omnes homines litterae, sic neque voces eaedem sunt. Affectus tamen quorum haec signa sunt primo: iidem apud omnes homines sunt: res quoque, quarum hi similitudines sunt, easdem itidem esse constat. Verum de his in libro de Anima dictum est: ad aliam enim facultatem huiusmodi consideratio pertinet. Quemadmodum autem in anima conceptus est, interdum sine veritate aut falsitate: interdum vero est talis, ut horum alterum ei necessario competat: sic et in voce esse videtur. Nam verum, falsumque, in compositione, divisioneque consistit. Ipsa igitur nomina et verba similia sane sunt ei conceptui, qui sine compositione, divisioneque est: velut hoc nomen [Album] vel [Homo] cum nihil additur ipsi: nondum enim verum est, aut falsum: cuius quidem hoc indicium est: Hippocentaurus enim aliquid quidem significat: at nondum verum est, aut falsum, nisi esse, aut non esse additum: aut simpliciter, aut respectu temporis fuerit.

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## Aristotle's *De interpretatione*

### Chapter 1

#### *On Signs*

“First, it is necessary to define what a noun and a verb are, then what negation and affirmation are, what an enunciation is, and finally what speech is. Accordingly, those things which are words are signs of affections which are in the soul, and those things which are written are signs of those which are in words. And just as writings are not the same among all men, so neither are words the same. However, the affections of which these are first signs are the same among all men. Also the things of which these [affections] are likenesses are in like manner evidently the same. However, these matters were treated in the book ‘*On the Soul*,’ inasmuch as their consideration belongs to another discipline.<sup>1</sup> But just as a concept is in the soul sometimes without truth or falsity, but sometimes one of these necessarily belongs to it, so also it seems to be in the case of a word. For the true and the false consist in composition and division. Therefore, nouns and verbs themselves are indeed similar to that concept which is without composition and division; for example, this noun, ‘white [thing],’ or [this noun], ‘man,’ when nothing is added to it. For it is not yet true or false. Indeed, there is an indication of this inasmuch as ‘hippocentaur’ does signify something, but it is not yet true or false unless to be or not to be is added to it, either absolutely or in relation to time.” Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, Book One, Chapter One (ed. Bekker: 16a1-18).

## /p. 4/ Explanatio cap 1. De signis

## Summa capituli

In duas partes divisum est hoc caput. Prima habet locum praefationis; secunda initium tractationis est. In priori praemittit Arist. se dicturum de Nominibus, Verbo, Enuntiatione, ac Oratione. Quibus omnibus, quia commune est significandi munus, in priori parte tria quaedam supponit ad vocum significationem pertinentia. Primum est, voces esse signa conceptuum, scripta autem vocum. Secundum, ut characteres, ita et voces non esse easdem apud omnes, conceptus vero, et res per eosdem significatas, ubique easdem esse. Tertium, ut quidam conceptus sunt veritatis, et falsitatis expertes, alii veri, vel falsi, ita rem habere in vocibus.

a *Primo definire* ] Enumerando ea, de quibus dicendum est, proposuit Aristoteles partes quasi physicas Enuntiationis: Nomen scilicet, et Verbum: deinde Enuntiationem: ultimo Orationem, quae est pars Metaphysica, et videbatur prius numeranda. Deinde loco Enuntiationis scripsit affirmationem et negationem, quae sunt eius species. Fuisse autem constituendam Enuntiationem ex eo liquebat, quia haec est subiectum horum librorum. Circa primum, placet interpretatio Boetii in editione 2. ideo praemisisse Orationem, ut alioqui oportebat, ne quis existimaret, eam si primo assignaretur, esse subiectum operis. De 2. occurrit ea ratio, quam assignabimus initio Prior. cur in definitione Propositionis immiscuerit affirmationem, et negationem. Nimirum quia differentia propria Enuntiationis in communi innominata est: et ideo per copulationem inferiorum explicatur. Adde voluisse forte insinuare divisionem.

Quod deinde altercantur D. Tho. et alii; cur priorem numerat Negationem, /p. 5/ cum sit Affirmatione posterior. Dirimit recte Boetius negando Affirmationem esse priorem Negatione, si sumatur, ut species sub suo genere, ut initio Priorum probatur. Cur autem ex paribus anteposita sit Negatio: quae est deterior, refert Alber. tractatu 1. cap. 3. ad oppositionem negativam: est enim caput ad quod caetera reducentur.

b *Ea igitur quae in voce*<sup>1</sup> Est prima suppositio, in qua idem videtur esse (ea quae in voce, et in scriptura) ac voces et scripta, ut indicat Porphyrius. Quamvis Boetius, et D. Thomas mysterio tribuant (ea quae in voce) quasi voluerit Philosophus indicare significationem esse extra naturam vocis, et in ea fundari.

### A Summary of the Chapter

“This Chapter is divided into two parts. The first part serves as a preface, while the second begins the discussion. In the first, Aristotle (384/3-322 B.C.) says that he will speak of the Noun, the Verb, Enunciation, and Speech. Because the task of signifying is common to all of these, in a first section he supposes three things which pertain to the signification of words. The first of these is that words are signs of concepts, whereas writing is a sign of words. Second, that [written] characters and so also words are not the same for all, but concepts and the things signified by those concepts are everywhere the same. Third, as some concepts are devoid of truth and falsity, while others are true or false, so it is with words.” The *Conimbricenses*.

### Explanation of Chapter 1. *On Signs*

a “*First [it is necessary] to define*” —Enumerating what is to be treated, Aristotle has proposed quasi-physical parts of an enunciation, namely, the noun, the verb; then the enunciation; and finally speech, which is a metaphysical part<sup>2</sup> and which it seemed should be numbered first. Then in place of *enunciation* he wrote *affirmation* and *negation*, which are its species. But it was clear that enunciation was to be defined from that, because enunciation is the subject of these books. As regards the first point, Boethius’ interpretation in his second edition is acceptable. In his preface he treated *speech*,<sup>3</sup> as was necessary for other reasons, lest, if it were treated in the first [chapter], someone would think it to be the subject of the work. As regards the second point, the reason is the same as we will give at the beginning of the *Prior [Analytics]*.<sup>4</sup> [In that place we will say that] the reason why in the definition of the proposition [Aristotle] mixed affirmation and negation was doubtless because the proper difference of an enunciation is commonly unnamed, and therefore it is explained by the joining of its inferiors.<sup>5</sup> Add that he wished perhaps to suggest a division [of enunciations].

The point that St. Thomas and others dispute: why Aristotle lists negation first, since it is posterior to affirmation?<sup>6</sup> —Boethius correctly answers by denying that affirmation is prior to negation, if it is taken as a species under its genus, as is proven at the beginning of the *Prior [Analytics]*.<sup>7</sup> Why, however, for equal reasons negation, which is less perfect, is put first, Albert in his Tractate 1, Chapter 3, relates to a negative opposition. For it is to that head that other [oppositions] are reduced.<sup>8</sup>

b “*Those things which are in words*” —*Aristotle’s First Supposition*:<sup>9</sup> There is a first supposition in which “those things which consist in words and writing” seem, as Porphyry indicates, to be the same as words and writing —although Boethius and St. Thomas wonder about “those things which are in words,”<sup>10</sup> as if the Philosopher wished to indicate that signification was outside the

Verum minus recte diceret significationem esse notam, vox enim est nota, licet ratione significationis. Eadem est de scriptura interpretatio. Cur autem conceptus, et intellectiones appellet affectiones, patet ex dictis, alludit nimirum ad id quod tradit 3. de Anima ca. 4. intelligere esse pati, eo quod intellectus cognoscendo recipiat in se actionem.

c *Atque uti non*]<sup>2</sup> Est secunda suppositio. Quemadmodum omnes homines non utuntur iisdem characteribus in scriptura, sed longe diversis, ut in Graecis, et Latinis patet: ita non omnes utuntur iisdem vocibus in sermone. Quod subdit, affectus, id est, conceptus esse eosdem, non significat identitatem numericam, sed specificam. Item non vult omnes eodem modo apprehendere easdem res, nam alius perfectius, alius imperfectius eandem rem cognoscit. Sed ubicumque sit interna alicuius rei imago, qualiscunque illa formetur, retinere eandem repraesentationem, et secundum se aequae aptam esse omnibus idem repraesentare. Similiter docet res easdem esse. Quod non oportet cum Alberto hic tract. cap. 3. intelligere de naturalibus tantum, nam etiam artificiales, postquam semel confectae sunt, iisdem usibus ubique deservire possunt.

d *Quemadmodum autem*]<sup>3</sup> Tertia suppositio. Ut quidam conceptus sunt veri, vel falsi, alii minime, ita nonnullae voces veritatem continent, aut falsitatem: aliae /p. 6/ neutram. Docet vero iis conceptibus inesse verum, vel falsum: in quibus cernitur compositio et divisio. Nomine compositionis intelligit propositionem affirmantem, in qua scilicet unum alteri attribuitur. Ut /p. 7/ Homo est animal. Nomine divisionis significat propositionem negantem, in qua unum ab altero removetur. Ut Homo non est bellua.<sup>4</sup> Quidnam sit de simplicibus conceptibus existimandum, in quaestione definietur.

nature of a word and was founded in that nature. But he would less correctly say that signification is known, for it is the word that is known, albeit by reason of a signification. The interpretation is the same with respect to writing. But why he calls concepts and intellections “affections” is clear from what has been said. That is, he is alluding to what he says in *De Anima*, Book Three, Chapter 4: *to understand is to be affected*,<sup>11</sup> for the reason that the intellect in knowing receives an action into itself.

c “*But just as [writings are] not*” —*Aristotle’s Second Supposition*: There is a second supposition. Just as all men do not use the same characters in writing, but rather ones which are very different, as is clear in Greek and Latin characters, so all men do not use the same words in their speech. What he adds — that affections, i.e., concepts, are the same —does not mean numerical but rather specific identity. Again, he does not mean that all men grasp the same things in the same way, because different men know the same thing more perfectly or imperfectly. But wherever there is an internal image of something, of any thing at all, that image is formed to retain the same signification and is of itself equally apt to represent the same thing for all. Similarly, he teaches that things are the same —which it is not necessary, with Albert in this place, Tractate 2, Chapter 3, to understand about natural things only.<sup>12</sup> For artificial things also, after they are once made, can serve everywhere for the same functions.

d “*But just as ... without*” —*Aristotle’s Third Supposition*: The third supposition: as certain concepts are true or false and others are not, so some words contain truth or falsity and others contain neither. But he teaches that the true or the false are in those concepts in which there appears to be composition and division. By the word, “composition,” he understands an affirmative proposition in which, indeed, one thing is attributed to another. For example, “A man is an animal.” By the word, “division,” he means a negative proposition, in which one thing is removed from another. For example: “A man is not a beast.” What must be thought about simple concepts, will be specified in a [following] question.”

/p.6/

## Quaestio 1

## De natura, et conditionibus signi in commune

## Articulus primus

## Quae sit essentia signi

Quae<sup>5</sup> Aristoteles proximo capite summatim et stricte docuit, fundamenta sunt rerum, quae progressu operis ab eo disputantur. Quocirca uberius et enucleatius a nobis pertractanda erunt, ducto exordio ab ipsa signi definitione, quam D. Augustinus lib. 2. de doctr. Christ. cap. 1. ad hunc modum instituit. Signum est res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliquid aliud, ex se faciens in cognitionem venire. Eodem sensu libr. de Principiis Dialecticae, cap. 5. ait, signum esse, quod se ipsum sensui,<sup>6</sup> et praeter se aliquid animo repraesentat. Hoc est, signum dicitur illud, quod perceptum ab aliquo sensu, est in causa, ut cognoscens ex vi illius provehatur in alterius rei notitiam.

Sed<sup>7</sup> animadvertentes posteriores Dialectici has definitiones solis signis instrumentalibus, nec omnibus accomodari, aliam ampliorem statuerunt, hodieque ratam, quae sic habet. Signum est quod potentiae cognoscenti aliquid repraesentat. Quae ut pateat, simulque eius discrimen a definitionibus Augustini aliqua observanda sunt.

Primum<sup>8</sup> est, Bifariam signum accipi: videlicet aut presse, et secundum primaevam institutionem: aut fuso vocabuli significatu, et secundum Philosophorum consuetudinem. Priori modo signum ea tantum comprehendit, quae sub sensus cadunt; cum enim omnis nostra cognitio exordium capiat a sensu, et signum sit, quo in alicuius rei cognitionem pertrahimur; effectum est inde, ut homines ea primo signa appellarint, quae sensus movent. Posteriori modo, complectitur notio signi tam sensibilia, quam spiritualia.

Supposuisse videtur hanc acceptionem Magister Sent. in 4. dist. 1. cum definiens Sacramentum, ait esse invisibilis gratiae visibilem formam, id est; (ut commentantur scholastici) sensibile signum, frustra enim adhiberet signo eam limitationem [sensibile] si nullum signum insensibile esset.

Eadem coniectura est de caeteris scholasticis; ad quam accedit /p. 7/ ratio pro hac acceptione. Nam signum est, quod loco rei substituitur, et eius notitiam affert: sed pleraeque res spirituales sunt huiusmodi; ut enim docet D. Tho. 1. p. q. 56. art. 3. essentia Angeli cognita, est cognoscenti medium intelligendi Deum, et ita in multis aliis. Igitur definitiones D. Augustini intelligendae sunt secundum priorem, et pressiore signi acceptionem: illa, quam tradunt Logici, iuxta posteriorem, et ampliorem.

## Question 1

## About the General Nature and Conditions of a Sign

## Article 1

## What is the Essence of a Sign

*The Definition of a Sign which is Given by St. Augustine.*<sup>13</sup>—The things which Aristotle has summarily and cursorily taught in the foregoing chapter [i.e., the present chapter: *De Interpretatione*, Chapter One] are the basis of what he is discussing in the course of the work. For this reason, we need to treat those things more fully and more plainly, beginning with the definition of a sign which St. Augustine (354-430) in Book II, Chapter 1 of [his work] ‘*On Christian Doctrine*’ has set out in this way: ‘*A sign is a thing which, besides the appearance it induces in the senses, of itself makes something else known.*’<sup>14</sup> With the same meaning, he says, in chapter 5 of the book, ‘*On the Principles of Dialectic*,’ that a sign is what is sensible itself and represents to the mind something other than itself.<sup>15</sup> That is, a sign is said to be that which, perceived by some sense, is the cause of a knower’s being carried by its influence to the knowledge of something else.

*The Definition of a Sign Invented by Logicians after Augustine.*—But later logicians, noting that these definitions are fitting not for all but only for instrumental signs,<sup>16</sup> formulated another more adequate definition, today accepted, and going as follows: ‘*A Sign is what represents something to a knowing power.*’ To clarify this and its difference from the definitions of Augustine, some points need to be noted.

*It is First Noted that ‘Sign’ is Taken in Two Ways.*—First: ‘sign’ is taken in two ways: either strictly and according to its original institution; or with a broader meaning of the word and according to the custom of philosophers. In the first way, a sign includes only those signs which fall under the senses. For since all our knowledge takes its origin from sensation and a sign is that by which we are brought to the knowledge of some thing, from this it results that men first call those things signs which move the senses. In the second way, the notion of sign embraces both sensible and spiritual signs.

The Master of the *Sentences* [i.e., Peter the Lombard (ca. 1095-1160)] seems to have supposed this second understanding, when in Book 4, Distinction 1, defining a sacrament, he says ‘it is a visible form of invisible grace,’<sup>17</sup> that is: (as Scholastics comment on his text) a *sensible* sign. For it would be useless to employ for a sign the limitation, ‘sensible,’ if there were no insensible signs.

The same inference holds for other Scholastics and there is an added reason for this understanding. For a sign is that which is substituted in place of a thing and brings knowledge of that thing. But very many spiritual things are of this kind. For as St. Thomas (1225-1274) teaches in [*Summa theologiae*] Part I, question 56, article 3, the known essence of an angel is for the one knowing it a means to understand God,<sup>18</sup> and something similar is true in many other cases. Therefore, the definitions of St. Augustine should be taken according to the first and more strict understanding of a sign; and that which the logicians give should be taken according to the second and fuller understanding.<sup>19</sup>



Pro<sup>9</sup> cuius maiori explicatione notandum est secundo cum Bonaventura in 4. dist. 1. q. 1. in quovis signo duas esse comparationes, habitudinesve unam ad rem significatam, alteram ad potentiam, cui significat: nam fumus v.g. nisi respiciat latentem ignem, quem prodat, et aptus sit alicui potentiae illum proponere, nequaquam afferet rei cognitionem; in quo posuimus signi rationem. Et uterque hic respectus exprimitur, tam in definitionibus D. Augustini, quam in vulgata Dialecticorum, cum dicitur. Signum est, quod imprimit sui speciem sensui, ut deinde afferat alterius cognitionem: vel: Quod facit aliquid praesens potentiae.

Non est tamen praetereundum, quod animadvertit Ferrariens. 2. contra Gent. cap. 73. non oportere, ut per eandem potentiam percipiatur signum et res significata, dummodo eadem anima sit, quae una potentia signum, alia percipiat significatum. Exemplum proponit in motu, qui a sensu percipitur, et indicat latentem animam, quam sola ratio valet penetrare. Videturque hoc desumptum ex 2. definitione D. August. in qua ait signum se ostendere sensui, aliquid vero praeter se animo. Quod manifestius inculcat cap. 7. de principiis Dialecticae. Quae doctrina intelligenda est de possibili, seu suppositione, quod potentia, quae cognoscit rem significatam, non percipiat signum; quamvis enim ita contingat, non desinet signum esse vere signum. De facto tamen ea potentia interior, quae rem cognoscit semper signum apprehendit; ut consideranti erit manifestum.

Maior<sup>10</sup> dubitatio est in quo ex praedictis consistat essentia signi. D. Bonav. loco citato eam collocat in respectu ad rem. Idem sentire videtur Scotus in 4. d. 1. qu. 2. cum ait relationem signi esse simplicem: intelligit enim eam, quae est ad significatum, ut ex antecedentibus colligitur. Consentiant Recentiores, qui addunt respectum ad potentiam esse proprietatem inseparabilem signi: quamvis nomine signi hic proprius significetur; nam respectum ad rem /p. 8/ significatam, aiunt, importari per nomen significativum.

Huius opinionis ratio esse potest. Quia ex eo quod signum habet aliquam habitudinem aut connexionem ad rem, vel ex natura sua, vel ex hominum arbitratu, est idoneum: ut potentia mediante illo rem percipiat; ergo habitudo ad potentiam est passio consequens priorem ad rem significatam respectum: in quo proinde absoluta videtur signi ratio.

Non est<sup>11</sup> tanti momenti haec res, ut in alterutra parte multum insistendum sit; nihilominus verisimilius videtur signum formaliter includere utramque habitudinem. Quod primo colligitur ex definitione, ubi utraque ex aequo exprimitur; idque jure optimo: nam si mens

*It is Noted, Second, that a Sign Entails Respects both to a Knowing Power and to a Thing Signified.*—For a better explanation of this, we should note secondly with St. Bonaventure (ca. 1220-1274) in [commentary on the *Sentences*] Book IV, distinction 1: in any sign there are two directions or respects, one to a thing signified and another to a potency for which it signifies.<sup>20</sup> For example, smoke, unless it respects a hidden fire, which it reveals and is able to propose to some potency, would never bring knowledge of anything—in which [bringing knowledge] we place the essence of a sign. Moreover, these two respects are expressed in both the definition of St. Augustine and that common to the logicians, when it is said: *A sign is what impresses a species of itself on a sense and then brings knowledge of something else*, or, [a sign is] *what makes something present to a potency*.<sup>21</sup>

However, we should not overlook what Ferrara [Francis Sylvester of Ferrara, O.P. (1474-1528)] notes in [commentary on] *Contra Gentiles*, Book II, Chapter 73: that it is not necessary that both the sign and the thing signified be perceived by the same potency, as long as they are perceived by the same soul—which with one potency may perceive the sign and with another what is signified. As an example of this, Ferrara proposes *motion*, which is perceived by the senses but which indicates a hidden soul, which reason alone can fathom.<sup>22</sup> This seems to be derived from St. Augustine's second definition in which he says that a sign shows itself to a sense but shows something beyond itself to the mind. Augustine more obviously teaches this in Chapter 7 [of his work] '*On the Principles of Dialectic*,'<sup>23</sup> which teaching must be understood about what is possible, or with the supposition that the potency which knows the thing signified may not perceive the sign. For even though this may be the case, the sign will not cease to truly be a sign. As a matter of fact, however, that interior potency which knows the thing does always apprehend the sign, as will be obvious to anyone who thinks about it.

*The Opinion of Those Asserting that a Sign Formally Entails a Respect to a Thing.*—From what has been said, a larger question arises here about what is the essence of a sign. St. Bonaventure, in the passage cited, locates that essence in the respect to the thing [signified]. Duns Scotus (1266-1308) seems to think the same in his [Commentary on the *Sentences*], Book 4, Distinction, 1, Question 2, when he says that the relation of a sign is simple.<sup>24</sup> For, as can be inferred from what he has previously said, he understands that relation to be to that which is signified. More recent authors agree with this, adding that the respect to a potency is an inseparable property of a sign, although by the word 'sign' there is here more properly indicated [a respect to the thing]. For they say that a respect to the thing signified is implied by a significant word.

The reason for this opinion can be that from the fact that a sign, either of its nature or by human choice, has some disposition to or connection with a thing, it is appropriate that the potency by means of that sign perceive the thing. Therefore, the disposition to the potency is a property following upon a prior respect to the thing signified. In this then the nature as such of a sign is evident.

*The True Opinion Affirming that a Sign Formally Includes Dispositions both to a Thing and to a Potency.*—This matter is not of such great importance that we should insist much on either one of the two sides. Nevertheless, it seems more probable that a sign formally includes both dispositions. This is first inferred from the definition in which both are equally expressed. And this is most right; for if we

consulatur, non potest apprehendi integra signi ratio, quin concipiatur potestas obiiciendi rem alicui potentiae. Secundo respectus ad potentiam variat speciem signi; ergo pertinet ad illius essentiam. Consequentia est optima, quia species non variatur nisi per partem essentialem. Antecedens probatur. Quoniam signum formale et instrumentale sunt duae signorum species in hoc dissidentes, quod unum percipitur a potentia: aliud non percipitur; qui sunt respectus ad potentiam.

Nec responderi potest hoc provenire ex differentiis essentialibus horum signorum, non esse autem ipsas differentias. Quoniam ut postea ostendemus, eadem repraesentatio conceptus, modo constituit signum formale, modo instrumentale, propter diversum modum se habendi ad potentiam; nam conceptus solis, ut est in intellectu Mathematici, est signum formale; ut percipitur ab Angelo, invariata omnino repraesentatione, est instrumentale. Itaque signum iuxta hanc sententiam, etiam si formaliter sumatur, est compositum per accidens ex duplici respectu, altero ad rem, altero ad potentiam, et quovis eorum immutato, variatur ratio signi.

A prima sententia,<sup>12</sup> si quis eam probet, illud omnino expungendum, quod Recentiores addiderunt, de discrimine inter signum et significativum; nam utrumque idem omnino est. Et imprimis, quod vocabulo signi, indicetur respectus ad rem, convincitur ex omnibus scholasticis: qui cum Magistro in 4. d. 1. initio definiunt sacramentum ex D. Augustino libr. 10. de Civitate Dei cap. 5. signum rei sacrae. Et idem D. August. 12. super Genesim. Cum loquimur, inquit, signa utique rerum dantur. Hieronymus cap. 28. in Matth. D. Thom. 3. p. q. 60. art. 1. Abulensis cap. 9. Genes. ubi eodem caractere utitur sacra pagina, aiens Deum posuisse arcum in signum foederis, et caet. Accedunt prophani scriptores, Plinius lib. 18 Historiae cap. 35. Seneca lib. 1. Natural. quaest. q. 6. Scaliger. in Cardan. exercitio. 6. appellantes Iridem pluviae, vel serenitatis signum, pro tempore, in quo apparet.

Certum ergo est,<sup>13</sup> signum formaliter significare habitudinem ad rem. Solum existit dubitatio, an simul includat habitudinem, ad potentiam; cuius partem affirmantem probavimus, et Re /p. 9/ centiores sua illa distinctione videntur admittere.<sup>14</sup> Iuxta quam ad rationem pro parte negativa concedendum est, respectum ad rem in quovis signo esse priorem illo, qui est ad potentiam, saltem comparatione talis rei; negandum tamen quod inde infertur, in illo priori absolvi rationem signi. Si enim intelligeremus totam illam habitudinem in re aliqua absque proportionem, ut concurreret cum aliqua potentia ad repraesentandum significatum, non

reflect, the whole nature of a sign cannot be grasped unless we conceive its power to make something an object for some potency. Second, the respect to the potency varies the species of a sign; therefore, it belongs to its essence. The consequence is valid; because a species is varied only by an essential part. The antecedent is proven: because formal and instrumental signs are two species of sign which differ in this that one is perceived by the potency and the other is not—which amounts to [different] respects to a potency.

Neither can it be answered that this results from essential differences of these signs but it is not the same as those differences. For, as we will afterwards show, the same representation of a concept at one time constitutes a formal sign and at another time an instrumental sign because of its different way of being related to the potency. For the concept of the sun, as it is in the mind of the mathematician is a formal sign; but as it is perceived by an angel, with its representation remaining totally unvaried, it is instrumental. Therefore, a sign according to this opinion, even if it is taken formally, is accidentally composed of two respects, one to the thing and the other to the potency. And if either of these is changed, the nature of the sign is changed.<sup>25</sup>

*A Sign and What is Significant are Simply the Same.*—From the first opinion, if someone accepts it, he should entirely expunge what the more recent authors have added about the distinction between a sign and something significant; for they are completely the same. First of all, that by the word ‘sign’ there is indicated a respect to a thing, is proven from all the Scholastics, who with the Master [i.e., Peter the Lombard] in [*Sentences*] Book 4, at the beginning of Distinction 1,<sup>26</sup> following St. Augustine in Book 10, Chapter 5 [of his work] ‘*On the City of God*,<sup>27</sup> define a sacrament as ‘the sign of a sacred thing.’ And the same St. Augustine, in Book 12 [of his work] ‘*On Genesis*,’ says: when we speak, signs of things are certainly present.<sup>28</sup> [Compare also]: Jerome (ca. 347-419) [commenting on] *Matthew*, chapter 28;<sup>29</sup> St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part III, Question 60, Article 1;<sup>30</sup> and Abulensis [Alfonso Tostado de Madrigal, Bishop of Avila (d. 1455)] on Chapter 9 of *Genesis*, where Sacred Scripture uses the same pattern, saying that God placed the rainbow for a sign of the covenant, etc.<sup>31</sup> And secular writers say about the same; for example: Pliny [the Elder (24-79)] in Book 18, Chapter 35, of the *Histories*;<sup>32</sup> Seneca (4 B.C.-65 A.D.) in Book 1, Question 6, of his *Natural Questions*;<sup>33</sup> and [Julius Caesar] Scaliger (1484-1558), who in [his work] against Cardano [Girolamo (1501-1576)], Exercise, 6 [sic], calls the rainbow a sign either of rain or of fine weather, depending on the time in which it appears.<sup>34</sup>

*The Argument Advanced for the First Opinion is Refuted.*—Therefore, it is certain that a sign formally signifies a disposition to a thing. The only question is whether it simultaneously includes a disposition to a potency. We have approved the affirmative side of this, and the [mentioned] more recent authors seem to admit that with their distinction. [But] in line with that distinction, it must be granted to the reasoning for the negative side that in any sign the respect to the thing is prior, at least relative to such a thing, to that respect which is to the potency. However, we must deny any inference from this that in the first respect the nature of the sign is completed. For if we were to understand that whole disposition in some thing without the dimension that it would unite with some potency to represent what is signified, that thing would not be called a sign. For

appellaretur ea res signum: ut non appellatur fumus signum ignis respectu auris, a qua non percipitur, sed respectu oculi: fieri ergo potest, ut secunda habitudo supponat priorem; in utraque tamen constituatur perfecta ratio signi.

At cuiusmodi<sup>15</sup> sunt illae habitudines ad rem, et potentiam, ex quibus signum efflorescit: relationesne, an potius aptitudines quaedam, et velut potentiae. D. Bonaventura, et Scotus locis citatis existimant esse relationes. Sequitur Petrus Bruxelensis in praedic. q. 1. art. 5. et alii Recentiores. Qui praesertim loquuntur<sup>16</sup> de signo ex impositione, in quo invenitur relatio rationis impositionem consequens. Et eadem ratio est de naturalibus; omnia enim (Et hoc sit huius partis fundamentum) definiuntur, et intelliguntur per ordinem ad terminum. Quod est primum relationis indicium.

Alexander Alensis<sup>17</sup> 4. p. q. 1. in 1. et alii Recentiores inter quos est Ledesma 1. 4. q. 1. art. 2. dubio 3. et si concedunt in utrisque signis tam naturalibus, quam ex instituto aliquas resultare relationes: opinantur tamen non in iis, sed in earum fundamentis consistere formalem rationem signi, sive in ordine ad rem, sive ad potentiam.

Et quidem<sup>18</sup> de signis ex instituto res videtur manifesta. Nam ut vocabulum [Homo] habeat sufficiens fundamentum ad nos perducendos in notitiam hominis satis est, quod impositum fuerit, et a nobis intelligatur, ut secum deferens illam extrinsecam voluntatem: quae etsi physice nusquam sit, moraliter tamen intelligitur in voce perseverare. Quemadmodum in numo durat regia constitutio, cuius merito, absque ulla relatione, tanti, vel tanti aestimatur. Et in iudice quid opus est ad illius iurisdictionem respectum rationis fingere, si intelligatur ad hoc muneris electus. Aequae facile est idem ostendere in naturalibus. Nam signum per id intelligitur constitutum in sua ratione formali, quod est ei ratio promovendi potentiam in notitiam rei significatae: at hoc praestat media proportione fundamentali; non vero interventu relationis; ergo per id constituitur in formali ratione signi. Minor sola ostendenda est exemplo fumi, in quo nemo percipit relationem ad ignem: sed naturam ab eo in sua existentia dependentem: ex eo enim fumus ducit in notitiam ignis, quia absque eo esse non potest. Haec ratio accommodari eodem modo potest signis ex instituto.

Ad rationem<sup>19</sup> alterius partis respondetur idcirco explicari si /p. 10/ gnum per ordinem ad terminum, quia fundamentum relationis habet se per modum respectus transcendentalis, qui semper explicatur per terminum. Ut videre est, in potentiis comparatione obiectorum.

example, smoke is not called a sign of fire with respect to the ear, by which it is not perceived, but with respect to the eye. It can, therefore, be the case that the second respect supposes the first, but the complete nature of the sign is constituted by both.

*What are the Respects of a Sign?*—But of what sort are those respects, to the thing and to the potency, from which a sign develops? Are they *relations*, or are they rather certain *aptitudes* or, as it were, *potentialities*? St. Bonaventure and Duns Scotus, in the cited passages, think they are relations. Peter of Brussels [i.e., Peter Crokaert (1460-1517), commenting] on the *Categories*, Question 1, Article 5, follows them,<sup>35</sup> as do other more recent authors.

*The Opinion of Those who Think these Respects are Relations.*—These are especially speaking about an imposed sign [i.e., one on which some signification has been placed], in which there is a relation of reason following the imposition [of the signification]. And the argument is the same with regard to natural signs. For they all are defined and understood (and this is the basis of this first part) by an order to a terminus—which is the first indication of a relation.

*The True Opinion.*—Alexander of Hales (ca. 1186-1245) [in his *Summa*], Part 4, Question 1, In Reply to the First Objection,<sup>36</sup> and other more recent authors, among whom is Ledesma [Martin de Ledesma, O.P. (1509-74)] in [his *Sentences* commentary] Book 1, [Distinction] 4, Question 1, Article 2, Doubt 3,<sup>37</sup> may grant that in both kinds of sign, natural and by institution, some relations result. But they still think that the formal character of a sign, whether in order to the thing or in order to the potency, consists not in those relations but in their foundations.

*The Proven Truth of the Opinion is Shown.*—And, indeed, with regard to signs by institution, the fact seems clear. For in order that the word ‘man’ have sufficient foundation to lead us to the knowledge of a man it is enough that it be established, and that it be understood by us, as carrying with it the extrinsic intention [of the original wordmaker], which even though it never physically exists is, nevertheless, understood to persevere morally in the word. This is just as in a coin there endures a royal ordinance in virtue of which, without any relation, it is thought to be of such or such an amount. And in a judge, what need is there to imagine a relation of reason for his jurisdiction, if he is understood to be chosen for this office?<sup>38</sup>

It is equally easy to show the same in natural signs. For a sign is understood to be constituted in its formal character by the fact that there is in it a reason to move a potency to knowledge of the thing it signifies. But this it does by means of a fundamental proportion, and not by an intervening relation. Therefore, it is by that proportion constituted in its formal character of sign. The minor premiss will be shown simply by the example of smoke, in which no one perceives a relation to fire but rather a nature which depends in its existence on fire. For smoke leads to the knowledge of fire from the fact that it cannot exist apart from fire. This argument can in the same way be accommodated to signs by institution.

*The Objection of the Opposite Opinion is Met.*—To the argument of the second position the answer is that a sign is explained by an order to a terminus because the foundation of a relation exists in the manner of a transcendental respect which is always explained by its terminus.<sup>39</sup> One may see this in potencies in relation to their objects.

## Articulus 2

### Nihil se ipsum proprie significare

Non constat omnino ex praecedenti articulo, an aliquid signum sui esse queat; licet enim statuerimus inter signum et significatum semper intercedere relationem: subiicimus tamen in plerisque eam esse rationis. Quam non implicat esse eiusdem rei ad se ipsam; et aliunde non pauca sunt, quae id videntur comprobare.

Imprimis<sup>20</sup> enim significare idem videtur esse, ac repraesentare: siquidem per illud definitur: at repraesentare idem seipsum concedit D. Augustinus in libro de Magistro. Et indicat notio vocabuli; nam repraesentare est rem praesentem facere; quod vero est accomodatius ad efficiendam rem praesentem, quam ipsamet, ergo idem dicendum erit de significare: atque adeo de signo. Quod tandem concedit idem D. Augustinus loco citato cap. 5. docens quaedam signa significare inter alia se ipsa. Cuius rei exempla sunt, primum hoc vocabulum [Nomen] quod significat omnia nomina: inter quae ipsum numeratur, cum nomen quoddam sit. Item. Conceptus formatus de conceptu communi se ipsum repraesentat, quatenus sub communi conceptu cum reliquis continetur.

Deinde:<sup>21</sup> Deus, Angelus, Anima separata se cognoscunt per suasmet essentias immediate, ut probatiores Theologi profitentur: sed nulla res cognitiva percipit obiectum nisi mediante aliquo signo; ergo eadem essentia est signum et significatum.

Communis<sup>22</sup> tamen, et vera sententia est nihil posse esse signum sui. Eam tradunt D. Augustinus loco citato, D. Anselmus in cap. 4. ad Romanos. D. Ambrosius libro 1. de Abraham cap. 4. circa ea verba Pauli ad Rom. 4. Abraham accepit signum circumcisionis. Soncinas. 12 Metaphy. q. 59. Cuius fundamentum a quibusdam assignatur oppositio relativa, quae visitur saltem consequenter inter signum et significatum. Verum illud recte in argumento impugnatur quoad ea, quibus inest relatio rationis: quae non exigit actualem diversitatem extremorum, ut patet in relatione identitatis eiusdem ad se ipsum, cuius extrema est, unus idemque Socrates. Soncinas loco citato hanc assignat huius distinctionis necessitatem. Signum est medium inter rem et potentiam, cui significat; ergo ab utraque differre debet.

Optima ratio<sup>23</sup> sumi potest ex verbis Aristotelis in contextu; vocavit enim voces notas conceptuum. Quod si accommodetur signo in communi, ostendit necessariam eius distinctionem a signi /p. 11/ ficato: nihil enim est nota sui. Idque indicatur in definitione, tum Augustini, in qua dicitur signum ostendere aliquid praeter se, tum in vulgata; nam ille terminus [aliquid] importat



## Article 2

## No Thing Properly Signifies Itself

From the preceding article it is not entirely clear whether something can be a sign of itself.<sup>40</sup> For although we have stated that between a sign and what is signified there always intervenes a relation, nevertheless, we submit that in many instances this is a relation of reason. But it is not contradictory that this [kind of relation] be of the same thing to itself. And from other directions there are many things which seem to confirm that.

*Arguments for the Affirmative Position. The First Argument.*—For, first of all, *to signify* seems to be the same as *to represent*, since it is defined by that. But St. Augustine in his work ‘*On the Teacher*,’ admits that the same thing represents itself.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, the meaning of the word [‘represent’] indicates that; for *to represent* is to make something present. But what is better fitted to making a thing present than that thing itself? Therefore, the same will have to be said about *to signify*, and then also about a sign. St. Augustine admits this a bit later in Chapter 5 of the cited work, teaching that certain signs among other things signify themselves.<sup>42</sup> Examples of this are, first: this word, ‘word,’ which signifies all words, among which it is itself numbered inasmuch as it is a certain word. Likewise: the concept which is formed of a *common concept* represents itself, insofar as it is contained with everything else under a common concept.

*The Second Argument.*—Second, as better theologians tell us, God, an angel, and a soul separated [from its body after death] all know themselves immediately through their own essences. But no cognitive thing perceives its object without the mediation of some sign. Therefore, [in these cases] the same essence is both a sign and what is signified.

*The True and Common Opinion Proves that Nothing can be the Sign of Itself.*—Nevertheless, the common and true opinion is that nothing can be a sign of itself.<sup>43</sup> The following teach this: St. Augustine in the place cited [i.e., ‘*On the Teacher*’]; St. Anselm (1033-1109) [commenting] on Chapter 4 of *Romans*;<sup>44</sup> St. Ambrose (335-397), in Book 1, Chapter 4 [of his work] ‘*On Abraham*,’ [commenting on] the words of St. Paul to the *Romans*, in Chapter 4: ‘*Abraham received the sign of circumcision*,’<sup>45</sup> and Soncinas [Paulus Barbus Soncinas, O.P. (d. 1494)], in *Metaphysics*, Book 12, Question 59.<sup>46</sup>

The basis of this opinion is said by certain authors to be the relative opposition which is seen at least afterwards between a sign and what is signified. But this is rightly opposed in an argument with respect to those things in which there is a relation of reason, which relation does not require an actual diversity of the [related] extremes. This is clear in the relation of identity of the same thing with itself, a relation whose extremes are, for example, one and the same Socrates. Soncinas, in the place cited, says this distinction is necessary for this reason: A sign is a medium between a thing and the potency to which it signifies; therefore, it must differ from both.

*The Basis of the Conclusion, Especially for Instrumental Signs.*—The best reason can be taken from the words of Aristotle in this context. For he has called words signs<sup>47</sup> of concepts—which, if it is adapted to a sign in general, shows its necessary distinction from what is signified; for nothing is a sign of itself. And this is indicated in the definition of Augustine in which a sign is said to show something



diversitatem significati a signo. Atque haec ratio tametsi universalis sit, speciatim procedit in Instrumentalibus; quae idcirco talia nuncupantur, ut recte monet Fonseca in lib. *Introduct.* quia, ut instrumenta prius movenda sunt, ut operentur, et ita sunt media inter causam principalem, et effectum: ita haec signa prius attingenda sunt a cognitione ut deinde percipiatur res. Cuius rei gratia necessaria est aliqua distinctio.

Pro formalibus<sup>24</sup> est propria, et efficacior ratio. Haec enim, ut ostendemus quaestione sequenti sunt imagines et similitudines rerum significatarum: imaginem vero esse distinctam a repraesentato certissimum est in Theologia, et Philosophia. Ubicunque est similitudo, inquit D. Tho. in 1. d. 7. q. 2. art. 2. ad 2. oportet quod sit aliqua distinctio; quia secundum Boetium similitudo est rerum differentium eadem qualitas: alias non esset similitudo, sed identitas. Idem repetit d. 48. q. unica. art. 1. In d. vero 27. refert Magister ex Augustino 7. de Trinitate cap. 1. nihil absurdius esse quam imaginem dici ad se. Et in d. 2. refert ex Hilario similitudinem non esse solam. Hoc ipsum docet Greg. Niss. de opificio hominis cap. 17. Et Athanas. de consubstantialitate Verbi contra Meletium, ex eo probat non esse Verbum simile Deo, sed Patri, quia a Patre distinguitur, non autem Deo. Confirmatio non potest accipi accommodatior, quam ex verbis Boetii; nam similitudo hoc differt ab identitate, quod semper est inter diversa; cum ergo formalia signa sint similitudines, consequens est necessario, ut differant a significatis.

Quamvis<sup>25</sup> hoc fundamentum firmiter sit, quam illud de relatione; uberius tamen doctrinae gratia tradendum est, in quibus signis relationes sint reales, et in quibus rationis. Qua in re sit primum pronuntiatum. Nullum signum ex instituto habere potest relationem realem. Probatur. Quia nullum ens reale ut sit, et conveniat, dependere potest ex operatione intellectus: sed ratio signi ex instituto dependet ex impositione; ergo nequit esse realis. Ratio est manifesta. Nec locus patitur maiorem eius explicationem; praesertim cum hoc pronuntiatum a nemine improbetur. Secundum. Signa naturalia habent relationes significandi reales, nisi aliqua desit conditio ex iis, quas Philosophi deposcunt ad relationem realem. Probatio est facilis. Quoniam huiusmodi signa non pendent ab intellectu, ergo si alioqui sint realia, existantia, et realiter distincta, fundabunt relationem realem. Sed quoniam ratio realis non modo poscit reale extremum, sed etiam fundamentum: opus omnino est explicare, quodnam sit in singulis fundamentum; nam universim loquendo constat fundamentum relationis in signo naturali esse proportionem inter signum

besides itself<sup>48</sup> and also in common language. For that word ‘something’ implies a diversity between a significate and its sign. And this reasoning, even though it is universal, is especially cogent in the case of instrumental signs, which are so named for this reason that, as Fonseca [Pedro da Fonseca, S.J. (1548-1599)] correctly advises in his book ‘*Introductions*,’ they must first be moved as instruments, in order to operate, and in this way they are means between the principal cause and the effect.<sup>49</sup> Thus, these signs must be first acquired by cognition in order then that the thing be perceived. Because of this, some distinction is necessary.

*An Effective Argument for the Conclusion in the Case of Formal Signs.*—With regard to formal signs the reasoning is fitting and more effective. For, as we will show in the following question, these are images and likenesses of things signified. But that an image is distinct from what is represented is most certain both in theology and in philosophy. And wherever there is a likeness, St. Thomas says [in his *Commentary on the Sentences*], Book 1, Distinction 7, Question 2, Article 2, In Reply to Objection 2, there must be some distinction.<sup>50</sup> For, according to Boethius (ca. 480-524/5), a likeness is the same quality of different things,<sup>51</sup> otherwise it would not be a likeness but an identity. St. Thomas repeats the same thing [in the same book of the same work], Distinction 48, the Only Question, Article 1.<sup>52</sup> But in [Book 1], Distinction 27, the Master [i.e., Peter the Lombard]<sup>53</sup> tells us, from St. Augustine, ‘*On the Trinity*,’ Book 7, Chapter 1, that nothing is more absurd than that an image be said to be related to itself.<sup>54</sup> And, in [Book 1] Distinction 2, he [i.e., Peter the Lombard] tells us, from Hilary [of Poitiers (ca. 315-366)], that a likeness is not alone.<sup>55</sup> Gregory of Nyssa (ca. 335-ca. 394) teaches the same thing [in his work] ‘*On the Making of Man*,’ Chapter 17 [sic].<sup>56</sup> And Athanasius (293-373), [in his work] ‘*On the Consubstantiality of the Word—Against Meletius*,’ proves that the [Divine] Word is not like God but like the Father from the fact that the Word is distinguished from the Father but not from God.<sup>57</sup> A better confirmation cannot be obtained than from the words of Boethius: for a likeness differs in this from an identity, that a likeness is always between diverse things.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, since formal signs are likenesses, the consequent is that they necessarily differ from what they signify.

*Of What Kind are the Relations of a Sign, Real or Rational?*<sup>59</sup> —Although the basis here is more firm than that of a relation, nevertheless, for the sake of a fuller teaching we must say in which signs the relations are real and in which they are of reason. In this, the first point to be made is that no sign by institution can have a real relation. This is proven from the fact that no real thing can depend on an operation of the intellect for its existence and its consistence. But the relation of a sign by institution depends upon an imposition [by the intellect]. Therefore, it cannot be real. The reason is obvious and this place does not allow a greater explanation of it, especially since this point is not rejected by anyone.

The second point is that natural signs involve real relations of signifying unless they lack one of the conditions which philosophers demand for a real relation. The proof is simple, because signs of this kind do not depend upon an intellect. If then they are otherwise really existing and really distinct, they will ground a real relation. But since a real relation not only demands real extremes, but also a real foundation, it is necessary to explain what the foundation is in particular relations. For, speaking generally, it is clear that the foundation of a relation in a

et significatum. At non deerunt qui existiment hanc proportionem non esse in omnibus reale.

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Ad hoc explicandum sit tertium pronuntiatum.<sup>26</sup> Fundamentum remotum relationis in signo naturali est reale. Probatur. Huiusmodi fundamentum est illud, ratione cuius signum ducit in cognitionem rei (ut ex supra dictis patet) id autem necessario est reale; quoniam in signo formali est id, quod realiter causat cognitionem: in instrumentali vero id quod cognitum est ratio cognoscendi significatum; sed negatio non potest realiter causare cognitionem ullo modo ex dictis, maxime cum instrumentalia (de quibus esset maior dubitatio) plerumque percipiuntur a sensu, qui non attingit negationem.

Quod si roges<sup>27</sup> quidnam sit hoc fundamentum; Respondeo esse ipsam naturam signi, vel aliquam eius potestatem realem. Exempli causa, in formalibus est ipsa repraesentatio, quae est eorum natura, et essentia: in instrumentalibus, si sint effectus, ut est fumus respectu ignis, fundamentum est eius natura causata ab igne: si vero sint causae, ut ignis respectu fumi, est virtus, per quam causa operatur: quae aliquando est ipsa natura, aliquando potentia realis superaddita.

Unde colligitur<sup>28</sup> quartum pronuntiatum. Relatio signi per ordinem ad rem coincidit cum relationibus causae, vel effectus, aut ullius dependentiae, si qua fuerit. Hoc ex praecedenti manet confirmatum. Nam habitudo unius naturae ad aliam, vel est quia una supponit aliam, a qua accipiat esse: vel quia est talis, ut ea posita, necessario alia consequatur. Qui respectus non sunt alii quam effectus, vel causae. Illud tamen non omittendum, in signis Instrumentalibus videri respectus esse in genere causae efficientis: in Formalibus in genere causae exemplaris, seu formalis externae; quia in prioribus attenditur sola dependentia in esse. Unde ut plurimum inserviunt ad indicandam existentiam significati praesentem, praeteritam, vel futuram. In posterioribus similitudo et imitatio; quo circa repraesentare possunt obiectum absolute non respiciendo existentiam.

Quaerat<sup>29</sup> praeterea diligens rerum indagator. Quando ita se habent relationes signi ad rem; quid philosophandum de iis, quae tendunt in potentiam. Sane quidem in instrumentalibus non abs re dixeris omnes esse rationis: quia fundantur in eorum intelligibilitate; haec enim signa ex eo ducunt in aliorum notitiam, quia percipiuntur. In formalibus videntur esse reales: quoniam haec realiter influunt in cognitionem potentiae; sive enim sint conceptus, sive species impressae, communiter sunt formae realiter inhaerentes potentiae cum sufficienti fundamento relationis cau-

natural sign is the proportion between the sign and what is signified. However, there are some authors who may believe that this proportion is real in all cases.

*In the Case of a Natural Sign, the Remote Foundation is Real.*—We may explain this with a third point: in the case of a natural sign, the remote foundation is real. This is proven inasmuch as a foundation of this kind is one in virtue of which a sign leads (as is clear from what was said above) to the knowledge of a thing. But this necessarily is real. For in a formal sign [the foundation] is that which really causes knowledge; but in an instrumental sign that which is known is the reason of knowing what is signified. But a negation cannot really cause knowledge in any of these ways. This is most of all because instrumental signs (about which there would be greater doubt) are generally perceived by the senses, which do not grasp a negation.<sup>60</sup>

*What is the Remote Foundation for a Natural Sign?*—But if you ask what is this foundation, my answer is that it is the very nature of the sign or some real power which it has. For example, in formal signs it is the representation itself which is the nature and essence of these signs. In instrumental signs, if they are effects, as in the case of smoke with respect to fire, the foundation is the nature of that smoke as caused by the fire. But if they are causes, as in the case of fire with respect to smoke, the foundation is the power by which the cause operates, which sometimes is the nature itself but is sometimes a real potency superadded [to the nature].

*What are the Relations of a Sign to a Thing Signified?*—From this is inferred a fourth point: the relation of a sign with respect to the thing coincides with relations of cause, or effect, or of any dependence, if there should be any. This is confirmed from what has been said. For the relation of one nature to another either is because the one supposes the other from which it receives being, or is because it is such that when it is posited, the other necessarily follows; which relations are nothing else than those of effect or cause.

However, this should not be overlooked: in instrumental signs the relation seems to be in the category of an efficient cause; but in formal signs it seems to be in the category of an exemplar cause, or of an external formal cause. For in the first kind of sign there seems to be only dependence in being. Hence, at most they serve to indicate the present, past, or future existence of what is signified. In the second kind there is likeness and imitation; wherefore they can represent an object in an absolute manner without regard to existence.

*Of What Kind is the Relation of a Sign to a Knowing Power?*—But a careful observer of things may further ask: while relations of a sign to a thing are such, what should a philosopher think about those which tend toward the potency? Certainly, in the case of instrumental signs you would not be off the mark to say they all are relations of reason, for the reason that they are founded upon the intelligibility of these signs. For these signs lead to the knowledge of other things from the fact that they are perceived. In the case of formal signs, the relations seem to be real, because these signs really influence the knowledge which the potency will have. For whether they are concepts, or impressed species, they commonly are forms which really inhere in the potency with sufficient foundation for a relation of formal cause, although species, in addition to this relation, have another causal aspect, insofar as they effectively, and perhaps as exemplars, concur for cognition.

sae formalis. Quanquam species, praeter hunc respectum, habeant alium conceptum causae, quatenus effective, et forte exemplariter, concurrunt ad cognitionem. Qui nobis videtur esse realis, et in primo genere relationum collocandus; cum ibi dentur ea, quae necessaria sunt ad huiusmodi relationem.

Praetermissis iis,<sup>30</sup> quae opponuntur de relatione. Ad primam difficultatem initio positam negandum est idem esse repraesentare, ac /p. 13/ significare; nam illud est universalius, et idcirco adhibetur in definitione signi pro genere. Quae maior universalitas explicatur a D. Augustino. Quem sequitur Soto cap. 2. libri Summularum. Et Recentiores hodie, ex parte repraesentatorum. Quia significare solum se extendit ad alia diversa a significante; repraesentare vero, et ad alia, et ad ipsum repraesentans. Subdit enim D. Augustinus eodem loco, multa se repraesentare, quae signa non sunt; nimirum quia non repraesentant aliud diversum. Et hac de causa diximus illam partem definitionis [aliquid] denotare diversitatem. Quam exprimendam putavit Torres<sup>31</sup> de Trinitate, q. 27. art. 1. disput. 2. dum signum ita definit. Signum est quod repraesentat rem aliam a se. Ad exempla Nominis, et Conceptus: in quibus D. Augustinus non negat idem se significare: respondetur signum duobus modis posse rem significare, uno expresse et immediate: altero confuse et secundario: et hoc 2. modo significare se ipsum Nomen, et Conceptus, nos vero negare quidquam esse signum sui priori modo.

Ad tria exempla<sup>32</sup> posteriora negamus essentias Dei, Angeli, vel Animae, esse signa. Ad probationem, in qua dicitur nihil cognosci a potentia absque signo, respondemus id esse verum de signo in actu secundo, seu producto per potentiam cognitivam, qualis est conceptus; falsum vero, de signo in actu primo, concurrente ad cognitionem: cuiusmodi sunt species; quoniam obiectum si proportionatum sit, et sufficienter praesens, per se influit in cognitionem.

To us this seems to be real and needing to be located in the first class of relations.<sup>61</sup> For what a relation of this kind needs is found in that class.

*Replies to the Arguments.*—Passing over opposing views about relation, in reply to the first objection given at the beginning [of this Article], we must deny that *to represent* is the same as *to signify*. For the former is more universal, and for that reason it is used as a genus in the definition of a sign. This greater universality is explained by St. Augustine, who is followed by Soto [Domingo de Soto, O.P. (1494-1560)], in Chapter 2 of his *Summulae*,<sup>62</sup> as well as by more recent authors at the present time, as on the side of what is represented. For *to signify* extends only to other things which are diverse from what is signifying; but *to represent* extends both to other things and to the thing itself that is representing. For St. Augustine in the same passage adds that many things represent themselves which are not signs, doubtless because they do not represent something else that is different. And for this reason we have said that the word ‘something’ in the definition of a sign denotes diversity. This is what Torres [Bartolomé de Torres (d. 1568)] was thinking to express [in his work] ‘*On the Trinity*,’ Question 27, Article 1, Disputation 2, when he defined a sign thus: *A sign is what represents a thing other than itself*.<sup>63</sup>

To the examples of a word and a concept, in which St. Augustine does not deny that the same thing signifies itself: the answer is that a sign can signify a thing in two ways: in one way explicitly and immediately, in another confusedly and secondarily. A word or a concept signify themselves in this second way; but we deny that anything is a sign of itself in the first way.

*Reply to the Second Argument.*—In reply to the three last examples, we may deny that the essences of God, an angel, or a soul, are signs. With regard to the proof in which it is said that nothing is known by a potency apart from a sign, we answer that this is true with respect to a sign in second act, or as it is produced by a cognitive power, a sign, for example, such as the concept. But it is false with respect to a sign in first act,<sup>64</sup> as it concurs for cognition, of which kind are species, since the object, if it is proportionate and if it is sufficiently present, exercises influence by itself for knowledge.

## Quaestio 2

## De signorum divisionibus

## Articulus 1

## Multiplex signorum divisio explicatur

Non est infrequens apud scholasticos signorum distributio in rememorativa, demonstrativa, et prognostica.<sup>33</sup> Eam tradunt praesertim Alensis 4. p. q. 1. in 1. D. Thom. in 4. d. 1. q. 1. art. 1. Scotus q. 2. Richardus art. 1. q. 3. indicavit D. Basilius in c. 7. Esaiae constituens hoc discrimen inter signum et significatum: quod illud necessario sit praesens: hoc possit esse praesens, praeteritum, vel futurum. Rememorativa sunt, quae praeteritum aliquid in memoriam reducunt. Huiusmodi, voluit Deus esse Iridem Genes. 6. Ponam, inquit Deus, arcum meum in nubibus coeli, et recordabor foederis mei. Demonstrativa sunt, quae praesentia monstrant: ut fumus ignem. Prognostica vero, quae futura praenuntiant. Huiusmodi est varius solis color, dum occidit; iuxta illud Poetae, Ceruleus pluvias denuntiat, igneus Euros.

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Haec divisio<sup>34</sup> non fit proprie in species, vel quasi species signorum; quia eodem significandi modo possunt signa habere illam significandi varietatem circa praesens, praeteritum, et futurum, ut patet in postremis duobus exemplis. Nam fumus, et color solis eodem modo concurrunt ad notitiam suorum significatorum; nimirum ex sua vi naturali, et per sui cognitionem. Illa autem diversitas temporis in significato est plane per accidens. Ut est in vocibus significantibus ex instituto, quod una tempus praesens, alia futurum significet.

Minus frequens,<sup>35</sup> minusque accomodata est illa divisio qua signa bipartiuntur in propria et impropria. Propria dicuntur, quae non modo inducunt in alterius cognitionem, sed in hoc ipsum munus constituta sunt vel a natura, vel ab alio: a natura sunt ad significandum instituta, verbi causa species visibiles, aut idolum ex visione productum in oculo. Huc pertinet quod D. Aug. docet in Imperfecto de Genesi ad literam, cap. 16, et in lib. 83. Quaest. q. 74. unum ovum etsi alteri simile sit, non esse eius imaginem; quia non sit intuitu repraesentandi aliud. Et consequenter non erit signum alterius, quantumvis illud ob similitudinem in memoriam revocet. Signa Propria ab alio constituta ad significandum sunt voces.

Impropria<sup>36</sup> sunt, quae tametsi ob aliquem nexum in cognitionem alterius nos promoveant, ad hoc tamen nec e se, nec ab alio destinantur. Huiusmodi sunt effectus respectu causarum: et e contra; horum enim inter se connexio



## Question 2 About the Divisions of Signs

### Article 1

#### Various Divisions of Signs Are Explained

*Some Signs are Commemorative, Others are Demonstrative, and still Others are Prognosticative.*—Frequently among the Scholastics signs are divided into commemorative, demonstrative, and prognosticative. Alexander of Hales, [in his *Summa*] Part 4, Question 1, Reply 1 [sic];<sup>65</sup> St. Thomas, in [his *Commentary on the Sentences*], Book 4, Distinction 1, Question 1, Article 1;<sup>66</sup> Scotus in Question 2;<sup>67</sup> and Richard [of Middleton (ca. 1249-1300/8)] in article 1, question 3,<sup>68</sup> all give this division. And St. Basil (329-379) has suggested it in Chapter 7 of *Isaiah* when he states this difference between a sign and what is signified: that the sign is necessarily present, but what is signified can be present, past, or future.<sup>69</sup>

Commemorative signs are those which recall some past thing to the memory. It was of this kind that God willed to make the rainbow, in *Genesis*, Chapter 6. ‘*I will place,*’ says God, ‘*my bow in the clouds of heaven and I will remember my covenant.*’ Demonstrative signs are those which indicate something which is present, as smoke, for example, indicates fire. And prognosticative signs are those which foretell future things. A sign of this kind is the varying color of the setting sun, which according to the poet’s verse ‘*when it is blueish portends rain and when it is fiery foretells winds*’ (*Ceruleus pluvias denuntiat, igneus euros*).<sup>70</sup>

*The Given Division of Signs is not Like a Division into Species.*—This division is not properly into species or quasi-species of signs. For signs with the same way of signifying can have that variety of signifying with respect to present, past, and future, as is clear in the last two examples. For smoke and the color of the sun act in the same way to make known what they signify. That is, they act from their natural power and by knowledge of themselves. However, that diversity of time in what is signified is plainly by accident; as it is in words which signify by institution that one word may signify a present time while another may signify a time which is future.

*Some Signs are Proper, Others are Improper. What is a Proper Sign?*—A less frequent and less appropriate division is that in which signs are divided into two types: proper and improper.<sup>71</sup> Those are called proper which not only lead to the knowledge of something else but which have been instituted for this task either by nature or by someone other than nature. Instituted by nature for the task of signifying are, for example, visible species or an image produced in the eye by vision. (At this point what St. Augustine teaches in his unfinished ‘*Literal Commentary on Genesis*,’ Chapter 16,<sup>72</sup> and the book, ‘*On 83 Diverse Questions*,’ Question 74,<sup>73</sup> is pertinent: that one egg, even though it is similar to another, is not its image, since it is not made with a view to represent something else. Consequently, it will not be the sign of another, however much, on account of a likeness, it calls that thing back into memory.) Proper signs instituted by someone other than nature are words.

*What is an Improper Sign?*—Improper signs are those which, even though they may move us to the knowledge of another thing, because of some connection [they may have with that thing], nevertheless, are not destined for this either by



est propter ipsum esse, unde per accidens evenit, ut sint idonea ad notitiam aliorum afferendam. Quod patet in fumo comparatione ignis, et rauco maris sono respectu futurae tempestatis. Haec divisio si aliquid utilitatis habet, coincidit cum duabus subsequentibus: nam sub signis impropriis complectuntur omnia naturalia instrumentalia: sub propriis formalia, et instrumentalia ex instituto; ut consideranti patet.

Celebres<sup>37</sup> ergo signorum divisiones sunt hae duae; altera in signa naturalia et ex instituto; altera in formalia et instrumentalia. Et primae quidem meminerunt omnes pene interpretes Aristotelis hoc loco; Scholastici in 4. dist. 1. post Magist. ibi et post D. August. lib. 2. de doctr. Christia. cap. 2. Eius sufficientia, quae mox examinanda est, hac ratione probatur.<sup>38</sup> Quidquid aliud repraesentat, vel habet vim ad eam repraesentationem ex natura sua, vel beneficio alicuius (alius enim modus fingi non potest). Si habet vim a natura, est signum naturale; si beneficio imponentis, est ex instituto, sive, ut vocat D. August. signum datum, ut alii, ad placitum, vel artificiale. Signa autem naturalia sunt, quae apud omnes idem significant, seu potius quae suapte natura vim habent significandi aliquid. Signa vero ex instituto, quae ex hominum voluntate, et quadam quasi compositione significant. Ut videre est lib. 1. Dialect. instit. cap. 8.

Secundam divisionem haud inculcant veteres; ea fortasse ratione, quod formalia minus proprie signa putent; sed non verebitur ea signa nuncupare, qui definitionem signi superiori quaestione ex /p. 15/ plicatam consideraverit, est nimirum signum omne id, quod potentiae cognoscenti aliquid a se distinctum repraesentat: species vero potentiis impressae maxime praesentia reddunt obiecta, quae exprimunt; ergo merito cum signis enumerantur. Consentit Magnus Albertus 4. Eth. tract. 3. cap. 2. ubi species intelligibiles appellat signa, et D. Tho. opusc. 9. quaest. 2. appellans conceptiones mentis repraesentationes essentiae Dei. Similia habet 2. cont. Gen. cap. 98. et in 1. cap. epistolae ad Hebraeos: quaestione vero 4. de veritate artic. 1. ad 7. expressius ait significationem proprius inesse verbo mentis, quam oris. Accedit Scot. in 3. dist. 14. quaest. 3. Aegidius in 1. dist. 27. q. 2. principali art. 2. et 4. Sonc. 12 Metaph. q.

themselves or by anything else. Effects are this kind of sign with respect to their causes, and vice versa. For the connection of these between one another is because of their being. Hence, it is accidental that they are suitable to bring knowledge of one another. This is clear in the case of smoke in relation to fire, and the murmuring sound of the sea in relation to a future storm. But if this division has some usefulness it coincides with the two divisions which follow. For under improper signs are comprised all natural instrumental signs, and under proper signs are formal signs and instrumental signs by institution—as is clear to one thinking about it.

*Certain Signs are Natural, Others are by Institution. Some Signs are Formal and Some are Instrumental.*—Therefore, the most often recognized divisions of signs are these two: first into natural signs and signs by institution, and second into formal and instrumental signs. And, indeed, almost all interpreters of Aristotle make mention of the first division in this place [i.e., *De Interpretatione*] as do the Scholastics [Commenting on the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard], in Book 4, Distinction 1 and following Saint Augustine in Book 2, Chapter 2 of his work, ‘*On Christian Doctrine*.’<sup>74</sup> The sufficiency of this division, which will soon be examined, is proven by the following argument.

*A Brief Proof of the Sufficiency of the Division of Signs into Natural and By Institution. Natural Signs and Those By Institution are Defined.*—Whatever represents something besides itself has the power to make that representation either from its own nature or by benefit of something else, for no other way can be imagined. If it has the power from its nature, it is a natural sign; if it has the power by benefit of someone imposing it, then it is by institution, or it is what St. Augustine calls ‘a given sign,’<sup>75</sup> and what others call a voluntary or artificial sign.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, natural signs are those which signify the same thing for all, or rather those which by their very nature have the power to signify something. But signs by institution are those which signify by human will and by a certain kind of composition. This may be seen in [Fonseca’s] ‘*Dialectical Instructions*,’ Book 1, Chapter 8.<sup>77</sup>

*The Division of Signs into Formal and Instrumental was not unknown to Earlier Philosophers.*—Older writers do not emphasize the second division, perhaps for the reason that they think formal signs are less properly signs. But no one will fear to call them signs who will consider the definition of a sign which was explained in the preceding question, namely, that a sign is anything which represents something other than itself to a knowing power. But impressed species, especially, make present to potencies the objects which they express. Therefore, they are rightly classified as signs. Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280) agrees with this, in his *Ethics*, Book 4, Tractate 3, Chapter 2, where he calls intelligible species ‘signs.’<sup>78</sup> Also St. Thomas in *Opuscle* 9 [sic], Question 2 [agrees] when he calls conceptions of the mind ‘representations’ of the essence of God.<sup>79</sup> And he thinks the same in *Contra Gentiles*, Book 2, Chapter 98,<sup>80</sup> and in [commenting on] Chapter 1 of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*.<sup>81</sup> Indeed, in ‘*On Truth*,’ Question 4, Article 1, in reply to Objection 7, he more explicitly says that signification is more properly in the mental than in the spoken word.<sup>82</sup> Scotus agrees in [commenting on the *Sentences*] Book 3, Distinction 14, Question 3,<sup>83</sup> [as do also] Aegidius [Giles of Rome (1247-1316)] [commenting on the *Sentences*] Book 1, Distinction 27, in the principal Question 2, Articles 2 and 4,<sup>84</sup> and Soncinas, in *Metaphysics*, Book 12, Question

59. Haec adduximus, ut non videatur absque veterum autoritate introducta haec signorum divisio in formalia et instrumentalia. Formalia porro signa sunt, imagines, et similitudines rerum, quae potentiis consignatae ducunt in rerum notitiam. Instrumentalia, quae cognita efficiunt alterius rei cognitionem.

Hanc quoque divisionem idoneam esse ita probabis cum Aegidio in 1. dist. 3. q. 2. principali art. 3. Omne id, quo mediante aliud cognoscimus, aut necesse est a nobis prius cognosci, aut non, si debet cognosci, est instrumentale signum; sin minus, formale.<sup>39</sup> Quod idcirco formale dicitur, quia causat cognitionem informando, aut in ratione termini, aut in ratione principii, ut mox dicemus. Praeferimus has divisiones, quia procedunt per proprias et intimas differentias signorum et maxime oppositas; nam significare ex propria natura, et ex beneplacito alterius, sunt modi ex diametro repugnantes; similiter significare per sui cognitionem, et absque cognitione, quae sunt differentiae signi formalis, et instrumentalis, sibi ex adverso opponuntur.

Alia signorum divisio est in practica, et speculativa, cuius meminit D. Tho. 3. par. q. 60. ar. 2. Practica (quae a D. Tho. efficacia dicuntur) sunt, quae non modo significant rem, sed eam etiam causant. Huiusmodi censentur a praecipuis Theologis sacramenta novae legis, quae gratiam indicant, et efficiunt in anima. Speculativa sunt, quae rem tantum indicant, ut fumes ignem, fragor arborum futuram tempestatem. Ex quibus descriptionibus, si quis animum advertat, intelliget signa practica esse causas, speculativa autem effectus, vel alia, a quibus significata non pendeant.

Ubi non levis exurgit dubitatio, an recte causae dicantur signa, cum teste D. Thom. 1. par. quaest. 10. artic. 2. et 3. par. quaest. 60. artic. 1. rerum divisio fiat in causas, et signa; ut in membra opposita; adeo ut demonstrationes, quae ab effectu procedunt, dicantur esse a signo. Nihilominus recte D. Thom., loco citato, et quaest. 9. de veritate arti. 4. ad 5. tradidit praeter rationem signi esse, quod sit effectus, vel causa; sed quod nos ducat in alterius cognitionem. Quare id, quod notius fuerit, si debitam proportionem habeat, /p. 16/ erit alterius signum; et quia effectus plerunque notiores sunt, quam causae, ideo frequentius signa nominantur. Vel certe quia effecta nihil habent respectu causarum, nisi esse signa, causae autem praeter hoc, vendicant potestatem causandi; illa denominantur a ratione signi, hae a praestantiori forma causae.

59.<sup>85</sup> We have cited these so that this division of signs into formal and instrumental would not seem to be introduced without the authority of older writers. In addition, formal signs are images and likenesses of things, which impressed on potencies lead to the knowledge of things; but instrumental signs are those which themselves being known cause knowledge of something other than themselves.

*Formal and Instrumental Signs are Defined. The Division into Formal and Instrumental Signs is Proven to be Sound.*—Along with Aegidius [in his *Sentences* commentary], Book 1, Distinction 3, the Principal Question 2, Article 3,<sup>86</sup> you may see that this division is suitable also for the following reason. Everything by whose mediation we know something else must be itself first either known or not known to us. If it must be known, it is an instrumental sign; if not then it is formal. It is called formal because it causes knowledge by informing it, as we shall soon say, either in the role of a terminus or in the role of a principle. We prefer these divisions, because they proceed by way of proper, intrinsic, and maximally opposed differences of signs. For to signify from one's own nature or to signify by the good pleasure of someone else, are ways of signifying which are diametrically opposite to one another. Likewise, to signify through knowledge of oneself and to signify apart from such knowledge are opposed to each other.

*Certain Signs are Practical and Others are Speculative.*—There is another division of signs, into practical and speculative, of which St. Thomas was mindful in [*Summa Theologiae*] Part 3, Question 60, Article 2.<sup>87</sup> Practical signs (which are called 'efficacious' by St. Thomas) are those which not only signify a thing, but also cause it. Distinguished theologians think that the Sacraments of the New Law are of this kind inasmuch as they both indicate and effect Grace in the soul. Speculative signs are those which only indicate something, as smoke indicates fire, or the breaking of trees indicates a coming storm. If one takes notice, from these descriptions he will understand that practical signs are causes, while speculative signs are effects or other things on which what is signified does not depend.

At this point a serious doubt arises as to whether causes are rightly called signs, since St. Thomas tells us [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 10, Article 2<sup>88</sup> and in Part 3, Question 60, Article 1,<sup>89</sup> that things are divided into causes and signs, as into opposite members. Accordingly, [only] demonstrations which go from effect [to cause] are said to go 'from a sign.'<sup>90</sup> Nevertheless, St. Thomas in the place cited, and in '*On Truth*,' Question 9, Article 4, Reply to Objection 5, says that the notion of a sign does not entail that it be either an effect or a cause, but [only] that it lead us to knowledge of something else.<sup>91</sup> Accordingly, that which will have been more known, if it have the required proportion, will be the sign of something else. And because generally effects are more known than causes, they are more frequently called signs. Or indeed because effects have nothing with respect to their causes except that they be signs, but causes apart from that lay claim to the power of causing, the former are designated by the character of a sign and the latter by the more eminent character of a cause.

Rogabit aliquis,<sup>40</sup> an omnis causa naturalis sit signum sui effectus, et e converso, omnis effectus signum suae causae? Ratio dubitandi est, quia signum ubi percipitur, affert cognitionem significati; at nos multas cognoscimus causas ignari effectuum earum; multos similiter cognoscimus effectus inscii, quarum causarum sint. Respondendum tamen videtur affirmative de effectu, et causa per se. De effectu quidem, quia, ut annotavit S. Thom. 1. p. quaest. 12. artic. 2. et sumitur ex<sup>41</sup> D. Dionysio de divinis nominibus, omnis effectus esto sit aequivocus, est similitudo suae causae, quatenus causam imitari conatur, et ex consequenti eam repraesentat. Quod expresse docuit D. Paulus ad Romam. 1. invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. In quem sensum loquitur S. Thom. et Ferrar. 1. contra Gent. cap. 29. et 3. par. quaest. 12. art. 3. cum ait creaturas esse signa divinae sapientiae, ut voces intellectualis scientiae creatae. De causa vero, quoniam etsi non dicatur similitudo sui effectus, siquidem eum non imitatur, quemadmodum nec Pater Aeternus eadem de causa dicitur similitudo Filii, tametsi hic Patris similitudo appelletur; nihilominus signum est, vel quia experientia deprehensum est ex tali causa oriri talem effectum; vel quia comprehensa perfecte causa, necesse est eius virtutem cogitatione circumscribi, et effectum inde processurum assequi; ut contingit Angelis, cum in subiecto passiones agnoscunt; et nobis, cum easdem per discursum investigamus. Quod si aliquando nec effectum ex causa, nec causam ex effectu deprehendimus; vel est, quia neutrum perfecte penetramus; vel, quia est effectus, et causa per accidens, inter quae non est naturalis, et intima habitudo, quae dirigit mentem ab uno in aliud. Et hac de causa responsionem angustavimus ad causam, et effectum per se.

*An Effect and its Natural Cause are Essentially Signs of One Another.*—Someone will ask whether every natural cause is a sign of its effect or, vice versa, whether every effect is a sign of its cause? The reason for asking is that where a sign is perceived it brings knowledge of what is signified. But we know many causes of whose effects we remain ignorant. Similarly, we know many effects without knowing their causes. Still, it seems we should reply in the affirmative about an effect and an essential cause.

To be sure, about an effect because as St. Thomas has noted [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 12, Article 2 [sic],<sup>92</sup> and as is taken from [Pseudo] Dionysius (ca. 525), ‘*On Divine Names*,’<sup>93</sup> every effect, even if it is equivocal, is a likeness of its cause insofar as it strives to imitate its cause and, as a result, represents it. This is expressly what St. Paul has taught in *Romans*, Chapter 1 [when he says]: ‘*The invisible things of God are clearly seen inasmuch as they are understood from the creation of the world by those things which have been made.*’ St. Thomas speaks in this sense (as also does Ferrara) in *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 29,<sup>94</sup> and in [*Summa Theologiae*] Part 3, Question 12, Article 3, when he says that creatures are signs of Divine wisdom just as words are signs of created intellectual knowledge.<sup>95</sup>

And about a cause: although it is not called a likeness of its effect, since it does not imitate that effect (just as the Eternal Father, for the same reason, is not called a likeness of the Son, even though the Son is called a likeness of the Father) nevertheless, it is a sign. This is either because experience has grasped the fact that such an effect arises from such a cause, or because when the cause is perfectly comprehended its power is necessarily circumscribed by the thought [which comprehends it] and it is also inferred that the effect will follow from it. This happens with angels when they know properties in a subject and with us when we search for the same properties by way of a reasoning process. But if sometimes we do not apprehend an effect from a cause or a cause from its effect, this is either because we penetrate neither one perfectly or because they are accidentally cause and effect, between which there is no natural and intrinsic relationship which directs the mind from one to the other. And for this reason we have restricted this reply to essential causes and effects.

## Articulus 2

**Examinatur divisio signorum in naturalia, et ex instituto**

Primo,<sup>42</sup> omne signum videtur esse ex instituto; nam res omnes naturales ex arbitrio Dei habent talem naturam, quae proportionata sit ad aliud significandum; ergo significant ex instituto divino. Antecedens, praeterquam sit per se notum, tradidit D. Hilarius lib. de Synodis, his verbis, omnibus creaturis substantiam voluntas Dei attulit. Secundo ex opposito nullum signum ex instituto humano dari posse, ostenditur. Res ad significandum imposita, Verb. Gra. [vox]<sup>43</sup> ut signum cen /p. 17/ seatur, debet post impositionem in se habere aliquid, ratione cuius significet: sed nihil omnino habet, ergo non est signum. Minor est clara, cum impositio humana sit voluntas, et deputatio extrinseca minime efficax ad causandum aliquid permanens in re. Maior probatur. Eadem res omnino invariata non potest modo praestare, quod autem non praestabat, cum sit causa mere naturaliter movens potentiam ad cognitionem.

Tertio,<sup>44</sup> eadem res signum est naturale, et ex instituto; ergo divisio non est idonea. Patet antecedens in Iride, quae simul significat ex instituto divino terram amplius non esse illuendam aquis; et quia sit in nube rorida, aptaque ut brevi dissolvatur in imbrem naturaliter significat pluviam mox futuram.

Quarto,<sup>45</sup> eadem Iris signum est nunquam, deinceps futuri Cathaclysmi, ut testatur sacra pag. Gen. 9. at nec est naturale, nec ex instituto, ergo est in adaequata partitio: non<sup>46</sup> naturale, quoniam ante diluvium id non significabat; alioqui quorsum a Deo imponderetur; signum autem naturale semper idem repraesentat. Non est ex instituto. Quia hoc definitur signum ex hominum voluntate significans; Iris autem significat arbitratu divino. Quod si respondeas institutum divinum sufficere, et illam descriptionem intelligi de signis vulgatis quibus homines uti solent. Opponimus signum quod Deus apposuit Caimo, ut a nullo interficeretur; Genes. 4. ab eodem impositum<sup>47</sup> fuit ad significandum; et nihilominus erat signum naturale; alioqui caeteri homines, quibus Deus significationem eius non revelaret, per illud non intelligerent.

Quinto,<sup>48</sup> idea artificis est signum artefacti, cum ipsum ad vivum exprimat; at non est naturale, quia ex arbitrio artificis hoc vel illo modo artefactum significat. Non est ex instituto, quoniam imago naturalis nulla eget impositione: ergo, etc.

Constat<sup>49</sup> nihilominus assignata divisio, et auctoritate, et ratione proposita: quare si obiectionibus satisfiet, erit haec quaestio profligata. Circa primum igitur est notandum, rerum naturas bifariam spectari posse,

## Article 2

**An Examination of the Division of Signs into Natural and by Institution**

*The Given Division is Opposed by Arguments. First.*—First of all every sign seems to be by institution. For, from the will of God, all natural things have natures such that they are proportioned to signify something else. Therefore, they signify from God's institution. The antecedent, apart from the fact that it is self-evident, is given by St. Hilary, in his book, 'On Synods,' in these words: '*The Will of God gave substance to all creatures.*'<sup>96</sup>

*Second.*—Second, on the opposite side, it seems that no sign can be brought about by human institution. For a thing which is established in order to signify, v.g., a *word*, in order that it be thought to be a sign, must after its establishment have something in itself by reason of which it does signify. But [a thing established by human institution] does not have anything at all. Therefore, it is not a sign. The minor premiss is clear, because a human establishment is an extrinsic will and deputation which is in no way able to cause something permanent in the thing. The major premiss is proven: for the same entirely unchanged thing cannot now give what it was not giving before, since it is a cause which moves a potency to knowledge in a merely natural way.

*Third.*—Third, the same thing may be a natural sign and a sign by institution. Therefore, the division is not suitable. The antecedent is clear in the case of the rainbow, which at once signifies by Divine institution that the earth will not again be flooded with water and because it exists in a dew-filled cloud which is apt in a short time to be dissolved into a rainstorm, it naturally signifies the coming rain.

*Fourth.*—Fourth, the same rainbow is a sign of a never thereafter future cataclysm, as is attested in Sacred Scripture, *Genesis*, Chapter 9. But this is neither natural nor by institution. Therefore, the division is inadequate. It is not natural, since before the Flood it did not signify that. Otherwise, for what purpose would it be established by God [to signify that]? For a natural sign always represents the same thing. Neither is it by institution. For this is defined as a sign which signifies from a human will. But the rainbow signifies by Divine will. But if you answer that a Divine institution suffices and that that description is understood about the common signs which people customarily use—we reply that the sign which God, in *Genesis*, Chapter 4, placed upon Cain, in order that he not be killed by anyone, was established by God in order to signify that and, nevertheless, it was a natural sign. For if that were not so, other men to whom God would not have revealed its signification would not understand through it. *Fifth.*—Fifth, an artist's idea is a sign of his artifact, since it expresses it in a living manner. But it is not natural, because from the will of the artist it signifies the artifact in this or that way. But it is not by institution, because a natural image<sup>97</sup> needs no establishment. Therefore, etc.

*The Objections are Answered. The First is Answered: Things Depend upon the Free Will of God for their Existence; but as regards their Essence they Depend upon Divine Ideas which actually precede the Divine Will.*—Nevertheless, the described division is evident as proposed by authority and by reason. Therefore, if the objections are met, this question will be answered. With regard to the first objection, therefore, it must be noted that the natures of things can be looked at in two ways, one with respect to their essence and another with respect to their existence. And in the



uno modo quoad essentiam, alio quoad existentiam;<sup>50</sup> ac posteriori modo subordinatas esse voluntati divinae liberae: iuxta illud Psal. 134. omnia quaecunque voluit Dominus fecit in caelo, et in terra; priori tamen modo haud accipere, esse a voluntate Dei, sed ab idaeis existentibus in Essentia divina ante omnem actum voluntatis, ut praeter alios docet Caie. 1. par. quaest. 14. art. 16. §. ultimo. Et ratio pro loco est, quia existentia est praedicatum contingens, quod rebus communicatur per influxum realem ex tempore, quem Deus pro libito impendere, vel cohibere potest: at essentia aeterna est, et nullo modo separabilis a re, cuius est essentia, quare non potest a libera voluntate pendere. Et quia significatio naturalis fundatur in natura rei, ut dictum est, nulla ratione censi potest imposita a voluntate Dei; imo si per impossibile Deus nollet, ut fumus suapte natura significaret ignem, nihilo- /p. 18/ minus, si talem naturam habeat participatam ex ideis, illum repraesentabit. Quare ad argumentum negandum est res naturales esse talis naturae et consequenter praefere talem repraesentationem arbitrio Dei. Nec D. Hilarius aliter opinatur, sed locutus est de esse quoad existentiam.

Ad secundum,<sup>51</sup> neganda est maior propositio cum Scoto: in 4. distin. 1. quaest. 5. ubi nec ex impositione divina concedit remanere aliquid in sacramentis, ut signa sint. Ad probationem dicendum est, rem omnino invariata nihil amplius efficere nunc, quam antea, si illud subiectum, in quod operatur eodem quoquo modo affectum sit, ac prius; quod in praesenti materia significavit D. August. lib. de Magist. cap. 1. aiens. Cum mihi signum datur, si nescientem me invenit, cuius rei sit signum, docere me nihil potest. Sed non ita contingit iis, qui norunt aliqua signa fuisse imposita ad significandum, nam ante impositionem nullam habebant in mente notitiam habitudinis, vel deputationis illorum signorum ad certa obiecta, quam postea habent, cuius notitiae proposito signo cum recordantur, deveniunt in cognitionem significati, ut eo loco tradit August. Satis ergo est, quod moraliter censeatur manere impositio in signo per extrinsecam denominationem, et in nobis sit cognitio illiusmodi impositionis, ut in rem significatam pelliceamur. Si nesciero, inquit D. Paulus 1. ad Corinth. 14. virtutem vocis, ero ei, cui loquor, barbarus, et qui loquitur mihi barbarus, id est, nihil ad rem inter nos communicabimus. Per virtutem vero vocis intelligit D. Thom. eo loco significationem. Ex hac doctrina colliges insigne discrimen inter signum naturale, et ex instituto:<sup>52</sup> hoc enim in se nihil, in cognoscente vero requirit memoriam significationis, et rei significatae. Illud in cognoscente nihil supponit, in se vero habet naturam accommodatam, et sufficientem ad pertrahendam potentiam in significatum.

second way, they are subject to Divine free will, in accord with the verse of *Psalm* 134: 'All things whatsoever God willed He made in heaven and on earth.' But in the first way, they do not receive being from the will of God, but from Ideas existing in the Divine essence before every act of will, as Cajetan [i.e., Thomas del Vio (1469-1534) better than others teaches [in commenting upon the *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 14, Article 16, the last paragraph.<sup>98</sup>

And the reasoning in that place is that existence is a contingent predicate which is communicated to things by a real temporal influence which God can freely give or hold back. But an essence is eternal and is in no way separable from the thing whose essence it is, for which reason it cannot depend upon a free will. And because natural signification, as has been said, is based upon the nature of a thing, by no reason can it be thought to be imposed by the will of God. Indeed, if by some impossibility, God were to will that smoke by its very nature would not signify fire, nevertheless, if it has such a nature, participated from the [Divine] Ideas, it will represent that fire. For this reason, in reply to the argument, we must deny that natural things are of such a nature, and consequently put such representation before the will of God. Nor does St. Hilary think otherwise, but he has spoken about being with regard to existence.

*The Second Objection is Answered.*—In answer to the second objection, we must deny the major premiss. This squares with Scotus in [his *Sentences* commentary] Book 4, Distinction 1, Question 5, where he denies that from a Divine imposition something remains in the sacraments in order that they be signs.<sup>99</sup> In reply to the proof [offered for this objection], we must say that a completely unchanged thing effects nothing more now than it did before, if the subject on which it operates is also disposed in the same way now as before. But this is what St. Augustine has indicated in the present case when he says in Chapter 1 [sic] of his book, 'On the Teacher': 'When a sign is given to me, if it finds me ignorant of the thing of which it is a sign, it can teach me nothing.'<sup>100</sup> But this has not happened for those who know that some signs have been set up in order to signify. For before that establishment those persons did not have in mind knowledge of the relationship to or the deputation of those signs for certain objects, which knowledge they did have afterwards. And when they remember this knowledge, through the proposed sign, they come to a knowledge of what is signified, as Augustine teaches in that passage. Therefore, it is enough that what is imposed on a sign through an extrinsic denomination<sup>101</sup> be thought to remain and that there be in us a knowledge of this kind of imposition, in order that we be drawn to the thing which is signified. 'If I know not the power of the word,' says St. Paul, in *Corinthians* I, Chapter 14, 'I will be a barbarian to him to whom I speak, and he who speaks will be a barbarian to me,' that is, we will communicate to one another nothing that matters. St. Thomas [commenting on] this passage understands 'the power of the word' to be its signification.<sup>102</sup>

*The Difference between a Natural Sign and a Sign by Institution.*—From this doctrine you may infer a notable difference between a natural sign and one by institution. The latter requires nothing in itself, but in the knower it requires a memory of its signification and of the thing signified. The former supposes nothing in the knower, but in itself it has a nature which is fitted and sufficient for drawing the potency to the thing signified.

Ad tertium<sup>53</sup> respondetur, hanc divisionem non fieri in membra opposita materialiter, sed formaliter; quamvis enim in unam rem utraque signi ratio incurrat, ut in exemplo Iridis adducto in argumento visitur; semper una discriminatur ab alia per suam propriam et intrinsecam essentiam.

Ad quartum<sup>54</sup> respondemus, sufficere institutum divinum ad imponendum signum; alioqui sacramenta vera signa gratiae ex institutione non essent, contra omnes scholasticos in 4. d. 1. quia a solo Deo imposita sunt. Ad cuius impugnationem recte ibidem occurrebatur. Instantia<sup>55</sup> tangit difficultatem de significatione signi Caimo concessi; quae erit plana si cum D. Hieronymo epist. 115.<sup>56</sup> dicimus illud signum fuisse tremorem, ut ipse colligit ex versione septuaginta interpretum, qui ubi in vulgata habetur, [ero profugus, et vagus] legunt, [ero gemens, et suspirans]. Nimirum tremore illo omnes ad miserationem naturaliter commovebantur, ne illum interficerent.

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Ad quintum<sup>57</sup> est fere eadem responsio, quae ad primum; idea nanque artificis, spectari potest, vel quoad suam existentiam, vel quoad essentiam; quae posita est in repraesentatione. Et quidem eius existentia pendet a voluntate, ut esse rerum creaturarum a Deo. Verum repraesentatio, cum sit essentia illius, imperio cognoscentis non subest. Ut enim in primo argumento de Deo respectu creaturarum dicebamus, ita producta in intellectu idea hac, vel illa ratione repraesentans, etsi voluntas renuat talem ei repraesentationem inesse, nihilominus idem repraesentabit; quare in signis naturalibus est numeranda. Idem dicendum erit, si fiat imago ad vivum repraesentans Caesarem; quanvis enim non imponatur, vel certe ad aliud significandum instituat non desinet esse naturale signum Caesaris.

De industria<sup>58</sup> omisimus illud argumentum quod ex Angelorum locutione desumitur; et a Recentioribus Dialecticis ad propositam divisionem impugnandam huc affertur: non continet enim ullam difficultatem huius loci propriam. Quoniam si Angelorum locutio per species conceptusve internos perficitur, (quod potior Theologorum pars arbitratur) ad naturalia signa proculdubio pertinebit; si per notas spirituales, nutusve corporeos (ut alii autumant) spectabit ad signa naturalia, vel ex instituto pro varia existimatione auctorum, qui has notas, sive nutus confingunt; nam qui naturalem significandi vim illis attribuunt, in naturalibus consequenter reponunt; qui ascititiam, et ex Angelorum placito dependentem significationem concedunt, cum signis ex instituto haec numerare coguntur. Inter has vero sententias iudicium ferre altioris subsellii est.

*The Third Objection is Answered.*—In answer to the third objection: the members of this division are not opposed materially, but rather formally. For even though both conceptions of a sign occur in one thing, as appears in the example of the rainbow which is adduced in the argument, one is always distinguished from the other by its own proper and intrinsic essence.

*The Fourth Objection is Answered.*—To the fourth objection we answer that a Divine command is enough to establish a sign. Otherwise, the Sacraments, inasmuch as they have been instituted by God alone, would not by that institution be true signs of grace—which position is contrary to all the Scholastics [commenting on the *Sentences*] in Book 4, Distinction 1, where arguments against it have been correctly given.

*The Sign of Cain was a Bodily Tremor.*—The ancillary argument touches on the difficult matter of the sign which was given to Cain. But this will be plain if, with St. Jerome, in *Epistle* 115 [sic], we say that Cain's sign was a tremor—which Jerome inferred from the version of the seventy translators [i.e., the *Septuagint*], who, where it says in the *Vulgate*, 'I will be a fugitive and a wanderer,' read 'I will be groaning and sighing.' Doubtless, by that tremor all were naturally moved not to kill him.<sup>103</sup>

*The Fifth Objection is Answered.*—The answer to the fifth objection is almost the same as that which was given to the first. For the artist's idea can be looked at either with respect to its existence or with respect to its essence which is located in representation. And indeed its existence depends upon [the artist's] will, just as the existence of created things depends upon God. But representation, inasmuch as it is its essence, is not subject to the command of the knower [i.e., the artist]. For as we said in the first argument about God with respect to creatures, an idea produced in the intellect and representing in this or that way will still represent in that same way, even if the [Divine] will is not to allow such a representation to be in it. For this reason [the representation] must be accounted a natural sign. The same will have to be said if a living image is formed which represents Caesar. For even though it may not be certainly instituted [for that], or it may be instituted for the purpose of signifying another thing, it is in fact a natural sign of Caesar.

*The Argument against the Given Doctrine which is taken from Angelic Speech is shown to be Futile.*—We have intentionally omitted the argument which is taken from the speech of angels and which is adduced here by more recent logicians in order to impugn the proposed division, since it does not contain any difficulty which is peculiar to this place. For if the speech of angels is accomplished by internal species or concepts (which is what the majority of theologians think) then without doubt it will be a natural sign. If it is accomplished by spiritual symbols or by bodily signals (as others say) it will be either a natural sign or a sign by institution, in the different estimates of the authors who imagine these symbols or signals. This is because those who attribute a natural power of signifying to them consequently classify them as natural; but those who affirm an adventitious signification which depends upon the voluntary agreement of the angels are obliged to number them with signs by institution. But to pass judgment between these opinions is a task for a higher court.

### Articulus 3

#### Expenditur alia signorum divisio in formalia, et instrumentalia

Etsi<sup>59</sup> ostendimus in 1. art. non esse reiicienda ab scholis signa formalia quasi novum inventum, aut rationi dissentaneum. Supersunt nihilominus adversus eadem et contra ipsam divisionem non levia obiecta.<sup>60</sup> Primum<sup>61</sup> si qua essent signa formalia, forent utique species intelligibiles, et conceptus in intellectu, phantasmata impressa, et expressa in sensu: at species non esse signa formalia ita ostenditur. Formale signum ex eo dicitur, quia se ipso informando potentiam efficit illi obiectum praesens; sed hoc non praestant species cum intellectus multis consignatus speciebus, nisi actu operetur, nihil cognoscat, ac proinde praesens obiectum non habeat.

Quod si respondeas satis esse, ut species sint signa, quod effective concurrant ad cognitionem; dicam pariter intellectum esse signum, quia efficit cognitionem. Respondebitur esse maiorem rationem quoniam species habent se ex parte obiecti, cuius loco con- /p. 20/ stituuntur in potentia, quae est propria signi conditio, et sunt illius imagines; quod in intellectum non quadrat.<sup>62</sup> At non est certum, quod sumitur, species scilicet esse obiectorum similitudines; quia nusquam est vera similitudo, nisi cum convenientia univoca in eo gradu, in quo similia esse dicuntur; sed species, et obiectum non habent hanc convenientiam, cum plerunque alterum sit accidens, alterum substantia, ergo etc.

Iam vero conceptum non esse signum formale, inde patet, quia cognoscitur eadem actione, qua producitur, ut docet sanct. Thom. quodlib. 5. art. 9. ad 1. et primo contra Gentes c. 55. et lib. 4. cap. 11. et 13. iisdem locis Ferrariensis, et Caietanus 1. part. quaest. 27. artic. 1. Torres ibidem disp. 5. et caeteri Thomistae, quod autem prius cognoscitur, ut moveat in cognitionem alterius, signum est instrumentale.

Secundum,<sup>63</sup> multa sunt signa simul formalia, et instrumentalia, ergo divisio non est idonea. Antecedens patet multis exemplis. Primum sit. Conceptus solis Astrologo per illum immediate solem cognoscenti est signum formale; Angelo, a quo cognoscitur, est instrumentale; quia cognitus ingerit notitiam solis. Secundum,<sup>64</sup> imago obiecti existens in speculo est signum formale; siquidem est eiusdem speciei cum ea, quae est in oculo, quam nemo excludet a formalibus signis: est instrumentale, quoniam obiicitur apectui, et ab eo percepta ducit in cognitionem obiecti, ut tradit D. Tho. 1. p. quaest. 56. art. 3. et 58. arti. 3. ad primum. Et de veritate quaest. 20. art. 4. Caiet. priori loco 1. partis ad 2. obiectionem. Scotus in 2.<sup>65</sup> dist. 13. quaest. unica. Rodiginus lib. 15. antiq. lect. cap. 1. Tertium<sup>66</sup> conceptus medius est signum formale sui obiecti ut per se patet,

## Article 3

**Another Division of Signs is Explained: into Formal and Instrumental**

*The Accepted Division is Impugned.*—Although we have shown in Article One, that formal signs should not be rejected by the Schools as something newly found or contrary to reason, nevertheless, there still are serious objections against those signs and against that division.

*The First Objection.*—First, if there are any formal signs, they will certainly be intelligible species, concepts in the intellect, and phantasms both impressed and expressed in the senses. But that species are not formal signs is shown as follows: A sign is said to be formal inasmuch as by itself informing a potency it presents an object to that potency. But a species does not do this, since the intellect affected by many species, unless it actually operates, knows nothing, and thus does not have an object present.

*The Argument Supporting Those who Deny that Species are Images.*—But if you reply that, in order for species to be signs, it is enough that they be concurrent efficient causes of knowledge, I<sup>104</sup> will say that the intellect is equally a sign because it is an efficient cause of knowledge. You will reply that there is more reason that species be on the side of the object in place of which they exist in the potency, which is a proper condition of a sign, and they are images of that object; which is not the case for the intellect. But what is assumed in this is not certain, that is, that species are likenesses of objects. For there is never a true likeness unless there is a univocal agreement in the grade in which the like things are said to exist. But a species and an object do not have such agreement, since the one is generally an accident while the other is a substance. Therefore, etc.

But that a concept is not a formal sign is clear from the fact that it is known by the same activity through which it is produced, as St. Thomas teaches, in *Quodlibet* 5, Article 9, in reply to Objection 1,<sup>105</sup> and in *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 55,<sup>106</sup> and Book 4, Chapters 11<sup>107</sup> and 13,<sup>108</sup> as does Ferrara in those same places.<sup>109</sup> So also does Cajetan [commenting on the *Summa Theologiae*], Part 1, Question 27, Article 1,<sup>110</sup> as well as Torres in the same place, Disputation 5,<sup>111</sup> and the other Thomists.<sup>112</sup> But something which, in order to move to the knowledge of something else, is itself first known is an instrumental sign.

*The Second Objection.*—Second, many signs are simultaneously formal and instrumental; therefore, this division is not suitable. The antecedent is evident from many examples.

*A Difficulty regarding the Astronomer's Concept of the Sun.*—First: the concept of the sun is a formal sign for an astronomer who through it immediately knows the sun. But for an angel who knows it, this concept is instrumental because as known itself it causes knowledge of the sun.

*A Difficulty with regard to the Species in the Mirror.*—Again, the image of an object existing in a mirror is a formal sign, since it is of the same species as that which is in the eye, which no one will deny is a formal sign. But it is instrumental inasmuch as it is objected to vision and as perceived by that vision it leads to knowledge of an object, as St. Thomas teaches [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 56, Article 3,<sup>113</sup> and Question 58, Article 3, Reply to the First Objection,<sup>114</sup> and in 'On Truth,' Question 20, Article 4,<sup>115</sup> and also Cajetan [commenting on] the first passage from the First Part, in Reply to the second Objection.<sup>116</sup>

at simul esse instrumentale colligitur ex 1. lib. introductionum cap. 1. ubi confessi sumus eundem conceptum esse signum ex instituto; est enim solemne in Logica nullum signum formale esse ex instituto, quoniam formale significat per essentiam suam, impositum vero per constitutionem externam.

Tertium<sup>67</sup> obiectum. Pleraque signa sunt neutro in membro collocanda; ergo divisio est angusta. Antecedens confirmatur multis exemplis. Unum est. Essentia Angeli est illi signum Dei; quoniam eius interventu assurgit in Dei cognitionem, ut probat D. Thom. 1. par. quaest. 56. artic. 3. sed nec est formale, nec instrumentale; non formale, quoniam non est consignata in intellectu Angeli nec est Dei imago; non instrumentale, quia hoc genus signi oportet prius cognoscatur, ut potentiam propellat in significatum; sed Angelus eadem cognitione, et se, et Deum percipit, ut docent multi ex discipulis D. Tho. Capreol. Caiet. Ferrar. Et probatur: nam aliter discurreret Angelus, si ex notitia suae essentiae veniret in notitiam Dei per distinctam cognitionem. Secundum exemplum huic simile visitur in Essentia divina, quae beatis est signum creaturarum; est enim in causa, ut eas cognoscant, verum non est signum formale; /p. 21/ quia non informat eorum intellectum; non instrumentale, quoniam eadem visione attinguntur creaturae cum essentia, ergo. etc.

Tertium, phantasmata singularium sunt signa respectu intellectus possibilis; siquidem per ea simul cum speciebus universalium agnoscit singularia, ut lib. 1. Physic. cap. 1. quaest. 4. traditur; sed non sunt formalia, cum non possint informare intellectum, utpote crassa et materialia; non instrumentalia, cum ab eodem non percipiuntur, ergo. etc.

Quartum, quando aliquis viso fumo ignem subintelligit, phantasma fumi est signum comparatione intellectus; sed in neutro membro constituitur. Maior patet; cum intellectus ab eo phantasmate moveatur ad percipiendum ignem. Minoris probatio est eadem, quae in superioribus exemplis; nam productum phantasma nec est imago ignis, neque intellectui inustum, ut sit formale. Item non est necessario percipiendum, ut evadat instrumentale.

Quintum denique exemplum sit. Cognitionis est signum obiecti, nam similitudo infixae potentiae participat absolutam signi definitionem; cognitionem esse expressam similitudinem docet Augustinus 7. de trinitate cap. 16. et D. Anselmus cap. 31. Monologii; at non est signum instrumentale, cum non percipiatur; non formale, quoniam hoc debet a<sup>68</sup> cognitione distingui, aut tamquam principium, aut tanquam terminus



See also Scotus in [his commentary on the *Sentences*] Book 2, Distinction 13, the only Question,<sup>117</sup> and Rodiginus [i.e., Ludovico Celio Rodigino (ca. 1450-1525)] Book 15, Chapter 1, of his *Ancient Readings*.<sup>118</sup>

*A Difficulty with regard to the Intermediate Concept.*—Third ‘an intermediate concept’<sup>119</sup> is evidently a formal sign of its object. But that it is simultaneously an instrumental sign is deduced from Book 1, Chapter 1 [sic], of the ‘*Introductions*,’ where we have declared that the same concept is a sign by institution.<sup>120</sup> For it is a logical rule that no formal sign is by institution, because a formal sign signifies by its essence, whereas one which is instituted signifies by an extrinsic establishment.<sup>121</sup>

*The Third Objection.*—The third objection is that many signs should be located in neither member. Therefore, the division is too narrow. The antecedent is confirmed by many examples. One is that the essence of an angel is for that angel a sign of God, since by the mediation of its essence an angel rises to the knowledge of God, as St. Thomas shows in [*Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 56, Article 3.<sup>122</sup> But it is neither a formal nor an instrumental sign.

It is not formal, because it is not a form affixed to the intellect of the angel, nor is it an image of God. It is not instrumental, because that kind of sign must first be known in order to impell the potency toward what is signified. But an angel perceives both itself and God by the same knowledge, as many of the disciples of St. Thomas teach (e.g. Capreolus [John (1380-1444)], Cajetan, and Ferrara). And this is proven: because otherwise an angel would reason discursively, if from the knowledge of its own essence it were to come to an awareness of God by a different knowledge.

A second example, similar to this, is seen in the Divine essence, which for the Blessed [in heaven] is a sign of creatures, since they know those creatures in their cause. But it is not a formal sign, because it does not inform the intellects of those Blessed. It is not an instrumental sign, because creatures and the Divine essence are apprehended in the same vision. Therefore, etc.

A third example is from the fact that the phantasms of singular things are signs with respect to the possible intellect, since it is through those phantasms together with the species of universals that it knows singulars, as is taught in [our commentary on Aristotle’s] *Physics*, Book 1, Chapter 1, Question 4.<sup>123</sup> But they are not formal signs, since they cannot inform the intellect, because they are too tangible and material. They are not instrumental, since they are not perceived by that same intellect. Therefore, etc.

A fourth example is when someone seeing smoke understands that it implies fire, the phantasm of the smoke is a sign with respect to the intellect. But such a sign is neither formal nor instrumental. The major premiss is clear, because the intellect is moved by that phantasm to the perception of fire. The proof of the minor premiss is the same as in the examples above. For the produced phantasm is neither an image of fire, nor is it imprinted on the intellect in order to be formal. Again, it does not necessarily have to be perceived and with that become instrumental.

Finally, a fifth example is that knowledge is a sign. For a likeness fixed upon a potency shares in the definition of a sign as such, and St. Augustine, in ‘*On the Trinity*,’ Book 7, Chapter 16 [sic],<sup>124</sup> and St. Anselm, in the ‘*Monologium*,’ Chapter 31,<sup>125</sup> both teach that knowledge is an expressed likeness. But it is not an



illius: siquidem habet rationem signi per ordinem ad potentiam cognoscentem; ergo, etc.

### Sectio articuli prima

#### Solvitur primum argumentum:

##### explicatur modus significandi specierum, et conceptuum

Ut res<sup>69</sup> aliqua a potentia cognitiva percipiatur, bifariam cum illa concurrat ad cognitionem, necesse est; primo, ut principium productivum illius; secundo, ut eiusdem terminus; et quoniam res cognoscenda plerunque est externa, vel etiam absens, quae per se uniri non potest cum potentia (quod tamen esse omnino necessarium, praeterquam sit lex omnium agentium naturalium, traditur expresse a D. Thom. 1.p. q. 12. art. 2.) producit loco sui speciem, qua mediante unitur cum potentia in ratione principii efficientis cognitionem.

Eodem modo philosophandum est de unione in ratione termini; nam hac etiam ratione per se coniungi nequit potentiae, praesertim internae et spirituali: et ideo per cognitionem exprimitur imago in qua relucet obiectum, et in qua illud conspici videtur a potentia tanquam in speculo. Oportet enim terminum actionis ab eadem actione immediate attingi, ut patet in calefactione et illuminatione, quantum illa calori realiter coniungitur, haec luci. Igitur cum /p. 22/ obiectum sit terminus cognitionis, et per se immediate attingi nequeat, vel quia absens, vel quia materiale, attingitur terminative in suo conceptu, sicut concurrat effective per sui speciem.

Ex doctrina huius discursus orta est occasio dubitandi, an species, et conceptus sint signa formalia; quia illae videntur se habere ex parte causae efficientis, quemadmodum intellectus, et ita non habere rationem signi: hi ex parte obiecti cogniti, proindeque deflectere ad signa instrumentalia. Nihilominus in communi sententia persistendum. Atque<sup>70</sup> ad eam partem primi argumenti, quae agit de speciebus, respondendum est, ut iam caepimus, species eatenus esse signa, quatenus constituunt potentiam in actu primo sufficientem ad cognoscendum, idque non modo ut causae efficientes, sed etiam ut formales praebendo speciem cognitioni loco obiecti, quod repraesentant; et sat esse, ut dicantur signa formalia. Quod autem in argumento sumitur, signa formalia dici ea, quae in formando causant cognitionem, solum est verum de iis, quae concurrunt in actu secundo. Cuiusmodi sunt conceptus. Non vero de caeteris, quae constituunt potentiam in actu primo; quibus sufficit, ut diximus, si potentiam informent. Quanvis neque id universim, sed frequentius tantum requiratur, ut art. 4. dicemus.

instrumental sign, because it is not perceived. And it is not a formal sign, since such a sign must be distinguished from knowledge as either its principle or its terminus, because it has the character of a sign by a relation to a knowing potency. Therefore, etc.

**The First Section of the Article  
The First Argument is Answered,**

**and the Way Species and Concepts Signify is Explained**

*An Object concurs with a Potency for Knowledge in two ways, namely, as a Principle or as a Terminus of that Knowledge.*—In order that some thing be perceived by a knowing power, it is necessary that it concur with knowledge in two ways: first, as a productive principle of that knowledge, and second as the terminus of the same knowledge. And because the thing which is to be known is generally external, or even absent, and cannot be by itself united with the potency (which is, however, absolutely necessary and, in addition to the fact that it is a law for all natural agents, is taught by St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 12, Article 2<sup>126</sup>), it produces in place of itself a species, by means of which it is united with the potency as an efficient principle of knowledge.

We must philosophize in the same way about the union [of the thing with the potency] in the thing's role of being a terminus. For also in this role it cannot by itself be joined to a potency, especially to a potency which is internal and spiritual. Therefore, through knowledge there is expressed an image in which the object is reflected and in which that object appears to be seen by the potency as in a mirror. For it is necessary that the terminus of an action be immediately attained by that same action, as is clear in heating and illumination, inasmuch as the former is really joined to heat and the latter is really joined to light. Therefore, since the object is the terminus of knowledge, and it cannot by itself be immediately apprehended, either because it is absent or because it is material, it is apprehended terminatively in its concept, just as it concurs efficiently through its species.

*Intelligible Species are Formal Signs.*—From what has been taught in this discourse an occasion arises to doubt whether species and concepts are formal signs. For species seem, just like the intellect itself, to be efficient causes and thus not to have the character of a sign. But concepts are on the side of the object, and therefore lean more toward instrumental signs. Nevertheless, we should stay with the common opinion. And to that part of the first argument which treats of species, we must answer, as we have already begun to answer, that species are signs insofar as they constitute the potency in a *first act* which is sufficient for knowing, doing so not only as efficient causes but also as formal causes by offering species to knowledge in place of the object which they represent. And this is enough for them to be called formal signs. But what is assumed in the argument, that formal signs are said to be those which by informing cause knowledge, is true only about those which concur in *second act*. Concepts are of this kind, but not the species which constitute a potency in *first act*. For these it is enough, as we have said, if they inform the potency. But that is not required always, but only more frequently, as we shall say in Article 4 [sic].<sup>127</sup>

Ad caeteras instantias recte occursum est inter arguendum. Ultima tangit novam difficultatem de repraesentatione specierum, quae fortasse ad praesens negotium nihil attinet. Verisimilius<sup>71</sup> enim existimamus species esse signa formalia, esto imagines non sint; quia sunt formae determinantes intellectum; habentes se ex parte obiecti, cuius loco ponuntur, et potentiam promovent in cognitionem, quin ipsae cognoscantur: quae conditiones abunde explent rationem signi formalis. Quod enim in definitione addimus [Esse imagines, et similitudines] supponit veram sententiam de harum specierum repraesentatione, quam hoc loco tractare non licet, etsi libeat. Eius tamen veritatem utcunque firmam relinquamus.

Aristoteles<sup>72</sup> libr. de Memor. et reminisc. videtur de industria affecisse speciem omnibus nominibus significantibus imaginem. Imprimis enim vocat imaginem, deinde similitudinem et figuram, qualem efformamus, cum sigillamus annulis; postea picturam velut delineatam in tabula. Mittamus alios locos, in quibus phantasmata vocat simulachra et idola. Veniamus ad hoc ipsum caput, in quo versamur, ubi passiones, id est conceptus aperte nuncupat rerum similitudines. Est autem eadem ratio, ut fatentur adversarii specierum, atque conceptuum. D. Aug. 8 de Trinit. cap. 8.<sup>73</sup> Finxi, inquit, in animo meo imaginem Alexandriae, atque intuens in ipsam, id est, imaginem, et quasi picturam eius, etc. Idem habet lib. 14. ca. 17. D. Thom. 1. p. q. 12. art. 9, species vocat modo similitudines, modo imagines. Consonat cap. 53. 1. contra Gent. cum Ferrariens. ibi. et ita loquuntur omnes scholastici.<sup>74</sup> Sed quid plura? Prima Joannis<sup>75</sup> cap. 3. dicitur; Similes ei erimus (id est Deo) quia videbimus eum /p. 23/ sicuti est, quod de expressa Dei imagine intelligunt communiter Patres.

Eadem pars stabilitur ratione.<sup>76</sup> Species significat rem, eiusque notitiam parit ob aliquam cum ea necessitudinem, ut constat: haec vero non est in essendo; tum quia species intentionalis est minimae entitatis, quae in essentia minus convenit cum obiecto, quam aliae res etsi obiecto oppositae, tum quia multi sunt effectus et proprietates eiusdem obiecti habentes cum eo maiorem convenientiam in natura, quibus non inest ea vis manifestandi obiectum, ergo illa convenientia est in repraesentando; quae nequit accommodatius intelligi, vel explicari, quam per modum imaginis et similitudinis.

Ratio,<sup>77</sup> qua adversarii moventur, primo arguit falsitatis Aristotelem, et omnes Philosophos, ac scholasticos uno ore vocantes species similes, et similitudines obiectorum; quas tamen constat in natura univoca cum obiectis non convenire. Deinde confundit similitudinem cum identitate; quanvis eo modo loquantur multi autores, cum appellant unum indi-

*Intelligible Species are Formal Signs even though they are not Images.*—The other objections will be directly met in what will be argued. The last one touches on a new problem which perhaps does not affect the present business. For we think that species, even if we grant that they may not be images, more probably are formal signs. For they are forms which determine the intellect, they are on the side of the object in place of which they are posited, and they move the potency to knowledge without themselves being known—which conditions amply fulfill the definition of a formal sign. For the fact that we add in the definition that they are images and likenesses presupposes a true opinion about how these species represent [the things whose species they are], which we may not treat in this place even if we may want to do so. However, let us leave the truth of that [i.e., that they are images] in some way established:

*That Species are Images of Things Known is Proven from the Philosophers.*—Aristotle in his book, ‘*On Memory and Reminiscence*,’ seems intentionally to have given the species names, all of which signify an image.<sup>128</sup> For, first of all, he calls it an image, then a likeness, and a figure, such as we form when we use a signet ring. Then he compares it to a picture which is drawn on a tablet. We may pass over other places in which he calls phantasms likenesses and images. But let us come to this very chapter with which we are now dealing, where he openly calls affections [of the mind], that is to say concepts, likenesses of things. But, as our opponents confess, species and concepts have the same character. See St. Augustine, ‘*On the Trinity*,’ Book 8, Chapter 8, where he says: ‘*I have fashioned in my mind an image of Alexandria, and looking at it, that is to say, the image and, as it were, the picture of Alexandria, etc.*’<sup>129</sup> He has the same in Book 14, Chapter 17.<sup>130</sup> And St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 12, Article 9, calls species now likenesses and now again images.<sup>131</sup> *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 53, agrees with this, as does Ferrara commenting in that place.<sup>132</sup> And all the Scholastics speak in the same way. But why more? The First Epistle of *John*, Chapter 3 says: ‘*We will be like Him (that is, God) because we will see Him just as He is,*’ which the Fathers commonly understand to be about the explicit image of God.

*The Same is Confirmed by Reason.*—The same position is confirmed by reason: The species signifies the thing, and it brings forth knowledge of that thing on account of some close connection which it evidently has with it. But this is not in being: First, because an intentional species has minimal entity, and in its essence agrees less with the object than do other things, even those which are adverse to that object; second, because there are many effects and properties of the same object, having more agreement in nature with it, in which there is not the same power to manifest that object. Therefore, that agreement is in representing, which cannot be better understood or explained than by way of an image and a likeness.

*The Basis of the Opposite Opinion is Destroyed.*—The argument, by which our opponents are moved, first accuses Aristotle, and all philosophers and Scholastics, of falsity when with one voice they all term species ‘like’ to and ‘likenesses’ of objects, which likenesses clearly do not univocally agree in nature with those objects. Next it confuses likeness with identity, although many authors speak that way when they call one individual like another. However, if we examine the matter more closely, an agreement in a univocal species is an identity and that agree-

viduum simile alteri. Re tamen severius examinata, convenientia in specie univoca est identitas; et illa, quae est in repraesentando, similitudo, iuxta Boetium supra citatum apud D. Thom. in 1. d. 7. q. 2. art. 2. ad 2.

Respondemus ergo negando ad rationem imaginis et similitudinis, sufficere, vel requiri convenientiam in eadem natura. Et quidem non sufficere, manifestum est ex vera Latinorum Patrum et scholasticorum doctrina, quam tradit D. Thom. 1. p. q. 35. art. 2. et asserit solum filium in divinis esse imaginem et similitudinem Patris, iuxta illud 1. ad Collos. Qui est imago Dei invisibilis. Et 1. ad Hebr. Qui cum sit splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius; non vero Spiritum sanctum, quem in natura aequae ac Filium convenire cum Patre, fides est. Non deficit ergo convenientia in natura.

At nec est necessaria; quia, ut satis fuse animadvertit Aristoteles in libr. de memoria, in his imaginibus repraesentatio non est in ipso esse, sed in exprimendo, et quasi delineando obiecto per modum figurae externae. Ut in tabula pictum animal, inquit Aristoteles, et animal est, et imago, et idem, et unum ipsum est ambo, esse tamen non idem amborum, et est considerare, et ut animal, et ut imaginem: sic et quod in nobis phantasma oportet suscipere, et ipsum aliquid se esse, et alterius phantasma. Quasi dicat.<sup>78</sup> Possumus considerare, et ex quibus constat pictura animalis, vel phantasma; et quod sint expressiva. Atque quoad illud pictura sunt colores, phantasma vero est quaedam qualitas; quoad repraesentationem autem sunt animal per imitationem et similitudinem.

Scimus D. Thom. 4. contra Gent. cap. 11. appellare etiam imaginem, eam naturam quae convenit in gradu univoco cum alia; Sed ibidem docet praeter hunc modum imaginis reperiri alium, de quo loquimur; sic enim ait; Imago alicuius rei est duplex: una, quae non communicat in natura cum eo, cuius est imago: sicut statua aenea, et ratio hominis in intellectu: alia quae eandem naturam habet cum /p. 24/ re, cuius est imago, ut filius regis, in quo imago patris apparet.

Secunda pars<sup>79</sup> eiusdem argumenti attingit quaestionem alio in libro tractandam: nimirum. Utrum verbum mentis cognoscatur eadem intellectione, qua producitur? Nunc uno verbo respondemus conceptum mentis, iuxta sententiam D. Thomae, et discipulorum existimantium verbum, seu conceptum cognosci per se proprie eadem actione, qua producitur, esse signum instrumentale ob rationem in argumento propositam. Secundum<sup>80</sup> aliam vero sententiam communiorem et veriore, quae negat verbum proprie cognosci actione, qua fit, asserimus esse signum

ment which is in representing is likeness, according to Boethius as he was cited above by St. Thomas in [his *Commentary on the Sentences*], Book 1, Distinction 7, Question 2, Article 2, In Reply to Objection 2.<sup>133</sup>

We answer, therefore, by denying that the definition of an image or a likeness requires an agreement in the same nature. And indeed, that [such an agreement] is not enough is evident from the true doctrine of the Latin Fathers and the Scholastics, which St. Thomas gives in [*Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 35, Article 2,<sup>134</sup> when he asserts that only the Son among the Divine Persons is an image and likeness of the Father, according to the verse of *First Colossians*: ‘*Who is the image of the invisible God,*’ and the verse of *Hebrews*, Chapter 1: ‘*Who, since he is the splendor of glory and the figure of his substance.*’ But the Holy Spirit is not an image, the Spirit, who, Faith teaches, agrees equally with the Son and the Father in the Divine Nature and therefore does not lack agreement in nature.

*A Passage from Aristotle is Explained.*—But neither is [such an agreement] necessary. For, as Aristotle notes at sufficient length in his book, ‘*On Memory,*’<sup>135</sup> in these images the representation is not in being, but in expressing and, as it were, delineating the object like an external figure. For example, Aristotle says, an animal pictured on a page is both an animal and an image, and one and the same thing is both. But it is not the same *being* of both; but a *considering* [of the same thing] both as an animal and as an image. So also it is necessary that we receive a phantasm, and that it be something itself and also the phantasm of something else. It is as though he is saying that we can consider both the material makeup of the picture or the phantasm of the animal and also the fact that they are expressive. And with respect to the former the colors are the picture, while the phantasm is a certain quality. But with respect to the representation, they both are the animal by imitation and likeness.

We know that St. Thomas, in *Contra Gentiles*, Book 4, Chapter 11, calls that nature an image which agrees in a univocal grade with another nature.<sup>136</sup> But in the same place he teaches that there is, besides this, another kind of image, about which we are now speaking. For he speaks as follows: ‘*There are two kinds of image: one which does not share a nature with that whose image it is, for example, a bronze statue, and the concept of a man in the intellect; and a second which has the same nature as the thing whose image it is, as for example the son of a king in whom the image of his father appears.*’<sup>137</sup>

*According to the Thomists the Concept is an Instrumental Sign.*—The second part of the same argument touches on a question which will be treated in another book. This is: whether the mental word is known by the same act of understanding by which it is produced? Now we answer briefly that, according to the opinion of St. Thomas and his disciples who think that the word or the concept is directly and properly known by the same act by which it is produced, the mind’s concept is an instrumental sign because of the reason proposed in the argument.

*According to the Common and more True Opinion, the Concept is a Formal Sign.*—But according to another more common and more true opinion, which denies that the word is properly known by the act by which it is produced, we assert that it is a formal sign, for the opposite reason, namely, because it does not have to be known in order to bring knowledge of the object. We have said that it is not

formale, propter oppositum fundamentum, videlicet, quia non est necessario cognoscendum, ut obiecti notitiam afferat. Diximus non cognosci proprie, quia multi ex Autoribus secundae sententiae, non negant verbum cognosci, ut quo actione, qua fit. Verum id non est simpliciter cognosci, sed esse id, quo aliud cognoscitur, ut explicabimus, cum ex professo hanc quaestionem discutiemus.

## Sectio articuli 2

### Solvitur secundum argumentum: explicatur sensus

#### divisionis: et disquiritur an oporteat signum actu significare

Praesupponendum est<sup>81</sup> pro totius argumenti solutione hanc divisionem (quemadmodum et priorem) non fieri in membra opposita materialiter, sed formaliter: idque sufficere ad rectam divisionem, iuxta Dialecticorum regulas. Quamobrem etsi in exemplis in argumento adductis, eadem res participet utramque significandi rationem, ut conceptus solis in mente Astrologi, species in speculo, et conceptus medius: nihilominus sunt plura signa formaliter; nam signum est nomen connotativum formaliter indicans vim significandi, et denotans rem significantem, verum uberioris doctrinae causa ad singula exempla respondeamus.

Primo<sup>82</sup> igitur exemplo concedendum est, conceptum solis non modo Angelo, sed eidem Astrologo, si per alium reflexe cognoscatur, esse signum instrumentale. Dubium tamen est, utrum eadem omnino significatione subeat utramque signi rationem? Si enim id concedatur, iam signum formale, et instrumentale, formaliter etiam accepta, non opponuntur. Quod autem ita existimandum sit, haec ratio demonstrat. Conceptus non habet vim repraesentandi solem, nisi quia est illius imago; ergo quocumque modo concurrat ad eius notitiam, concurrat per significationem imaginis, et solum est discrimen ex parte concursus cum potentia, quia modo concurrat ut terminus potentiam informans, modo ut res cognita. Huic obiectioni, etsi verbo tenus occurri possit in eorum sententia, qui essentiam /p. 25/ signi constituunt in respectu ad rem significatam, fingendo propter diversam habitudinem conceptus ad potentiam resultare diversas habitudines ad rem significatam; nequeunt tamen illae habitudines explicari, aut ulla probabili ratione defendi, dummodo illius sententiae Autores tueantur discrimen essentielle inter haec signa. Nam si contenti sint accidentali, hoc sufficienter sumitur ex diverso ordine ad potentiam, quem signum in eorum opinione ut proprietatem connotat.



known *properly*, because many of the authors of the second opinion do not deny that the word is known as a 'by which' in the act in which it is produced. But that is not to be known in an absolute sense, but to be that by which something else is known, as we will explain, when we discuss this question *ex professo*.

### The Second Section of the Article.

The Second Argument is Answered;

the Meaning of the Division is explained;

and the Question is Asked: Must a Sign Actually Signify?

*The Division of Signs into Formal and Instrumental, or into Natural and By Institution, is into Members which are Formally rather than Materially Opposed.*—

To answer the whole argument, we must presuppose that this division (like the one before) is into members which are opposed not materially, but formally—which, according to the rules of the logicians, is enough for a correct division.<sup>138</sup> Therefore, although in the examples brought out in the argument, that is, the concept of the sun in the mind of the astronomer, the species in the mirror, and an intermediate concept, the same thing shares in both definitions of a sign, nevertheless, they are several signs in a formal sense. For 'sign' is a connotative term which formally indicates a power to signify and connotes<sup>139</sup> a thing signified. But for the sake of a fuller doctrine, let us respond to the individual examples.

*The Difficulty regarding the Concept of the Sun is Explained.*—Therefore, with regard to the first example we grant that the concept of the sun is an instrumental sign not only for an angel but also for the astronomer himself, if it is known in a reflex manner through something else. However, the question is: does it come under both definitions of a sign with entirely the same signification? For if the answer is yes, then a formal sign and an instrumental sign, even taken as such, are not opposed. But that we should think so, is demonstrated by the following argument: A concept has power to represent the sun only because it is an image of that sun; therefore, in whatever way it concurs for the knowledge of the sun, it concurs through the signification of an image; and there is a distinction only on the side of its concurrence with the potency, inasmuch as at one time it concurs as a terminus informing the potency, and at another time it concurs as the thing which is known.

To the question here, although it can be found in so many words in the opinion of those who place the essence of a sign in a relation to the thing signified, imagining that on account of the different relations of a concept to a potency there result different relations to the thing signified, nevertheless, these relations cannot be explained or defended with any probable argument, as long as the authors of this opinion defend an essential difference between these [formal and instrumental] signs. For if they are content with an accidental difference, this is sufficiently taken from a different relation to the potency, which, in their opinion, a sign connotes as a property.



Nobis tamen<sup>83</sup> iuxta communiorem sententiam placet divisionem fieri in membra essentialiter diversa, et respectum illius conceptus ad solem in utroque modo significandi unicum esse; verum cum existimemus habitudinem ad potentiam ingredi formalem rationem signi: et haec sit omnino diversa, quando conceptus concurret formaliter, et quando obiective, ex eadem sumitur sufficiens ratio distinctionis specificae. In cuius maiorem explicationem advertimus hoc interesse inter membra huius divisionis, et membra praecedentis,<sup>84</sup> quando in eandem rem materialem incurrunt, quod in his respectus ad rem est idem, ad potentiam diversus, ut patet in proposito exemplo; in praecedentibus e contra respectus ad potentiam potest esse idem, ad rem significatam semper est diversus. Apparet hoc in Iride, quae eodem modo est apta videri, cum significat naturaliter futuram pluviam, et cum repraesentat ex institutione non futurum diluvium. Nec est, quod aliquis obijciat, Iridem cum est signum ex instituto habere aliquid diligentius examinandum; scilicet impositionem; nam haec non variat respectum ipsius Iridis ad oculum, et caeteras potentias, sed ultra illum addit hoc cognoscendum. Assumpsimus respectum signi naturalis semper esse diversum a respectu signi ex instituto, quod probatione non eget, cum alter sit proportio innata rei; alter constitutio omnino extrinseca.

In secundo exemplo<sup>85</sup> speciei impressae speculo dubia est utraque pars antecedentis, in quo assumitur, eam speciem esse signum instrumentale et formale. Et quoad primum (quidquid existimarint Thomistae), certum est speciem in speculo non videri; ut ex perspectivorum schola late demonstratur in lib. 2. de anima, c. 7. q. 8. Interim sufficiat haec communis ratio ibi allata. Obiectum visus nihil est, nisi lucidum, et coloratum, quorum neutrum participat species, cum sit accidens alienae omnino naturae ab his; ergo non percipitur a visu, qui ultra suum obiectum versari non potest; sed quod cernitur est obiectum per speciem reflexam ex speculo: unde perspicuum manet speciem non esse signum instrumentale.<sup>86</sup>

Quod attinet ad secundum. Est gravis contentio, hodieque satis agitata an ea species, et quaevis alia existens in aere sit signum formale? Ratio dubitandi est, quia signum definitur, quod potentiae cognoscenti aliquid repraesentat: repraesentare vero cum idem sit, ac praesens facere, non potest quadrare in rem, quae actu non significat: cuiusmodi sunt illae species. Unde aliqui autores colligunt /p. 26/ actualem repraesentationem esse omnino necessariam ad rationem signi; quibus favere videtur D. Basilius in cap. 7.<sup>87</sup> Esaiiae, ubi ait rem significatam posse esse praesentem, praeteritam, vel futuram, signum autem oportere secundum instans tem-

*The Given Division is into Members which are Essentially Diverse.*—We, however, are content with the more common opinion, that the division is into essentially diverse members, and that the relation of that concept to the sun is unique in each way of signifying. But because we think that a disposition to a potency enters into the formal definition of a sign, and that this is totally diverse when the concept concurs formally as opposed to when it concurs objectively, from that is derived a sufficient reason for a specific distinction.

*The Distinction between This and the Preceding Division.*—For a greater explanation of this we note that there is a difference between the members of this division and the members of the preceding division, when they occur for the same material thing, that in the latter the relation in the members to the thing is the same, but to the potency it is diverse, as is clear in the proposed example; whereas in the former [i.e., the members of the distinction between natural and by institution signs] the relation to the potency can be the same, but to the thing signified it is always diverse. This is evident in the rainbow, which is apt to be seen in the same way when it naturally signifies a coming rain and when by [Divine] institution it represents the fact that there will not be a flood. Nor is it true, as someone may object, that the rainbow, because it is a sign by institution has something, viz., an imposition [from the one instituting it], which must be more diligently examined. For this does not change the relation of that rainbow to the eye and the other potencies; but beyond that relation it adds this to be known. We have assumed that the relation of a natural sign is always different from the relation of a sign by institution. And this does not need proof, since an innate proportion to what is signified is one thing, but an entirely extrinsic establishment is something else.

*The Difficulty about the Species Impressed on the Mirror is Dissolved. The Species in the Mirror is not an Instrumental Sign.*<sup>140</sup>—In the second example, of the species impressed upon a mirror, both parts of the antecedent are doubtful when they assume that the species is an instrumental and a formal sign. And with regard to the first (whatever the Thomists may think) it is certain that the species in the mirror is not seen, as is extensively shown from the school of the perspectivists in [our commentary on] *De Anima*, Book 2, Chapter 7, Question 8.<sup>141</sup> For now let this common argument given there suffice: The object of sight is nothing else but an illumined and colored thing and the species is neither of these. For it is an accident of an entirely different nature from these. Therefore, it is not perceived by sight, which cannot be exercised beyond its own object. But what is seen is that object through the species which is reflected from the mirror. Therefore, it is clear that the species is not an instrumental sign.<sup>142</sup>

*The Difficulty about Species diffused in the Air is resolved. For the Essence of a Sign, an Aptitude to Represent is Enough.*—With regard to the second: there is a serious debate, which is currently rather heated, as to whether that species, or any other existing in the air,<sup>143</sup> is a formal sign. The reason for the question is that a sign is defined as that which represents something to a knowing potency; but since to represent is the same as to make present, it cannot fit a thing which does not actually signify; and these species are things of that kind. Hence, some authors conclude that an actual representation is in every way necessary for the nature of a sign. And St. Basil seems to agree with them, in his commentary on *Isaiah*,

pus animadvertere. Opposita tamen sententia asserens ad rationem signi sat esse aptitudinem ad repraesentandum, est communior et verior.<sup>88</sup> Traditur ab Alensi. 4. p. q. 1. m. 1. ad. 2. Bonaventura ibidem q. 2. Probatur primo ex consuetudine Dialectorum perpetuo definiendum res secundum aptitudinem. Deinde ab incommodo. Nemo quippe negaverit sacrosanctam syntaxim tam proprie et vere sacramentum esse, dum custoditur in pyxide, quam dum oculis visenda proponitur: at sacramentum definitur signum rei sacrae. Denique ratione, signum constituitur formaliter per fundamenta relationum ad rem et potentiam: sed haec reperiuntur in signo, sive potentiam moveat, sive non; ergo utroque modo est signum. Nec adversariorum ratio desumpta ex definitione oppositum convincit; nam verbum [repraesentare] in definitione accipitur more Dialectico pro aptitudine, non pro actu.

D. Basilius<sup>89</sup> locutus est de signo actu significante, quod in eo distinguitur a re significata, quia haec potest esse actu significata, licet non existat, signum vero necesse est existat. Quod est intelligendum, vel regulariter, vel de signo sensibili; alioqui non evadet calumniam, quoniam (ut mox docebimus) essentia rei naturalis cognita est Angelo signum instrumentale passionum; potest autem essentia non existens cognosci. In gratiam tamen sententiae D. Basili, et in concordiam harum opinionum advertimus signum dividi posse in actuale, et aptitudinale,<sup>90</sup> quorum illud apte dicitur significans, hoc significantivum, non tamquam in res materiales diversas, sed uti in diversas habitudines eiusdem rei. Quemadmodum enim intelligibile, et intellectum sunt diversi respectus eiusdem rei, alter consequens rem absolute, alter supposita cognitione; ita signum secundum se habet vim repraesentandi rem, sed cum actu repraesentat, acquirit novum respectum significantis. Et iuxta has duas acceptiones verae sunt praedictae sententiae, licet verior ea, quae simpliciter appellat signum, quod solum habet aptitudinem.

At non segniter advertendum,<sup>91</sup> hanc divisionem non cadere in respectum signi ad rem significatam; hic enim cum sit, vel naturalis proportio, vel impositio, quocunquo modo se habeat signum ad potentiam, semper est idem; sed in habitudinem ad potentiam, cui nunc repraesentat, nunc repraesentare potest. Subiungunt aliqui debere hanc potestatem esse proximam, cuiusmodi est illarum specierum, quae sunt in memoria, et posita sola applicatione potentiae exeunt in actum: non vero in specie speculi, quae cum sit accidens, et migrare nequeat a subiecto in subiectum, non habet potentiam, ut obiectum oculo repraesentet. Unde iterum

Chapter 7, where he says that a thing which is signified can be present, past, or future, but a sign must make [something] known to the mind in present time.<sup>144</sup>

However, the opposite opinion which asserts that for the definition of a sign an aptitude for representing suffices, is the more common and the more true opinion. It is taught by [Alexander of] Hales, [in his *Summa*] Part 4, Question 1, Member 1, In Reply to Objection 2 [sic],<sup>145</sup> and by Bonaventure in the same place, Question 2.<sup>146</sup> It is proven first from the practice of the logicians who always define things according to their aptitude.<sup>147</sup> Second, it is proven from the inconvenience [which comes from denying it]. For no one would deny that Holy Communion is just as properly and truly a sacrament when it is kept in a pyx, as when it is offered to be seen by the eyes; but a sacrament is defined as a sign of something sacred.

Finally, it is proven for the reason that a sign is formally constituted by the foundations of its relations to the thing and to the potency. But these are found in the sign whether it moves the potency or not. Therefore, it is a sign either way. And the opponents' argument which is taken from the definition does not prove the opposite; for the word, 'to represent,' is taken in the definition in the logical way, for being in aptitude and not in act.<sup>148</sup>

*The True Sense of St. Basil's Opinion is Put Forward. Signs are Correctly Divided as Actual or Aptitudinal.*—And St. Basil spoke about a sign which is actually signifying, which is in that distinguished from the thing signified inasmuch as the thing can be actually signified, even if it does not exist, but it is necessary the sign exist. This should be understood either as a general rule or with regard to a sensible sign. Otherwise, it will not escape falsehood, since (as we will presently teach) the known essence of a natural thing is for an angel an instrumental sign of its properties; but a non-existing essence can be known. Thanks, however, to the opinion of St. Basil, and for the sake of harmony among these opinions, we remark that signs can be divided into actual and aptitudinal, of which the former will fittingly be called 'signifying' and the latter 'significative'—which is not to be divided into different material things but as different dispositions of the same thing. For just as 'understandable' and 'understood' are different aspects of the same thing, the one following the thing in an absolute way and the other [following the thing] but with knowledge supposed, so a sign in itself has the power to represent a thing, but when it actually does represent that thing, it acquires a new relation of 'signifying.' And taken in these two ways, the mentioned opinions are true, although that one is more true which simply calls that a sign which only has an aptitude.

*The Given Division of Signs is taken in Relation to the Potency. Species in Air have a Proximate Aptitude to Represent.*—But it should be quickly noted, that this division does not fall under the relation of a sign to a thing signified. For since this last relation is either a natural proportion or one of imposition, it is always the same in whatever way a sign is related to a potency. Rather it falls under the relation of a sign to a potency, to which at one time the sign actually represents and at another time it is able to represent.

Some authors add that this potency must be proximate, in the way of those species which are in the memory and which are actualized, as soon as the potency is exercised. But this [they think] is not so in the case of a species in a mirror, which because it is an accident and cannot pass from subject to subject does not

concludunt non esse signum etiam aptitudinale.<sup>92</sup> Verum decipiuntur; quia tunc res /p. 27/ censetur esse in potentia proxima ad aliquid praestandum cum non eget aliquo augmento, vel mutatione in se facta, ut illud exhibeat; quamvis desit aliqua alia conditio necessaria. Qua ratione merito dices ignem esse in potentia proxima ad comburendum, esto non habeat passum approximatum, in quod operetur, quia approximatio non perficit vim activam ignis. Eodem modo res habet in specie, quia ex se consummatam habet vim repraesentandi, nisi subiectum, in quod incidit, capax non sit repraesentationis. Addunt aliqui (quod iniudicatum relinquimus) satis esse, ut aliae species eiusdem naturae specificae habeant illam potentiam proximam et eius actum, ut omnibus attribuat haec signi nuncupatio.

Tertium exemplum<sup>93</sup> nihil absurdum colligit, cum professi simus idem materiale signum posse habere utramque rationem, non modo respectu diversorum, ut contingit in conceptu medio: sed respectu eiusdem, quod patuit in conceptu solis. Dubium tamen est, an re vera conceptus medius sit signum instrumentale conceptus ultimi, et rei significatae. Et ratio, quae assertur, est signum instrumentale percipiendum esse, ut ducat in notitiam significati: hunc autem conceptum minime percipi. Adde nec ad significandum imponi.

Sed propter hanc rationem potuit non poenitere Sotum lib. 1. Summul. c. 3. alterius sententiae, quam tenuerat in prima editione; et tenet Fonseca citatus nosque probabiliorem iudicamus. Non quasi ipse conceptus medius per se impositus sit ad significandum, et per se cognoscatur; id enim etsi necessarium est in signo, quod per se tale est, non exigitur tamen in eo quod sola consecutione ob similitudinem cum vero signo imponi dicitur et cognosci. Confirmatur exemplo scripturae, quae non imponitur per se, sed consequutive per impositionem vocis a cuius etiam significatione extrinsece denominatur, uti et conceptus medius; qui deterior est scriptura hac in parte; quod non modo non imponitur per se, sed nec percipitur: sufficit tamen, ut utrumque habeat merito vocis. Favet huic sententiae Caietanus 1. p. q. 34. artic. 1. cum docet conceptum medium extrinseca tantum denominatione dici verbum ratione scilicet vocis, cuius est causa, et imago.

have potency to represent an object to the eye. Hence they further conclude that it is not even an aptitudinal sign.

But they are deceived; because a thing is then thought to be in proximate potency to do something when it does not need any addition or any change introduced into it in order to do that thing, even though some other necessary condition may be lacking. For this reason one will rightly say that fire is in proximate potency for burning, even though it does not have an approximate subject on which it may act, for an approximation does not perfect the active power of the fire. And the situation is the same for the species [in the mirror], because of itself it has complete power to represent, unless the subject onto which it falls is not capable of representation. Some add (something we are leaving undecided) that it is enough that other species of the same specific nature have that proximate potency and its act, in order that this name 'sign' be attributed to them all.

*The Obscurity regarding the Intermediate Concept is Shown.*—The third example concludes to nothing absurd. For we have stated that the same material sign can have both characters, not only with respect to different things, as happens in the case of an intermediate concept, but also with respect to the same thing, which was clear in the case of the concept of the sun. But there is a question whether in fact the intermediate concept is an instrumental sign of the ultimate concept and of the thing which is signified? And there is an argument which asserts that an instrumental sign must be perceived in order to lead to the knowledge of what is signified; but this concept is in no way perceived. Add that neither is it established in order to signify.

But because of this argument it was possible for Soto, in his *Summulae*, Book 1, Chapter 3, not to reject the second opinion which he held in his first edition.<sup>149</sup> And Fonseca, as cited, held it and we ourselves judge it to be more probable. It is not as if that intermediate concept is by its nature established in order to signify and that it is directly known. For even if it is necessary in a sign that by its nature it be such, it is, however, not an intrinsic requirement that it be set up and known only consecutively on account of a likeness with a true sign. This is confirmed by the example of writing, which is not established directly but consecutively through the establishment of a spoken word from whose signification it also is denominated extrinsically. So too is the intermediate concept, which is weaker than writing in this way that it not only is not directly established, but neither is it directly perceived. However, it is enough that it have both by virtue of the spoken word. Cajetan, [commenting on *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 34, Article 1, favors this opinion, when he teaches that the intermediate concept is called a word only by extrinsic denomination, that is, by reason of the spoken word of which it is a cause and an image.<sup>150</sup>

## Sectio articuli 3

**Explicatur tertium obiectum: disquiritur an aliquid praeter speciem,  
et conceptum sit signum formale et utrum  
cognitio signi differat necessario a cognitione significati?**

In tertio argumento plures sunt difficultates ordine expediendae.<sup>94</sup> Initio illud statuimus nihil ducere in cognitionem alterius, quod in aliquam speciem signi non reducat. Dixi alterius quia idem cum parit notitiam sui, ut essentia Angeli et animae /p. 28/ separatae, non est signum, sed obiectum. Hoc posito, circa prius exemplum de essentia Angeli, cum per eam in Dei cognitionem venit, est gravis quaestio, an sit signum formale, vel instrumentale, hoc est, an concurrat per modum speciei, quin cognoscatur, an prius cognoscenda sit; Et ea mediante Deus percipiatur. Sed omissa controversia supponimus cum D. Thoma 1. p. q. 56. artic. 3. et cap. 1. epistola ad Romanos lect. 6. Bonavent. in 2. d. 3. p. 2. art. 2. q. 2. Bassoli qu. 3. art. 2. Richardo in 2. d. 4. art. 1. q. 1. Nipho 12. Metaph. q. 12. et recentioribus communiter non posse Angelum per suam essentiam intellectui unitam, et non cognitam devenire in notitiam Dei;<sup>95</sup> quoniam Angelus non est imago Dei intentionalis, sed realis quidam effectus; at effectus non ducit in cognitionem causae, nisi prius cognoscatur: eatenus enim ad cognoscendum inservit, quatenus continet virtutem causae; ergo necesse est primo eum percipi, ut arguendo causa penetretur. Alioquin posset etiam Angelus per essentiam equi sibi unitam Deum immediate cognoscere, est enim equus quoddam vestigium Dei ostendens illius virtutem licet minus perfecte quam Angelus.

Iuxta hanc sententiam,<sup>96</sup> quae procul dubio certa est, respondemus essentiam Angeli esse signum instrumentale Dei, siquidem cognita movet Angelum in Dei perceptionem. Est tamen difficultas iuxta priorem, et probabiliorem dicendi modum, an sufficiat unica cognitio ad hoc genus signi. Nam signum instrumentale debet prius cognosci, ut deducat in notitiam rei; ergo notitia rei posterior est cognitione signi, et ex consequenti ab eadem re ipsa differt. Dicendum nihilominus est, etsi in hominibus eae notitiae perpetuo distinguantur, non esse id absolute necessarium: quia ratio signi instrumentalis solum exigit, ut cognitum, perducatur in cognitionem alterius. Quod vero sit eadem, vel diversa notitia non curat. Nec illa prioritas cognitionis signi est necessario realis: sed sufficit rationis; secundum quam verum sit dicere rem significatam percipi, quia signum cognoscitur. Unde Philosophorum vulgus admittit essentiam esse Angelo



### The Third Section of the Article

#### The Third Objection is Clarified; The Question Is Raised: Whether apart from the Species and the Concept There Are Any Formal Signs? and Whether the Knowledge of a Sign Necessarily Differs from the Knowledge of What is Signified?

*Nothing Leads to the Knowledge of Something else Unless it be Some Kind of Sign.*—In the third argument there are several difficulties which should be treated in order. At the outset we are stating that there is nothing which leads to the knowledge of something else which may not be reduced to some species of sign. I have said, ‘of something else,’ because when the same thing brings forth knowledge of itself, as for example, the essence of an angel or separated souls, it is not a sign but rather an object. This stated, with regard first to the essence of an angel, when through it there results a knowledge of God, there is a serious question: is it a formal sign or an instrumental sign? That is to say, does it concur [for that knowledge] in the way of a species, without being known, or must it be known first before by means of it God is known?

*An Angel cannot by its own Essence, not [first] known, come to a Knowledge of God.*—But leaving controversy aside, we are supposing with St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 56, Article 3,<sup>151</sup> and [in his commentary on] the Epistle to the *Romans*, Chapter 1, Lecture 6,<sup>152</sup> together with Bonaventure [commenting on the *Sentences*] Book 2, Distinction 3, Part 2, Article 2, Question 2,<sup>153</sup> Bassolis [John (d. ca. 1347)] Question 3, Article 2;<sup>154</sup> Richard, in [his *Sentences* commentary] Book 2, Distinction 4, Article 1, Question 1;<sup>155</sup> Nifo [Agostino (1473-1546)], *Metaphysics*, Book 12, Question 12 [sic],<sup>156</sup> and more recent authors commonly, that an angel cannot through its own essence united to its intellect, but not known, come to a knowledge of God. For an angel is not an intentional image of God, but rather a certain real effect. But an effect does not lead to a knowledge of its cause, unless it is first known. For it serves in order to know insofar as it contains the power of the cause. Therefore, it is necessary that it first be perceived so that by inference the cause be comprehended. Otherwise, an angel could also immediately know God through the essence of a horse with which it might be united. For a horse is a certain vestige of God which shows his power, although less perfectly than does an angel.

*The Essence of an Angel is an Instrumental Sign of God.*—In accord with this opinion, which is without doubt certain, we reply that the essence of an angel is an instrumental sign of God, since when it is known it moves the angel to a knowledge of God. There is, however, in line with the first and more probable way of speaking, a question: does a single knowing suffice for this kind of sign? For an instrumental sign must first be known in order that it lead to the knowledge of a thing [signified]. Therefore, knowledge of the thing is posterior to knowledge of the sign, and as a result it differs from this in reality.

Nevertheless, it must be said that although these knowledges are always distinguished in men, this is not absolutely necessary. For the definition of an instrumental sign requires only that as known it leads to knowledge of something else. But it is indifferent as to whether that knowledge be the same or different. Neither is the priority of the knowledge of the sign necessarily a real priority. Rather a priority of reason will suffice, according to which it may be true to say that the



signum instrumentale suarum passionum et effectus suarum causarum; cum utraque eadem notitia cognoscantur.

Secundum exemplum<sup>97</sup> de essentia divina, eodem modo explicandum est. Si enim accipiatur quatenus beati eandem percipiunt non est signum, proprie loquendo, ob defectum distinctionis: si ut illa mediante cognoscunt creaturas, est signum instrumentale, ut essentia Angeli. Ad tertium de phantasmate<sup>98</sup> supposita doctrina primi Physicor. dicendum est phantasmata singularium esse signa formalia respectu intellectus, cum quo simul concurrunt ad notitiam singularium. Ad improbationem dicendum, proprium characterem signi formalis esse, ut non cognitum efficiat cognitionem: non autem quod consignetur in potentia, si nomine consignificationis intelligatur inhaerentia; hanc enim habere non potest phantasma /p. 29/ in intellectu, ut in argumento recte ostenditur: si tamen intelligatur quaelibet informatio per assistentiam, et determinationem saltem extrinsecam, hanc habet phantasma comparatione intellectus, ut eo loco Physic. explicatur.

Ad quartum dicendum,<sup>99</sup> phantasma fumi non esse signum immediatum ignis, nec comparatione intellectus, nec comparatione sensus; quia cum<sup>100</sup> neutro concurrere potest immediate ad percipiendum ignem (nisi forte intellectus ipsum cognoscat, ut quanvis rem extra se; tunc enim erit instrumentale). Est tamen utriusque respectu signum formale remotum, quatenus est signum formale fumi, quo percepto tam sensus, quam intellectus devenit in notitiam ignis. Est enim celebris Scoti regula<sup>101</sup> in quaestione secunda huius capit. quod est signum signi, esse signum significati. Addunt Recentiores in eodem genere signi. Quod bifariam interpretantur alii: uno modo, ut sit signum in eodem genere, hoc est, eiusdem rationis, vel speciei, cuius est signum ab eo significatum: altero in eo genere, in quo ipsum dicitur significare aliud signum. Hoc secundo modo est vera sententia; quia tale signum mediatum a sua propria significacione denominatur: haec autem in proposito exemplo est formalis; ergo dicitur signum formale.

Quintum exemplum<sup>102</sup> continet difficultatem alterius loci, et temporis. Interim negandum est cognitionem esse signum rei; quia (uti ibidem indicatur) signum est ratio cognoscendi: unde aliquo modo a cognitione dissideat; necesse est. Ad probationem negandum cognitionem esse imaginem obiecti, cuius oppositum cum indicant illi Patres, loquuntur de cognitione cum termino per eam producto, qui est verbum mentis vel idolum sensus. Caeterum haec longius persequi alienum est a Dialectico.

thing which is signified is perceived inasmuch as the sign is known. Hence, most philosophers admit that its essence is for an angel an instrumental sign of its properties and an effect of its causes, although both are known by the same knowledge.

*The Second Difficulty is Explained. About the Divine Essence as it concurs for the Knowledge of Creatures.*—The second example about the Divine essence must be explained in the same way. For if it is taken insofar as the Blessed perceive it, then it is not a sign, properly speaking, because of a lack of distinction.<sup>157</sup> If it is taken in such way that by means of it the Blessed know creatures, then it is an instrumental sign, like the essence of an angel.

*About the Phantasm of a Singular Thing.*—In reply to the third example of the phantasm, we must say that, presupposing the doctrine of *Physics*, Book 1,<sup>158</sup> phantasms of singular things are formal signs with respect to the intellect together with which they concur for the knowledge of singulars. To the argument against this it must be said that the proper character of a formal sign is that without itself being known it produces knowledge [of something else], but [its proper character is] not that it be impressed on a potency, if by the word ‘impression’ there is understood an inherence. For a phantasm cannot have this status in the intellect, as is correctly shown in the argument. If, however, it is understood to be a kind of information by its assistance [in the act of understanding] or at least by its extrinsic determination [of that act], the phantasm does have this status in relation to the intellect, as is explained in that place in the *Physics*.

*About the Phantasm of Smoke leading to the Knowledge of Fire.*—In answer to the fourth objection, it must be said that the phantasm of smoke is not an immediate sign of fire, either in relation to the intellect or in relation to the sense [of sight]. For it cannot immediately concur with either one in order to perceive fire (unless perhaps the intellect knows it, as a certain thing outside itself, in which case it will be an instrumental sign). However, with respect to both it is a remote formal sign, inasmuch as it is a formal sign of the smoke, through which smoke, once it is perceived, both the sense and the intellect come to the knowledge of fire.

*The Sign of the Sign is the Sign of what is Signified.*—For this is the famous rule of Duns Scotus in the second question of this chapter: *a sign of a sign is a sign of what is signified*.<sup>159</sup> More recent authors add that it is in the same genus of sign, which others interpret in two ways: one, that it is a sign in the same genus, that is, of the same nature, or species to which belongs the sign which is signified by it; two, that it is in the genus in which it is said to signify the other sign. Understood in this second way, the opinion is true; for such a mediated sign is denominated from its own proper signification. But in the proposed example this is formal; therefore, it will be termed a formal sign.

*The Fifth Difficulty regarding Knowledge is left for Another Place and Knowledge is Assumed not to be the Sign of the Thing Known. Knowledge is not the Image of the Object.*—The fifth example contains a difficulty for another place and another time. But for now we must deny that knowledge is a sign of the thing [that is known]. For (as is indicated in that other place) a sign is a cause of knowledge;<sup>160</sup> hence it is necessary that it differ in some way from knowledge. In reply to the proof [given to support the example], we must deny that knowledge is an image of the object, since those Fathers are indicating the opposite of this. They are speaking about knowledge together with the term that it produces, which is a mental word or a sensible image. However, it is not the task of a logician to pursue this further.

### Quaestio 3

#### De vocum, Scripturarum significatione

##### Articulus 1

##### Variae de significatione vocum sententiae

Inter effata Aristotelis<sup>103</sup> in hoc capite primum fuit: voces esse signa conceptuum: scripta autem signa vocum. De cuius prima parte sunt tres sententiae. Prima est Scoti<sup>104</sup> in primo distinct. 27. quaestio. 3. et quaest. 1. huius libri Gabrielis in primo dist. 22. quaest. unica, articul. 3. et aliorum Recentiorum asserentium voces substitui quidem pro conceptibus intellectus, sed eos non significare, nisi sint aliquae peculiare voces quae impositae sunt ad significandos conceptus, /p. 30/ ut hoc ipsum nomen [conceptus] aut [verbum]. Quod voces pro conceptibus subrogentur, ex eo probant; quia vocibus utimur, ut ostendamus rem, quam mente apprehendimus, et per ipsos conceptus exprimere non possumus: alioqui si mente sermocinari possemus, haud expromerentur verba.

At conceptus<sup>105</sup> per voces non significari probatur. Primo. Quia ex opposito sequeretur, ut omnes propositiones essent falsae; nam vox ponitur in oratione pro suo significato; ergo si conceptum significet, huius orationis [homo est animal] sensus erit [conceptus hominis est conceptus animalis] quo nihil falsius. Secundo. Sequitur omnia nomina esse aequivoca; enim vero si nomen [Homo] est analogum ad hominem, et eius imaginem in tabula depictum, quare non erit analogum ad eam, quam mente exprimimus. Tertio. Vox id significat, quod audiens percipit: sed qui audit loquentem, res apprehendit, non conceptus (nisi dedita opera in eisdem reflectat) ergo non signat conceptus. Confirmatur hoc ex sententia Aristotelis capite tertio sequenti, ubi ait, verbum ideo significare, quia constituit conceptum audientis, hoc est, quia imprimit notitiam in conceptum audientis; hic autem conceptus, ut diximus, est rerum.

Quarto. Multae sunt voces, quibus non respondent conceptus; ergo non est absolute verum voces significare mediis conceptibus. Antecedens probatur primo autoritate D. Augustini 5. de Trinitate cap. 3, qui ait multa verba significantia ore proferri, quibus nulli praecedunt in mente conceptus: et subdit. Divina nec dicuntur, ut cogitantur: nec cogitantur ut dicuntur, ergo ex illius mente aliquae ponuntur voces, haud respondentes conceptibus. Idem pene docet D. Chrysostomus orat. 2. in 1. ad Hebr. Quae de Deo, inquit, mente versamus, ne possumus quidem loqui, aut multa loquimur, non possumus autem intelligere. Probatur secundo ra-

### Question 3 About the Signification of Words and Writing

#### Article 1

#### Various Opinions about the Signification of Words

*Words are Signs of Concepts; Writings are Signs of Words.*—Among the things which Aristotle said in this Chapter the first was this: *words are signs of concepts; and things written are signs of words.*<sup>161</sup> And about the first part of this there are three opinions.

*The Opinion of Scotus and Gabriel that Words do not Signify Concepts.*—The first is that of Duns Scotus in [his Commentary on the *Sentences*] Book 1, Distinction 27, Question 3,<sup>162</sup> and Question 1 of this Book,<sup>163</sup> and also of Gabriel [Biel (d. 1495)] in [his Commentary on the *Sentences*] Book 1, Distinction 22, the Single Question, Article 3,<sup>164</sup> as well as of recent authors who say that words substitute for the concepts of the intellect, but do not signify those concepts, with the exception of some peculiar words which have been established in order to signify concepts, as for example, the terms ‘concept’ or ‘word’ [i.e., the mental word] themselves. That words substitute for concepts they prove from the fact that we use spoken words in order to manifest a thing which we mentally apprehend and which we cannot express through concepts as such. Otherwise, if we could mentally speak, words would not be uttered.

*This Opinion is Supported with Arguments. The First Argument.*—But that concepts are not signified by words is proven as follows: First, because if this were not so, it would follow that all propositions would be false. For a word is used in speech in place of what it signifies. Therefore, if it signifies a concept, the meaning of this sentence, ‘*man is an animal,*’ will be, ‘*the concept of man is the concept of an animal,*’ than which nothing is more false.

*The Second Argument.*—Second, it follows that all words are equivocal. For indeed if the word, ‘man,’ is analogous to the man or to his image which is pictured on a page, why will it not be analogous to that image which we are mentally expressing?

*The Third Argument.*—Third: a word signifies what a hearer perceives. But one who hears someone speaking apprehends things and not concepts (unless with effort he reflects on those concepts). Therefore, a word does not signify concepts. This is confirmed from Aristotle’s opinion which follows in Chapter 3, where he says that a verb signifies because it forms the hearer’s concept,<sup>165</sup> that is, because it impresses knowledge for the hearer to conceive. But, as we have said, this is a concept of things.

*The Fourth Argument.*—Fourth: there are many words to which no concepts correspond. Therefore, it is not absolutely true that words signify by means of concepts. The antecedent is proven first by the authority of St. Augustine, in his work, ‘*On the Trinity,*’ Book 5, Chapter 3, who says that many signifying words are spoken orally, which no mental concepts precede. And he adds that Divine things are neither said as they are thought, nor are they thought as they are said.<sup>166</sup> Therefore, to his mind there are some words which do not correspond to concepts. St. [John] Chrysostom (ca. 347–407) teaches almost the same thing in his *Oration 2*, on *Hebrews*, Chapter 1. ‘*The things of God,*’ he says, ‘*we turn round in*

tionem. Nam Aves, et dormientes, in quibus nulli sunt conceptus, humanas proferunt voces: et quidem non esse conceptus in avibus liquidum est: non esse autem in dormientibus colligitur ex D. Gregorio Nisseno de hominis opificio docente inter dormiendum non operari intellectum hominis, at feriente intellectu, nusquam sunt conceptus. Ad haec. Cum quis mentitur, non habet conceptum respondentem orationi externae, ut docet D. Thomas 2.2. q. 110. art. 3. ex eo enim probat mendacium esse peccatum, quia inordinatum est velle voce indicare id, quod non est in mente.

Secunda sententia<sup>106</sup> est Boëtii editione secunda huius libri, cui adeo prima sententia displicuit, ut in aliam omnino extremam abierit, existimavitque vocibus solos conceptus significari. Refert pro eadem Porphyrium asserentem eam esse de mente Aristotelis. Quod colligi potest ex hoc capite, ubi voces conceptuum tantum notas dixit. Eadem sententia probatur primo.<sup>107</sup> Voces datae sunt tantum ad supplendum defectum conceptuum; ergo eos solum /p. 31/ significant. Patet consequentia; quia significando conceptus eos reddunt praesentes, ut suum munus exequantur, quod solum desiderabatur; ergo si voces inventae sunt in defectum conceptuum, eos tantum indicare debent. Primum antecedens traditur a D. Augustino lib. 2. de ordine cap. 12. ubi ait rationem invexisse sermonem, quia homines animos suos sentire non poterant. Et patet in Angelis, quibus omnes signa locutionis externa denegant, qui eos confabulari posse conceptibus opinantur.

Secundo.<sup>108</sup> Vocabula [Hircocervus] [Chimaera] et similia solos animi conceptus indicant, ut docet Aegidius in 2. d. 2. q. 3. art. 1. Ergo idem dicendum erit de caeteris; habent enim eundem significandi modum. Idem dici potest de Syncategorematis, verbi causa de hac voce [si] in illo versu. Si vera est fama; significat enim solam dubitationem, ut in simili docuit S. Augustinus libr. de Magistro cap. 2. dubitatio autem in mente est. Confirmatur. Quia nutus aequipollent vocibus: ut docuit Alensis 2. p. q. 27. m. 6. ad 2. et Augustinus 15. de Trinitat. cap. 10. hoc solo discrimine, quod nutus oculis, vox auribus objiciatur: sed nutus solum indicant consensum, aut dissensum mentis; ergo, etc.

Tertia sententia<sup>109</sup> inter has media asserit vocem tum conceptus, tum res ipsas significare. Est expressa Aristotelis hoc libro; nam primo capite ait voces esse notas affectuum, id est, conceptuum, in ultimo vero docet,

our minds, but we cannot say them; or we speak many things, but we cannot understand them.<sup>167</sup> [The antecedent] is proven, second, by reason: For birds and people who are sleeping, in whom there are no concepts, speak human words. And indeed that birds have no concepts is obvious. But that sleepers have no concepts, is gathered from St. Gregory of Nyssa, who, in his work, ‘*On the Making of Man*,’ teaches that the human intellect is inoperative during sleep;<sup>168</sup> but ‘when the intellect is on holiday’ there are no concepts. In addition: when someone is lying he does not have a concept which corresponds to his external speech, as St. Thomas teaches, [in *Summa Theologiae*] The Second Part of the Second Part, Question 110, Article 3, when he proves that lying is a sin from the fact that it is a disorder to want to indicate by word what is not in the mind.<sup>169</sup>

*Boethius’ Opinion that Words signify Concepts Only.*—The second opinion is that of Boethius, in the Second Edition of [his Commentary on] this Book [i.e., the *De Interpretatione*], for whom the first opinion is so unacceptable that he goes to the absolute opposite extreme, concluding that it is only concepts which are signified by words.<sup>170</sup> In favor of this opinion, he cites Porphyry (232-304) asserting that it is to the mind of Aristotle, which can be inferred from this Chapter [of the *De Interpretatione*] where he has said that words are only signs of concepts.<sup>171</sup>

*This Opinion is Supported with Arguments. The First Argument.*—The same opinion is proven first: because words are used only to supply for the inadequacy of concepts. Therefore, they signify only those concepts. The consequence is clear: because in signifying concepts they make them present so that they may fulfill their task, which is the only thing desired. Therefore, if words have been invented [to supply] for the inadequacy of concepts, they must indicate those concepts only. The first antecedent is given by St. Augustine, in his work ‘*On Order*,’ Book 2, Chapter 12, where he says that reason has introduced language, because men could not sense their own minds.<sup>172</sup> And it is clear in the case of angels, who have no external signs of speech and who are thought to be able to converse with concepts.

*The Second Argument.*—The opinion is proven in a second way, because the words ‘goatstag,’ ‘chimaera,’ and the like, indicate only mental concepts, as Aegidius [Romanus] teaches in [his Commentary on the *Sentences*] Book 2 [sic], Distinction 2, Question 3, Article 1.<sup>173</sup> Therefore, the same will have to be said of other words inasmuch as they have the same way of signifying. This also can be said about syncategorematic words, for example, about this word, ‘*if*,’ in the verse, ‘*If the rumor is true*,’<sup>174</sup> for it signifies only a hesitation, as St. Augustine has taught in a similar case in his book, ‘*On the Teacher*,’ Chapter 2.<sup>175</sup> But the hesitation is in the mind. This is confirmed: because gestures are equivalent to words, as [Alexander of] Hales has taught [in his *Summa*] Part 2, Question 27, m. 6, In Reply to Objection 2,<sup>176</sup> and also Augustine, in his work ‘*On the Trinity*,’ Book 15, Chapter 10, with this single difference that a gesture is an object for the eyes while a word is one for the ears.<sup>177</sup> But gestures indicate only consent or dissent of the mind. Therefore, etc.

*The Opinion of Aristotle (which is proven from his Texts): the Word Signifies both Concepts and Things themselves.*—The third opinion, midway between these, asserts that a word signifies both concepts and things themselves. This is the explicit opinion of Aristotle in this book. For in the first chapter he says that words are

quia res est, aut non est, orationem esse veram, vel falsam; non penderet autem veritas orationis ex re, nisi vox eam significaret. Alia eiusdem loca adduci possent: ut ex libro de sensu, et sensib. capite primo: pro conceptibus ex libro quarto Metaphysicorum capite septimo, ubi iuxta versionem Petri Fonsecae ait. Ratio cuius nomen est signum, definitio rei est ex libr. 8. cap. 4. et 6. Quibus locis Interpretes ostendunt velle Aristotelem nomina significare res. Eandem sententiam tenent fere omnes Aristotelis interpretes hoc loco. Sancti Patres,<sup>110</sup> praesertim ad ea verba Ioannis. 1. Ego vox clamantis in deserto. Scholastici Doctores, cum explicant mysterium Trinitatis. Sed quia totam conclusionem simul non tradunt, adducamus aliquos pro una, alios pro alia eiusdem parte.

Igitur<sup>111</sup> quod vox rem significet, patet ex sacra Scriptura. Genes. 2. ubi Scriptura docet adduxisse Deum omnia animalia ad Adam; ut propriis ea nominibus afficeret; posuit ergo Adam nomina ipsis animalibus. Deinde Genes. cap. 17. mutato nomine vocavit Abram Abraham. Et cap. 32. Iacob vocavit Israel. Et Christus Dominus. Ioann. 1. imposuit nomen Petro. Vocaberis, inquit, Cephas. D. Augustinus 7. de Trinitate cap. 3. ait vocem manifestare praeter se id, de quo loquimur: at nos loquimur de rebus. Idem tenet Albertus hic tract. 2. cap. 1. Atque haec pars facilis est.

Aliam<sup>112</sup> de significatione conceptus, ut magis ambiguum, vel obscuram docent plures. D. Augustinus 15. de Trinitate cap. 11. /p. 32/ Verbum quod foris sonat, signum est verbi quod intus latet. D. Basilius Homilia in 1. Ioann. Verbum nostrum totius nostrae cognitionis imaginem refert; quod enim secundum cor novimus, hoc verbo proferimus. Gregorius Nissenus de hominis creatione, cap. 9. Humana mens sonis intelligentiae suae occulta manifestat. Damascenus lib. 1. fidei cap. 17. appellat vocem Angelum intelligentiae, id est, conceptuum internuntiam. D. Ambrosius cap. 9. Exam. ait tacitas mentis cogitationes oris sermone designari. Plotinus de virtute cap. 3. appellat vocem interpretem animi. Philo Iudaeus libro quod deterior potiori insidietur, vocat sermonem fratrem mentis: eumque comparat Aaroni, qui fratris sui Mosis interpret et quasi Propheta erat; quod ibidem elegantissime prosequitur. Inter alios interpretes docent hanc sententiam, nominatim Averroes, Aphrodisaeus, Boëtius, Albertus tract. 2. cap. 1. D. Thom.



signs of [the mind's] affections, which is to say, concepts. But in the last chapter he teaches that speech is true or false because the thing [spoken about] is or is not.<sup>178</sup> But the truth of speech would not depend upon a thing, unless the word signified it. Other passages of Aristotle can be adduced: for example, from the book, '*On Sense and the Sensible*,' Chapter 1, about concepts,<sup>179</sup> and from the *Metaphysics*, Book 4, Chapter 7, where according to the translation of Pedro da Fonseca he says: '*the meaning of which the word is the sign is the definition of the thing*,'<sup>180</sup> and from Book 8, Chapters 4 and 6<sup>181</sup>—in which passages, as his interpreters explain, Aristotle wants words to signify things. And almost all the interpreters of Aristotle hold the same opinion in the present place, as do the Holy Fathers especially [when commenting] on those words of *John*, Chapter 1: '*I am the voice of one crying in the desert*,' and the Scholastic doctors, when they explain the mystery of the Trinity. But because they do not all together teach the same conclusion, we may adduce some for one part and others for another part of the same opinion.

*The Opinion is Proven for the Part that the Word signifies the Thing.*—Accordingly, the fact that a word signifies a thing is clear from Sacred Scripture; see *Genesis*, Chapter 2, where Scripture teaches that God brought all the animals to Adam so that he might give them their proper names. Thus Adam imposed names on those animals. Then *Genesis*, Chapter 17, with a change of name called Abram Abraham. And in Chapter 22, it called Jacob Israel. And Christ the Lord, in *John*, Chapter 1 imposed a name on Peter: '*You will be called*,' he said, '*Cephas*.' And St. Augustine, '*On the Trinity*,' Book 7, Chapter 3, says that, besides itself, a word manifests that about which we speak.<sup>182</sup> But we speak about things. Albert here [commenting on *De Interpretatione*] Tractate 2, Chapter 1, holds the same.<sup>183</sup> And this part is easy.

*It is Proven for the Part that [the Word] signifies Concepts.*—The other part, about the signification of the concept, many say is more ambiguous or obscure. St. Augustine, in '*On the Trinity*,' Book 15, Chapter 11, says: '*The word which sounds externally is a sign of the word which lies within*.'<sup>184</sup> St. Basil, in his '*Homily on Chapter One of John's Gospel*,' says that our word relays an image of our whole cognition; for what we know in our heart, this we speak in a word.<sup>185</sup> Gregory of Nyssa, in his work, '*On the Making of Man*,' Chapter 9, says: the human mind manifests with sounds the hidden things of its own intelligence.<sup>186</sup> John Damascene (d. 780), in his work '*On the Orthodox Faith*,' Book 1, Chapter 17, calls the word the angel of intelligence, that is, a messenger for concepts.<sup>187</sup> St. Ambrose, in [Book 1], Chapter 9 of his *Hexaemeron*, says that silent thoughts of the mind are indicated by the speech of the mouth.<sup>188</sup> Plotinus (204-269) in Chapter 3 [of his work] '*On Virtue*,'<sup>189</sup> calls the word the interpreter of the mind.<sup>190</sup> Philo the Jew (ca. 13 B.C.- ca. 50 A.D.) in the book, '*That One more Evil Ordinarily Attacks One Who is Better*,' calls speech the brother of the mind and compares it with Aaron, who was the interpreter and, as it were, the spokesman of his brother Moses, on which in the same place Philo most elegantly expatitates.<sup>191</sup> And among other interpreters, Averroes (1126-1198),<sup>192</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias (ca. 200),<sup>193</sup> Boethius,<sup>194</sup> Albert (in Tractate 2, Chapter 1<sup>195</sup>) and St. Thomas teach the same.



## Articulus 2

### Reiectis primis duabus sententiis, Tertia rationibus confirmatur, et explicatur

Certe quidem utramque sententiam Scoti, et Boetii haec una experientia revincit.<sup>113</sup> Cum vox auditur, statim mens convolat ad rem determinatam percipiendam, et certa est de cognitione loquentis, ita ut hominum de rebus iudicia, et apprehensiones audita voce experiamur; ergo necessario fatendum est, tum rem, tum conceptum per vocem significari. Id enim, quo mediante per se ducimur in cognitionem rei, signum illius est. Secundo<sup>114</sup> speciatim quod vox significet res, probat primum argumentum pro sententia Scoti, nimirum quia omnes propositiones essent falsae. Tertio<sup>115</sup> conceptus etiam significari, praeter primum argumentum pro Boetio, quod hoc saltem convincit, ita ostenditur. Voces significant ex hominum intentione; ergo id omne significabunt, ad quod intentio se extenderit: sed hominum intentio in vocibus imponendis fuit conceptuum manifestatio, ergo voces conceptuum signa sunt. Caetera clara sunt. Minor ostenditur. Humanus sermo est institutus ad hominum commercium et societatem, ut post Platonem in Cratillo docet Aristoteles in Politicis: sed hoc commercium praecipue consistit in communicatione conceptuum, quae fit per externum sermonem, iuxta illud D. Augustini 2. de ordine cap. 12. rationem docuisse homines, ut quoniam animos suos sentire non poterant, ad eos sibi copulandos sensu quasi interprete uterentur; est et illud Platonis in Thimaeo; Propterea sermonis est ordinata communio, ut praesto fiant mutuae voluntatis indicia.

Quarto<sup>116</sup> in idem institutum. Si voces non essent signa conceptuum nullum daretur mendacium; etenim mentiri ex ipsa etymologia vocabuli quae est contra mentem ire, nihil videtur esse aliud, quam voce enuntiare, quod in mente non habeas, hinc enim provenit auctore D. Thoma 2.2. q. 110. art. 3. ut mendacium intrinsece malum sit, quia cum voces naturaliter sint signa conceptuum hoc est, data a natura, ut aliis conceptus nostros aperiamus, iniustum est significare te habere in mente, quod re vera non habeas. Cum enim vox, attestante D. Augustino serm. 2. de Nativ. Ioan. Bapt. sit vehiculum verbi interioris, si interius non sit verbum, quod te vehiculo imposuisse dissimulas, alium plane decipis.

Illud<sup>117</sup> in hac communi sententia difficile est. An voces eadem significatione primo, et immediate significant conceptus, secundo res: vel e contra, primo res, secundario conceptus: vel denique res et conceptus immediate, et per diversas significationes.

## Article 2

## With the First Two Opinions Rejected,

## The Third is Confirmed with Arguments and Explained

*Argument 1.*—One experience certainly refutes both the opinion of Scotus and the opinion of Boethius. When a word is heard, the mind immediately leaps to perceive some definite thing, and it is certain about the knowledge of the speaker, in such way that upon hearing a word we perceive men's judgments and apprehensions about things. Therefore, it necessarily must be admitted that both a thing and a concept are signified by a word. For that by the medium of which we are led directly to the knowledge of a thing is a sign of that thing.<sup>196</sup>

*Argument 2.*—Second, more in particular, that a word signifies things is proven by the first argument in favor of Scotus' opinion, namely, that [otherwise] all propositions would be false.

*Argument 3.*—Third, that concepts also are signified, apart from the first argument on behalf of Boethius, which at least proves this, is shown as follows. Words signify from human intention. Therefore, they will signify all that to which intention is extended. But the intention of men in establishing words was the manifestation of concepts. Therefore, words are signs of concepts. The rest is clear. The minor is shown: human speech has been instituted for human commerce and society, as Aristotle, following Plato (429-348/7 B.C.) in the *Cratylus*,<sup>197</sup> teaches in his *Politics*.<sup>198</sup> But this business especially consists in the communication of concepts, which is done through external speech. This is in line with the saying of St. Augustine, in 'On Order,' Book 2, Chapter 12, that reason has taught men that, since they could not sense their minds, they should use sensation as a kind of interpreter in order to join them together.<sup>199</sup> That is also the view of Plato in the *Timaeus*.<sup>200</sup> Therefore, the task of speech is an ordered communion, so that signs of a mutual willing may come to be present.

*Argument 4.*—Fourth, for the same purpose: If words were not signs of concepts, there would be no lying. For lying, from the very etymology of the word, which is 'to go against the mind,' seems to be nothing else than to say with a word what you may not have in mind. From this it results, on the authority of St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*] The Second Part of the Second Part, Question 110, Article 3,<sup>201</sup> that a lie is intrinsically evil. For, since words are naturally signs of concepts, which is to say, given by nature in order that we reveal our concepts to others, it is unjust to signify that you have in mind what in fact you may not have in mind. For, since the spoken word, as St. Augustine attests, in his 'Second Sermon on the Nativity of John the Baptist,' is the vehicle for the mental word,<sup>202</sup> if there is no word within, inasmuch as you are pretending to have imposed it on the vehicle, you are plainly deceiving someone else.

*Whether a Word immediately signifies a Thing and a Concept.*—That is the difficulty in this common opinion. Do words, with one same signification, signify first and immediately concepts and then things? Or the opposite, do they first signify things and then secondarily signify concepts? Or finally, do they signify both things and concepts immediately through different significations?

Scotus<sup>118</sup> q. 1. huius cap. etsi probabiliorem putet sententiam, quam postea defendit in 1. sentent. voces nimirum res tantum significare, ait tamen, iuxta mentem Autorum dicendum esse conceptus significari et immediate: res vero remote, una eademque significatione. Ita loquitur D. Thomas 1. p. q. 13. ar. 1. et q. 8 de potentia art. 1. in corpore Albertus tract. 2. c. 1. Dominicus de Flandria 4. Metaph. q. 7. art. 4. Petrus de Bruxelis hic q. 1. art. 1. Quae sententia probatur, primo ex Aristotele hoc capite expresse asserente voces esse primo notas conceptuum.

Probatur secundo.<sup>119</sup> Quando unum signum substituitur pro alio prius indicat necessario signum, pro quo supponitur, quam rem ab illo significatam; sed voces subrogantur pro conceptibus rerum significativis ergo prius indicant ipsos conceptus. Maior sola explicanda est: eius tamen veritas inde patet, quia illiusmodi signum tendit in rem, beneficio eius pro quo sufficitur; ergo non potest nisi mediante illo rem attingere.

Tertio. Voces non significant conceptus quatenus qualitates, sed quatenus sunt rerum significativi, ut docet Scotus loco citato; ergo nulla significatio potest sistere in conceptu: sed omnis quae ad illum ordinatur, debet ultimo ferire rem tanquam terminum representationis conceptus; ergo, cum aliunde significatio non possit prius tendere in rem, quam in conceptum: fatendum est eadem significatione prius conceptum, posterius rem indicari. Quarto. Vox est animi nuntius et interpret, ut docuimus; interpretis vero, et nuntii prius est referre mandata, et verba eius, quem interpretatur, quam rem ipsam. Denique, ut genus eadem relatione terminatur prius ad speciem, posterius ad individuum, et potentia primo ad actum, secundo ad obiectum, ita potest contingere in voce.

Alii opinabuntur<sup>120</sup> eadem significatione vocis indicari prius rem, et illa mediante conceptum; quam opinionem: etsi nullus exprimat tribuere possumus Scoto loco citato docenti per vocem significari rem, ut cognitam; monet enim non significari hoc coniunctum /p. 34/ [res cognita] quia esset significatum compositum per accidens; et nihilominus ait indicari rem sub cognitione. Quod videtur commodius explicari non posse, quam si dicamus unica significatione ferri primo rem, postea eius conceptum. Quod probo primo.<sup>121</sup> In quavis re executio medii praecedat assecutionem finis: sed significatio rei est medium ad manifestandos conceptus; ergo est prior significatione conceptus. Maior, et consequentia patent. Finis instituendi sermonem fuit conceptuum manifestatio, ut expresse docuerunt Augustinus et Plato proxime citati; et probat illa ratio. Quoniam, si aliter communicare possemus animi sensa, non institueretur sermo. Quod his

*The First Opinion: the Word first and immediately signifies Concepts, but remotely the Thing.*—Scotus, even though he thinks that the opinion which he defends afterwards in [commenting on] the *Sentences*, Book 1, is more probable, that is, that words signify only things, nevertheless, [when he is commenting on *De Interpretatione*] in Question 1 [sic], of this Chapter, says that according to authoritative opinion it must be said that with one and the same signification concepts are signified immediately but things are signified remotely.<sup>203</sup> St. Thomas speaks in the same way [in *Summa Theologiae*], Part 1, Question 13, Article 1,<sup>204</sup> and *De Potentia*, Question 8, Article 1, in the body of the article,<sup>205</sup> as well as Albert, in Tractate 2, Chapter 1,<sup>206</sup> Dominic of Flanders (d. 1479), in *Metaphysics*, Book 4, Question 7, Article 4,<sup>207</sup> and Peter of Brussels, in this place, Question 1, Article 1.<sup>208</sup>

*The Opinion is Proven.*—This opinion is proven, *first* from Aristotle explicitly asserting in this Chapter that words are immediately the signs of concepts. It is proven, *second*: when one sign is substituted for another it necessarily indicates the sign for which it is substituted before the thing which is signified by that sign. But words are substituted for concepts which are significative of things; therefore they first indicate those concepts. Only the major premiss needs to be explained. However, its truth is clear from the fact that a sign of that kind tends toward the thing by benefit of that for which it is substituted. Therefore, it cannot apprehend the thing except by means of that.

It is proven, *third*, inasmuch as words do not signify concepts insofar as these are qualities, but, as Scotus teaches in the place cited, insofar as they are significative of things. Therefore, no signification can end with a concept, but every signification which is ordered to that must ultimately come to ground in the thing as terminus of the representation of the concept. Therefore, since from another perspective signification cannot first tend toward the thing before it tends towards the concept, it must be said that by the same signification the concept is indicated first and after that the thing.

*Fourth*: as we have stated, the word is the messenger and interpreter of the mind. But the task of an interpreter or a messenger is to relate the commands and the words of the one whom he is interpreting before he relates the thing itself.

*Finally [fifth]*, as with the same relation, a genus is terminated first at a species and then at an individual, and a potency is terminated first at an act and then at an object, so it can happen in the case of a word.

*The Second Opinion: the Word first indicates the Thing and, second, the Concept.*—Others think that by the same signification of a word the thing is indicated first, and then, by means of that thing, the concept is indicated. Although no one expressly states this opinion, we can attribute it to Duns Scotus, who, in the passage cited, teaches that through the word the thing is signified as known. For he cautions us that this combination ‘known thing,’ is not signified, because there would thus be signified an accidental composite. And, nevertheless, he says that the thing is indicated as known.<sup>209</sup> It seems that this cannot be better explained

verbis tradidit D. Basilius Homil. 3. Examer. Usus sermonis minime necessarius est iis, qui inita consilia solo possunt intellectu inter se partiri communiter; ergo omnis alia significatio reperta in voce est quasi via ad hanc. Probo secundo, argumento Scoti. Cognitio rei est directa; cognitio conceptus reflexa in quam non incidimus audita voce, nisi percipiamus rem: imo ideo cognoscimus loquentem habere talem conceptum, quia res per vocem significata talem deponit; ad hoc vero necessarium est prius rem percipere.

Tertia demum sententia est,<sup>122</sup> in voce reperiri diversas significationes, unam conceptus, alteram rei, et utramvis immediate attingere suum terminum. Hanc expressius quam reliqui tradit Sotus lib. 1. Summul. cap. 2. argumento 1. Indicant, Henricus in summa art. 73.<sup>123</sup> q. 6. Bassolis in 2. d. 22. q. 1. art. 1. Iandunus hic q. 1. Probatur.<sup>124</sup> Significatio aut est ipsa nominis impositio (quod magis probavimus) aut in ea fundatur, et cum eadem multiplicatur: sed impositio ad significandos conceptus est diversa ab impositione rei significandae; ergo, etc. Probatur Minor. Homines prius voluerunt suos conceptus communicare uno actu communi, et expresso, deinde investigarunt modum huic communicationi accommodatum, isque fuit impositio vocum ad res significandas; ergo duo interfuerunt actus, atque adeo duae impositiones. Antecedens huius rationis probatum est ex Augustino et Platone in confirmanda secunda sententia; ubi etiam insinuatum est discrimen inter has impositiones; nam quae est ad rem significandam, est expressa in singulis vocibus; quae vero ad indicandos conceptus in confuso tantum fuit actualis, et expressa, cum primo<sup>125</sup> voluerunt se manifestare; in singulis autem vocibus satis est virtualis, et implicita. Quemadmodum ad exequenda media propter finem, etsi requirantur expressae volitiones mediorum; sufficit tamen implicita finis. Ita accidit cum quis propter sanitatem semel appetitam potionem sumit, et venam scindit per expressos voluntatis actus. Quam doctrinam tradit Albertus Magnus tract. 2. c. 1. etsi alio sensu. Secundo, probatur idem institutum ex diverso communi usu, et officio vocis respectu rei, et conceptus. Nam res per vocem significatur tanquam significatum quod et (uti dici solet) doctrinaliter: quae enim in doctrinis per voces /p. 35/ significamus, de rebus ipsis intelligimus: at conceptus non significantur doctrinaliter, sed innuuntur: unde dici solet voces substitui conceptibus, et significare res.

than if we say that with a single signification first the thing and then its concept are encountered.

*The Second Opinion is Proven.*—This I will prove, *first*: in any matter at all the employment of the means precedes the attainment of the end. But the signification of the thing is a means to manifest concepts; therefore, it is prior to the signification of the concept. The major premiss and the consequence are clear. The purpose of establishing speech was, as Augustine and Plato, just cited, explicitly taught, and as that argument proves, the manifestation of concepts. For, if we could communicate the mind's understandings in another way, speech would not have been established. St. Basil, in his third *Homily on Hexaemeron*, has taught this in the following words: *The use of language is not at all necessary for those who are able to share intentions commonly among themselves by intellect alone. Therefore, every other signification which is found in a word is like a way to this.*<sup>210</sup>

I will prove it *second*, by an argument from Scotus: The knowledge of the thing is direct; the knowledge of the concept is reflex, and it does not come to mind when we hear the word, unless we perceive the thing. Indeed, for this reason we know that one speaking has such a concept, because the thing signified by the word demands it. But for this it is necessary first to perceive the thing.

*The Third Opinion: the Word with Two Significations immediately attains both the Thing and the Concept.*—Finally, there is a third opinion: in the word there are found different significations, one of the concept and a second of the thing, and terminus of the word reaches both immediately. More explicitly than others, Soto teaches this in his *Summulae*, Book 1, Chapter 2, Argument 1.<sup>211</sup> And the following indicate it: Henry [of Ghent (1217-1293)], in his *Summa*, Article 73, Question 6;<sup>212</sup> Bassolis in [his *Sentences* commentary] Book 2 [sic], Distinction 22, Question 1, Article 1;<sup>213</sup> and John of Jandun (d. 1328), in this place, Question 1.<sup>214</sup>

*The Third Opinion is Proven: First.*—[This opinion] is proven [as follows]: Signification is either the institution itself of the term (which we have more or less proved) or it is founded on that institution and is multiplied with it. But an institution for the purpose of signifying concepts is different from an institution of the thing to be signified. Therefore, etc. The minor premiss is proven: men first wished to communicate their concepts with a common and explicit act, and then they searched for a way which would be suited for this communication, and that was the institution of words to signify things. Therefore, two acts occurred, and accordingly there were two institutions. The antecedent of this argument has been proven from Augustine and Plato in the confirmation of the second opinion, where also the difference between these institutions was suggested. For the institution which is for the purpose of signifying the thing is expressed in individual words; but the institution which is for the purpose of indicating concepts in a general way was actual and was expressed only when men first wished to manifest themselves. However, in the individual words it is enough to be virtual and implicit, just as in order to execute means because of an end, even though there are required explicit willings of the means, there nevertheless suffices an implicit willing of the end. This is the case [for example] when someone, because of a once desired health, drinks a potion or opens a vein by explicit acts of the will. Albert the Great, in [commenting on *De Interpretatione*] Tractate, 2, Chapter 1, gives this doctrine, also in another sense.<sup>215</sup>

Inter has opiniones<sup>126</sup> tertia nobis videtur planior. Quare ad primam rationem primae sententiae ex Aristotele respondet Henricus loco citato, illud Philosophi, voces esse primo notas conceptuum, non esse accipiendum significative, quasi prius significantur conceptus,<sup>127</sup> sed impositive (ut sic loquar) quia necesse est inter rem, et vocem,<sup>128</sup> cum imponitur mediare conceptum; perinde ac si dicat Philosophus conditionem praerequisitam, ut vox rem<sup>129</sup> significet, esse conceptum; non enim significatur res ut est, sed pro mensura nostrae apprehensionis. Hanc interpretationem probant D. Thom. 1. par. q. 13. artic. 1. Durand in 1. dist. 27. quaest. 2. numer. 8. Ferrari. 1. contra Gent. cap. 35. Verum,<sup>130</sup> quia diximus conceptum propter hoc munus esse vocis significatum, respondemus, Philosophum voluisse conceptum significari primo, primitate intentionis, idest, principaliter, quia propter ipsum, ut propter finem imponitur vox, quamvis primitate executionis prius significetur res, hoc est, significatio rei semper praesupponatur ad significationem conceptus; tametsi diversae sint.

Ad secundum respondetur maiorem esse veram, quando est unica significatio; in praesenti vero esse diversas. Ad eius probationem respondetur, bifariam subrogari unum signum pro alio; primo cum non habet propriam impositionem ad significandam rem, sed solum ad indicandum signum, in cuius locum sufficitur; quo modo se habet scriptura supposita pro voce, ut postea dicitur. Secundo cum per se imponitur ad significandam rem simul, et aliud signum, quo pacto se habent voces. In primo eventu est verum, signum, quod sufficitur, tendere in rem beneficio alterius, illudque prius significare, in secundo est falsum.

Ad tertium concessio antecedente, distingue consequens. Si enim contendat illam significationem vocis, quae est ad conceptum, terminari aliquo modo ad rem, permittit, si neget esse aliam immediate terminatam ad rem, inficiare.

Ad quartum respondendum est, ut respondimus ad locum Aristotelis, munus enim primum, idest, principale interpretis et nuntii est, verba et mandata denuntiare; sed hoc exequitur res eloquendo. Dic secundo similitudinem illam non esse in omnibus omnino quaerendam, sed in eo,



*The Opinion is Proven, Second.*—The same doctrine is secondly proven from the different common usage and role of the word in relation to the thing and to the concept. For the thing is signified by the word as ‘a significate which’ and, as is usually said, ‘doctrinally.’ For what we signify in teaching through words, we understand about those things themselves. Concepts, however, are not signified doctrinally, but are rather implied. Hence, it is usually said that words are substituted for concepts and they signify things.<sup>216</sup>

*The Third Opinion is Preferred and the Arguments of the First Opinion are Answered.*—Among these opinions, the third seems more evident to us. Accordingly, in answer to the first argument taken from Aristotle in support of the first opinion, Henry [of Ghent] in the passage cited answers that the dictum of the Philosopher [i.e., Aristotle], that words are first signs of concepts, should not be taken ‘significatively,’ as though concepts are first signified, but rather ‘impositively’ (so to speak) because it is necessary that the concept mediate between the thing and the word when it is imposed [to signify that thing]. Therefore, it is as if the Philosopher is saying that the concept is a required condition for the word to signify the thing. For the thing is not signified as it actually is, but rather as it is in the measure of our apprehension. This interpretation is approved by St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 13, Article 1,<sup>217</sup> by Durandus (d. 1334) [in his *Sentences* commentary] Book 1, Distinction 27, Question 2, Number 8,<sup>218</sup> and by Ferrara [commenting on] *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 35.<sup>219</sup>

*The Explanation of Aristotle’s Text.*—But, because we have said that the concept is the significate of the word, our answer is that the Philosopher meant that the concept is signified first, with a primacy of intention, that is, principally, because on account of it, as on account of an end, the word is instituted. But with a primacy of execution the thing is signified first, that is to say, the signification of the thing is always presupposed to the signification of the concept, although they are diverse.

*To the second argument* [of the first opinion] the answer is that the major premiss is true when there is a single signification; but in the present instance the significations are diverse. To the proof which is offered for it, the answer is that one sign can substitute for another in two ways. The first is when it is not properly instituted in order to signify the thing, but only to indicate the sign in place of which it is substituted. In this way, as will be afterwards said, writing stands for the word. The second is when it is directly instituted in order to signify simultaneously the thing and another sign, in which way words exist. In the first event, it is true that a sign which is substituted tends toward the thing by benefit of the other sign, and signifies that sign first; but in the second event, this is false.

*To the third argument* [of the first opinion], granted the antecedent, you should distinguish the consequent. For if it contends that the signification of the word, which is directed toward the concept, is terminated in some way at the thing, concede it. But if it maintains that there is not another signification which is immediately terminated at the thing, deny it.

*To the fourth argument* [of the first opinion], we must respond in the same way that we answer to the passage from Aristotle. For the first, which is to say the principal, duty of an interpreter and a messenger is to announce words and commands. But this requires that he speak about things. Secondly, that likeness is not



quod vox interpretetur mentem, licet modus interpretandi sit diversus. Ad quintum fatemur eundem respectum posse attingere multos terminos subordinatos, quando est idem modus referendi, sed in voce est diversus, ut probavimus, et idcirco duos admittimus respectus.

Argumenta<sup>131</sup> secundae sententiae confirmant nostram, solum enim probant significationem rei in voce priorem esse significatione conceptus, quia est medium ad illam; sed non ostendunt esse unicam. /p. 36/ Ac licet cognitio conceptus, cum habetur (nec enim est necessaria) reflexa sit, non continuo eadem significatione causatur, sed alia quae praesupponit priorem significationem rei. Quod, si obiicias vocem non posse per reflexionem indicare conceptum, si illum immediate significet. Respondet Scotus hoc loco ad ultimum non esse id mirum in signo ad placitum, significat enim uti impositum fuit.

to be sought in every way in all things, but in the fact that the word interprets the mind, although the way of interpreting is different.

*To the fifth argument*, we say that the same relation can connect with numerous subordinate termini, when the way of relating is the same. But, as we have proven, in the case of the word, the way of relating is diverse, and therefore we admit two relations.

*The Arguments of the Second Opinion are Dissolved.*—The arguments of the second opinion confirm our own opinion, since they only prove that in the word the signification of the thing is prior to the signification of the concept, inasmuch as the word is a means to the concept. But they do not show that the signification is unique. And although the knowledge of the concept, when it is possessed (for it is not necessary) is reflex, it is not continuously caused by the same signification, but by another which presupposes the prior signification of the thing. But, if you object that the word cannot indicate the concept by reflection, if it immediately signifies it, Scotus lastly answers in this place that this is not strange in a voluntary sign, for that signifies in the way in which it was instituted.<sup>220</sup>

### Articulus 3

#### Argumenta primi articuli dissolvuntur

Opinio Scoti<sup>132</sup> quinque rationibus depugnabat. Ad primam, ut satisfacias, notandum praeter alias signorum divisiones in 2. quaest. commemoratas,<sup>133</sup> hanc etiam ab eo inculcari, qua signa dispartiuntur in doctrinalia; et non doctrinalia; haec sunt, quorum in doctrinis usus non est, ut fumus, statua Caesaris etc. Illa, quibus utimur in docendo; quorum tria sunt genera, conceptus, voces, et scripta.<sup>134</sup> Nomine conceptus intellige tam proprios conceptus mentis, quam expressa phantasmata phantasiae, si in ea fiant propositiones, ut multi volunt; non comprehendas tamen species impressas intellectus, vel sensus, ex quibus ut propositiones non fiunt, eo quod non sunt termini actus cognoscendi, ita nulla notitia sumitur in doctrinis; vel ob eam causam, quia nullo modo sunt sermo; in doctrinis autem non est usus nisi sermonis; Unde fit, ut haec per voces non significantur; quemadmodum docent D. Tho. 1. par. q. 85. art. 2. ad 3. Aegidius in 1. dist. 27. q. 2. Per voces intelligimus eas tantum, quae ex instituto significant; per scripta omnia, quibus cum absentibus communicamus.

Hic eam dubitationem<sup>135</sup> interserunt Dialectici, an signum doctrinale univoce dicatur de tribus enumeratis? Cui negative respondendum, quia significatio conceptus est naturalis, et realis; significatio vocis, et scripturae adventitia, et rationis. Deinde, quia vox, et scriptura non sunt plura signa formaliter, ut postea dicemus.

Ad rem accedendo<sup>136</sup> dicimus idem signum posse habere plura significata, pro quorum uno supponatur in oratione, et eius respectu appelletur signum doctrinale, pro alio non supponatur, nec illud doctrinaliter significet, et huiusmodi esse voces, quae pro rebus tantummodo ponuntur, ne orationes falsas reddant, ut argumentum ostendere conabatur.

Ad secundum<sup>137</sup> respondet Scotus, tunc solum esse nomen Analogum, cum multa per plures impositiones significat, vocem autem omnia per unam significare: Sed iuxta nostram sententiam dicendum, vocem tunc esse analogam, cum eodem modo diversa significat; quo pacto se habet nomen [Homo] ad verum, et in tabula depictum; utrumque enim doctrinaliter indicat. Non autem ad hominem, et eius /p. 37/ conceptum, cum istum significet non doctrinaliter. Ad tertium negat Richardus in 1. dist. 22. q. 3. audientem non percipere per vocem immediate conceptum, et deinde rem; Sed loquitur iuxta aliam sententiam. Nos respondemus,<sup>138</sup> etsi necessarium non sit audientem cognoscere conceptum ad percipiendam

## Article 3

## The Arguments of the First Article Are Answered

*Signs are Divided as Doctrinal and non-Doctrinal.*—The opinion of Scotus argued with five arguments. For the first, to prove it sufficiently, one should note that besides other divisions of signs mentioned in the second question [above],<sup>221</sup> he also intermixed this one, by which signs are divided into doctrinal and non-doctrinal.<sup>222</sup> Non-doctrinal are those which are not used in teaching, for example, smoke, a statue of Caesar, etc.

*Doctrinal Signs are Threefold: Concepts, Words, and Writings.*—Doctrinal signs are those which we use in teaching, and they are of three kinds: concepts, words, and writings. By the term, ‘concept,’ understand both properly mental concepts and also explicit phantasms of the imagination, if propositions are fashioned, as many think, in the imagination. However, you should not include impressed species of the intellect or of the senses, from which propositions are not formed, for the reason that they are not termini of an act of knowing, with the result that no knowledge is derived from them in teaching. Or [they should not be included] for the reason that they are in no way speech; but in teaching nothing is used except speech. Hence it happens that non-doctrinal signs are not signified by words, as St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 85, Article 2, In Reply to Objection 3,<sup>223</sup> and Aegidius [Romanus] in [his *Sentences* commentary] Book 1, Distinction 27, Question 2,<sup>224</sup> both teach. By ‘words’ we understand only those words which signify by institution; by ‘writing’ we understand all those things by which we communicate with absent persons.

*‘Doctrinal Sign’ is not Univocal among Concepts, Words, and Writings.*—At this point, logicians insert this question: Is ‘doctrinal sign’ said univocally about the three kinds enumerated? This should be answered in the negative, because the signification of a concept is natural and real, but the signification of a word or of writing is adventitious and rational. Then because, as we will say later, a word and writing are not formally more than one sign.

*The First Argument is Refuted.*—Approaching the matter, we say that the same sign can have a number of significates. And for one of these it may stand in speaking, and with respect to that it may be called a doctrinal sign. For another it may not stand and it will not signify that significate doctrinally. And of this last kind are words which are employed only for things, lest they make utterances false, as the argument was trying to show.

*The Second Argument is Answered.*—To the second argument Scotus answers that a term is analogous only when it signifies many things through many impositions, but a word signifies everything through one imposition. However, according to our opinion, it must be said that a word is analogous when it signifies different things in the same manner. In this way, the word ‘man’ is related to a true man and to one pictured on a page; for it indicates both doctrinally. But it is not so related to a man and to a concept of that man, since it does not signify the latter doctrinally.

*The Third Argument is Answered.*—In answer to the third argument, Richard [of Middleton] in [his *Sentences* commentary] Book 1, Distinction 22, Question 3, says that through the word a hearer immediately perceives the concept and then the thing<sup>225</sup> —but he is speaking according to another opinion [i.e., one which is not his own]. Our response is that, even though it is not necessary for a

rem ob distinctionem significationum; quemadmodum visa scriptura non oportet agnoscere vocem, quam scriptura immediate significat, ut teneatur res per scripturam significata; nihilominus cum volumus, media voce loquentis conceptum apprehendimus; quod sat est, ut significari perhibeatur. Ad confirmationem, scilicet, signum debere rem in cognitionem adducere fatemur, negamus vero id non praestari a voce comparatione conceptuum.

Postulat quarta ratio,<sup>139</sup> ut quam brevissime doceamus, quis conceptus necessario vocem praecedat? Est enim conceptus duplex alter medius, alter ultimus, id est unus vocis, quae profertur, alius rei per eam significatae. Et quidem<sup>140</sup> imaginationem vocis eandem praeire tam in nobis, quam in animalibus ex eo demonstratur, quia potentia motiva, a qua formatur vox, ad nullum opus impellitur, nisi regatur ab imaginativa idem opus cognoscente. Et hoc significavit Aristoteles lib. 2. de anima text. 9. cum dixit vocem fieri cum imaginatione. Nam soni, qui aliter fiunt, ut tussis, et risus, voces non sunt; quod si brutae animantes, ut Pica, et Psyttacus, vocem formant sola eius imaginatione (siquidem rei significatae conceptum habere non possunt) non est dubitandum hoc ipsum a nobis effici posse. Atque adeo saepe nos voces significativas edere absque ulla cognitione rei significatae, ut etiam edunt, qui latina vocabula recitant, nec intelligunt, aut quamvis intelligunt, non advertunt. In quo eventu non modo phantasia, sed etiam intellectus habere potest conceptus medios absque ultimis. Experti sumus, et in nobis, et in aliis, inquit August. lib. de Magistro cap. 13. non earum rerum, quae cogitantur, verba proferri.

Verum<sup>141</sup> haec vocum prolatio, cum et ignaris et brutis communis sit, locutionibus, et sermonis rationem non habet; est enim sermo autore Alber. tract. 2. cap. 1. locutio edita animo rem significandi. Quod etiam confirmat Augustinus cap. 5. de principiis Dialecticae, cum ait loqui esse de articulata voce signum dare. Dubitatio ergo est, an cum aliquis utitur sermone deliberate, et animo significandi rem, debeat necessario in mente formare illius rei conceptum; nam cum aliter verba proba profert, diximus id minime necessarium esse.

Affirmat D. Thom.<sup>142</sup> 2.2. quaest. 110. arti. 1. eo quod manifestatio per huiusmodi signum requirat signi, et significati collationem, quae (ut manifestum est) absque utriusque termini cognitione fieri non potest. Haec responsio D. Thomae etsi verissima, occasionem praebet ulterioris dubitationis, videlicet an cognitio rei significatae debeat esse intellectualis, an sufficiat sensitiva; nam D. Thom. di /p. 38/ xit illam collationem esse

hearer to know the concept in order to perceive the thing, because of the distinction of their significations, just as when writing is seen it is not necessary to perceive the word which the writing immediately signifies, in order that the thing signified by the writing be grasped, nevertheless, when we wish, we grasp the concept by means of the word of the speaker, which is enough that it be said to be signified. In reply to the confirming argument, namely, that a sign must make the thing known, we agree; but we deny that this is done by a word in relation to concepts.

*Which Concept Necessarily precedes the Word?*—To present it as briefly as possible, the fourth argument asks: *which concept necessarily precedes the word?* For there are two kinds of concept: the one intermediate and the other ultimate; the former is the concept of the word which is spoken, while the latter is the concept of the thing which is signified.

*It is Proven that the Concept of the Word precedes that of the Thing.*—And indeed, that the same imagining of the word precedes both in us and also in animals is demonstrated from the fact that the active power by which the word is formed is not induced to operation unless it is ruled by the imaginative power knowing that same operation. And Aristotle indicated this, in *De Anima*, Book 2, Text 9, when he said that the word comes to be with imagination.<sup>226</sup> For sounds which come to be in another way, such as coughing and laughing, are not words. But if brute animals, such as a magpie or a parrot,<sup>227</sup> form a word, only by the imagination of that word (since they cannot have a concept of the thing signified) it should not be doubted that this same thing can be done by ourselves. And, what is more, we often do utter significative words without any knowledge of a thing signified, as indeed they do who recite Latin words without understanding or who, even if they do understand, do not advert [to what the words signify].<sup>228</sup> In that event, not only the imagination, but also the intellect, can possess intermediate concepts without ultimate concepts. ‘*We have experienced, both in ourselves and in others,*’ says Augustine, in his book, ‘*On the Teacher,*’ Chapter 13, ‘*that words are spoken apart from things which are thought.*’<sup>229</sup>

*When Someone wishes to signify a Thing by a Word, must he form in his Mind a Concept of that Thing?*—But this saying of words, since it is common to the utterances of both ignorant persons and brute animals, does not have the character of speech. For speech, on the authority of Albert, in Tractate 2, Chapter 1, is speaking with the intention of signifying something.<sup>230</sup> Augustine, [in his work] ‘*On the Principles of Dialectic,*’ Chapter 5, also confirms this, when he says that to speak is to give a sign by means of an articulated word.<sup>231</sup> Therefore, the question is whether when one uses speech, deliberately and with an intention of signifying some thing, he is necessarily obliged to form in his mind a concept of that thing. For inasmuch as without this he speaks proper words, we have said that this is in no way necessary.

*The Affirmative Answer of St. Thomas.*—St. Thomas answers affirmatively, [in *Summa Theologiae*], the Second Part of the Second Part, Question 110, Article 1,<sup>232</sup> from the fact that a manifestation through this kind of sign requires a comparison of the sign and what is signified, which (as is clear) cannot be done without a knowledge of both terms. This response of St. Thomas, even though it is most true, offers occasion for a further question, namely, whether the knowledge

opus rationis. Idem significat Damascenus lib. 1. de Philosophia capite 1. cum ait: Deus articulatam vocem menti, et intellectui copulavit. Boëtius capite 1. edit. 2. in hunc librum ita loquitur. Praeter intellectum vox penitus nihil designat. Ambrosius 6. Exameron. cap. 9. ait uti sono vocis ad aliquid significandum esse rationabile. Scotus hic quaest. 2. Omne significare, inquit, supponit intelligere. Quid plura? videtur expressum ab Aristotele hoc capite, cum ait voces esse notas affectionum animi. Et accedit manifesta ratio. Ad proferendum sermonem eo modo significativum, necessaria est cognitio habitudinis inter signum, et significatum ex instituto, sed haec a signo attingi non potest, ut docet Scotus in 4. dist. 1. q. 1. et patet ex eo, quia habitudo illa signi ex instituto est rationis, et materia magis abstracta, quam sensus attingit. Diximus [inter signum ex instituto] quoniam habitudinem signi naturalis, et materialis ad suum significatum, ut fumi ad ignem, fortasse percipit internus sensus.

Huic doctrinae<sup>143</sup> cum vera et Dialectico plana videatur, non est cur repugnemus, tametsi non nihil difficultatis in ea sit, praesertim si cum iis, quae in prima quaest. docuimus, conferatur; sed ibi locuti sumus de perceptione rei significatae mediante signo naturali; hic de eiusdem rei expressione per signum ex instituto.

His praelibatis,<sup>144</sup> ad quartam rationem occurrimus absolute loquendo non esse incommodum, cum sine advertentia loquimur, nullos in mente conceptus praecedere; adhuc enim voces eos exprimunt, quia communis et naturalis loquendi modus, cui voces conformantur, est, ut praecedant conceptus. Ad Augustinum dicimus, eum primo loco agere de vocibus indeliberate prolatis: in secundo loqui per hyperbolem, ad explicandam magnitudinem Divini esse. Nam dubitatio, quam ibi insinuat: An voces plus significant, quam mens capiat: vel e contra? alibi est expedienda. Eadem interpretatio est D. Chrysostomi. Ad exemplum de avibus, et dormientibus damus nullos ibi intervenire conceptus, quamvis verum non sit nostrum intellectum inter dormiendum non operari, ut in libr. 3. de Anima q. 5. art. 4. disseritur, et eodem capite indicat Nissenus. Unde eo loco non videtur assertive loqui.

Ad ultimum<sup>145</sup> negat D. Augustinus cap. 13. lib. de Magistro. mentientes non cogitare de rebus, quas sermone proferunt; cum enim voces edant animo significandi, necessario significata concipiunt, ut proxime dictum est. Nec mentiri est ita contra mentem ire, ut verba sonent, quae mente non apprehenduntur; sed ut significant oppositum eius, quod intellectu cognoscitur verum. Itaque mentientis intellectus, et verum, et falsum

of the thing signified must be intellectual, or is sense-knowledge enough? For St. Thomas has said that the required comparison is a task for reason, and Damascene indicates the same thing when he says, [in his work] ‘*On Philosophy*,’ Book 1, Chapter 1: ‘*God has joined the articulated word to the mind and intellect.*’<sup>233</sup> Boethius in the Second Edition [of his Commentary] on this book [i.e. the *De Interpretatione*], Chapter 1, speaks in the same way: ‘*Apart from the understanding, a word designates nothing at all.*’<sup>234</sup> Ambrose [in his work] on the *Hexaemeron*, Book 6, Chapter 9, says that it is reasonable to use the sound of a word in order to signify something.<sup>235</sup> And Scotus in this place, Question 2, says that every signifying presupposes understanding.<sup>236</sup>

What need for more? It seems it is expressed by Aristotle in this Chapter when he says that words are signs of the affections of the mind. And the obvious reason is at hand: in order to utter speech which is significative in that way it is necessary to have knowledge of the relationship between the sign and what is by institution signified; but, as Scotus teaches in [his *Sentences* commentary], Book 4, Distinction 1, Question 1 [sic], this cannot be attained by the sign.<sup>237</sup> This is clear from the fact that this relationship of a sign by institution is one of reason, and it is something more abstract than what sensation attains. We have said ‘between a sign [and a significate] by institution’ because perhaps an internal sense perceives the relation of a natural and material sign to its significate, for example of smoke to fire.

*The Opinion of St. Thomas is Accepted and Reconciled with the Doctrine above.*—Since it seems true and evident to a logician, there is no reason for us to contradict this doctrine, even if it contains some difficulty, especially if it is compared with what we taught in the First Question. But in that place we were speaking about the perception of the thing signified by means of a natural sign. Here we are speaking about the expression of the same thing through a sign by institution.

*The Fourth Argument is Answered.*—With these matters resolved, to the fourth argument we say that, absolutely speaking, it is not a problem that, when we speak without advertence, no mental concepts precede. For words still express those concepts, because it is the common and natural mode of speaking, to which words are conformed, that they precede concepts.

To [the texts from] Augustine we say that that in the first passage he is dealing with words that are spoken without deliberation and in the second passage he is speaking with hyperbole in order to explain the greatness of Divine being. For the question, which he suggests there, whether words may signify more than the mind may grasp, or vice versa? will have to be settled elsewhere.<sup>238</sup> And the text of St. Chrysostom is to be interpreted in the same way. In reply to the example about birds and sleeping persons we grant that there are no concepts present there, although it is true that our intellect does operate during sleep, as is discussed in [our Commentary on] *De Anima*, Book 3, Question 5, Article 4,<sup>239</sup> and as [Gregory of] Nyssa indicates in the same chapter<sup>240</sup> (hence, in that passage he does not seem to speak assertively).

*The Fifth Argument is Answered.*—In answer to the last argument, St. Augustine, in his work, ‘*On the Teacher*,’ Chapter 13, denies that liars do not think about the things which they say in their speech.<sup>241</sup> For since they utter words with the intention of signifying, they necessarily conceive what [those words] signify, as



apprehendit, sed falsum tantum prodit. At insurges. Eo pacto mentientem contradictorios assensus simul habere. Si enim ut quis dicat Regem Posthumum in Africa occubuisse, oportet huius habere internam enunciationem, cum sciat oppositum esse verum, duas habebit contradictorias. /p. 39/ Respondetur distinguendo illationem, sequitur enim haberi duas contradictoras, alteram apprehensam, alteram iudicatam, non autem ambas iudicatas; quod solum repugnat.

Argumenta<sup>146</sup> pro sententia Boëtii, quatenus obsunt nostrae, ita diluantur. Imprimis asserimus in contextu, Aristotelem non modo dixisse voces esse notas conceptuum, sed esse notas primo, ut indicaret consortium alterius significati. Ad primum argumentum concedendum est, voces inventas esse in supplementum conceptuum, qui per se manifestari non possunt: sed hoc munus praestare significando immediate res ipsas; neque enim ita conceptus innuunt, ut eorum tantum merito significant; ut supra dictum est. Contra quod nihil efficiunt verba<sup>147</sup> Augustini.

Ad secundum<sup>148</sup> negandum est, vocabula rerum, quae confinguntur, solos indicare conceptus. Quamvis enim veram rem non significant, ut pote quae nulla est, designant tamen obiectum confictum per modum veri. Illud Syncategorema [Si] et similia tantum abesse, ut solum conceptum significant, ut, si per se proferantur, quemadmodum nullum ingenerant in audiente conceptum ultimum, ita nullum denotant in loquente. Si autem sumantur cum categoremate, significant illius conceptum modificatum. Et cum D. Augustinus ait significare dubitationem, imprimis non loquitur de sola ea voce [Si] sed de tota oratione. Deinde vel loquitur de significatione solius conceptus, minime negando aliam, qua significet totum aggregatum rerum significatarum per illas voces; et tunc verum est per illam orationem exprimi dubitationem mentis; vel de re significata in esse obiectivo; nam eo modo accepta est dubia propter denominationem ab actu interno. Similiter dicendum est, omnes orationes imperativas, et optativas significare res ipsas modo non enunciativo, ut 4. cap. docebimus. Ad confirmationem, negandum est, nutus significare solos conceptus. Sermocinantur enim homines cum surdis, nutibus, ut ait Augustinus cap. 3. lib. de Magistro; idque de iisdem rebus. Quod vel inde patet: quia surdi, cum quibus loquimur, res ipsas nutu significant, ut Zacharias Lucae 2. significavit pugillarem. Vide etiam D. Thomam in 2. d. 12. q. 1. art. 3.

was just said. Neither is 'to lie' 'to go against the mind' in such way that the words mean things which are not apprehended by the mind, but that they signify the opposite of that which is known by the intellect to be true.<sup>242</sup> Therefore, the intellect of a liar apprehends both the true and the false, but brings forth only the false.

But you will object: in that way a liar simultaneously gives assent to contradictories. For if in order that someone say that the last king died in Africa<sup>243</sup> it is necessary that he internally enunciate this, even though he knows its opposite to be true, he will have [in his mind] two contradictories. This is answered by distinguishing the inference. For it follows that he has two contradictories, one of which is apprehended while the other is judged; but it does not follow that he has two judged contradictories, which alone is conflicting.

*The Arguments in Favor of Boethius' Opinion are Answered. The First Argument is Answered.*—The arguments in support of Boethius' opinion, insofar as they are opposed to our opinion, may be refuted as follows. To begin, we assert that in context Aristotle did not just say that words are signs of concepts. But he said that they are 'first' signs, so as to indicate the addition of another significate. In answer to the first argument, we must concede that words have been invented to supplement concepts, which cannot become manifest by themselves. But they fulfill this task by immediately signifying things themselves. Neither indeed do they give any indication of concepts in such way that they signify only by benefit of those concepts, as was said above. Against this, the words of Augustine have no effect.

*The Second Argument is Answered.*—In answer to the second argument, we must deny that words which stand for imaginary things indicate concepts only. For even though they do not signify a true thing, they do, however, designate an object which is fashioned in the manner of a true thing. [Again] the syncategorematic term, 'if,' and similar terms, are lacking only to the degree that they signify simply [an intermediate] concept, with the result that, if as such they are spoken, just as they engender no ultimate concept in a hearer, so also they denote none in a speaker. But if they are taken together with a categorematic term, they signify a modified concept of that. And when St. Augustine says that 'if' signifies a hesitation, first of all he is not speaking about the single word 'if,' but rather about the whole utterance. Or, second, he is speaking about the signification of the concept alone, not at all denying any other signification, by which it may signify the whole aggregate of the things signified by those words. And then it is true that by that utterance there is expressed a mental hesitation. Or he is speaking about the thing signified in its objective being, for taken in that way it is doubtful because of a denomination from the internal act.<sup>244</sup> In a similar manner, we must say that all imperative and optative utterances signify things themselves in a non-enunciative way, as we will explain in Chapter 4.<sup>245</sup>

In reply to the confirming argument, it must be denied that gestures signify concepts only. For people converse with the deaf by means of gestures, as Augustine says in Chapter 3 of *On the Teacher*,<sup>246</sup> and that conversing is about those same things themselves. This is also clear from the fact that the deaf, with whom we speak, signify things themselves by gesturing, for example, Zachary, in *Luke*, Chapter 2, signified a writing-tablet. [On this] see also St. Thomas, in [his *Sentences* commentary], Book 2, Distinction 12, Question 1, Article 3.<sup>247</sup>

#### Articulus 4

##### An scripta significant voces, et quo modo?

Haec est secunda pars prioris pronuntiati Aristotelici, in qua de scriptis eadem explicandae sunt quaestiones, quae hactenus expeditae sunt de voce. Videlicet an significant vocem, et rem? utrum eadem, an diversis significationibus? an per se existant signa, vel solum ratione vocis? Pro definitione primae dubitationis sit,<sup>149</sup> primum /p. 40<sup>150</sup>/ pronuntiatum.<sup>151</sup> Scripturae, et res et voces significant. Primam partem conclusionis, etsi non expresserit Aristoteles, supposuit tamen ut certam; quod ex illius interpretibus hoc loco est manifestum. Et vero is tantum eam neget, cui omnia Graeca sunt, et nihil per scripturam percipit: in quem recte cadit censura Catonis. Legere, et non intelligere, negligere est. Secundam tradit Philosophus, Boëtius, Albertus, et caeteri hoc capite, Augustinus 15. de Trinitate c. 10. et de principiis Dialecticae cap. 5. et in dialogo de Magistro cap. 4. Nullus denique est, qui dissentiat. Ratio<sup>152</sup> optima est, quae tangitur cap. 10. lib. 1. Introductionum, videlicet, qui Latinas literas legunt, nec intelligunt, nihilominus vocum conceptum formant; signum ergo est literas per se afferre notitiam vocum.

Secundum pronuntiatum<sup>153</sup> ad solutionem secundae dubitationis. Scripta diversis significationibus repraesentant voces, et res. Probatur primo. Scriptura aliquando significat vocem, et non rem; ergo est diversa significatio. Consequentia est bona ex ea regula. Quae separari possunt in re ipsa, aliquo modo distinguuntur. Antecedens patet in scriptura [Blictri] qua visa formamus similem vocem, nullam rem ulterius cognoscendo. Secundo significatio rei est simplex in scriptura, ut statim demonstrabimus: significatio autem vocis complexa; integratur enim ex significationibus, quibus singuli characteres denotant singulos vocis sonos. Enim vero, ut nomen scriptum significet vocem, non imponitur totum simul, sed per singulas literas. Quod colliges ex multis capitibus. Primo. Quia, ut aliquis proferat vocem significatam ab scriptura, satis est, si cognoscat singulos eius characteres. Secundo,<sup>154</sup> quoniam nunc possum fingere vocabulum scriptum, quod hactenus nemo excogitavit; atque adeo nec totum simul ad significandum imposuit: quod nihilominus significabit vocem sibi respondentem; ergo significatio scripturae, respectu vocis, coalescit ex significationibus literarum. Tertio,<sup>155</sup> id ipsum visitur in dictione [Blictri] quae nunquam fuit per se totam imposita; ergo ut significatio totius orationis est aggregatio significationum suarum partium, ita res habet in scriptura.

## Article 4

## Whether Writing Signifies Words, and How?

This is the second part of the Aristotelian assertion, in regard to which the same questions need to be answered about writing, which up to now have been treated about words. That is: does writing signify the word and the thing? Does it do so with the same or with different significations? Are writings signs by themselves, or only by virtue of a word?

*The First Assertion: Writings signify both Things and Words.*—To define the first question, let the first assertion be: *writings signify both things and words*. Even though Aristotle did not express the first part of this assertion, he did, however, suppose it as certain—which is evident from his interpreters in this place. And, indeed, that man alone may deny it for whom ‘all things are Greek,’<sup>248</sup> who perceives nothing through writing, and on whom rightly falls the censure of Cato [Marcus Porcius (234-149 B.C.)]: ‘*to read and not to understand, is not to read.*’<sup>249</sup> Aristotle, Boethius,<sup>250</sup> Albert, and others teach the second part in this Chapter, as does Augustine in his works: ‘*On the Trinity*,’ Book 15, Chapter 10;<sup>251</sup> ‘*On the Principles of Dialectic*,’ Chapter 5;<sup>252</sup> and ‘*On the Teacher*,’ Chapter 4.<sup>253</sup> In the end, there is no one who disagrees.

*This is [also] Proven by a rational Argument.*—The best argument is the one touched on in the *Introductions*, Book 1, Chapter 10, namely, those who read Latin letters and do not understand do, nevertheless, form a concept of the words.<sup>254</sup> This is, therefore, a sign that the letters directly bring knowledge of the words.

*The Second Assertion is that Writing represents Words and Things by different Significations. The First Proof.*—The second assertion for an answer to the second question is that writing represents with different significations words and things. This is proven first: writing sometimes signifies a word and not a thing; therefore, its signification of each is different. The consequence is valid from this rule: *Things which can be separated in reality, are in some way distinguished.*<sup>255</sup> The antecedent is clear in the case of the written term, ‘*Blictri*,’ upon whose being seen, we form a similar word while not knowing any thing beyond.

*The Second Proof.*—Second, as we will presently show, the signification of a thing in writing is simple. But the signification of a word is complex. For it is put together from significations in which single letters denote single sounds of the voice. To be sure, in order that a written term signify a word, it is not instituted all at once, but through its individual letters. This you may infer for various reasons. First, because in order that someone speak a word which is signified by writing, it is enough that he know its individual letters. Second, because right now I am able to fashion a written word, which up to this point no one has thought of and for that reason has not instituted it in order to signify all at once. Yet, it will signify the spoken word which corresponds to it. Therefore, the signification of writing in relation to the spoken word, coalesces from the significations of letters.

*The Third Proof.*—Third, that very thing is seen in the word ‘*Blictri*,’ which was never by itself as a whole instituted [to signify something].

Therefore, as the signification of a whole utterance is the aggregate of the significations of its parts, the same is true in the case of writing.

Oppones<sup>156</sup> adversus hoc pronuntiatum. Aristoteles eodem modo dixit scripta esse signa vocum, quo dixerat voces esse signa conceptuum: sed voces significant conceptus integre, et non per distinctos articulos; ergo idem erit dicendum de scriptis. Et confirmatur. Si scripta solum significationem partium haberent, significarent voces, ut quod, et principaliter, atque consequenter pro ipsis in oratione acciperentur. Quod est manifeste falsum.

Huic<sup>157</sup> obiectioni<sup>158</sup> (qua nonnulli persuasi sunt, ut scripturae tribuerent significationem simplicem respectu vocum distinctum a significationibus partium) occurrens facile negando Aristotelem constituisse omnimodam similitudinem inter vocem, et scripturam; sed in eo tantum quod utraeque praeter res aliud significant: voces /p. 41/ quidem conceptus: scriptura autem voces. Quanvis in modo sit magna diversitas; siquidem vox nequit exprimere conceptum, nisi significando rem: scriptura vero significat vocem, etsi nullam rem ulterius indicet. Unde ad confirmationem respondetur, scripta esse quidem primo, et per se signa vocum, sed non doctrinalia; et idcirco cum in Oratione ponuntur pro eis non accipi: quanvis ignari alterius significationis comparatione rei, cum scripturam legunt ad voces recurrunt.

Oppones secundo,<sup>159</sup> singulos articulos in voce significare characteres, verbi causa sonum [A] hanc literam, et sic in caeteris; ergo non posse e contra characteres esse articulorum signa. Respondetur,<sup>160</sup> nullum esse incommodum, quod haec sint mutuo signa. Quod non accidit integris dictionibus; scriptae enim significant vocales, non e converso, quantumvis nobis videamur mediis vocibus in cognitionem scripturarum devenire; id enim est ob similitudinem non ob significationem.

Tertium pronuntiatum.<sup>161</sup> Scriptum significat rem per eandem significationem, qua vox, ita ut ea significatio immediate, et quasi intrinsece afficiat vocem, remote, et extrinsece scripturam. Probat. Vox et scriptura eadem impositione significant: sed haec ipsa est vera significatio; ergo est unica. Maior probatur; quia ut nomen scriptum censeatur impositum ad significandum, satis est vocem, quam exprimit, significativam esse; si enim modo imponeretur haec vox [Blictri] ad significandum Turcam, absque alia impositione, idem significaret eius scriptura. Ratio nimirum est, quia scriptum eatenus significat rem, quatenus est signum vocis significantis, et in eius locum substituitur, iuxta illud axioma Dialecticum [signum alicuius signi, est etiam signum significati.] Atque hac de causa addidimus, in conclusione significationem esse intrinsece in voce, extrinsece autem in scriptura: quia illa imponitur per se, haec per quandam consecutionem

*Objection 1.*—To this assertion you will object that Aristotle said writings are signs of words in the same way in which he had earlier said that words are signs of concepts. But words signify concepts in an integral manner and not through distinct parts. Therefore, the same will have to be said about writings. And this is confirmed: if writing had only the signification of parts, it would signify words, as what it principally signifies, and, consequently, it would be taken for those words in an utterance—which is obviously false.

*The Objection is Answered.*—You will easily answer this objection (by which some have been persuaded to give writing, with respect to words, a simple signification distinct from the significations of its parts) by denying that Aristotle thought there was in every way a likeness between the word and writing. Rather he thought that they were alike only in that they both may signify something besides things: that words may signify concepts, while writing may signify words. However, there is a great difference in the way they signify, inasmuch as a word can express a concept only by signifying a thing, but writing signifies a word even if it does not further indicate any thing. Hence, the answer to the confirming argument is that writings are indeed immediately and directly signs of words, but not doctrinal signs. Therefore when writings are put into speech [i.e., spoken aloud] they are not taken for those words, although when they read something written persons who are ignorant of another signification in relation to the thing come back to the words.

*Objection 2.*—You will object, second, that the individual parts of a word signify characters, for example, the sound, ‘A’ signifies this letter, and so with the other sounds. Therefore, the characters cannot *vice versa* be signs of the parts.

*The Objection is Answered.*—We answer, that there is no problem in these being mutually signs one of another. But this does not occur in whole utterances, for writing signifies spoken words, not the other way round, however much we may seem to ourselves to come by means of words to the knowledge of writing. For that is because of likeness and not because of signification.

*The Third Assertion: Writing signifies the Thing by the Same Signification as does the Word.*—The third assertion is that something written signifies the thing by the same signification as does the word, in such way that that signification immediately and, as it were, intrinsically attaches to the word but remotely and extrinsically to the writing. This is proven: the word and writing signify with the same signification; but this is the true signification; therefore, it is unique. The major premiss is proven: because in order that a written term be thought to be instituted for signifying, it is enough that it be significative of the word which it expresses. For if now this word ‘*Blictri*’ were to be instituted in order to signify the [Grand] Turk,<sup>256</sup> without any other institution its being written [i.e., its written equivalent] would signify the same thing. Without doubt the reason is because something written signifies the thing insofar as it is the sign of the word which signifies [that thing], according to the logical axiom, ‘*the sign of some sign is also the sign of what it signifies.*’<sup>257</sup> And by reason of this, we are adding in the conclusion that signification is intrinsically in the word and extrinsically in writing. For the former signification is directly imposed but the latter is denominated from a certain fol-

ab impositione denominatur. Quod fortasse movit Aristotelem, ut significationis scripturae per ordinem ad rem nunquam meminerit.

Oppones<sup>162</sup> primo contra hoc pronunciatum, id quod supra indicavimus. Si eadem foret significatio vocis et<sup>163</sup> scripturae, non recte divideretur signum doctrinale in illa tria membra, conceptus, voces, et scripta; siquidem posteriora duo ab una forma denominantur. Respondetur<sup>164</sup> negando illationem; ad multiplicationem enim signorum in concreto satis est multiplicatio rerum significantium, quia ut nomina adiectiva dicantur in numero plurali, sufficit multiplicatio subiectorum, ut alibi dictum est: et fatentur cum Aristotele, qui dividunt sanum ut Analogum in varia membra, omnia enim denominantur ab una sanitate existente in animali, ad quod caetera dicunt attributionem; igitur, etsi doctrinalis significatio non sit triplex, tria tamen sunt significantia, hoc est, habentia significationem, et inter haec voces, et scripta sunt analogae per /p. 42/ attributionem unius ad aliud, scilicet scriptorum ad voces.

Oppones secundo.<sup>165</sup> Scripturae hieroglyphicae (Quibus utebantur Chaldaei sequuti Zoroastrem eorum inventorem, et Aegyptii, inventore Mercurio, ut author est Marsilius Ficinus in Platonem de summo bono cap. 29. et utuntur hodie Sinarum, et Iaponiorum populi) immediate significant res nullas indicando voces; ergo habent peculiarem significationem, et sibi intrinsicam. Respondetur<sup>166</sup> omnia illa signa, quae afferuntur, non esse proprie scripturas; sed quasdam figuras inventas ad significandas res immediate. Ad eum modum Arithmeticorum numeri significant certam rerum summam, et Mathematicorum imagines, planetas, constellationesque repraesentant. At nobis hoc loco, ut non est sermo nisi de voce dearticulata, sicuti ait Albertus, et Augustinus infra citandi, ita nomine scripturae intelligimus eam, quae coalescit ex partibus, seu literis.

Si praecedens doctrina recolatur,<sup>167</sup> invenientur scripta, et voces in significando dupliciter convenire, trifaria differre. Conveniunt primo; Quia ut voces significant conceptus, et res, ita scripturae repraesentant voces, et easdem res. Secundo. Ut voces pro rebus tantum supponuntur, easque doctrinaliter significant, ita scripta. Discrepant primo, quoniam utraque significatio vocis, rei nimirum, et conceptus est simplex; at significatio scripturae respectu vocis est complexa. Secundo. Scriptura est signum rei beneficio vocis formaliter, hoc est, eadem omnino significatione: at vox diversam sortitur significationem a conceptu, cum haec sit naturalis, illa ex instituto. Tertio differunt. Quoniam scripta possunt exequi solum munus significandi vocem, nullam rem simul indicando, ut patet in scriptura [Blictri] at vox nequit indicare conceptum, non significata re aliqua; cum haec repraesentatio sit veluti medium ad illam consequendam, ut supra monuimus.



lowing upon [that former] imposition. And this perhaps is what moved Aristotle so that he never mentions the signification of writing by relation to the thing.<sup>258</sup>

*Objection 1.*—Against this assertion you will first object what we have indicated above. If the signification of the word and of writing would be the same, doctrinal signs would not be correctly divided into those three members: concepts, words, and writings. For the last two would be denominated from one form.

*The Answer to the Objection.*—Our answer is to deny the inference, because for a multiplication of signs in the concrete a multiplication of things signifying is enough. For in order that adjectival terms be said in plural number it is enough to have a multiplication of subjects, as was said elsewhere.<sup>259</sup> And they agree who, with Aristotle,<sup>260</sup> divide ‘healthy’ as an analogous term into various members. For these members are all denominated from one health existing in an animal, to which the other [‘healthies’] are said by reference. Therefore, even if doctrinal signification is not threefold, there are still three things which signify, that is, three things having signification. And among these, words and writing are analogous by a reference of one to the other, namely, of writing to words.

*Objection 2.*—You will object second: Hieroglyphic writings (which the Chaldeans used in the wake of their invention by Zoroaster, and the Egyptians with Mercury inventing them, as Marsilio Ficino [1433-1499] writes in his work on Plato, ‘*On the Supreme Good*,’ Chapter 29;<sup>261</sup> and which the peoples of China and Japan use today) immediately signify things without indicating any words. Therefore, they have a peculiar signification which is intrinsic to themselves.

*The Answer to the Objection.*—Our answer is that all those signs mentioned are not properly writings, but rather certain figures invented in order to immediately signify things.<sup>262</sup> In that way, the numbers of the arithmeticians signify a certain sum of things,<sup>263</sup> and the images of mathematicians represent planets and constellations.<sup>264</sup> But for us in this place, inasmuch as we are discussing only an ‘articulated word,’ as Albert says,<sup>265</sup> as well as Augustine as he will be cited below, by the term ‘writing’ we thus understand that which comes together from parts or letters.

*Words and Writings inasmuch as they are Signs Agree in Two Ways and Differ in Three Ways.*—If we recall the preceding doctrine, writing and words will be found to agree in signifying in two ways and to differ in three ways. They agree, first, because as words signify concepts and things, so writing represents words and the same things. They agree, second, as words are substituted for things and signify them doctrinally, so do writings. They differ, first, because the signification both of the word (that is to say, its signification of the thing) and of the concept is simple, but the signification of writing in relation to the word is complex. They differ, second, because writing is the sign of the thing formally by benefit of the word, which is to say, with entirely the same signification, but the word obtains a different signification from that of the concept, because the latter is natural, while the former is by institution. They differ, third, because writings can execute only the task of signifying the word, while at the same time not indicating any thing, as is evident in the writing, ‘*Blictri*.’ But the word cannot indicate the concept without some thing being signified. For this representation [of the concept] is like a means to reach that thing.



## Quaestio 4

## Utrum conceptus iidem sint apud omnes: voces autem diversae

## Articulus I

## Quo sensu verum sit conceptus esse eosdem apud omnes

Hactenus<sup>168</sup> explicavimus cum Aristotele in suo primo pronunciato quaenam essent conceptuum, vocum, et scripturarum significata; nunc quis sit eorum significandi modus inquirimus. Et est secundum Aristotelis effatum, in quo astruit conceptus esse signa naturalia, voces vero ex instituto; hic est enim planus, plenusque illius sensus, si tota haec do- /p. 43/ctrina recte cohaeret. Nam idem esse apud omnes nihil est aliud, quam natura sua tale esse, non ex<sup>169</sup> hominum arbitratu. Et e contra non esse ubique idem (quod Aristoteles de voce protulit, et scriptura) significat haec ex libera voluntate esse signa. Quanvis haec ita sint iuxta graviore Interpres, et consultam rationem; uberior tamen doctrina postulat, ut utramque huius pronunciati partem accuratius examinemus. A prima igitur, quae ad conceptus pertinet exorsi ita obiicimus.

Cum Philosophus<sup>170</sup> ait conceptus esse eosdem apud omnes, vel intelligit ab omnibus hominibus eosdem formari conceptus de eadem re, vel eum quem quilibet apud se parit, omnibus inservire posse ad illius rei cognitionem: sed utrumque est falsum; ergo etc. Probatur minor quoad primam partem. De eadem re non modo finguntur diversi conceptus a diversis hominibus, ut videre est in rustico, et Mathematico, quorum unus apprehendit solem maiorem tota terra, alter minorem rota plaustrum, non modo inquam, diversi; sed etiam oppositi: cum de una propositione plerique contraria opinentur. Quod<sup>171</sup> ad secundam partem probatur, quia conceptus ab uno formatus, cum sit accidens, nequit migrare in mentem alterius; ergo non potest alteri repraesentare. Imo tametsi transferretur a Deo, nihilo magis inserviret alteri ad cognitionem, quoniam, ut nemo vivere potest per alterius vitam, ita nec intelligere per alterius conceptum.

Ad explicationem<sup>172</sup> huius dubitationis est supponendum ex supra dictis conceptum perinde, ac speciem intelligibilem, esse imaginem ad vivum experimentem suum obiectum; ad illudque referri transcendentaliter tanquam ad mensuram, et exemplar sui esse quae vero ita referuntur, per suammet essentiam et naturam tendunt in terminos: cum autem rerum essentiae mutari non possint, fit consequenter, ut huiusmodi conceptus ubique retineant suam repraesentationem, et per eam ducant potentiam in cognitionem obiecti. Et haec est praecipua ratio, qua interpretes hoc loco probant conceptus esse eosdem apud omnes: In ea tamen, ut firmior

**Question 4**  
**Whether Concepts are the Same for All People**  
**but Words are Different**  
**Article 1**

**In what sense is it true that concepts are the same for all?**

*Concepts are the same for all and thus are Natural Signs; But Words are not the same and thus are Signs by Institution.*—Up to now we have explained, with Aristotle in his first assertion, what would be the significates of concepts, words, and writing. Now we are asking what is their mode of signifying? And this is in line with the dictum of Aristotle, in which he affirms that concepts are natural signs, but words are by institution. For if the whole doctrine here is consistent, this is its plain and full sense. For to be the same for all is nothing else than to be such by its own nature, and not from human will. On the other hand, not to be everywhere the same (which Aristotle says of both the word and writing) indicates that these are signs from a free will. But even though this all is so, according to authoritative interpreters and careful reasoning, nevertheless, a fuller teaching demands that we more closely examine both parts of this assertion. Hence, beginning with the first part, which pertains to the concept, we object as follows.

*Objection 1. That Concepts are not the Same for All Human Beings.*—When the Philosopher says that concepts are the same for all, either he understands that the same concepts are formed by all men about the same thing, or that a concept which any man brings forth for himself can serve all men for the knowledge of that thing. But both are false. Therefore, etc. The minor premiss is proven with respect to the first alternative. Not only are diverse concepts formed by different men about the same thing, as can be seen in the case of a peasant and a mathematician, one of whom understands the sun to be greater than the whole earth, while the other thinks it less than the wheel of a wagon—not only do I say ‘diverse’ but even opposite concepts [are formed], since about one proposition many may think opposite things. It [the minor premiss] is proven [also] with respect to the second alternative. For a concept formed by one person, since it is an accident, cannot migrate into the mind of another person. Therefore, it cannot represent anything to another person. Indeed, even if it were to be transferred by God, it would not serve that other person any more, since, just as no one can live by the life of another, so neither can anyone understand by another’s concept.<sup>266</sup>

*The Objection is Clarified, and the Concept is taken to be an Image of an Object.*—To clarify this problem, we must suppose, from what was said above, that the concept, just like the intelligible species, is a living image which expresses its object and is related in a transcendental way to that object as to the measure and exemplar of its being. But things which are related in that way, by their very essence and nature tend to their termini.<sup>267</sup> However, since the essences of things cannot be changed, it follows that concepts of this kind everywhere retain their own representation and through that they lead the potency to the knowledge of the object. And this is the principal argument by which the interpreters [of Aristotle] in this place prove that concepts are the same for all. But in order that the argu-

sit duo examinanda sunt. Primum, an omnibus in universum conceptibus conveniat esse suorum obiectorum imagines an quibusdam tantum? Secundum, an conceptus constituentur in ratione signi per illum transcendentalem respectum formaliter; vel solum fundamentaliter.

Quod attinet ad primum;<sup>173</sup> inter philosophos, qui opinantur conceptus esse obiectorum imagines (a quibus paucos excipio) hoc certum, ratumque est, conceptus pure speculativos entitatum realium esse veras earum imagines, et similitudines essentialiter dependentes ab eiusmodi rebus. Quoniam si illa sententia alicubi vera est, in his maxime, ubi nulla apparet ratio difficultatis. Verum non ita philosophandum esse de conceptibus negationum, entium rationis et figmentorum, imo et artefactorum, sic quispiam suadebit: Id quod nullam habet entitatem, nequit exprimere veram et realem sui imaginem in aliquo genere causae, sed con- /p. 44/ ceptus, ut sit vera alicuius imago, ab eo exprimi debet; ergo nullus conceptus est imago non entis; atqui negatio, ens rationis, et fictitium sunt non entia; ergo vel eorum non sunt conceptus, vel si qui dantur, a ratione imaginis longe absunt. Maior huius discursus probatur a D. Thoma. q. 1. de veritate art. 8. quia id, quod non habet in se formam, nequit eam alteri impartiri. Minor est D. Augustini lib. 5. quaest. super deuter. q. 4. et lib. 83 quaest. q. 74.<sup>174</sup> existimantis imaginem natura sua ducere originem ab eo, quod repraesentat. Unde acceperunt Durandus in 1. d. 4. q. 1. Aegidius art. 1. q. 2. et 3. de ratione imaginis esse, quod ab alio sit expressa effective, vel exemplariter. Quibus consentire videtur Henricus quotlib. 4. q. 2. Idem probari potest in conceptibus practicis; cum enim sint causae artefactorum, minime possunt ab iisdem artefactis regulari, ne in eodem genere sint sibi mutuo causae; quod si non regulentur, nec artefactorum imagines erunt; ut manifeste sequitur ex proposita ratione de entibus negativis: et dixit expresse D. Thomas 4. contra Gentes c. 14. Ex his facile colligitur, quod in hac dubitatione etiam intendimus, non omnes conceptus essentialiter referri ad eorum obiecta.

Tametsi<sup>175</sup> haec pars probabilis sit, maxime ob eorum, quos retulimus auctoritatem. Opposita, quae asserit omnem conceptum esse imaginem sui primarii obiecti, illudque transcendentem habitudine respicere, nobis videtur probabilior et communior, supponendo cum Ferrariens. 1. contra Gentes, cap. 71. Capreol. 2. d. 39. q. 1. art. 3. Soncinate, 10. Metaph. q. 16. et aliis (quod non est huius loci disputare) negationem, et ens fictum habere in intellectu proprium conceptum. Pro ea afferri possunt<sup>176</sup> pene omnes Autores, cum absolute dicunt, praeceunte Aristotele 1. de Anima omnem

ment be stronger, two things in it must be examined. The first is whether all concepts universally are images of their objects, or whether this is true of certain ones only? The second, is whether concepts are by that transcendental relation established as signs formally or only fundamentally?

*The Question is: Whether Concepts of Negations, Beings of Reason, and Figments are Images of those Things?*—As regards the first: among the philosophers who think that concepts are images of objects (from whom I except few) this is certain and settled: purely speculative concepts of real entities are their true images and are likenesses which essentially depend on such things. For if that opinion is anywhere true, it is especially in these [speculative concepts] where there is no apparent difficulty.

But that one should not philosophize that it is true about concepts of negations, beings of reason, figments, and indeed of artifacts, anyone will be persuaded as follows. That which has no entity, cannot express a true and real image in any genus of causality. But a concept, in order to be a true image of any thing, must be expressed by that thing. Therefore, no concept is an image of a non-being. But a negation, a being of reason, and a fictitious thing are non-beings. Therefore, either there are no concepts of these, or if such do exist, they are far outside the nature of an image. The major premiss of this argument is proven from St. Thomas, ‘*On Truth*,’ Question 1, Article 8: for what does not have a form in itself cannot impart it to another.<sup>268</sup> The minor premiss is from St. Augustine, ‘*Questions on Deuteronomy*,’ Book 5, Question 4, and ‘*On 83 Diverse Questions*,’ Question 74,<sup>269</sup> who thinks that an image by its nature takes its origin from that which it represents. Hence, Durandus in [his *Sentences* commentary] Book 1, Distinction 4 [sic], Question 1,<sup>270</sup> and Aegidius in Article 1, Questions 2 and 3 [sic],<sup>271</sup> have taken it to be of the essence of an image that it be expressed by something else either effectively or exemplarily.<sup>272</sup> And Henry [of Ghent] seems to agree with them in his *Quodlibet* 4, Question 2.<sup>273</sup>

The same thing can be shown in the case of practical concepts. For since they are causes of artifacts, they can in no way be regulated by those same artifacts, lest they [and those artifacts] mutually cause one another in the same genus of causality. But if they are not regulated, they will not be images of those artifacts, as evidently follows from the argument proposed with regard to negative beings, and as St. Thomas, in *Contra Gentiles*, Book 4, Chapter 14 [sic],<sup>274</sup> has said explicitly. From all of this it is easy to conclude that in this question we indeed lean to this that not all concepts are essentially related to their objects.

*The Affirmative Side of the Question is Defended.*—But even if this part is probable, most of all because of the authority of those whom we have mentioned, the opposite opinion which states that every concept is the image of its primary object, and that it relates to that object with a transcendental relation, seems to us more probable and more common. In this we are supposing with Ferrara [commenting on] *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 71,<sup>275</sup> Capreolus [in his *Defensiones*] Book 2, Distinction 39, Question 1, Article 3,<sup>276</sup> Soncinas, in his *Metaphysics*, Book 10, Question 16,<sup>277</sup> and others (whom this is not the place to discuss) that a negation and a being of reason each has a proper concept in the intellect. Almost all authors can be brought in support of this opinion when, with Aristotle leading

nostram cognitionem fieri per assimilationem intellectus ad obiectum cognitum, quod expressit Henricus in summa art. 1. q. 5.

Et probatur.<sup>177</sup> Unius potentiae unus est operandi modus, ut argumentatur Scotus in 1. d. 2. q. 7. ergo si intellectus cognoscit entia positiva producendo in se eorum repraesentativos conceptus, eadem ratione cognoscet caetera, etiam negativa. Et confirmatur. Quia intellectio, ut supponimus, est actio productiva constituens rem praesentem intellectui, non in esse reali, sed intentionali: atqui non apparet alius modus constituendi obiectum intentionaliter praesens, quam per eius imaginem. Alioqui si intellectio producta alia qualitate non repraesentativa potest efficere rem praesentem, quorsum adigimur ad invehendas imagines, et interna idola, quae tanto labore tuemur? Quod enim aliqui Recentiores dicunt conceptus negationum esse illarum similitudines, non imagines (opinati scilicet imaginem angustius patere, quam similitudinem, quia praeter repraesentationem, qua similitudo contenta est, exigit, ut exprimatur ab eo, cuius est imago) etsi verum sit, nihil efficit: quia, ut mox dicemus, conceptus exprimuntur a negationibus. Praeter /p. 45/ ea, quoniam similitudo in repraesentando nulla in re imagine differre potest.

Quare<sup>178</sup> ad rationem in oppositum negamus maiorem propositionem.<sup>179</sup> Ad probationem dicimus eundem D. Thomam, loco ad 7. admittere negationem aliquo modo esse exemplar suae cognitionis. Ubi ostendit se priori loco fuisse locutum de communicatione effectiva: haec enim tribui negationi non potest. Unde ad rationem, qua utitur, patet respondendum esse illud intelligi in causa effectiva:<sup>180</sup> non vero in exemplari. Quam non est maius incommodum influere verum esse, tametsi non sit positiva, quam causam finalem: de qua non est dubium, quin habeat reales effectus, esto sit rationis, vel negativa. Nimirum hae causae finales, et exempla habent influxum passivum, aut quasi passivum, qui non oportet, in re supponat aliquam entitatem realem. Admittimus igitur sine examine imaginem debere exprimi, saltem formaliter extrinsece, seu exemplariter a suo repraesentato: negamus vero non ita exprimi a negatione.

Ad aliam partem<sup>181</sup> eiusdem argumenti de conceptibus practicis facile respondent, qui existimant artefacta quoad existentiam accipere esse ab arte, et exemplari creato; quoad essentiam vero praesupponi. Nimirum fatentur conceptum practicum non pendere a re quoad eius existentiam: at secundum essentiam in eandem non tendere respectu essentiali; ut veram artefacti imaginem, et exemplatam, inficiantur. Est consequens haec sententia ad eam, quae traditur in 2. *Physic.* et docet res creatas non pendere

in *De Anima*, Book 1, they flatly affirm that all our knowledge is caused through an assimilation of the intellect to the object known<sup>278</sup>—which Henry [of Ghent], in his *Summa*, Article 1, Question 5, says explicitly.<sup>279</sup>

*This is Confirmed by Reason.*—And it is proven: for of one potency there is one mode of operation, as Scotus argues [in commenting on the *Sentences*], Book 1, Distinction 2, Question 7.<sup>280</sup> Therefore, if the intellect knows positive beings by producing in itself concepts which are representative of those beings, in the same way it will know other things, even negative beings. This is confirmed: because intellection, we are supposing, is a productive action which makes a thing present to the intellect, not in real but rather in intentional being. But there does not seem to be any other way to make an object intentionally present than through its image. Otherwise, if an intellection produced with some other non-representative quality can make a thing present, why are we compelled to introduce images, and internal pictures which we maintain with so great effort? For what some more recent authors say, that the concepts of negations are likenesses and not images (having thought, that is, that *image* is less extensive than *likeness*, since besides representation, by which likeness is encompassed, it requires that it be expressed by that whose image it is), although it is true, is nugatory. For, as we will presently say, concepts are expressed by negations. Moreover, [it is nugatory] because, in the act of representing, a likeness cannot in any way really differ from an image.

*The First Part of the Opposed Argument is Answered.*—Therefore, in answer to the argument on the other side, we deny the major proposition. In reply to the proof, we say that the same St. Thomas, in that place, in Reply to Objection 7, admits that a negation is in some way an exemplar of its own being known.<sup>281</sup> In that place he shows that he was speaking in the prior passage about an effective communication [i.e., in the genus of efficient causality], for this cannot be attributed to a negation. Hence, in reply to the argument which he employs, it is clear that this is understood in the case of an effective cause, but not in the case of an exemplar cause. For an exemplar cause is not less fitted to influence true being than is a final cause: about which there is no doubt that, even though it may be rational or negative, it has real effects. Without doubt, these final and exemplar causes have a passive, or a quasi-passive, influence, which does not necessarily suppose any real entity in a thing. We admit, therefore, without question that an image must be expressed, at least in an extrinsic formal or exemplar way by what it represents. But we deny that it is not expressed in this way by a negation.

*The Second Part of the Opposed Argument is Answered.*—To the second part of the same argument, about practical concepts, they easily reply who think that as regards existence artifacts receive being from art and from a created exemplar but that as regards essence [such being] is presupposed. Doubtless, they say that a practical concept does not depend on the thing as regards its existence. But with regard to essence they deny that it [i.e., the practical concept], as the true and exemplified image of the artifact, does not tend to the same thing in an essential relation. This opinion follows on that which is given in Physics, Book 2,<sup>282</sup> [which] teaches that created things do not depend upon the Divine practical ideas with respect to their essences, but with respect to existence. For according to St. Tho-

ab ideis divinis practicis, quoad suas essentias, sed quoad existentiam. Nam ex mente D. Tho. q. 16. art. 1. et aliorum Autorum, ita se habent artefacta ad mentem humanam, ut naturalia ad divinum.

### Sectio articuli

#### *Disquiritur, an conceptus constituatur formaliter signum per relationem super additam*

Haec est secunda dubitatio in hoc articulo proposita, quam de industria remisimus in hunc locum ex quaestione prima de essentia signi, ubi definita videbatur, cum ostendebamus formalem rationem signi in communi haud consistere in relatione. Est nihilominus specialis disceptatio de conceptu, ex iis, quae proxime disputavimus, expedienda. Igitur<sup>182</sup> conceptum non esse formaliter signum per essentiam suam, et respectum essentialem ad obiectum, sed per relationem super additam docet Caietanus 1. p. q. 28. art. 1. Scotus quodlib. 13. art. 3. quanvis non ita expresse. Aegidius in 1. d. 27. q. 3. et alii. Probatur primo. In scientia est relatio secundum esse ad obiectum: ut ex Praedicamentis /p. 46/ patet, et in Metaphysica demonstrabitur; ergo habet relationem ab entitate sua distinctam: atqui haec scientia praesertim est actualis conceptus, ergo quamvis conceptus habeat respectum transcendentalem ad obiectum, non respuit realem relationem. Et confirmatur. Quia relata tertii generis (quae aut omnia, aut pene omnia sunt transcendentia) praeter entitatem fundant realem relationem. Quam expresse concedit D. Thomas in 1. d. 3. quaest. 4. art. 2. ad 4.<sup>183</sup> in Materia prima per ordinem ad formam substantialem. Secundo. Verbum Divinum est signum creaturarum non minus proprium, quam noster conceptus sui obiecti; sed dicitur earum signum per relationem rationis: ut docet S. Thomas 1. p. q. 34. art. 3. ergo idem erit dicendum de nostro verbo mentali, sive conceptu.

Ad solutionem<sup>184</sup> huius dubii supponendum est ex prima quaestione, relationem signi naturalis in rebus creatis non esse specialem relationem ad hoc munus a natura destinatum, et a quavis alia distinctam; sed perpetuo coincidere cum aliis relationibus causae, vel effectus, aut similibus, advenireque illi denominationem signi ex aptitudine ad pertrahendum potentiam cognoscentem in notitiam alicuius rei. Deinde<sup>185</sup> rationem formalem signi compleri per id, quod eidem signo est ratio promovendi potentiam ad rem cognoscendam. Quod ibidem probatum est ea ratione, quia id perficere debet rationem signi, quod est ratio cognoscendi: hoc vero appellamus causam cognoscendi.



mas, in Question 16, Article 1,<sup>283</sup> as well as other authors, artifacts are related to the human mind as natural things are related to the Divine mind.

### A Section of the Article

#### *The Question is: Whether a Concept Formally Becomes a Sign by an Added Relation?*

This is the second question in this article, which we have deliberately left for this place from the First Question about the essence of the sign, where it seemed settled, inasmuch as we showed that the formal character of a sign in general did not consist in a relation. However, there is a special debate about the concept which needs to be disengaged from what we have just discussed.

*The Affirmative Side is Stated and is Supported with Arguments.*—Thus Cajetan [commenting on *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 28, Article 1, teaches that a concept is not formally a sign by its essence and by an essential relation to its object, but by a superadded relation.<sup>284</sup> Scotus also says as much, although not so explicitly, in *Quodlibet* 13, Article 3,<sup>285</sup> as does Aegidius in [his *Sentences* commentary] Book 1, Distinction 27, Question 3,<sup>286</sup> as well as other authors. This is proven first: in knowledge there is a real relation to the object, as is clear from the *Categories*,<sup>287</sup> and will be demonstrated in *Metaphysics*.<sup>288</sup> Therefore, it has a relation which is distinct from its own entity. But this knowledge is especially [found in the instance of] an actual concept. Therefore, although a concept has a transcendental relation to its object, it does not exclude a real [categorical] relation. This is confirmed: because things related in the third kind [of Aristotelian relation] (which are all, or nearly all, transcendental<sup>289</sup>) found a real relation apart from their entity. This is what St. Thomas explicitly affirms, [in his *Sentences* commentary] Book 1, Distinction 3, Question 4, Article 2, in reply to Objection 4,<sup>290</sup> about prime matter in comparison to substantial form. Second, the Divine Word is not a less proper sign of creatures than our concept is a sign of its object. But it is said to be their sign by a relation of reason, as St. Thomas teaches [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 34, Article 3,<sup>291</sup> therefore, the same will have to be said about our mental word or concept.

*We Note What the Relation of a Natural Sign is.*—To resolve this doubt we must suppose, from the First Question, that the relation of a natural sign in creatures is not a special relation which is by nature destined for this task and which is distinct from every other relation. But it always coincides with other relations of cause or effect, or similar such, and the designation of ‘sign’ belongs to it from its aptitude to draw a knowing potency to a knowledge of some thing.

*Second, We Note What Completes the Formal Nature of a Sign.*—Next the formal character of a sign is completed by this, that the property of moving the potency to knowing the thing belongs to that same sign. This is proven in the same place by this reasoning: because that necessarily perfects the nature of a sign which is the reason for knowing; but this we call the cause of knowing.



Quibus praesuppositis<sup>186</sup> solum de nomine videntur esse praesens dubitatio. Certum quippe est conceptus admittere relationem tertii generis ad obiectum (si illud genus relationis cum Aristotele admittatur) idque ostendunt rationes factae pro prima sententia. Verum eam relationem esse formalem rationem signi nullo pacto conficiunt. At neque eae, neque aliae conficere possunt; quoniam praedicta relatio, etsi conveniat conceptui, nullo modo est necessaria, conductive ad repraesentationem: haec enim perfecta est in imagine, quae omnem antecedit relationem.<sup>187</sup> Atque haec sit responsio ad primam rationem alterius partis concessa nimirum ea relatione, negare eam pertinere ad rationem signi, cum ad omnem habitudinem significandi sufficiat transcendentalis respectus.

Ad secundam<sup>188</sup> negandum etiam est, verbum Divinum dici signum a relatione rationis: si verum est fundamentum superius iactum. Quod forma signi est ea, quae est ratio cognoscendi significatum; nam Verbum Divinum non repraesentat Patri creaturas mediante relatione rationis, sed per suamet substantiam, et intrinsecam repraesentationem: quare ab eadem signum constitui debet. Instabis, Signum esse respectivum ad significatum; ergo vel includere respectum essentialem, vel ascititium; Verbum Divinum non potest habere essentialem; ergo includet formaliter, qua signum, respectum rationis. Respondeo primo, Maiorem esse veram respectu primarii obiecti, non autem respectu secundarii, /p. 47/ creaturas vero esse secundarium obiectum Divini Verbi; quare, ut dicatur earum signum sat esse, quod in primario obiecto, Essentia nimirum Divina, eas repraesentet. Respondeo secundo, negando signum secundum se includere respectum ad significatum: sed hoc solum, quod vim habeat illud manifestandi. Cuius exemplum est etiam in rebus creatis; nam fumes haud dicit relationem transcendentem ad ignem, sed naturam absolutam talem, ut possit ignem manifestare; licet ergo signum formale creatum habitudinem transcendentem habeat ad obiectum, non erit hoc exigendum in omni signo formali, etiam divino, siquidem non vindicatur a communi ratione signi, nec a ratione specifica signi formalis, nisi tantum creati. Plura de hac re locus aversatur.

His utcunque expeditis,<sup>189</sup> ad argumentum initio articuli positum respondet Boëtius. Philosophum intelligere conceptus esse eosdem apud omnes priori modo: hoc est, omnes formare similes conceptus de una re. Quem D. Thomas exponit de conceptibus simplicibus; nam propositiones constat apud varios esse omnino discrepantes. Verum Scotus hic q. 3. limitationem D. Thomae non admittit: et merito, ut ostendit impugnatio

*The Negative Side is Stated and Explained.*—With these things presupposed, the present question seems to be only about a name. It is indeed certain that concepts allow a relation of the third kind to the object (if that kind of relation is admitted with Aristotle<sup>292</sup>) and the arguments given for the first opinion show that. But they in no way show that this relation is the formal character of a sign. For neither those nor others can conclude [to this], since the mentioned relation, even though it belongs to the concept, in no way is necessary or leads to representation. For this is perfected in an image, which is antecedent to every relation.

*The First Argument for the Opposite Side is Answered.*—And this is the answer to the first argument of the other position: that is, having admitted that relation, to deny that it pertains to the nature of a sign, since for every disposition toward signifying a transcendental relation is enough.

*The Second Argument for the Opposite Side is Answered.*—In answer to the second argument: it must also be denied that the Divine Word is called a sign from a relation of reason, if the foundation laid above is true: that the form of a sign is the reason of knowing what is signified. For the Divine Word does not represent creatures to the Father by means of a relation of reason, but by its own substance and an intrinsic representation. Therefore, the sign [in this instance] must be constituted by the same [essence and intrinsic representation].

You will object: a sign is related to what is signified; therefore, it includes a relation which is either essential or adventitious. The Divine Word cannot have an essential relation; therefore, as a sign, it will formally include a relation of reason.<sup>293</sup> I answer, first: the major premiss is true with respect to a primary object, but not with respect to a secondary object. But creatures are the secondary object of the Divine Word. Therefore, in order that it be called a sign of those creatures, it is enough that it represent them in the primary object, namely, the Divine Essence. I answer, second, by denying that a sign includes of itself a relation to what is signified; instead it includes only this, that it has the power to manifest the thing signified. There is also an example of this in created things. For smoke does not denote a transcendental relation to fire, but an absolute nature which is such that it can manifest fire. Therefore, although a created formal sign does have a transcendental relation to its object, this should not be required in every formal sign, even one which is Divine, since it is not demanded by the common nature of a sign, nor by the specific nature of a formal sign, but only of one which is created. But this is not the place for more about this.

*A Response to the Argument Made at the Beginning of the Article.*—These things having been put in order one way or another, in reply to the argument raised at the beginning of this Article, Boethius says that The Philosopher understands concepts to be the same among all people in the first way, that is, all form similar concepts of one thing.<sup>294</sup> St. Thomas explains that Aristotle is talking about simple concepts, since it is obvious that propositions are quite different for different people.<sup>295</sup> But Scotus, in this place, Question 3 [sic],<sup>296</sup> does not accept St. Thomas' limitation, and he is correct in that, as the criticism in the argument of the

de conceptu solis in argumento posita: nisi D. Thomas intelligat ab omnibus formari eosdem conceptus simplices, si omnia sint paria; at hoc modo etiam propositiones sunt eadem, quod impugnat. Quamobrem posteriori modo accipienda est mens Philosophi, videlicet conceptus natura sua habere vim significandi, ut ubicunque ponantur, idem repraesentent: quod non habent voces, et scripta, cum quibus Aristoteles conceptus comparavit. Ad improbationem huius partis respondetur iuxta mentem Scoti, propositionem Philosophi non esse absolutam, sed conditionatam: ad hunc modum. Conceptus eiusmodi est, ut in cuiusvis mente ponatur, idem semper repraesentet. Ad cuius veritatem nihil refert, an conceptus unius transferri possit in mentem alterius, nec ne. Qua de re in *Metaphysica* disseremus.

concept of the sun shows —unless St. Thomas means that the same simple concepts are formed by all men, if all things are equal. But in this way propositions also are the same, which he rejects. Therefore, the Philosopher's intention must be taken in the second way, namely, that concepts of their nature have a power to signify, so that wherever they are posited they represent the same thing. But words and writing, with which Aristotle has compared concepts, do not have this power.

To the countering argument the answer, in accord with the mind of Scotus, is that the assertion of the Philosopher is not absolute but conditioned in the following way. A concept is of such kind, that in whosever mind it exists it always represents the same thing.<sup>297</sup> For the truth of this, it makes no difference whether one person's concept can be transferred into the mind of another or not. But we will discuss this subject in *Metaphysics*.<sup>298</sup>

## Articulus 2 [sic]

**Quo sensu verum sit, voces non esse easdem apud omnes**

Docuimus ad initium huius quaestionis cum primis Aristotelis interpretibus, idem valere voces non esse easdem apud omnes, ac non habere ex se vim significandi, sed ex hominum arbitratu: vel certe illud ex hoc sequi; nam, quia voluntas hominum imponentium ubique eadem non est, ideo voces impositae eadem esse non possunt. Sed<sup>190</sup> /p. 48/ neque antecedens, nec consequens huius doctrinae vera esse videntur; hoc est, nec voces omnes videntur ex impositione significare, nec si ita significant, sequitur easdem non esse. Illud multis modis ostendi potest. Primo ex autoritate Aristotelis 1. Politicorum cap. 2. ubi ait sermonem esse homini naturalem, eo quod suapte natura sit animal sociabile. Idem sentiunt Heraclitus et Cratylus apud Platonem. Ipse vero Plato ita eorum sententias improbat, ut fateatur significationem vocum habere fundamentum in earum natura, perfici vero humana voluntate. Philo Iudaeus lib. de somnis ait, sicut hinnitus est proprius equi, et latratus canis, et mugitus bovis, ita sermonem esse hominis.

Unde secundo idem probatur, quod natura concessit brutis animantibus, homini denegare non debuit; esset enim praeposterus naturae ordo; sed animantibus concessit voces naturaliter significantes; ergo et hominibus. Minor est Aristotelis 7. Politicorum cap. 1.<sup>191</sup> D. Augustini 2. de doctrina Christiana cap. 2. et ostendit exemplo galli gallinacei vocantis reperto cibo gallinam: et columbi gemitu allicientis columbam; est D. Thomas hoc loco lection. 2. ubi concedit brutas animantes non modo res significare per voces, sed suas etiam conceptiones. Certe nisi sermo hominibus esset a natura, non posset Attis filius Croesi ab ortu mutus, cum videret militem stricto gladio irruentem in patrem, prorumpere in eam vocem,<sup>192</sup> Miles ne occide Croesum, quod narrat Plinius lib. 7. naturalis Historiae cap. 24. Solinus cap. 7. Polyhistoron. Gellius lib. 3. noctium Atticarum cap. 9. Quoniam mutus a nativitate surdus est; at surdus non potest per doctrinam voces addiscere. Non est minus memorabilis historia, cuius meminit Herodotus libr. 1. non longe a principio, de duobus pueris inter pecudes iussu Psamitichi Aegyptiorum regis ea arte educatis, ut humanam vocem non audirent, hi cum post biennium primum homines vidissent, beccus, hoc est, apud Phryges panem, proclamarunt, quo facto creditum est esse illos homines mortalium antiquissimos, quorum vox a natura esset expressa.

## Article 2

## In What Sense It Is True That Words Are Not the Same for All

At the beginning of this Question, we taught, with the first interpreters of Aristotle, that it means the same to say that words are not the same for all and that they have power to signify not from themselves but from the will of men. Or certainly that follows from this, for, because the will of the men imposing [that power on words] is not everywhere the same, therefore, the words empowered cannot be the same.

*The Argument is Made that Words Signify Naturally.*—But neither the antecedent nor the consequent of this doctrine seems to be true. This to say, all words do not seem to signify from such an imposition, or if they do so signify, it does not follow that they are not the same.

That can be shown in many ways. *First*, from the authority of Aristotle, in his *Politics*, Book 1, Chapter 2, where he says that speech is natural to man, by the fact that man is by his very nature a social animal.<sup>299</sup> According to Plato, Heraclitus and Cratylus thought the same thing.<sup>300</sup> Plato himself rejected their opinions but in such way that he allowed that the signification of words has a foundation in their nature, while saying that such signification is perfected by human will.<sup>301</sup> Philo the Jew, in his book, '*On Sleep*,' says that just as neighing is proper to a horse, barking is proper to a dog, and mooing is proper to a cow, so speech is proper to a man.<sup>302</sup>

Then, *second*, the same thing is proven: what nature has given to brute animals it should not have denied to man, for otherwise the natural order would be preposterous. But nature has given animals words which naturally signify; therefore, it must have given such also to men. The minor premiss is from Aristotle, in the *Politics*, Book 7 [sic], Chapter 1,<sup>303</sup> and from St. Augustine, '*On Christian Doctrine*,' Book 2, Chapter 2.<sup>304</sup> And he shows it by the example of a rooster calling a hen to food that he has found, and the example of a male dove attracting a female dove with cooing.<sup>305</sup> And it is the opinion of St. Thomas in this place, Lecture 2, where he allows that brute animals using their voices signify not only things, but also their own conceptions.<sup>306</sup> To be sure, if speech were not natural in men, Attis, the son of Croesus, who was mute from birth, when he saw the soldier with a drawn sword attack his father, could not break out in these words: *Soldier, do not kill Croesus!*—which is what is reported by Pliny, in Book 7, Chapter 24 [sic], of the *Natural History*,<sup>307</sup> by Solinus [C. Julius (3rd cent.?)] in Chapter 7 of the *Polyhistoron*,<sup>308</sup> and by Gellius [Aulus (ca. 123-ca. 165)], in Book 3 [sic], Chapter 9 of his *Attic Nights*.<sup>309</sup> For one who is mute from birth is also deaf; but one who is deaf cannot learn words through teaching. Not less remarkable is the story related by Herodotus (ca. 484-ca. 425 B.C.), in Book 1, not far from the beginning, about two children who, by order of Psammetichus, king of the Egyptians, were educated among cattle, in such way that they would not hear a human voice. These children, when after two years they first saw human beings, cried out 'beccus,' which among the Phrygians is bread. And from this it was thought that those men, whose word would be expressed by nature, were the most ancient of mortals.<sup>310</sup>

Tertio. Sermo primorum parentum non potuit ex impositione esse: aut enim ambo concurrerent in ea impositione, aut solus Adamus; si ambo, quibus vocibus mutuuum consensum explicuerunt? si ex instituto significantibus, de illis redit eadem quaestio, si naturaliter habetur institutum; si solus Adamus, quomodo Evae indicavit tot vocum impositionem, et quo tempore? longum enim exigebatur; fuit ergo eius sermonis significatio mere naturalis. Et confirmatur, quia Scriptura Genes. 2. docet nomina ab Adamo animalibus imposita esse eorum propria, et quodcunque vocavit Adam animae viventis, hoc ipsum est nomen eius; nomen vero quod sola impositione significat, non potest rei proprium appellari. Idem dici potest de illo sermone, quem Deus concessit hominibus turrim Babel aedificantibus. At haec probant falsum esse illud /p. 49/ antecedens, quod voces significant ex instituto.

Quod tametsi verum esset, non videtur recte consequi, ut voces non sint ubique eadem, et sit quartum argumentum. Essentia rei ubique est eadem; sed vox significativa, essentialiter est significativa; ergo ubique est eadem; et significat omnia sua significata. Maior, et consequentia patet. Minor declaratur. Vox per impositionem accipit significationem; omnis autem forma in subiecto existens necessario causat suum effectum formalem; ergo postquam semel significationem accepit, necessario est significativa, et quod consequens est, apud omnes idem significat.

Dicendum nihilominus est, verissimam esse Aristotelis suppositionem: Pro cuius maiori explicatione notandum est voces bifariam spectari posse.<sup>193</sup> Primo ut sunt quaedam naturales qualitates, videlicet soni, qui ab aliqua causa in sua productione pendent. Secundo, ut accipiuntur eae libera voluntate ad hoc, vel illud significandum; et utroque modo esse signa; primo quidem modo naturalia, quemadmodum caeteri effectus sunt signa suarum causarum, et quoad hoc pares sunt voces brutorum, atque hominum,<sup>194</sup> ut docuit Magnus Albertus tract. 2. cap. 1. quemadmodum enim hinnitus, quia peculiari modo editur, significat equum, et mugitus bovem, ita sermo humanus ob dearticulationem, quae non potest habere aliud principium, quam rationem humanam, repraesentat hominem, ut effectus suam causam, et hac ratione est idem apud omnes. Secundo modo sunt voces signa ex instituto, et apud eos tantum significant, quibus innotuit impositio.

Dices,<sup>195</sup> et nonnullos brutorum sonos, et aliquos, iam humanos, ut risum et gemitum praeter causam producentem, significare rem aliam, ut laetitiam, vel dolorem; et in brutis praeterea res externas, ut vox galli

*Third:* the speech of our first parents could not have been by institution. For either both would concur in that institution or it would have been from Adam alone. If they both concurred, by what words did they declare their mutual consent? If by words which signified by institution, the same question recurs about those words. If by words which were natural, then the point is made. If it were Adam alone, how did he indicate the institution of so many words to Eve, and at what time? For it required a long time. Therefore, the signification of his speech was simply natural. And this is confirmed, because the Scripture, in *Genesis*, Chapter 2, teaches that the names which Adam imposed upon the animals were their proper names, and that whatever Adam called a living animal that very word is its name. But a name which signifies only by imposition cannot be called proper to a thing. The same can be said about that speech which God gave to the men who were building the tower of Babel. But these examples prove that the antecedent, that words signify by institution, is false. But even if this were true, it does not seem rightly to follow that words are not everywhere the same, and so there is a *fourth* argument. The essence of a thing is everywhere the same; but a significative word is essentially significative; therefore, it is everywhere the same and everywhere it signifies all of its significates. The major premiss and the consequence are clear. The minor is shown: A word receives signification by an imposition. But every form which exists in a subject necessarily causes its own formal effect. Therefore, after it has once received signification, a word is necessarily significative, and as a result, it signifies the same thing among all men. —Nevertheless, it must be said, that Aristotle's supposition is most true.

*Words can be taken in Two Ways.*—To better understand this, it should be noted that words can be taken in two ways: first, as they are certain natural qualities, namely, sounds, which depend in their production on some cause and, second, as they are taken by a free will in order to signify this or that. And in both ways they are signs.

*Words taken as Sounds are Natural Signs, taken with Signification they are Signs by Institution.*—In the first way they are natural signs, in the same way that other effects are signs of their causes, and to this extent the words of brutes and men are equal, as Albert the Great taught in Tractate 2, Chapter 1.<sup>311</sup> For just as neighing, because it is uttered in a peculiar way, signifies a horse, and mooing signifies a cow, so human speech, because of its articulation, which cannot have another source besides human reason, represents a man, as an effect represents its cause. And in this aspect, it is the same for all. In the second way, words are signs by institution, and they signify only for those, to whom the institution has become known.

*An Objection.*—You will say, *yes*, but some sounds of animals and indeed some human sounds, such as laughing and groaning, signify, in addition to the cause which is producing them, some other thing such as joy or pain. Moreover, in the case of brutes they may signify external things, as, for example, the voice of the rooster points out the food which is found, and similar cases. But these significations are not by institution. Therefore, there is a natural signification in words which is not the signification of an effect with respect to its cause.

*A Response.*—We answer that this signification in brute animals, and in men when they operate by natural instinct, must be entirely reduced to the signification of an effect. For all these things signified are interior feelings which naturally



reperitum ostendit cibum, et similia; et tamen has significationes non esse ex impositione; ergo dari significationem naturalem in vocibus, quae non sit significatio effectus respectu suae causae. Respondemus<sup>196</sup> hanc significationem in brutis, et in hominibus, dum ex naturae instinctu operantur, reducendam omnino esse ad significationem effectus, nam haec omnia significata sunt affectus interiores naturaliter impellentes animal ad proferendos eiusmodi sonos: ex affectu enim ea sequitur motio in caeteris facultatibus exequentibus, et sonum causantibus, ut non possint aliter, quam eo modo sonum edere, ut patet in eo, qui invitus ridet. Itaque ut talis sonus indicat tale animal, ut illius causam, ita sonus certo quodam modo variatus, causam taliter affectam; Verbi causa, vox a gallo edita, cum cibum reperit, non significat cibum inventum, sed laetitiam appetitus, quae ad emittendum illum sonum absque, ullo intuitu significandi cibum compellit: quod manifeste docuit Aristoteles in 7. Politicorum cap. 2. cum dixit brutorum voces,<sup>197</sup> solum molestum, et iucundum significare. Dixi hanc significationem in vocibus naturalibus humanis esse simpliciter repraesentationem effectus comparatione suae causae, quia ut annotavit S. Thomas 1.2. q. 50. art. 3. homo dupliciter utitur viribus sensitivis: uno modo ex instinctu naturae, alio ex imperio rationis; et propter hunc secundum operandi modum nonnunquam utitur illis iisdem vocibus de industria ad significandum dolorem, vel laetitiam, non ut causas, sed ut obiecta significata.

His breviter annotatis.<sup>198</sup> Ad primum argumentum initio propositum negandum est voces non significare ex instituto. Ad locum Aristotelis. Respondetur eodem sensu dixisse sermonem esse hominibus naturalem, quo 1. cap. eiusdem libri dixit civitates a natura esse, non quod natura, absque humana industria, eas extruxerit, sed quia natura hominis proclivis sit ad societatem vitae, in quem finem civitates extruxit. Igitur quia homo natura sua animal sociabile est, et in societatem venire non potest; nisi sermone utatur, dicitur sermo ei naturalis. Non est diversa responsio Aegidii quodl. 1. q. 16. cum ait idcirco voces homini naturales dici, quia eas articulare, et invicem communicare soli humanae naturae contingit. Eadem videtur esse sententia Platonis, cum ait vocum significationem habere fundamentum in earum natura, nisi loquatur de quibusdam vocibus, quae dicuntur per Onomatopaeiam, ut sibilare de serpentibus, coaxare de ranis, ut eum interpretatur Marsilius Ficinus in Cratilo, nec dissentit Aristoteles in 7. Politicorum. Quo sensu interpretandus sit Philo Iudaeus, patet ex annotatione, ubi confessi sumus aliquo modo sermonem dici homini naturalem.

impel the animal to utter sounds of that kind. For from that feeling motion follows in the other executive faculties which cause sound, in such manner that they must in that way utter a sound, as is evident in the instance of a person who laughs even when he does not want to do so. Therefore, just as a certain kind of sound indicates a certain kind of animal as its cause, so a sound which is varied in a certain way indicates a cause which is comparably affected.

For example, the utterance emitted by the rooster when it finds food, does not signify the found food but the joy of the appetite which compels the rooster to emit that sound apart from any consideration of signifying food. This is what Aristotle has obviously taught in his *Politics*, Book 7, Chapter 2 [sic], when he said that the words of brutes signify only what is painful or pleasant.<sup>312</sup> I have said, that this signification in natural human words is simply a representation of an effect in relation to its cause. For as St. Thomas, [in his *Summa Theologiae*] the First Part of the Second Part, Question 50, Article 3, has noted, a man uses his sensitive powers in two ways, one by natural instinct and, two, under the rule of reason.<sup>313</sup> And because of this second way of acting, he sometimes uses the same words deliberately to signify sorrow or joy, not as causes but as objects signified.

*The Arguments Proposed at the Beginning are Answered. The Solution of the First Argument.*—With all of this briefly noted, in reply to the first argument proposed at the beginning, we must affirm that words signify by institution. In reply to the passage cited from Aristotle: we answer that he said that speech is natural to men in the same sense in which in Chapter 1 of the same book he said that cities are by nature, not because nature has produced them apart from human intention, but because human nature is inclined to life in society, for the purpose of which it has produced cities. Therefore, because man is by his nature a social animal and he cannot enter into society unless he uses speech, speech is said to be natural to him. The answer of Aegidius, in *Quodlibet* 1, Question 16, is not different from this, when he says that words are natural to man for the reason that to articulate them and to communicate with one another occurs only with human nature.<sup>314</sup> The opinion of Plato seems to be the same when he says that the signification of words has a foundation in the nature of those words, except that he is speaking about certain words which are said onomatopoetically,<sup>315</sup> like the hissing of serpents, or the croaking of frogs. This is the way Marsilio Ficino, [commenting] on the *Cratylus*, interprets him;<sup>316</sup> and Aristotle in *Politics*, Book 7 [sic], does not disagree.<sup>317</sup> In what sense Philo the Jew is to be interpreted is clear from the remark in which we admitted that speech is said to be in some way natural to man.

Ad secundum argumentum<sup>199</sup> negamus cum Magno Alberto, non fuisse concessas hominibus suas voces affectus naturaliter indicantes, quemadmodum brutis: licet haec plures acceperint a natura voces, quam homines, quod humanae dignitati non derogat, nam homo artem, et rationem accepit, quibus sermonem sibi potuit comparare, bruta nisi a natura acceperint, haud vocem ad significandum instituissent. Similis ratio assignatur a Galeno lib. 1. de usu partium cap. 2. et late explicatur in lib. 2. de generatione cap. 8. q. 3. art. 2. cur natura caeteris animantibus arma vestesque<sup>200</sup> procurarit, hominem vero quasi e naufragio inermem, spoliatum proiecerit. Quod affertur ex D. Thoma,<sup>201</sup> brutorum voces explicare aliquo modo ipsorum conceptiones, intelligendum est de significatione secundaria, et consecutiva; nam illae voces directe solum significant molestum, et iucundum, ut docuit Aristoteles; bruta vero cum edunt vocem ex affectu doloris, non apprehendunt dolorem;<sup>202</sup> Ergo neque vox significat eius apprehensionem, nisi per circuitum, quatenus brutum apprehendit doloris obiectum. Attis (si vera est historia) mutus ad illud usque tempus extitit, non surdus; quo circa, etsi voces non efferebat, addiscebatur tamen, et earum tenebat significatum, alioqui nisi audisset, formare vocem non posset. Quod adeo verum est, ut Aristoteles 4. lib. de historia ani- /p. 51/ malium cap. 7. doceat nec ipsas aves modulate canere posse, nisi inter eas alantur quarum audiant, addiscantque vocem.

Ut vero pateat quomodo Attis tunc primum loqui potuerit, est sciendum nervos administrandis sensationibus necessarios oriri ex cerebro, sed non omnes initio statim esse disiunctos:<sup>203</sup> nam nervi descendentes ad auditum coeunt in unum truncum cum iis, qui munere loquendi funguntur. Unde fit plerumque, ut qui muti sunt, etiam sint surdi, quia laesio contingit initio, ubi nervi sunt uniti; fieri tamen potest, ut impedimentum locutionis sit in lingua, quo in eventu, etsi quis mutus sit, non erit surdus, et ob vehementem passionem tantum adhibebit conatum, ut dissolvat impeditae locutionis vinculum, quod existimamus Croesi filio contigisse. At surdus nemo est a nativitate, quin sit mutus, ut docet S. Thomas de sensu, et sensibili cap. 2. vel quia laesio fit initio nervorum, ut diximus, vel quia surdus nunquam didicit vocem formare, et multo minus eius significationem percepit, quae ratio est Alexandri lib 1. Problematum quaest. 133. Unde etiam patet, quam fictitium sit, quod affertur de pueris inter pecudes educatis; casu enim protulerunt sonum confusum similem vocibus caprarum, quem Phryges ambitiose interpretati sunt, cum tamen primi homines non fuerint, vel si vox existit formata, Demonis inventum fuit, ad homines illudendos; fortasse enim eo consilio iussit Psammetichus

*A Reply to the Second Argument.*—In answer to the second argument, we, with Albert the Great,<sup>318</sup> admit that men were given their words which naturally indicate feelings, just as brutes were. And even though brutes have received more words from nature than men have, this does not derogate from human dignity. For man has received art and reason, by which he has been able to procure for himself speech. But if brutes had not received their words from nature, they would hardly have instituted them in order to signify. A similar reason is given by Galen (129-ca.199), in his work *‘On the Use of Parts, Book 1, Chapter 2,*<sup>319</sup> and it is extensively explained in [our commentary on] *De Generatione, Book 2, Chapter 8, Question 3, Article 2,* why nature provided weapons and clothing for other animals but cast man up unarmed and despoiled like someone from a shipwreck.<sup>320</sup>

*In What Sense St. Thomas said that the ‘Words’ of Brutes Express their Conceptions.*—What is adduced from St. Thomas, that the ‘words’ of brutes in some way express their conceptions, must be understood about a secondary and consequent signification. For, as Aristotle has taught, those words directly signify only what is painful and pleasurable. But when brutes from a feeling of pain emit a word, they do not apprehend that pain. Therefore, neither does the word signify the apprehension of that pain, except circuitously, insofar as the brute apprehends the object of the pain.<sup>321</sup> As for Attis (if the story is true), up until that time he was mute, but not deaf. Therefore, even though he was not speaking he was still learning words, and he was grasping what they signified. Otherwise, without having heard, he could not form a word.<sup>322</sup> This is so true that Aristotle, in his *‘History of Animals,’ Book 4, Chapter 7,* teaches that the birds themselves cannot sing melodiously, unless they are nourished among those [other birds] whose voice they hear and learn.<sup>323</sup>

*The Nerves which Serve for Sensations have their Origin in the Brain.*—To clarify how Attis could have first spoken at that time, it should be understood that the nerves which are required to support sensations arise from the brain. But they are not all immediately from the outset separated. For the nerves descending to the sense of hearing go together in one trunk with those that perform the task of speaking. Hence, it often happens that those who are mute are also deaf, because an injury occurs at the beginning where the nerves are united. However, it can happen, that the impediment to speech is in the tongue, in which event, even though someone is mute, he will not be deaf and because of a vehement passion he will make so much effort, that he dissolves the bond of impeded speech — which is what we think happened with the son of Croesus. However, as St. Thomas teaches, [in his commentary on] *De Sensu et Sensibili, Chapter [sic] 2,*<sup>324</sup> no one is deaf from birth without being mute —either because, as we have said, an injury occurs at the beginning of the nerves, or because a deaf person never learns how to form a word and much less to perceive its signification, which is the reason given by Alexander [of Aphrodisias] in his *‘Questions on Problems’ Book 1, Question 133 [sic].*<sup>325</sup> Hence it is also clear how fanciful is the example brought about children educated among cattle. For by chance they uttered a confused sound similar to the ‘words’ of goats,<sup>326</sup> which the Phrygians interpreted in their own interest, even though they were not the first men. Or if it was a formed word, it was an invention of the Devil, for the purpose of mocking at men.

pueros extra humanum commercium educari; quo idem nostra aetate anno, scilicet 1596.<sup>204</sup> fieri iussit Rex Achebar Magni Tamorlani pronepos, ut cuius gentis linguam puer ita educatus, natura duce loqueretur, illius susciperet fidem: at non permisit Deus Optimus maximus tantum principem, apud quem tunc temporis, fidei propagandae causa, nostrae Societatis homines versabantur, in errorem adeo periculosum prolabi; itaque nullum prorsus verbum locutus est, qui ita educabatur.

Ad tertium<sup>205</sup> dicendum est, utriusque illius sermonem Autorem fuisse Deum, qui non modo voces imposuit, sed earum notitiam in mentes hominum infudit; ut de sermone primorum parentum docet Augustinus lib. 8. de Genesi ad literam cap. 16. et Abulensis in 13. cap. genes. q. 341. De linguis vero in turri Babel concessis speciatim id docet Caietanus eo loco, qui addit hoc factum esse a Deo, ut tam naturalium, quam artificialium autor cognosceretur. Unde etiam verisimile est, omnium Idiomatum, quae simpliciter diversa sunt, autorem fuisse Deum, qui creditur in 72. linguis eo loco homines divisisse. Ad illud,<sup>206</sup> quod subditur de impositione nominum animalium facta ab Adamo; variae sunt doctorum interpretationes, inter quas duae praecipuae, Una, dici ea nomina propria animalium, quia in modo proferendi cohaerebant cum animalium natura et proprietatibus, ut quae significabat leonem, maiestatem prae se ferret, atque terrorem: quae Philomelam, suavitatem. Secunda verior, significasse Moysem illis verbis, iisdem /p. 52/ nominibus appellasse Adamum animalia in orbis conditione, quibus ea suo tempore Hebraeis nuncupabant.

Ad quartum argumentum respondetur primo<sup>207</sup> Aristotelem non loqui de voce significativa cum reduplicatione, qua significativa est, sed de voce simpliciter: et asserit hanc non esse eandem, id est, non habere unam significationem apud omnes. Secundo,<sup>208</sup> respondetur in forma concessa maiori distinguendo minorem; si enim velit vocem significativam essentialiter esse talem, ubi significat, concedenda est; si autem contendat vocem ubique significativam esse, neganda; quoniam, ut supra notavimus ex D. Augustino lib. de Magistro, et docet Scotus in 4. d. 1. q. 5. signum ex instituto non est significativum, nisi ubi est notitia de illius impositione. Ad probationem illius minoris dicendum est, vocem per impositionem non accipere aliquid intrinsecum, quod secum deportet, sicut papyrus accipit albedinem; sed impositionem manere in sola hominum existimatione: quamobrem apud eos tantum censebitur impositionem habere, qui illius habent cognitionem.

*A Memorable Story from Our Own Time.*—Indeed, perhaps it was by the Devil's counsel that Psammitichus ordered children to be reared outside human society and by which in the year 1596 of our age, King Akbar (1556-1605), the great grandson of Tamerlane the Great (1336-1405), ordered that the same thing be done, in order that he would embrace the faith of that nation whose language a child so reared would naturally speak. But God, the Greatest and the Best, did not permit so great a prince, in whose territory at that time the men of our Society were working to spread the Faith, to fall into an error so dangerous. And thus, the child who was so reared spoke no word at all.<sup>327</sup>

*The Solution of the Third Argument.*—*The Solution of the Third Argument.*—In answer to the third argument, it must be said that the author of the speech of both was God, who not only established the words but also infused their meaning into the minds of men. This is what St. Augustine, in Book 8, Chapter 16, of his '*Literal Commentary on Genesis*,' teaches about the speech of our first parents,<sup>328</sup> as does also Abulensis, in his commentary on *Genesis*, Chapter 13, Question 341.<sup>329</sup> Cajetan teaches the same in that place with special regard to the languages given at the tower of Babel. And he adds that this was done by God, in order that He would be recognized as the author both of natural and artificial things.<sup>330</sup> Hence, it is also probable that of all languages which are simply diverse the author was God, who is thought at that place to have divided men into 72 languages.

*A Reply to the Confirming Argument.*—In answer to the argument offered about Adam's imposing names on the animals, the interpretations of the [Scholastic] doctors are varied, but two among them are the most important. The first is that those are called the proper names of the animals because in the way of their being spoken they cohered with the nature and properties of the animals. For example, the word which signified a lion would manifest majesty and terror, but the word which signified a nightingale would manifest sweetness. The second and more true interpretation is that Moses meant that Adam at the creation of the world called the animals by the same names by which in Moses' own time the Hebrews were naming them.<sup>331</sup>

*A First Solution of the Fourth Argument.*—To the fourth argument, the first answer is that Aristotle is not speaking of a significative word with reduplication, i.e., precisely as it is significative, but about a word simply as such. And he is asserting that this is not the same, that is, that it does not have one signification for all men.

*The Second Solution of the Same Argument.*—Second, we answer in form, by conceding the major premiss and distinguishing the minor premiss. For if he means that a significative word is essentially such where it does signify, the minor must be conceded. But if he is contending that a word is everywhere significative, it must be denied. For, as we have noted above from St. Augustine, in the book, '*On the Teacher*,' and as Duns Scotus teaches in [his *Sentences* commentary] Book 4, Distinction 1, Question 5, a sign by institution is significative only where there is knowledge of its imposition.<sup>332</sup> In reply to the proof of that same minor, it must be said that by an imposition a word does not receive anything intrinsic that it carries with it in the way paper receives whiteness. But the imposition remains only in the estimation of men. Hence, a word will be thought to have that imposition only among those who have knowledge of it.

## Quaestio 5

Utrum in nostro intellectu sint aliqui conceptus veri, vel falsi,  
alii veritatis, et falsitatis expertes?

## Articulus 1

## De qua veritate et falsitate Philosophus hic loquitur

Non possumus tertium Aristotelis pronuntiatum explicare, nisi veritatis naturam, et subiectum, quoad Logica ferre potest, explicemus.<sup>209</sup> Initio igitur supponendum cum D. Thoma hoc loco lect. 3. omnem veritatem esse habitudinem inter rem, et intellectum; quia, ut auctor est Aristoteles lib. 6. Ethic. cap. 3 ita se habet verum ad intellectum, ut bonum ad voluntatem, quare ut nullum est bonum, nisi per ordinem ad voluntatem, ita nullum est verum, nisi per respectum ad intellectum. Porro bifariam se habere potest res aliqua ad intellectum; Uno modo tanquam mensura eius cognitionis, quae est in intellectu; quo pacto res naturales se habent ad nostram cognitionem; altero ut mensuratum per cognitionem, et hac ratione affectae sunt res omnes creatae ad intellectus divini artem, tales enim sunt, quales ars divina praescripsit. Hinc orta est communis divisio veritatis<sup>210</sup> in veritatem rerum, et veritatem cognitionis: quarum prima, quae omnes pervadit res, transcendens etiam appellatur, et est entis passio. Secunda vocatur a D. Thoma, et aliis philosophis veritas complexa, ab aliis formalis. Disputatio de /p. 53/ veritate transcendentem est propria Metaphysicae. Nobis hoc loco tantum erit sermo de veritate cognitionis, quae definitur, conformitas inter intellectum, et rem scilicet tunc intellectus vere cognoscit, cum rem percipit, sicuti est. Huic veritati opponitur falsitas (cuius etiam hic meminit Aristoteles) et est difformitas inter intellectum, et rem cognitam; eius explicatio ex declaratione veritatis sumi potest, et postea manifestius tradetur.

Quanvis ut certum assumamus, veritatem cognitionis esse habitudinem intellectus cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, adhuc manet incertum, quidnam sit ea habitudo, relatione, an absolutum: item, an cernatur in ipsa formali cognitione ad rem cognitam, vel in re, ut cognita ad se ipsam, ut est in rerum natura? et ab hac secunda dubitatione, a qua prima dependet exordiendo. Est prima opinio<sup>211</sup> Durandi in 1. d. 19. q. 5. Hervaei quodlib. 1. q. 1. art. 2 et 3. Ianduni 6. Metaphys. q. 2. accedit Soncinas ibidem q. 16. qui saltem eam indicat probabilem. Hi existimant veritatem non esse conformitatem formalis conceptus intellectus ad rem cognitam, sed eiusdem rei, ut cognita est ad se ipsam, ut est in esse reali, seu quod idem est, veritatem esse conformitatem conceptus obiectivi cum re ipsa. Probant



## Question 5

Whether there are in our Understanding Some Concepts which are True or False, and Others which are Devoid of Truth and Falsity?

## Article 1

## About what Truth and Falsity the Philosopher is Speaking Here

*What is Truth?*—We cannot explain the third assertion of Aristotle, unless we explain, insofar as Logic can allow, the nature and the subject of truth. At the beginning, therefore, we must suppose with St. Thomas, in this place, Lecture 3,<sup>333</sup> that all truth is a disposition between a thing and an intellect. For, as Aristotle writes in the *Ethics*, Book 6, Chapter 3, the true is to the intellect as the good is to the will.<sup>334</sup> Therefore, just as no thing is good except by an order to the will, so no thing is true, except by a respect to the intellect. Further, a thing can respect the intellect in two ways. In one way, it can be like a measure of that knowledge which is in the intellect, in which way natural things are disposed toward our knowledge. In another way, it can be as what is measured by knowledge, and in this way all created things are connected to the art of the Divine intellect for they are such as the Divine art has prescribed them to be.

*Truth is Divided into Truth of Things and Truth of Knowledge. What Truth of Knowledge is. What Falsity of Knowledge is.*—From this has arisen the common division of truth into the truth of things and the truth of knowledge. The first of these, which pervades all things, is also called transcendental truth, and it is a property of being. The second is called, by St. Thomas and other philosophers, complex truth, and by still others formal truth. Discussion of transcendental truth belongs to metaphysics. In this place we will discuss only the truth of knowledge, which is defined as conformity between the intellect and a thing. That is to say, the intellect truly knows when it perceives a thing just as it is. Opposed to this truth is falsity (which Aristotle also mentions here) and this is a difformity between the intellect and a thing known. Its explanation can be taken from a clarification of truth, and it will be afterwards given more explicitly.

Even though we assume as certain that the truth of cognition is a disposition of the knowing intellect to the thing known, it still remains uncertain what that disposition is, a relation or something absolute? Again, is it seen in the formal knowledge itself as it is related to the thing, or in the thing as known as it is related to itself as it exists in extra-mental reality?

*The Opinion Asserting that Truth is the Conformity of a Thing with Itself.*—Starting from this second question, on which the first question depends: there is a first opinion of Durandus in [his *Sentences* commentary] Book 1, Distinction 19, Question 5,<sup>335</sup> Hervaeus [Natalis (d. 1323)], in *Quodlibet* 3, Question 1, Articles 2 and 3,<sup>336</sup> and Jandun, in *Metaphysics*, Book 6, Question 2 [sic].<sup>337</sup> Moreover, Soncinas, in the same place [*Metaphysics*, Book 6], Question 16, comes close to this opinion when he indicates it as at least probable.<sup>338</sup> These authors think that truth is not the conformity of the formal concept of the intellect to the thing known, but rather the conformity of the same thing as known to its own self, as it exists in real being, or, what is the same, that truth is the conformity of the objective concept with the thing itself.<sup>339</sup>



primo: Intellectus cognoscens non dicitur conformis obiecto, quia ita se habet cum formali cognitione in essendo, ut res quam cognoscit, ut manifestum est, sed quia res ita ab eo apprehenditur, ut est in se; ergo tota comparatio fit inter rem in esse cognito, et eandem in esse reali.

Secundo.<sup>212</sup> In eo est primo veritas, quod significatur a vera enunciatione vocali, sed enuntiatio significat obiectivam propositionem, ipsa autem solum denominatur vera tanquam eius signum; ergo veritas est in conceptu obiectivo. Quod si respondeas enuntiationem vocalem non solum esse signum obiecti, sed etiam mentalis enuntiationis, et ab ea sortiri posse veritatem; imprimis assumis, quod omnes non probant; deinde conficiam idem argumentum in mentali; nam mentalis quoque est signum obiecti, ergo si vera dicitur, hoc habet, quia significat obiectum verum asserente Aristotele in 8. cap. huius libri orationem esse veram, aut falsam, quia res est, aut non est. Et confirmatur,<sup>213</sup> quia obiectum intellectus est verum: sed obiectum supponitur cognitioni; ergo veritas prius est in obiecto. Confirmatur secundo,<sup>214</sup> quia intellectus quando formaliter iudicat propositionem esse veram, non reflectitur in suum actum, sed comparat rem cognitam cum eadem, ut est in se; ergo formalis veritas est in obiectivo conceptu.

Opposita sententia<sup>215</sup> est communis, et simpliciter approbanda; eam tradit D. Augustinus 15. de trinitate cap. 11. asserens veritatem esse in verbo interno. D. Thomas hoc loco lect. 3. et 1. p. q. 16. art. 1. et 1. contra Gentes cap. 60. et Ferrariensis ibidem, Aegidius quodlibet. 4. q. 7. Albertus Magnus tractat. 2. in hunc librum cap. 2. Soncin. 6. Metaph. q. 17. Caietan. qui adeo certam hanc opinionem /p. 54/ existimavit, ut probationem non adhibuerit. Possumus tamen eam probare primo ex Aristotele,<sup>216</sup> quem Albertus Magnus tract. 2. cap. 3. existimat animo significandi hanc partem dixisse in hoc capite verum esse in compositione: compositio enim proprie dicitur de mentali, in qua inquit Albertus, est veritas, ut relatio in relativo: Et sane id voluisse Aristotelem non dubitabit, qui attente legerit hoc caput; ubi cum negat vel affirmat in vocibus esse veritatem, semper eas subordinat conceptibus formalibus.

Secundo, ratione<sup>217</sup> desumpta ex propria et universali ratione veritatis, quae est conformitas intellectus et rei significatae; nam eiusdem ad se ipsum non est conformitas, sed identitas, ut docet S. Thomas q. 7. de veritate art. 3. et fatentur adversarii: at res cognita si apprehendatur, ut est in se, omnino est eadem secum; ergo non potest denominari eo modo vera, sed eadem. Explicatur Minor; quando res cognoscitur, ut est in se (quod

[*The First Proof.*]—They prove this first: because the knowing intellect is not said to conform to an object because with its formal knowledge it is being in the same way as the thing which it knows, as is obvious—but because by it the thing is apprehended as it is in itself. Therefore, the whole comparison is between the thing in being known and the same thing in being real.

*The Second Proof.*—Second, truth is first in that which is signified by a true vocal enunciation. But an enunciation signifies an objective proposition. But the former is denominated true only as a sign of the latter. Therefore, truth is in the objective concept. But if you answer that a vocal enunciation is not only a sign of an object but also of a mental enunciation, and that truth can be derived from that, you are first of all assuming something which not everyone will accept. Second, I can make the same argument about a mental enunciation; for a mental enunciation is also a sign of an object. Therefore, if it is said to be true, it is so, because it signifies a true object, in line with Aristotle, in Chapter 8 of this book asserting that speech is true or false because a thing is or is not.<sup>340</sup>

*The First Confirmation of This.*—This is confirmed, because the object of the intellect is the true; but the object is presupposed to knowledge; therefore, truth is first in the object.

*The Second Confirmation of This.*—It is confirmed, second, because when the intellect formally judges a proposition to be true, it does not reflect upon its own act, but rather compares a thing known with the same thing as it exists in itself. [Thus] formal truth is in the objective concept.

*A Second Opinion Teaches that Truth is in Knowledge itself as Such.*—The opposite opinion is common and it should be accepted without qualification. St. Augustine gives it, in his work, ‘*On the Trinity*,’ Book 15, Chapter 11, where he states that truth is in the internal word.<sup>341</sup> [Also accepting this opinion are]: St. Thomas, in this place, Lecture 3,<sup>342</sup> and [*Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 16, Article 1,<sup>343</sup> and *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 60,<sup>344</sup> as well as Ferrara in the same place;<sup>345</sup> Aegidius, in *Quodlibet* 4, Question 7,<sup>346</sup> Albert the Great, commenting on this book, Tractate 2, Chapter 2,<sup>347</sup> Soncinas, *Metaphysics*, Book 6, Question 17;<sup>348</sup> and Cajetan, who thought this opinion so certain that he would not offer a proof for it.<sup>349</sup>

*A Proof from Authority.*—We can, however, prove it first from Aristotle, whom Albert the Great, in Tractate 2, Chapter 3,<sup>350</sup> thinks has, with the intention of indicating this opinion, said in this Chapter that truth is in a composition [i.e., in a judgment]. But the composition, in which Albert says truth exists like a relation in something relative,<sup>351</sup> is properly said of a mental composition. And certainly no one who reads this Chapter attentively will doubt that Aristotle meant that. For where he denies or affirms that there is truth in words, he always subordinates those words to formal concepts.

*A First Proof from Reason.*—Next, it is shown by an argument derived from the proper and universal understanding of truth, which is a conformity of the intellect and the thing which is signified. For of the same thing with itself there is not conformity, but rather identity, as St. Thomas teaches, in ‘*On Truth*,’ Question 7, Article 3,<sup>352</sup> and as the opponents admit. But a thing known, if it is apprehended as it is in itself, is simply identical with itself. Therefore, it cannot be in that way denominated as true, but identical.<sup>353</sup> The minor premiss is established: when a

praesertim fit in notitia intuitiva, cuiusmodi est ea, qua papyrum hanc intuemur, et qua beatus Deum contemplatur) non habet aliud esse obiectivum, quam illud ipsum reale, quod possidet, ut denominatur a cognitione, vel a relatione cogniti in re ipsa resultante; ergo tum temporis non sunt duo extrema, inter quae veritas esse possit. Secundo,<sup>218</sup> veritas intellectus est adaequatio mensurati cum sua mensura: ideo enim Aristoteles, caeterique Philosophi ponunt in scientia relationem tertii generis cuius fundamentum est mensura; sed res obiecta non mensuratur a se: si enim alicubi distinctio necessaria est, maxime ubi unum est regula alterius; cum ergo formalis conceptus sit imago obiecti, ab eoque reguletur, merito dicitur primo, et per se verus, quemadmodum caeterae artificiales imagines tunc verae sunt, cum prototypis adaequantur. Tertio,<sup>219</sup> denique veritas enuntiationis vocalis non consistit in conformitate rei ut significatae ad se ipsam ut existentem sed in conformitate propositionis ad significatum; ergo idem erit dicendum de mentali.

Primum argumentum<sup>220</sup> pro sententia Durandi recte concludit veritatem non esse conformitatem intellectus cognoscentis cum re in essendo, sed in representando, quatenus cognitio intellectus repraesentat rem ut est, quod Aristoteles docuerat lib. 3. de Anima cap. 8. tex. 37. falso autem assumitur comparisonem repraesentantis et repraesentati fieri inter rem cognitam, et se ipsam ut est a parte rei, fit enim inter conceptum, cui convenit repraesentare, et obiectum repraesentatum. Secundo,<sup>221</sup> recte ibidem occurrebatur: Nec audiendi<sup>222</sup> sunt qui contra Philosophum, et Philosophiam negant conceptus a vocibus significari. Ad instantiam concedendum est cum D. Thoma 1. p. quaest. 16. art. 1. ad 3. et Caietano ibidem art. 6. Alberto Magno tract. 2. cap. 3. veritatem in obiecto esse ut in causa ab eaque derivari in cognitionem, quemadmodum sanitas a medicina confertur animali. Verum ut hoc non tollit sanitatem proprie et formaliter esse in animali; ita illud non efficit, quomi- /p. 55/ nus veritas insit conceptui. Nec Aristoteles ait orationem esse veram, quia res est vera, sed quia est; animadvertit D. Thomas in loco proxime citato. De prima confirmatione<sup>223</sup> postea latius dicendum est: nunc respondemus cum Soncinate 6. Metaph. q. 16. ad 1. obiectum intellectus esse verum non formaliter, sed causaliter, hoc est, esse rem, quae cognita ut est, causat veritatem in cognoscente. Ad secundam<sup>224</sup> dicendum, qui examinat, an res ita habeat, ut ipse apprehendit, comparare rem cognitam ad se ipsam: qui autem veritatem formalem expendit, in conceptum reflectitur, et eum cum re componit.

thing is known as it is in itself (which especially happens in the case of intuitive knowledge, of which sort is the knowledge with which we are now seeing this paper and the knowledge by which someone Blessed [in heaven] contemplates God) it does not have an objective being which is other than its real being, [an objective being] which it possesses as it is denominated from knowledge or by the relation of known which results in that thing itself. Therefore, at that precise moment there are not two extremes, between which truth could exist.<sup>354</sup>

*A Second Proof from Reason.*—Secondly, the truth of the intellect is an adequation of the measured with its measure. For in this way Aristotle,<sup>355</sup> and other philosophers,<sup>356</sup> posit in knowledge a relation of the third kind, whose foundation is measure. But the thing which is objected is not measured by itself. For if a distinction is necessary anywhere, it is most of all where one thing is the rule of another. Since, therefore, a formal concept is the image of an object and is ruled by that object, it is rightly called immediately and directly true, just as other artificial images are then true when they equate with their prototypes.

*A Third Proof from Reason.*—Finally, third, the truth of a vocal proposition does not consist in a conformity of the thing as signified with itself as existing, but in a conformity of the proposition to what is signified. Therefore, the same must be said about a mental proposition.

*A Reply to the First Argument [in support of Durandus].*—The first argument in support of Durandus' opinion rightly concludes that truth is not the conformity of a knowing intellect with a thing in being, but in representing, insofar as the knowledge of the intellect represents the thing as it is, which is what Aristotle taught in his *De Anima*, Book 3, Chapter 8, text 37.<sup>357</sup> However, it is falsely assumed that the comparison of representing and represented occurs between the thing as known and itself as it exists in extra-mental reality. Rather it occurs between the concept, whose role is to represent, and the object represented.

*A Reply to the Second Argument.*—Second, in the same place, it was correctly stated that those should not be heard who against the Philosopher and Philosophy deny that concepts are signified by words. In answer to an objection, we must concede with St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 16, Article 1, In Reply to Objection 2,<sup>358</sup> and with Cajetan in the same place, Article 6,<sup>359</sup> as well as with Albert the Great, in Tractate 2, Chapter 3,<sup>360</sup> that truth is in the object as in a cause and that it is derived from that to knowledge, just as health is contributed by medicine to an animal. But just as this does not take away the fact that health is properly and formally in the animal, so that does not bring it about that truth does not belong to the concept. Neither, as St. Thomas notes in the place just cited, does Aristotle say that speech is true because the thing is true, but rather because the thing is.<sup>361</sup>

*A Reply to the First Confirmation.*—As regards the first confirmation, more will have to be said later. But now we answer with Soncinas, in *Metaphysics*, Book 6, Question 16, In Reply to Objection 1,<sup>362</sup> that the object of the intellect is true not formally but causally, which is to say that it is the thing which, known as it actually is, causes truth in the knower.

*A Reply to the Second Confirmation.*—In answer to the second confirmation, it must be said that he who considers whether a thing is such as he apprehends it compares the thing known to itself; but he who examines formal truth reflects upon the concept and compares it with the thing.

Expedita hac secunda dubitatione nullo negotio prima dissolvetur; quanvis enim ii philosophi; qui veritatem constituunt in conceptu obiectivo cogantur eam efficere ens rationis, cum sit respectus eiusdem rei ad se ipsam secundum aliud, et aliud esse. Nobis<sup>225</sup> tamen licet oppositum asserere, cum statuerimus relationem veritatis fundari in mensura, quod genus relationis Philosophus constituere videtur inter praedicamentales in lib. 5. *Metaphy.* ac proinde reale facere; quod ita est intelligendum, ut si obiectum sit ens reale, existens, et a conceptu, vel specie re ipsa diversum, relatio sit realis, alias erit rationis. Nec obiicias<sup>226</sup> Aristotelem in praedicamentis cap. de substantia asserentem orationem transire de vera in falsam, et e contra, absque sui mutatione: quod videtur fieri non posse, si veritas sit relatio realis. Negat<sup>227</sup> enim fieri mutationem ad formam absolutam, quae sola a philosophis mutatio existimatur, nam acquisitio relationis haud variationem inducit.

Etsi vere omnino docuerimus, intervenire praedictam relationem in adaequatione cognitionis, et obiecti, et eam appellari a gravibus autoribus veritatem formalem, ut patet ex Alberto, et D. Thoma supra citatis. Nihilominus<sup>228</sup> iuxta sententiam a nobis superius approbatam quae significationem formalem constituit in fundamento eiusdem relationis, dicendum est veritatem in eodem fundamento consistere. Etenim Aristoteles veritatem et falsitatem attribuit signo, qua signum est; nam ut notavit D. Thomas in 2. lectione, Philosophus in primo pronunciato indicavit res per conceptus, et voces significari: in secundo ostendit, in qua specie signi haec essent collocanda: in tertio demum exposuit affectionem eiusmodi signorum, nempe quod aliqua vere, aliqua falso significant, aliqua neutro modo. Quare cum veritas sit affectio signi, non videtur constituenda in relatione, sed in adaequatione passiva et respectu transcendentis, quo actus intellectus tendit in obiectum, praesertim cum ea adaequatio sufficiat, ut conceptus dicatur verus, et eius negatio ut dicatur falsus; et eadem ratione verissimum sit Aristotelis dictum in praedicamentis orationem absque ulla sui mutatione de vera transire in falsam. Atque ita sentire videntur Capreolus in primo. d. 19. quaest. 3. conclusion. 3. Soncin. 6. *Metaphy.* q. 17.

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*The Truth Relation is Based on Measurement.*—With this second question settled, the first will be answered without difficulty. For while those philosophers who place truth in the objective concept are forced to make it a being of reason, inasmuch as it is a relation of the same thing to itself according to different ways of existing, we, however, are able to assert the opposite. This is because we have determined that the relation of truth is based on measurement, which kind of relation the Philosopher seems, in *Metaphysics*, Book 5,<sup>363</sup> to locate in the categories and, therefore, to make real. But this should be understood in this way, that if the object is a real being, existing, and really diverse from a concept or a species, the relation is real. Otherwise, it will be a relation of reason.

*An Objection.*—Nor may you object that Aristotle, in the *Categories*, the Chapter on substance, asserts that speech passes from true to false, and *vice versa*, without any change in itself;<sup>364</sup> which, it seems, cannot happen, if truth is a real relation.

*A Reply to this Objection.*—For [Aristotle] denies that there is here a change to an absolute form (which alone is thought by philosophers to be a [true] change) because the acquisition of a relation does not cause a variation.

*Truth Properly Consists in the Entity of the Knowledge.*—Although we have in a completely true way taught that the relation in question occurs in the equation of knowledge and its object and that this equation is called formal truth by important authors, which is clear from Albert and St. Thomas as cited above, nevertheless, according to the opinion we have accepted above, which has placed formal signification in the foundation of the relation in question, it must be said that truth consists in the same foundation. And indeed Aristotle attributes truth and falsity to the sign inasmuch as it is a sign. For as St. Thomas has noted in Lecture 2, the Philosopher in his first assertion indicated that things are signified by concepts and words;<sup>365</sup> in the second assertion he showed in what species of sign these should be located;<sup>366</sup> and finally in his third assertion he explained a property of signs of this kind, namely, that they signify some things truly, some things falsely, and some things in neither way.<sup>367</sup> Therefore, since truth is a property of a sign, it does not seem that it should be placed in a [categorical] relation, but in a passive equation and a transcendental relation, by which the act of the intellect tends toward an object, especially since that equation is enough in order that the concept be called true and its negation enough for the concept to be called false. And for the same reason the dictum of Aristotle in the *Categories* is most true, namely, that speech may without any change in itself pass from true to false.<sup>368</sup> And this is the way Capreolus, in [his *Defensiones*] Book 1, Distinction 19, Question 3, Conclusion 3,<sup>369</sup> and Soncinas, in his *Metaphysics*, Book 6, Question 17 [sic],<sup>370</sup> both seem to think.

## Articulus 2

### Utrum veritas reperiatur in omnibus intellectus operationibus

Monuimus<sup>229</sup> tum in antepredicamentis, tum initio huius capituli tres esse intellectus nostri operationes, simplicium apprehensionem, propositionem, et discursum. Prima est, qua simpliciter rem cognoscimus nihil ei negando, vel tribuendo, ut cognitio hominis, aut Angeli. Secunda est, in qua aliquid alicui attribuimus, vel ab eo removemus, uti haec, Deus est summum bonum. Tertia est, in qua non modo cognoscimus, et aliquid rei attribuimus, sed ex una, vel pluribus propositionibus alteram colligimus interposita particula illativa, ergo, aut igitur; quae operatio, quasi supremum nostrae rationis opus, rationalis dicitur, vel ratiocinatio. Priores duae pertinent ad hanc tractationem, de quibus proinde latius est dicendum. Tertia spectat ad libros resolutorios; in quibus eam explicabimus: sed quia haec affectio per eadem fundamenta omnibus operationibus tribuitur vel denegatur, necesse est illam hoc loco cum omnibus conferamus.

Sit igitur pro decisione huius dubitationis unica conclusio.<sup>230</sup> In omnibus intellectus operationibus datur veritas. Haec quoad tertiam operationem a nemine expresse traditur, fortasse quia supponitur ab omnibus tanquam vera, vel certe quia eius veritas non creditur diversa a veritate secundae operationis ob rationem statim indicandam. Verum in tertia operatione non modo esse veritatem sed etiam a caeteris distinctam, hac ratione, quae omnibus his operationibus communis est, demonstratur. In tertia operatione est<sup>231</sup> conformatio cum suo obiecto distincta a conformatione reliquarum operationum; ergo et distincta veritas. Consequentia valet per locum a definitione. Antecedens quoad primam partem ostenditur; quia haec cognitio [Homo est animal rationale, ergo est risibilis] repraesentat obiectum, ut in se est, quod solum exigitur ad veram conformitatem. Quoad secundam ex eo patet, quia propositio illa quatenus secunda operatio intellectus; tantummodo affirmat risibilitatem de homine, et huic obiecto adaequatur; ut vero spectat ad tertiam operationem, asserit hominem esse risibilem, quia est animal rationale, quod est novum obiectum, distinctam exposcens conformationem;<sup>232</sup> quod vel inde colliges, quia contingere potest propositionem habere veritatem secundae operationis, et falsitatem tertiae; ut si eandem enuntiationem ita colligas. [Homo est animal, ergo est risibilis] quanvis enim verum sit hominem esse risibilem, falsum est risibilem esse, quia est animal.



## Article 2

## Whether Truth is Found in All Operations of the Intellect?

*There are Three Operations of the Intellect. What the First is. What the Second is. What the Third is.*—Both in the *Antepredicaments*<sup>371</sup> and in the beginning of this Chapter, we have taught that the operations of our intellect are threefold: the apprehension of simple things, the proposition, and the reasoning process. The first is that by which we simply know a thing, without denying or affirming anything of it; for example, knowing a man or an angel. The second is that in which we either attribute something to or remove it from something, for example this [proposition]: *God is supremely good*. The third is that in which we not only know and attribute something to a thing, but in which from one or more propositions we infer another, with the inferential word, ‘therefore,’ or ‘thus,’ interposed. This operation, as the highest activity of our reason, is called ‘rational,’ or is said to be ‘ratiocination.’ The first two operations pertain to this treatise [the *De Interpretatione*] and, therefore, more should be said about them. The third operation pertains to the books of the *Posterior Analytics*, in which we will explain it. But because this property [of truth] is attributed to or denied of all operations on the same basis, it is necessary that in this place we compare it with them all.

*A Single Conclusion Positing that there is Truth in Every Intellectual Operation.*—Therefore, to resolve this question, let the following be our single conclusion: *Truth occurs in all the operations of the intellect*. With regard to the third operation this conclusion is not explicitly taught by anyone, perhaps because it is supposed by all to be true, or indeed because the truth of the third operation is not thought to be different from the truth of the second operation, for a reason which will be presently indicated. But that in the third operation there is not only truth, but also a truth which is distinct from other truths, is demonstrated by the following argument, which is common to all these operations.

In the third operation there is a conforming with its object which is distinct from the conforming of the other operations; therefore, there is also a distinct truth. The consequence is valid by the argument<sup>372</sup> from definition. The antecedent is shown with respect to its first part: for this item of knowledge, ‘*Man is a rational animal; therefore, man is risible*,’ represents an object as it is in itself, which is all that is required for a true conformity. The antecedent is also clear with respect to its second part, because that proposition [‘*man is risible*’] insofar as it is a second operation of the intellect only affirms risibility of man, and it equates with this object. But as it pertains to the third operation, that proposition asserts that a man is risible *because* he is a rational animal, which is a new object demanding a distinct conformity. Actually, you may infer the same thing from the fact that a proposition can have truth as regards the second operation and falsity as regards the third—for example, if you take the same proposition [“*man is risible*”] in this way, “*Man is an animal, therefore, man is risible*.” For even though it is true that a man is risible, it is false that a man is risible because he is an animal.<sup>373</sup>



Dices,<sup>233</sup> propositio discursiva est quaedam species secundae operationis, quae dividitur a Philosopho in 6. Ethic. c. 1. in notitiam primorum principiorum, Scientiam, Sapientiam, Prudentiam, et Artem. Ergo, etsi veritas propositionis discursivae sit distincta a veritate propositionis non discursivae, adhuc continetur intra latitudinem secundae operationis; et confirmatur,<sup>234</sup> quia omnis ea veritas fundatur in affirmatione, vel negatione per copulam verbalem, quae est propria secundae operationis intellectus. Respondeo:<sup>235</sup> etsi discursus, seu tertia operatio frequentius accipiatur pro toto aggregato ex cognitione antecedente, et consequente, ut in 1. priorum patebit, iuxta quam acceptionem omnis propositio, sive discursiva, sive non, numeratur cum secundis operationibus: nihilominus propriam eius formam, et essentiam consistere in assensu illativo ex alio antecedente, qui magis praesupponitur, quam includitur in discursu. Negandum<sup>236</sup> igitur est, vel propositionem discursivam contineri sub secunda operatione, etsi illam comprehendat; vel Aristotelem eam divisisse, distribuit enim eo loco omnem cognitionem certam, et evidentem, sive in secunda, sive in tertia operatione contineatur. Confirmatio falsum assumit; cum inter probandum nostram conclusionem ostenderimus veritatem discursus fundari in illatione, quae tamen supponit veritatem antecedentis, et consequentis. Adde non modo in discursu: sed in propositionibus etiam hypotheticis inveniri veritatem<sup>237</sup> in alia copula, quam verbali, verbi causa, si homo haberet alas, volaret, in qua propositione, cum nulla sit actu verbalis copula affirmata, vel negata, est nihilominus actualis veritas.

Quod attinet ad secundam operationem intellectus,<sup>238</sup> est conclusio Aristotelis hoc capite, et aliis mille locis, qui in obiectionibus adversus veritatem primae operationis articulo tertio adducentur: communi etiam omnium Auctorum consensu approbatur, ut pote in quam maxime cadit illa communis ratio. Ubi est conformitas mensuratae, et repraesentantis, cum sua mensura ac repraesentato, ibi est veritas: sed haec, si alicubi, praecipue in compositione et divisione sunt; ergo inibi veritas principaliter efflorescit. Non est tamen exigua difficultas in assignando speciali, et insigni modo, quo veritas est in secunda operatione; sed pertinet<sup>239</sup> ad quartum caput, ubi Aristotelem eum significare videtur, cum definit enuntiationem, orationem significantem verum, vel falsum.

Denique<sup>240</sup> in prima operatione suam inesse veritatem, docet imprimis Aristoteles 9. Metaph. cap. 7. et 3. de Anima cap. 6. ubi intellectum in apprehensione simplicium comparat cum sensu, quem lib. 2. de Anima

*An Objection.*—You will say: a discursive proposition is a certain species of the second operation, which Aristotle, in *Ethics*, Book 6, Chapter 1 [sic], divides into knowledge of first principles, science, wisdom, prudence, and art.<sup>374</sup> Therefore, even though the truth of a discursive proposition is distinct from the truth of a non-discursive proposition, it is still contained within the range of the second operation.

*A Confirmation of This.*—This is confirmed, because every such truth is founded on an affirmation or a negation by means of the verbal copula, which is proper to the second operation of the intellect.

*A Reply to the Objection.*—I answer: even though discursive reasoning, or the third operation, is more frequently taken for the whole which is pieced together from antecedent and consequent knowledge (as will be clear in Book 1 of the *Prior Analytics*<sup>375</sup>) and taken in this way every proposition, whether discursive or not, is numbered among second operations, nevertheless, its proper form and essence consists in an inferential assent from another antecedent which is more presupposed than included in that reasoning. Therefore, we must deny either that a discursive proposition is contained under the second operation, even if it comprehends that, or that Aristotle divided it so. For in that place [*Prior Analytics*, Book 1, Chapter 1] he divided every certain and evident knowledge whether it is contained in the second or in the third operation.

*A Reply to the Confirmation.*—The confirmation assumes something false. For in the course of proving our conclusion we will show that the truth of a reasoning process is founded on the inference which, however, supposes the truth of the antecedent and the consequent. Add that this is so not only in discursive reasoning, but also in hypothetical propositions, that truth is found in a verb other than the copula. For example, in this proposition, ‘*if a man had wings, he would fly*,’ even though no verbal copula is actually affirmed or denied, there still is actual truth.

*Truth is Shown to be in the Second Operation of the Intellect.*—With regard to the second operation of the intellect, [that it contains truth] is Aristotle’s conclusion in this chapter, and in countless other places, which in Article 3 [of this Question] will be adduced as objections against the truth of the first operation. It is also shown by the common consent of all authors, inasmuch as it is to that operation, most of all, that the common character [of truth] belongs. Where there is a conformity of what is measured and of what represents with its measure and what is represented, there is truth. But if these are anywhere, they are most of all in composition and division [i.e., affirmation and negation]. Therefore, truth most of all flourishes in these. There is, however, no small difficulty in pointing out the special and remarkable way in which truth exists in the second operation. But this pertains to the fourth Chapter, where Aristotle seems to indicate it when he defines enunciation as speech which signifies what is true or false.<sup>376</sup>

*There is a Proper Truth in the First Operation of the Intellect.*—Finally, that there is a proper truth in the first operation, first of all Aristotle teaches in *Metaphysics*, Book 9, Chapter 7 [sic],<sup>377</sup> and in *De Anima*, Book 3, Chapter 6, where he compares the intellect with a sense power,<sup>378</sup> which in *De Anima*, Book 2, Chapter 6, he taught was always true with respect to its proper sensible object.<sup>379</sup> St. Thomas,

cap. 6. docuerat circa proprium sensibile semper esse verum. D. Thomas in primis duobus locis lect. 11. et 1. p. qu. 16. art. 2. licet non tam expresse Ferrariensis 1. contra Gentes. cap. 59.<sup>241</sup> Capreolus in 1. d. 19. q. 3. art. 1. conclus. 3. Aegidius quodlib. 4. q. 7. Soncinas 6. Metaph. q. 17. Probatur primo illa communi ratione.<sup>242</sup> Conceptus simplex, si repraesentat rem ut est, non minus ei conformatur, quam propositio; ergo cum veritas in conformitate /p. 58/ sit, non erit conceptui deneganda. Et confirmatur, quaelibet res naturalis quantumvis simplex, ex eo, quod conformetur suae Ideae in mente divina existenti, est vera; ergo simplex conceptus obiecto conformis, verus erit. Secundo.<sup>243</sup> In cognitione Divina et Angelica, nec est, nec esse potest compositio, et tamen est purissima veritas; ergo in nostra simplici erit.

Respondent adversarii, ex communi sententia Theologorum, praesertim S. Thomae 1. p. 16. art. 5. simplicem cognitionem divinam, et angelicam equipollere nostro iudicio, quo formaliter affirmamus unum de alio et idcirco in ea esse veritatem, non in nostra. Verum facile impugnantur; quia etsi cognitio Dei et Angeli in certificando intellectu se habeat, ut nostrum iudicium: modus tamen tendendi in obiectum, et se illi conformandi, est per simplicem repraesentationem, alioqui non est cur potius ea notitia, quam nostrum iudicium dicatur simplex; nam in entitate etiam iudicium nostrum est simplex qualitas, et in solo modo repraesentandi est complexum: ergo si cum eo repraesentandi modo stat veritas; quare in nostra apprehensione non erit? Quae hic opponi possent de cognitione divina, angelica, et humana practica in Metaphys. dissolventur.

in [commentary on] the first two places,<sup>380</sup> and [in *Summa Theologiae*], Part 1, Question 16, Article 2,<sup>381</sup> [agrees] although not so explicitly. [Also agreeing are]: Ferrara, at *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 59;<sup>382</sup> Capreolus in [*Defensiones*] Book 1, Distinction 19, Question 3, Article 1, Conclusion 3;<sup>383</sup> Aegidius, in *Quodlibet* 4, Question 7;<sup>384</sup> and Soncinas, in *Metaphysics*, Book 6, Question 17 [sic].<sup>385</sup>

*A First Rational Proof.*—This is proven first by the common argument. A simple concept, if it represents a thing as it is, does not less conform to that thing than does a proposition. Therefore, since truth is in conformity, it should not be denied to a concept. This is confirmed, because every natural thing, no matter how simple it is, from the fact that it is conformed to its Idea existing in the Divine mind is true. Therefore, a simple concept which conforms to its object will be true.

*A Second Proof.*—Second: in Divine and in angelic knowledge there neither is nor can be any composition, and still there is most pure truth. Therefore, there will be truth in our simple knowledge.

[*An Answer of the Opponents.*]—The opponents answer, from the common understanding of the theologians, especially St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*], Part 1, Question 16, Article 5, that simple Divine or angelic knowledge is equivalent to our judgment,<sup>386</sup> by which we formally affirm one thing of another, and for that reason there is truth in that simple knowledge, while not in ours.

[*A Reply to that Answer.*]—But they are easily answered, because even though the knowledge of God or of an angel, inasmuch as it generates intellectual certitude, is like our judgment, nevertheless, its way of tending toward its object and of conforming itself to that object is through a simple representation. Otherwise, there is no reason why that knowledge, anymore than our judgment, is called simple. For in its entity our judgment is also a simple quality, and it is complex only in its way of representing. Therefore, if truth exists with the Divine or angelic way of representing, why will it not exist in our [simple] apprehension? Objections which could be made here about Divine, angelic, and human practical knowledge will be answered in metaphysics.<sup>387</sup>

### Articulus 3

#### **Dissolvuntur ea, quae primae operationis veritatem oppugnare videntur**

Tametsi<sup>244</sup> praecedentis articuli conclusionem quoad secundam et tertiam operationem nullus improbet: quoad primam pauci approbare videntur, adeo ut communis sententia merito censeatur, quae veritatem simplicium cognitionum de medio tollit. Haec sententia traditur a D. Anselmo opusc. de veritate c. 6. D. Tho. hoc loco lect. 3. et 1. p. q. 16. art. 2. 1. contra Gentes ca. 59.<sup>245</sup> et q. 1. de veritate art. 3. Alberto tract. 1. huius libri c. 3. Caietano loco 1. p. citato. Hervaeo quodl. 3. q. 1. art. 2. et 3. Durando in 1. d. 19.<sup>246</sup> q. 5. n. 14. Probatur primo<sup>247</sup> ex Aristotele, qui hoc ipso capite, in quo versamur, aperte docet in sola compositione et divisione esse veritatem, idem affirmat 3. de Anima c. 5. tex. 22. et 6. Metaph. cap. 2. Secundo<sup>248</sup> ratione; in voce simplici non est veritas: ergo neque in simplici conceptu. Consequentia est Aristotelis hoc capite, et per se patet, cum vox sit vicaria conceptus, in qua proinde constitui debet tanquam in signo, quidquid est in conceptu tanquam in proprio subiecto. Antecedens probatur, quia non existimamus eum, qui profert simplex vocabulum, verum aut falsum dicere, nisi perficiat enuntiationem: nec vero intelligi potest, quae adaequatio sit inter simplicem vocem et rem, in signi- /p. 59/ ficando. Tertio,<sup>249</sup> in simplici cognitione non est falsitas: ergo neque veritas. Antecedens traditur ab Arist. 3. de anima c. 6. et 9. Metaph. c. 12. Consequentia ex eo probatur, quia contrariae circa idem subiectum sunt; at veritas, et falsitas, autore D. Thoma 1. p. q. 17. art. 4. habent formam contrariorum; ergo, si altera nequit esse in conceptu, neque alia erit, vel si una esse potest, utraque erit.

Haec controversia nobis videtur persimilis ei, in qua disceptatur, an accidens sit ens? quibusdam asserentibus solam substantiam esse ens, aliis tenaciter defendentibus hoc accidentibus etiam tribuendum esse; et utraque ortum habuit ex eo, quod loquendi modus in hisce rebus angustior sit, quam earum definitio. Usurpari nempe solet nomen veritatis pro magis principali, cuiusmodi est veritas complexa, nomen vero entis pro eo quod absolute et independenter ab alio existit, qualis est substantia, iuxta illam Dialecticorum regulam, quod nomen analogi absque moderatione prolatum, supponat pro principali; cum tamen utriusque definitio veritatis scilicet, ac entis laxior sit, et minus etiam praecipuis accommodetur. Veritas enim formalis<sup>250</sup> definitur conformitas cum obiecto, quae tum in complexo, tum in simplici reperitur; ens vero id quod esse potest, sive per se, ut substantia, sive in alio, ut accidens. Ad concordiam igitur utriusque

## Article 3

**Apparent Objections against the Truth of the First Operation Are Refuted**

*The Truth of Simple Knowledge is Opposed in Various Ways.*—Even if no one rejects the conclusion of the preceding article with regard to the second and third operations, few seem to accept it with regard to the first, to the point that the common opinion is correctly thought to be that which totally denies the truth of simple cognitions. This opinion is taught by St. Anselm, in his small work, ‘*On Truth*,’ Chapter 6;<sup>388</sup> St. Thomas, in this place, Lecture 3, in [*Summa Theologiae*], Part 1, Question 16, Article 2,<sup>389</sup> *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 59,<sup>390</sup> and ‘*On Truth*,’ Question 1, Article 3;<sup>391</sup> Albert, in Tractate 1, Chapter 3 of this work;<sup>392</sup> Cajetan, at the place cited in the First Part;<sup>393</sup> Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* 3, Question 1, Articles 2 and 3;<sup>394</sup> and Durandus, in [his *Sentences* commentary], Book 1, Distinction 19, Question 5, Number 14.<sup>395</sup>

*A First Argument.*—It is proven first from Aristotle, who in this very Chapter with which we are dealing openly teaches that truth is in composition and division only. He says the same in *De Anima*, Book 3, Chapter 5, Text 22,<sup>396</sup> and in *Metaphysics*, Book 6, Chapter 2 [sic].<sup>397</sup>

*A Second Argument.*—Second it is proved by an argument: in a simple word there is no truth; therefore, neither is there any in a simple concept. The consequence is from Aristotle in this Chapter, and it is self-evident inasmuch as the word stands in place of the concept, in which word, therefore, there must be as in a sign whatever is in the concept as in a proper subject. The antecedent is proven inasmuch as we do not think that one who speaks a simple word says what is true or false, unless he completes a sentence. Nor, indeed, can it be understood what equation there is in signifying between a simple word and a thing.

*A Third Argument.*—Third, in simple knowledge there is not any falsity; therefore, neither is there any truth. The antecedent is taught by Aristotle, in *De Anima*, Book 3, Chapter 6,<sup>398</sup> and in *Metaphysics*, Book 9, Chapter 12 [sic].<sup>399</sup> The consequence is proven from the fact that contraries concern the same subject. But truth and falsity, by the authority of St. Thomas, [in *Summa Theologiae*], Part 1, Question 17, Article 4,<sup>400</sup> have the form of contraries. Therefore, if one is not able to be in a concept, neither will the other; or if one can be, both will be.

To us this controversy seems very similar to that in which it is debated whether an accident is a being, with certain persons asserting that only substance is being and others tenaciously defending the position that being should be attributed also to accidents. Both controversies take their origin from the fact that the way of speaking in these matters is more narrow than their definition. That is to say, the word, ‘*truth*,’ is usually taken for the more principal kind of truth, which is complex truth, and the word, ‘*being*,’ is taken for that which exists in an absolute way and independently of another, of which kind is substance, according to the rule of the logicians that the name of something analogous, when it is spoken without modification, stands for the principal analogate.<sup>401</sup> However, since the definition of both truth and being is broader, it is also less fitted to their principal instances.

*What Formal Truth is.*—Formal truth is defined as conformity with an object, which is found both in complex and in simple knowledge, while being is defined as that which can be, whether by itself, as a substance, or in another, as an accident.

sententiae dicimus cum Aegidio quodlib. 4. q. 9. et autoribus nostrae sententiae iuxta mentem Aristotelis 3. de anima citato, veritatem esse duplicem,<sup>251</sup> alteram simplicem, alteram complexam: illam inesse in prima operatione intellectus, esseque simplicem conformationem imaginis cum suo prototypo: hanc in secunda, et repraesentare coniunctionem unius cum alio, quae magis est explicanda in capite quarto.

Ex his responderi potest<sup>252</sup> ad omnia loca Aristotelis: ipsum, cum asserit in secunda tantum operatione inveniri veritatem, et falsitatem, non negare simplicem veritatem in conceptibus, quam in locis a nobis allegatis adeo expresse concessit; sed loqui de veritate complexa, ut pote perfectiori, et frequentius usurpata. Verum<sup>253</sup> quia minus artificii, et ingenii in hac responsione elucet, quilibet enim facile dicet veritatem complexam non esse in simplici cognitione, sed in complexa: addenda est solutio Ferrariensis 1. contra Gentes cap. 53. sumpta ex D. Thoma ibi, et 1. p. q. 16. art. 2. imo ex Aristotele 6. Metaph. cap. 2. propterea dictum esse ab Aristotele, et ab aliis receptum veritatem esse in secunda operatione, non in prima, quia veritas est in intellectu enuntiante, tanquam in cognoscente verum, quo modo non est in simpliciter apprehendente; qui enim iudicat, existimat esse verum, quod cognoscit; at qui simpliciter cognoscit, nihil tale cogitat. In hac sententia est Aphrodisaeus 3. de anima cap. 6. ubi ait, verum non esse eodem modo in complexione, atque in conceptu simplici, sed alio diverso: caeterum quomodo id intelligendum sit c. 4. explicabitur.<sup>254</sup>

Ad secundum argumentum<sup>255</sup> negandum est in simplici voce non /p. 60/ esse veritatem incomplexam, est enim philosophandum de vocibus eodem modo, quo de conceptibus, nimirum complexas non modo habere veritatem; sed eam significare, ut docebit Aristoteles ca. 4. simplices vero solum habere veritatem quatenus conformantur cum suo significato, ut dictum est de conceptibus: licet modus se conformandi obiecto sit perfectus in conceptu, quia est imago, imperfectus in voce tanquam in vicaria conceptus. Ad probationem illius antecedentis respondetur, propterea nos non asserere eum, qui profert simplex verbum, verum dicere, quia etsi promit verum signum, non tamen verum significans, quod pari modo dicendum est de conceptu. Ad tertium<sup>256</sup> negandum est, in sensu non reperiri veritatem ob rationem ibi assignatam, quae est sententia Aristotelis 3. de Anima c.6. et Ferrariensis illo cap. 59. 1. contra Gentes: Philosophos autem in sua definitione huius mentionem non fecisse, vel quia veritas sensus non est propria hominis, vel quia angusta est; et circa res tantum materiales, nec circa omnes versatur. Philosophi autem voluerunt veritatem hominis



*Truth is Twofold: Simple and Complex.*—Therefore, to reconcile both opinions, we say with Aegidius, in *Quodlibet* 4, Question 9 [sic],<sup>402</sup> and with the authors of our own opinion that according to the mind of Aristotle, in the cited Book 3, of the *De Anima*, truth is twofold.<sup>403</sup> One kind is simple and the other is complex. Simple truth is in the first operation of the intellect, and it is the simple conformity of an image with its prototype. Complex truth is in the second operation, and it represents the conjunction of one thing with another, which will have to be more explained in the fourth Chapter.<sup>404</sup>

*A Reply to the First Argument.*—From what has been said we can respond to all the passages from Aristotle that when he asserts that truth and falsity are found only in the second operation, he is not denying the simple truth in concepts which he has so explicitly conceded in the passages we have adduced. But he is speaking about complex truth, inasmuch as it is the more perfect and the more frequently mentioned.

*Another Reply to the Same Argument.*—But because this answer seems less adroit and brilliant, since anyone will easily say that complex truth exists not in simple, but in complex, knowledge, we should add the solution of Ferrara, at *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 53,<sup>405</sup> which is taken from St. Thomas in that place, and [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 16, Article 2,<sup>406</sup> or indeed from Aristotle, in *Metaphysics*, Book 6, Chapter 2 [sic].<sup>407</sup> This is that it was said by Aristotle, and accepted by others, that truth is in the second operation, and not the first, because truth is in the intellect judging as it knows what is true, in a way in which it is not in the intellect simply apprehending. For one who judges thinks that what he knows is true; but one who simply knows does not think in that way. Alexander of Aphrodisias, [commenting on] *De Anima*, Book 3, Chapter 6, concurs in this opinion, where he says that the true is not in the complex judgment in the same way as it is in the simple concept, but rather in another way.<sup>408</sup> But how this should be understood will be explained in Chapter 4.<sup>409</sup>

*A Response to the Second Argument.*—In reply to the second argument, we must deny that there is no simple truth in the simple word. For we should philosophize in the same way about words as about concepts. But, without doubt, complex words<sup>410</sup> not only have truth but they also signify that truth, as Aristotle will teach in Chapter 4.<sup>411</sup> And indeed simple words have truth only insofar as they are conformed with what they signify, as was said of concepts, although the way of conforming itself to its object is perfect in a concept, because it is an image, but imperfect in a word, as in something which takes the place of a concept. In answer to the proof of the antecedent [of the second argument], we do not, therefore, assert that one who speaks a simple word says what is true. For even though he utters a true sound he does not, however, signify what is true—which in the same way must be said about a concept.

*A Response to the Third Argument.*—In reply to the third argument we must deny that truth is not found in sensation, for the reason given there, which is the opinion of Aristotle, in *De Anima*, Book 3, Chapter 6,<sup>412</sup> and of Ferrara, at Book 1, Chapter 59, of *Contra Gentiles*.<sup>413</sup> But the philosophers in their definition have not mentioned this, either because sensation is not proper to man, or because it is narrow and concerned only with material things and not about all things. But the philosophers wanted to define truth as proper to man, otherwise they could have



propriam, et rebus omnibus communem definere, alioqui potuissent definitionem ita construere,<sup>257</sup> veritas est conformitas rei, et potentiae cognoscentis. Quartum argumentum longius est discutiendum.

crafted the definition in this way: *'truth is the conformity of a thing with a knowing power.'* A fourth argument needs to be discussed more at length.<sup>414</sup>

#### Articulus 4

##### Utrum in cognitione simplici falsitas inveniatur

Qui<sup>258</sup> simplicem cognitionem veritatis expertem faciunt, maiori iure idem asserunt de falsitate. At inter caeteros videntur falsitatem illi concedere Aristoteles 2. de Anima cap.6. ubi ait sensum falli circa sensibile commune, et lib. 3. text. 161. docet circa proprium sensibile, aut non falli sensum, aut raro, et expressius hoc docet de phantasia. 4. vero Metaph. text. 26. de sensibus externis, cum asserit, si oculi sint dissimiles, non omnibus idem apparere. D. Thomas 3. de Anima lect. 6. ait sensum dici falsum, quando aliter<sup>259</sup> percipit res, ac in se sunt. Ex quibus hoc argumentum existit, et sit primum; sensus praesertim externi apprehendunt simpliciter, ut est receptissima sententia: sed in eis est falsitas; ergo datur in simplici apprehensione. Minor probatur primo adductis autoritatibus deinde experientia: saepe enim per hos sensus cognoscimus res quae non sunt, aut ubi non, aut aliter atque sunt. Nam lingua bili infecta percipit dulce ut amarum; oculus in collo columbae a Sole illustratae videt colores, qui revera non sunt, et autore Bonaventura in 2. d. 8. 2. p. dist. quaest. 3. paleae visae per fimum lucernae ex serpentis pinguedine confectae instar serpentium apparent. Ebrius videt geminas consurgere in mensa lucernas; et qui navigant prope littus intuentur aedificia moveri; qui<sup>260</sup> /p. 61/ longe rem contemplantur, album contuentur ut nigrum. Denique praestigiatorem opera cernuntur multa, quae aut omnino non sunt, aut alibi, et aliter sunt, quod si hoc fit in sensu, cur in simplici intellectu non continget?

At<sup>261</sup> probatur secundo contingere in intellectu. Enimvero rusticus falso apprehendit solem minorem, quam terram; et qui proposito auricalcho aurum apprehendit, non conformatur obiecto, cui conformari debebat; item qui concipit chimaeram, cum nullo obiecto conformatur; ergo est falsitas in ea apprehensione. Antecedens probatur, quia veritas non est conformitas inter conceptum, et rem obiective sumptam, sed ut est a parte rei, saltem secundum essentiam: alioqui<sup>262</sup> si conformitas cum re in esse obiectivo sufficeret, nulla enuntiatio esset falsa, siquidem omnis est conformis cum illo enuntiabili, quod profert, sive in re ita sit, sive non; igitur cum chimaera a parte rei nihil<sup>263</sup> sit, nulla eius apprehensio cum obiecto conformatur. Accedit, quia conceptus simplex potest repraesentare rem aliter, atque est, si vel ratione speciei, qua utitur, vel ob aliud impedimentum simul occurrens ad obiectum, ut est, imperfecte determinetur.

## Article 4

## Whether Falsity may be found in Simple Knowledge?

*Arguments Proving that there is Falsity in Simple Knowledge.*—Those who deny the truth of simple knowledge, with greater warrant assert the same about falsity. But among others Aristotle seems to allow falsity in that knowledge, in *De Anima*, Book 2, Chapter 6, where he says that a sense can be in error with respect to a common sensible,<sup>415</sup> and in Book 3, Text 161, he teaches that with regard to a proper sensible a sense either does not err, or rarely errs,<sup>416</sup> and he teaches this more explicitly about the imagination, but in *Metaphysics*, Book 4, Text 26, about the external senses when he states that if the eyes are dissimilar a thing does not appear the same to all.<sup>417</sup> And St. Thomas, [commenting on] *De Anima*, Book 3, Lecture 6, says that a sense is called false when it perceives things other than they are in themselves.<sup>418</sup> From these places, the following emerges as the principal argument: the senses, especially the external senses, do apprehend in a simple way (which is the most widely accepted opinion); but in them there is falsity; therefore, falsity occurs in a simple apprehension.

The minor premiss is proven first from the authorities which have been adduced and then by experience. For often by these senses we know things which are not, or where they are not, or otherwise than they are.<sup>419</sup> For the tongue which is infected with bile perceives what is sweet as sour. In the light of the sun the eye sees colors on the neck of a dove which in fact do not exist. And by the authority of Bonaventure in [his *Sentences* commentary], Book 2, Distinction 8, Part 2, Question 3, straw seen through the smoke of a lamp produced from the fat of a serpent appears like serpents.<sup>420</sup> A drunken man sees twin lamps rise up on a table.<sup>421</sup> And those who sail near the shore see buildings being moved. Those who look at a thing from a distance see what is white as black. Finally, many things appear to be produced by magicians, which are either completely non-existent, or which exist in another place or in another way. But if this happens in sensation, why will it not happen in simple intellection?

*A Second Argument.*—But, second, it is proven to happen in the case of intellect. To be sure, a peasant falsely apprehends the sun as smaller than the earth. And he who, when brass is offered, apprehends gold, is not conformed to the object to which he should be conformed. Likewise, he who conceives a chimaera is conformed with no object. Therefore, there is falsity in that apprehension. The antecedent is proven, because truth is not a conformity between the concept and the thing as it is taken objectively, but as it is in reality, at least according to its essence. Otherwise, if a conformity with the thing in objective being would be enough, no enunciation would be false, since every enunciation conforms with the enunciabile which it enunciates, whether that is so in reality or not. Therefore, since a chimaera is nothing in reality, no apprehension of it conforms with an object.

*A Confirmation of the Same.*—In addition, this is so because a simple concept can represent a thing otherwise than it is, if that concept is imperfectly determined, either by reason of the species it uses, or on account of another impediment which counteracts the object as it exists.

Tertio,<sup>264</sup> nulla videtur maior ratio, ob quam detur falsitas simplex in re, quam in conceptu, sed in re nonnunquam datur: ergo et in conceptu. Maior, et consequentia notae sunt. Minor probatur ex Aristotele 5. *Metaph.* cap. 5. asserente falsa esse, quae apta nata sunt apparere, aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt, quem sequutus D. Augustinus lib. 2. *soliloquiorum* cap. 6. relatus a D. Thoma 1. p. q. 17. definit falsum, quod aliter, atque ipsum est, videtur; esse autem aliquas res huiusmodi docet idem Augustinus lib. citato eodem cap. inquiring, Tragaedum esse falsum Hectorem, et stannum falsum argentum:<sup>265</sup> et Aristoteles loco citato, diametrum esse falso commensurabilem lateri. Praeterea artefacta, quae non conformantur cum Idea artificis, falsa dicuntur, ut domus deficiens a regula architecti: ergo et conceptus simplex, quando cum obiecto mensuratur, si ei non conformatur, difformis, ac falsus erit.

Communis<sup>266</sup> et vera sententia est, in simplici apprehensione non esse falsitatem, nisi per accidens. Est expressa Aristotelis 9. *Metaph.* cap. 12. text. 22. et 3. *de Anima* cap. 6. text. 26, ibidem Averrois. D. Thom. Philopon. Alberti Magni in 2. *de Anima*, tract. 3. c. 5. Apollinaris q. 13. Aegidii quodlib. 4. q. 17. Ferrariensis 1. *contra Gentes* cap. 59. item D. Thomae 1. p. q. 17. art. 3. Vigerii in *institutionibus* cap. 1. § 8. versi. 5. Probatur primo<sup>267</sup> ratione Aristotelis loco *Metaph.* citato. Qui simpliciter cognoscit, vel rei naturam attingit, vel non: si attingit, conformatur obiecto, et est verus: si non attingit, non est falsus, sed ignorat illud, quod non percipit; quia non recte dicitur falso cognoscere id, quod re vera non cognoscit, sed illud ignorare. Secundo,<sup>268</sup> est explicatio praecedentis: falsitas debet /p. 62/ cerni inter conceptum, et illius obiectum; ergo si datur falsitas inter haec ipsa versari debet; atqui non versatur; ergo nulla est. Probatur illa minor. Simplex cognitio est naturalis imago sui obiecti; ergo respectu illius neutiquam est difformis etsi comparatione alterius difformitatem habeat; verbi causa cognitio auri comparata occasione auricalchi praesentis habet pro obiecto aurum; et cum illo conformatur; cum auricalcho vero, nec conformationem habet, nec difformitatem, quia illud non respicit. Vim huius rationis inculcat D. Thoma. 3. *de Anima* lect. 11.

Haec<sup>269</sup> probant falsitatem non esse per se, et proprie in hac operatione. Verum quia addidimus in secunda parte huius sententiae id, quod desumptum est ex Aristotele lib. 3. *de Anima* citato, non repugnare illi falsitatem per accidens, duo sunt explicanda. Primum, Quid proprie sit falsitas.<sup>270</sup> Secundum, in quam ex simplicibus cognitionibus per accidens inveniatur. Quoad primum, falsitas iuxta Aristotelem 4. *Metaph.* text.

*A Third Argument.*—Third, there is apparently no greater reason why simple falsity exists in the thing than in the concept. But it does sometimes exist in the thing. Therefore, it also exists in the concept. The major premiss and the consequence are evident. The minor premiss is proven from Aristotle asserting in *Metaphysics*, Book 5, Chapter 5 [sic], that those things are false which are by nature apt to appear either not such as they are or as what they are not.<sup>422</sup> St. Augustine, in Book 2, Chapter 6, of his *Soliloquies*, followed Aristotle, and as cited by St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 17,<sup>423</sup> defined the false as what seems to be other than it is.<sup>424</sup> Moreover, the same Augustine, in the same [sic] Chapter of the cited book, teaches that there some things of this kind, when he says that the tragic actor is a false Hector,<sup>425</sup> and that tin is a false silver.<sup>426</sup> And Aristotle in the place cited says that the diameter is commensurable with a false side.<sup>427</sup>

*A Confirmation of the Argument.*—Also artifacts, which are not in conformity with the idea of the artisan, are called false, for example, a house which falls short of the plan of the architect. Therefore, a simple concept also, when measured with its object, if it does not conform to it, will be ‘difforming’ and false.

*The Common Opinion States that there is essentially no Falsity in Simple Knowledge.*—The common and true opinion is that in a simple apprehension there is no falsity, except by accident. This is the expressed view of Aristotle, in *Metaphysics*, Book 9, Chapter 12, Text 22,<sup>428</sup> and *De Anima*, Book 3, Chapter 6, Text 26;<sup>429</sup> and in the same place, Averroes,<sup>430</sup> St. Thomas,<sup>431</sup> and Philoponus (6th cent. A.D.),<sup>432</sup> plus Albert the Great commenting on *De Anima*, Book 2, Tractate 3, Chapter 5;<sup>433</sup> Apollinaris [Offredi (15th cent.)], [in *De Anima*] Question 13;<sup>434</sup> Aegidius, *Quodlibet* 4, Question 17 [sic];<sup>435</sup> Ferrara, at *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 59;<sup>436</sup> again St. Thomas [*Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 17, Article 3;<sup>437</sup> and Viguierius [John, O.P. (fl. ca. 1558)], in his *Institutions*, Chapter 1, § 8, Verse 5.<sup>438</sup>

*The First Proof.*—It is proven first by the argument of Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*, at the place cited.<sup>439</sup> He who knows in a simple way either attains the nature of a thing, or he does not. If he attains it, he is conformed to the object, and he has truth. If he does not attain it, [his knowledge] is not false, but he does not know that which he does not perceive. For he is not correctly said to falsely know what in fact he does not know, but he is said to be ignorant of it.

*The Second Proof.*—Second, there is this explanation of the preceding: falsity must be judged to be between the concept and its object. Therefore, if falsity exists, it must be between these two. But this is not the case. Therefore, falsity does not exist. The minor premiss here is proven: simple knowledge is the natural image of its object. Therefore, with respect to that object it is in no way difforming, although in comparison with another object it does have difformity. For example, the knowledge of gold, which is given on the occasion of brass, has gold for its object, and it is conformed with that. But with brass it has neither conformity nor difformity, because it does not refer to that. St. Thomas, [commenting on] *De Anima*, Book 3, Lecture 11, urges the force of this argument.<sup>440</sup>

All of this proves that falsity is not essentially and properly in this operation. But because in the second part of this opinion we are adding, from Aristotle in the place cited from the *De Anima*, Book 3, that it is not repugnant that falsity acci-

27. definiri potest difformitas cognitionis cum suo obiecto; ait enim Aristoteles eo loco falsum esse ex eo, quod iudicatur esse quod non est, vel non esse quod est, quem locum veluti exponens D. Thomas 1. p. quaest. 17. art. 4. ait, propterea philosophum ita falsum explicuisse, quia ut verum ponit acceptionem adaequatam, id est, consentaneam rei: ita falsum acceptionem rei inadaequatam, hoc est, non conformem; quibus verbis ostendit D. Thomas, quam apte definiatur falsitas per conditiones omnino oppositas veritati, cui opponitur, ut ille ait, contrarie.

Ut ergo definitio explicetur,<sup>271</sup> notandum est duplicem esse difformitatem; alteram negativam, alteram positivam. Negativa, est carentia conformitatis cum aliquo obiecto; quae si accipiatur in quavis cognitione respectu rerum quas non repraesentat,<sup>272</sup> est pura negatio: si vero sumatur in cognitione comparatione rei per eam cognitae, sed non adaequate, et perfecte, quia scilicet non attingit omnes eius partes, vel totam eius cognoscibilitatem, est privatio. Positiva difformitas<sup>273</sup> est inadaequatio cognitionis cum obiecto, in quod tendit, et secundum eam partem, in quam tendit: qualis est haec, Socrates non est risibilis: dicit enim hoc iudicium habitudinem ad Socratem risibilem, sed dissentaneam. At<sup>274</sup> haec secunda difformitas est proprie falsitas, appellaturque error; quem constat verae cognitioni contrariae opponi: prima dicitur ignorantia, ut habetur ex eo loco 9. Metaph. Aristotelis. Ex dictis patet sensus definitionis; dicitur enim falsitas difformitas, quia haec est veluti genus ad positivam et negativam; additur cum suo obiecto, ut excludatur negativa quae semper est respectu alterius obiecti, vel quoad totum, vel quoad partem. Porro falsitas positiva formaliter non est relatio, sed eius fundamentum, videlicet difformitas actus cum suo obiecto, nam actus ipse secundum se sumptus non quadrat in obiectum ante omne relationem advenientem, ut de veritate dicebamus. /p. 63/

Quod attinet ad secundum,<sup>275</sup> sciendum est, in prima operatione duo genera conceptuum reperiri, quidam sunt ominino simplices, quibus apprehenditur nuda rei essentia, ut conceptus Hominis, Leonis, vel Auri. Alii, esto sint qualitates simplices, repraesentant obiectum aliquo modo compositum, ut conceptus hominis albi, remi fracti, etc. et hi virtute compositi dicuntur, non ea compositione, qua conceptus angelici, qui eiusmodi sunt, ut propriam veritatem, et falsitatem sortiantur. Priores conceptus appellat Caiet. 1. p. q. 58. art. 5. simplices quoad modum cognoscendi, et<sup>276</sup> quoad rem cognitam; Posteriores simplices, quoad modum cognoscendi non quoad rem cognitam. In cognitione<sup>277</sup> omnino

dentally exist in this operation,<sup>441</sup> two things must be explained. First, what exactly is falsity? And, second, in which simple knowledges is it accidentally found?

*What Falsity is.*—As regards the first, falsity can be defined, according to Aristotle, in *Metaphysics*, Book 4, Text. 27, as the difformity of knowledge with its own object.<sup>442</sup> For, in that place, Aristotle says that falsity is from this that what is not is judged to be or what is is judged not to be. More or less explaining this passage, St. Thomas [in *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 17, Article 4,<sup>443</sup> says that the Philosopher has explained falsity in this way because, just as he says that truth is an adequate, or a fitting, reception of the thing, so he says falsity is an inadequate reception of the thing, that is to say, one which does not conform to the thing. In these words, St. Thomas shows how well falsity is defined by properties which are totally opposite to the truth to which it is opposed, as he says, *contrarily*.<sup>444</sup>

*What Negative Difformity is.*—In order, therefore, to explain the definition, it must be noted that there are two kinds of difformity: one is negative and the other is positive. Negative difformity is the lack of conformity with some object. If this is taken in regard to any knowledge with respect to things which it does not represent, it is a pure negation. But if it is taken in regard to a knowledge with respect to a thing which is known by that knowledge, but not in an adequate and perfect way, because, that is, it does not apprehend all of its parts or its total knowability, it is a privation.

*What Positive Difformity is.*—Positive difformity is the non-equation of a knowledge with an object toward which it tends, and according to that part toward which it tends. An example would be this proposition: ‘*Socrates is not risible.*’ For this judgment does express a relation to the risible Socrates, but one which is not fitting.

*The Difficulty of the Question is made Apparent.*—But this second difformity is falsity in the proper sense, and it is called *error*, which is evidently opposed to a contrary true knowledge.<sup>445</sup> The first difformity is called *ignorance*, as is gathered from the cited passage in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, Book 9.<sup>446</sup>

From what has been said, the sense of the definition is clear. For falsity is called a difformity, because this is a kind of genus for both positive and negative falsity. ‘*With its own object*’ is added in order to exclude negative falsity which is always in respect to another object, either in whole or in part. Therefore, positive falsity is not formally a relation, but rather the foundation of that, which is to say, it is the difformity of the act with its object. For the act itself, taken by itself, and, as we said about truth: before every appended relation, does not square with the object.

*There are Two Kinds of Concepts.*—As regards the second [question<sup>447</sup>], it must be understood that in the first operation two kinds of concepts are found. Some are entirely simple, by which the bare essence of a thing is apprehended, as for example, the concepts of man, lion, or gold. Others, even though they are simple qualities, represent an object which is in some way composite, for example, the concepts of a white man, a broken oar, etc. And these are said to be virtually composite, but not with the same composition as angelic concepts which are such that they may be accorded genuine truth and falsity. [Commenting on *Summa Theologiae*] Part 1, Question 58, Article 5, Cajetan calls the first concepts simple with respect both to their way of knowing and to the thing known, and he calls



simplici potest dari falsitas seu difformitas negativa, quatenus cognitio hominis non est conformis equo, quem nullo modo repraesentat; haec tamen non denominat cognitionem falsam, alioqui omnis cognitio esset simul vera et falsa comparatione diversorum. Imo Ideae divinae falsae essent, cum infinitae sint res, cum quibus singulae illarum non conformantur. De hac cognitione procedunt rationes secundae sententiae, de qua locutus est Aristoteles in 3. de Anima, cum dixit in intellectione indivisibilium non esse falsitatem, quasi dicat cognitionem omnino simplicem ferri in suum obiectum, ut in indivisibile, quod necesse est, vel totum attingi, vel a toto aberrari.

Autores<sup>278</sup> igitur secundae sententiae, cum admittunt in simplici cognitione falsitatem, loquuntur de virtualiter complexa, ut patet ex Aristotele 2. de Anima. D. Thom. 1. p. q. 17. art. 3. Ferrariens. 1. contra Gentes cap. 59. et de hac procedunt argumenta initio articuli proposita; verum quomodo intelligendum sit falsitatem inesse per accidens huic cognitioni, bifariam exponi potest. Primo,<sup>279</sup> ut insit quidem falsitas in cognitione intrinsece, at non quatenus simplex est, sed prout involvit in radice affirmationem, vel negationem. Ita loqui videtur S. Thomas in 1. dist. 19. quaest. 5. artic. 1. ad 7. cum ait definitionem esse falsam in quantum involvit falsam affirmationem; eodem modo loquuntur Ferrariensis, et Caietanus; et confirmatur, quia falsitas, a qua denominatur haec prima operatio, est diversa a falsitate propositionis, alioqui eam non denominaret, sed in propositione non est, nisi falsitas sibi propria, et complexa: ergo in operatione virtute complexa intrinseca falsitas invenitur. Secundo modo<sup>280</sup> intelligi potest falsitas denominare hanc operationem extrinsece, quatenus est occasio, ut formetur propositio falsa. Hunc sensum magis indicat D. Thomas illa quaestione. 17. 1. par. artic. 3. docet enim intellectum concipiendo hanc definitionem, animal rationale quadrupes, idcirco esse falsum, quia falsus est formando hanc propositionem, aliquid animal rationale est quadrupes; ergo intelligit priorem cognitionem esse falsam, quia est causa posterioris.

Haec<sup>281</sup> secunda explicatio verissima est, vel ob rationem addu- /p. 64/ ctam pro prima; nam falsitas cognitionis virtute complexae, vel est difformitas repraesentationis, vel error in attribuendo unum alteri cum quo revera coniunctum non est; si detur secundum, nihil omnino differt haec falsitas a falsitate complexa, ut consideranti est manifestum, atque adeo in simplici cognitione erit falsitas propria secundae operationis intellectus; si primum ea difformitas ad summum potest esse privativa,

the second concepts simple with respect to their way of knowing but not with respect to the thing known.<sup>448</sup>

*In Completely Simple Knowledge there can be Negative Falsity. Aristotle's Text is Understood about this Knowledge.*—In knowledge which is entirely simple there can be a negative falsity or difformity, as for example, the knowledge of a man does not conform to a horse, which it does not in any way represent. However, this does not mark the knowledge as false; otherwise, every knowledge would be simultaneously true and false, in comparison with different things. Indeed, the Divine Ideas would be false, since there are infinite things with which each of those Ideas is not conformed. The arguments of the second opinion relate to this knowledge, about which Aristotle spoke in *De Anima*, Book 3, when he said that in the understanding of indivisibles there is no falsity<sup>449</sup>—as if to say that an entirely simple knowledge is brought to bear upon its object, as upon an indivisible, because it is necessary either that the whole thing be apprehended or that it be totally missed.

*Falsity can Exist in Simple Knowledge in Two Ways.*—Therefore, when the authors of the second opinion admit falsity in simple knowledge, they are speaking about virtually complex knowledge, as is clear from Aristotle, *De Anima*, Book 2;<sup>450</sup> St. Thomas, [*Summa Theologiae*], Part 1, Question 17, Article 3;<sup>451</sup> and Ferrara, at *Contra Gentiles*, Book 1, Chapter 59.<sup>452</sup> And the arguments which were proposed at the beginning of this Article relate to this. But how falsity should be understood to be accidentally in this knowledge, can be explained in two ways.

*The First Way of Explanation.*—First, falsity is indeed intrinsically in that knowledge, however not insofar as it is simple, but insofar as it radically involves affirmation or negation. St. Thomas seems to speak this way, in [*his Sentences commentary*], Book 1, Distinction 19, Question 5, Article 1, In Reply to Objection 7, when he says that a definition is false insofar as it involves a false affirmation.<sup>453</sup> Ferrara and Cajetan speak in the same way. And it is confirmed, because the falsity by which this first operation is denominated false, is diverse from the falsity of a proposition, otherwise it would not denominate that first operation. But in a proposition there is only a falsity which is proper to it and which is complex. Therefore, in a virtually complex operation an intrinsic falsity is found.

*The Second Way of Explanation.*—In a second way, falsity can be understood to extrinsically denominate this operation, insofar as this operation is the occasion for forming a false proposition. This is the sense toward which St. Thomas leans in the cited Question 17, Article 3, of the First Part.<sup>454</sup> For he teaches that the intellect in conceiving this definition, ‘*a four-footed rational animal*,’ is false for the reason that it is false in forming this proposition, ‘*There is some four-footed rational animal*.’ Therefore, he understands the first knowledge to be false, because it is the cause of the second.

*The Second Explanation is Most True.*—This second explanation is most true, actually because of the argument offered for the first. For the falsity of a virtually complex knowledge is either a difformity of representation or an error in attributing one thing to another with which in fact it is not joined. If the second obtains, this falsity differs in absolutely nothing from complex falsity, as is evident to anyone considering it. And thus in a simple knowledge there will be a falsity which is proper to the second operation of the intellect. If the first obtains, that difformity

quia cognoscitur res sine forma, quam habet, vel cum ea, quam non habet; positiva autem esse nequit, quia imago respectu sui proprii obiecti, quod refert non est dissona, vel difformis, ut patet ex dictis. Admittimus ergo in conceptu virtute complexo falsitatem privativam intrinsece dominantem: positivam autem, quae proprie est falsitas, solum extrinsece. Quo posito non oportet ad rationem pro prima expositione respondere.

Sed<sup>282</sup> ita quis obiiceret, quemadmodum veritatem divisimus in complexam, et simplicem, hancque tribuimus simplici conceptui, ita ut simpliciter illum verum appellemus, eodem modo partiri possumus falsitatem, ac complexam esse positivam, simplicem vero privativam, et ab eo denominari conceptum simpliciter falsum. Occurrendum<sup>283</sup> erit non esse utrobique eandem rationem. Nam communis ratio veritatis est conformitas quae proprie reperitur in prima operatione, licet perfectior sit ea, quae est in secunda: at falsitas in communi dicit difformitatem oppositam illi veritati exercitam inter eadem extrema, cuiusmodi est<sup>284</sup> sola positiva; privativa namque est ad partem rei non repraesentatam, et ideo proprie falsitas non est, sed defectus plenae conformitatis.

### Sectio articuli

#### Responsio ad argumenta primae sententiae

Imprimis<sup>285</sup> Aristoteles, et D. Thomas, si quando falsitatem attribuunt simplici cognitioni sensus, vel intellectus, loquuntur de falsitate per accidens, et de cognitione virtute complexa, ut ex aliis eorundem auctorum locis patet; et quod spectat ad sensum, ubi difficultas est major, expresse id docet Aristoteles 2. de Anima cap. 6. ut diligenter advertit Cardinalis Toletus quaest. 13. eiusdem libri. Aristoteles ita loquitur. Visus non errat esse colorem, vel auditus esse sonum, sed quid sit coloratum, ut ubi, aut quid sit sonans, aut ubi. Ad primum argumentum respondendum est, in sensu non esse propriam falsitatem intrinsece. Ad probationem,<sup>286</sup> quod attinet ad auctoritates, iam respondimus; ad experientiam negandum est absolute nos per sensus cognoscere illam rem, quae praesens non sit, quia sensus essentialiter est intuitivus; intuitio autem sensitiva non est rei absentis /p. 65/ realiter, nisi forte per miraculum: est tamen aliquando sensatio adeo confusa, ut praebet occasionem sensui interiori, vel intellectui percipiendi unum pro alio, et ferendi falsum iudicium, quod vocamus habere falsitatem per accidens: verum cognitio sensus perpetuo est conformis rei per illam repraesentatae.

can at most be privative, because the thing is known without the form which it has, or with that form which it does not have. However, it cannot be positive, because, as is clear from what has been said, an image with respect to its own proper object which it represents is not discordant or difforming. Therefore, in a virtually complex concept we admit an intrinsically denominating privative falsity; but one that is positive, which is properly falsity, we allow only extrinsically. This said, there is no need to respond to the argument offered for the first explanation.

*An Objection.*—But someone might object as follows: just as we have divided truth into complex and simple, and have attributed the latter to a simple concept, in such way that we are without qualification calling that concept true, in the same way we can divide falsity, so that complex falsity is positive while simple falsity is privative, and from that a concept can be without qualification denominated false.

*The Reply to the Objection.*—The answer will have to be that the argument is not the same in both cases. For the common nature of truth is conformity — which is properly found in the first operation, even though that conformity which is in the second operation is more perfect. But falsity in general means a difformity opposite to that truth, a difformity exercised between the same extremes, a difformity which can only be positive. For privative difformity relates to the non-represented part of the thing, and therefore, it is properly not falsity, but a defect of full conformity.

### A Section of the Article.

#### Reply to the Arguments of the First Opinion

*The Refutation of the First Argument.*—First of all, if at times they attribute falsity to a simple knowledge of a sense or of the intellect, Aristotle and St. Thomas are speaking about accidental falsity and about a virtually complex knowledge, as is clear from other passages of the same authors. And as regards a sense, where there is more difficulty, Aristotle, in *De Anima*, Book 2, Chapter 6,<sup>455</sup> explicitly taught this, as Cardinal Toletus [i.e., Francisco de Toledo, S.J. (1533-1596)] carefully notes in Question 13 of the same book.<sup>456</sup> Aristotle speaks in this way: Vision is not mistaken about the existence of color, or hearing about the existence of sound, but about what is colored, or where is it, or what is sound, or where is it? To the first argument the answer is that intrinsically there is no proper falsity in sensation.

*A Reply to the Proof [in connection with the First Argument].*—To the proof, with respect to the authorities [cited], we have already answered. In reply to [the proffered] experience, we must absolutely deny that through the senses we know the thing in question which is not present, because sensation is essentially intuitive. But there is no real sensitive intuition of an absent thing, except perhaps by a miracle.<sup>457</sup> However, sometimes there is a sensation which is so confused that it gives an occasion to an internal sense or to the intellect to perceive one thing for another and to make a false judgment, which we call having falsity accidentally. But the knowledge of a sense always conforms to the thing which it represents.

Hinc<sup>287</sup> ad singula exempla descendendo quatenus fert hic locus (res enim est propria secundi de anima, ubi late explicatur cap. 6. q. 6.) Dicimus aegrotantis linguam re vera percipere amarorem insidentem in humore cholericus, quo est conspersa, licet in applicatione illius ad cibum dulcem contingat deceptio. In collo columbae non colores videntur, sed lux taliter reflexa, ut esto visio sit lucis, intellectus ob similitudinem cum coloribus, aliter iudicet. In exemplo Bonaventurae visuntur re vera paleae, sed confusae ob perturbationem specierum per fumum. Eadem responsio danda est ad caetera exempla, quae sigillatim explicare, alienum esset ab hoc loco. Illud certum sit, cognitionem sensus semper esse conformem obiecto, quod repraesentat, sed variationem, vel remissionem speciei nonnunquam esse in causa, ut totam rem obiectam perfecte non percipiat.

Ad secundum<sup>288</sup> negandum similiter est, in conceptu simplici esse falsitatem, dicendumque priora duo exempla falso supponere obiecta illorum conceptuum esse auricalchum, et hunc Solem; alterius enim est aurum, alterius vero Sol confictus minor tota terra, licet utriusque concipiendi occasionem dederit auricalchum, et verus Sol, a quibus eatenus difformis est ille conceptus, quatenus repraesentare debuerat eam rem, de cuius specie processit; sed haec est radicalis, et impropriissima falsitas. Idem est dicendum de conceptu Chimaerae, conformari scilicet cum obiecto phantastico: et cum dicitur conformitatem debere esse cum vera essentia, negandum est. Ad probationem dicendum,<sup>289</sup> esse longe maiorem rationem, ob quam enuntiatio conferenda sit cum suo obiecto secundum esse reale, conceptus autem cum suo in esse obiectivo, quam explicabimus in 4. capite. Ad confirmationem<sup>290</sup> concedendum est intellectum per simplicem conceptum posse repraesentare rem aliter atque est, aliquid addendo, vel detrahendo, verum eiusmodi conceptum non esse rei, prout in se est, sed prout obijcitur, cum qua negari non potest esse conformem.

Ad tertium<sup>291</sup> negari imprimis posset maior, quando enim res artefacta, in qua sola concedenda foret propositio ob aliquod impedimentum, vel defectum potentiae exequentis non erit similis suae ideae simplici, dicitur difformis in ordine ad suam propriam Ideam, cum non habeat aliam, cum qua conferatur: conceptus autem habet proprium obiectum distinctum ab eo, a quo dicitur aberrare; ad quem modum loquitur D. Thomas ea q. 17. ar. 1. et explicat illud Psalmi 4. ut quid diligitis vanitatem, et quaeritis mendacium: dicitur, inquit, vitium mendacium, quia non conformatur cum regula /p. 66/ operandi divini intellectus. Concessa tamen maiori, negetur minor. Ad primam<sup>292</sup> illius probationem dices cum D. Thoma

*Replies to the Examples Offered [in support of the First Argument].*—But descending now to the individual examples, insofar as this context allows (for the matter is proper to *De Anima*, Book 2, where it is extensively explained in Chapter 6, Question 6<sup>458</sup>), we say that the tongue of a sick person in fact perceives the bitterness which is in the choleric humor with which it is moistened, although in the application of that to a sweet food a deception occurs. On the neck of a dove colors are not seen, but light is reflected in such a way, that while the vision is of light, the intellect, because of a likeness [of light] with colors, judges otherwise. In Bonaventure's example, in reality what is seen is straw, but it is confused because of the disturbance of the species<sup>459</sup> by the smoke. The same reply must be given to the other examples, which to explain individually would be outside our consideration here. But this is certain: sense knowledge is always in conformity with the object that it represents, but sometimes a variation or a remission of a species causes it to not perfectly perceive the whole thing objected.

*A Reply to the Second Argument.*—In answer to the second argument we must in a similar way deny that there is falsity in a simple concept. And we must say that the first two examples falsely suppose that the objects of those concepts are brass and this sun. For the object of one is gold, while the object of the other is an imagined sun which is less than the whole earth, although brass and the true sun give the occasion for conceiving each, from which that concept is diffoming insofar as it must represent that thing from whose species it proceeds.<sup>460</sup> But this is a radical and most improper falsity. The same must be said about the concept of a chimaera, namely, that it is conformed with an imagined object. And when it is said that its conformity has to be with a true essence, this must be denied.<sup>461</sup>

*A Reply to the Proof of the Second Argument.*—In answer to the proof [of the second argument], it should be said that there is much more reason to compare an enunciation with its object as it really exists; however, a concept should be compared with its object in objective being, which we will explain in Chapter 4.<sup>462</sup>

*A Reply to the Confirmation of that Proof.*—In reply to the confirmation, it must be granted that the intellect can by a simple concept represent a thing other than it is, by adding or subtracting something. But a concept of that kind is not the concept of a thing as it really exists, but rather as it is objected, with which [thing as so objected] that concept cannot be denied to be conforming.

*A Reply to the Third Argument.*—In reply to the third argument, first of all, its major premiss could be denied. For when an artificial thing, with respect to which alone the proposition needs to be admitted, on account of some impediment, or defect of an executive power, will not be similar to its simple idea [in the mind of artisan], it will be said to be diffoming in relation to its own proper idea, since it has no other idea with which it may be compared. However, a concept has a proper object distinct from that from which it is said to diverge. St. Thomas speaks in this way, in the cited Question 17, Article 1,<sup>463</sup> when he explains the verse of *Psalms* 4, 'Why do you love vanity and seek after lying?' Lying, he says, is called a vice, because it is not conformed with the Divine intellect's rule of acting. But even if we concede the major premiss, the minor may be denied.

*A Reply to the First Proof in favor of that Third Argument.*—In answer to the first proof in favor of that argument, you will say with St. Thomas, in the place just

loco proxime citato iuxta D. Augustinum, quem adducit, eas res vocari a Philosopho falsas ob similitudinem cum aliis rebus veris, a quibus nihilominus natura dissident: ratione cuius similitudinis causare possunt deceptionem, et ita vocari possunt falsae active, non formaliter.

Ad secundam probationem<sup>293</sup> de artefactis, etsi D. Thomas q. citata concedat ea appellari falsa, quando deviant a regula artificis, impropria tamen videtur ea locutio; quoniam, ut cognitio non /p. 67/ dicitur falsa, si relinquit aliquam partem obiecti repraesentandam, quia non est illius obiectum quoad eam partem; ita artefactum secundum id, quod non adaequatur, ideae non dicitur eius effectus, atque adeo nec proprie falsum, sed defectuosum. At opponebatur: non habet aliam Ideam, cum qua conferatur secundum eam deviationem: ergo debet comparari cum illa, a qua deficit. Neganda tamen est illatio; nam quoad illud est effectus a casu ob impedimentum, vel defectum, qui ideam non requirit. Atque haec de prima intellectus operatione sufficiant, si non pro rei dignitate, certe supra loci angustiam. Ad caetera magis logica procedamus.

mentioned, that according to St. Augustine, whom Thomas cites, those things are called false by the Philosopher because of their similarity with other true things, from which things, nonetheless, they are different in nature. By reason of this similarity they can cause deception, and thus they can be called actively, but not formally, false.

*A Reply to the Second Proof.*—In answer to the second proof about artifacts: even though St. Thomas, in the cited Question,<sup>464</sup> allows them to be called false when they deviate from the rule of the artisan, nevertheless such calling seems to be improper. For, just as knowledge, if it leaves out some part of the object which was to be represented, is not called false, because it is not knowledge of the object with respect to that part, so an artifact, in regard to that to which it does not equate, is not said to be its effect, and therefore it is not properly false, but rather defective. But the further objection was that it does not have another idea, with which according to that deviation it is compared. Therefore, it must be compared with that idea from which it is falling short. However, this inference must be denied. For in that respect, because of an impediment or a defect, an effect is a matter of chance which does not require an idea.

These remarks about the first operation of the intellect should be enough, if not for the dignity of the subject, certainly in view of the restriction of the context. Let us proceed now to other things which are more proper to logic.



## Notes to the Latin

- <sup>1</sup> In margin: *Prima Aristotelis suppositio.*
- <sup>2</sup> In margin: *Secunda Aristotelis suppositio.*
- <sup>3</sup> In margin: *Tertia Aristotelis suppositio.*
- <sup>4</sup> Lyons reads: “*bullā*”.
- <sup>5</sup> In margin: *Signi definitio a D. Augustino tradita.*
- <sup>6</sup> Lyons 1607 reads: ‘*sensuit*.’
- <sup>7</sup> In margin: *Signi definitio a Dialecticis Augustino posterioribus inventa.*
- <sup>8</sup> In margin: *Advertitur primum bifariam accipi signum.*
- <sup>9</sup> In margin: *Advertitur secundum signum dicere respectum et ad potentiam cognoscitivam, et ad rem significatam.*
- <sup>10</sup> In margin: *Opinio asserentium signum formaliter dicere respectum ad rem.*
- <sup>11</sup> In margin: *Vera sententia affirmans signum formaliter includere habitudinem, et ad rem, et ad potentiam.*
- <sup>12</sup> In margin: *Idem omnino sunt signum et significativum.*
- <sup>13</sup> In margin: *Infirmatur ratio pro parte negativa allata.*
- <sup>14</sup> Lyons reads: “*amittere*”.
- <sup>15</sup> In margin: *Quid sint habitudines signi.*
- <sup>16</sup> In margin: *Opinio existimantium esse relationes.*
- <sup>17</sup> In margin: *Vera sent.*
- <sup>18</sup> In margin: *Ostenditur veritas approbata opinionis.*
- <sup>19</sup> In margin: *Satisfit obiectioni contrariae opinionis.*
- <sup>20</sup> In margin: *Argumenta pro parte affirmativa. I. Argument.*
- <sup>21</sup> In margin: *2. Argum.*
- <sup>22</sup> In margin: *Nil posse esse signum sui probat vera et communis opinio.*
- <sup>23</sup> In margin: *Conclusionis fundamentum praesertim pro signis instrumentalibus.*
- <sup>24</sup> In margin: *Efficax ratio conclusionis pro signis formalibus.*
- <sup>25</sup> In margin: *Quales sint relationes signi, reales, an rationis.*
- <sup>26</sup> In margin: *Fundamentum remotum in signo naturali est reale.*
- <sup>27</sup> In margin: *Quid sit fundamentum remotum in signo Naturali.*
- <sup>28</sup> In margin: *Quales sint relationes signi ad rem significatam.*
- <sup>29</sup> In margin: *Cuiusmodi sit relatio signi ad potentiam cognoscentem.*
- <sup>30</sup> In margin: *Respondetur ad 1. argum.*
- <sup>31</sup> In margin: *Definitio signi secundum Torr.*
- <sup>32</sup> In margin: *Resp. ad 2.*
- <sup>33</sup> In margin: *Signorum alia rememorativa, alia demonstrativa, et prognostica.*
- <sup>34</sup> In margin: *Tradita divisio signi non est quasi in species.*
- <sup>35</sup> In margin: *Signorum alia, propria, alia impropria. Quid signum proprium.*
- <sup>36</sup> In margin: *Quid signum improprium.*
- <sup>37</sup> In margin: *Signorum quaedam naturalia, quaedam ex instituto, alia formalia, alia instrumentalia.*
- <sup>38</sup> In margin: *Probatur breviter sufficientia divisionis signorum in naturalia et ex instituto. Definiuntur signa naturalia et ex instituto. Signorum divisio in formalia et instrumentalia non latuit antiquos philosophos.*
- <sup>39</sup> In margin: *Definitur signum formale et instrumentale. Probatur bonam esse divisionem in signa formalia et instrumentalia. Signa quaedam practica, alia speculativa.*
- <sup>40</sup> In margin: *Effectus et causa naturalis per se sibi invicem signa sunt.*
- <sup>41</sup> Lyons omits ‘*ex*.’
- <sup>42</sup> In margin: *Argumentis oppugnatur tradita divisio. Primo. Secundo.*
- <sup>43</sup> Lyons reads: ‘[*uxor*]’.
- <sup>44</sup> In margin: *Tertio.*
- <sup>45</sup> In margin: *Quarto.*
- <sup>46</sup> Lyons reads: ‘*nam*.’
- <sup>47</sup> Lyons reads: ‘*oppositum*.’
- <sup>48</sup> In margin: *Quinto.*
- <sup>49</sup> In margin: *Solvuntur obiecta argumenta. Solvitur primum.*
- <sup>50</sup> In margin: *Res quoad existentiam pendunt a libera Dei voluntate; quoad essentiam vero, ab ideis divinis voluntatis actu prioribus.*
- <sup>51</sup> In margin: *Solvitur 2. argum.*

- <sup>52</sup> In margin: *Discrimen in signo inter signum naturale, et ex instituto.*
- <sup>53</sup> In margin: *Solvitur 3. argum.*
- <sup>54</sup> In margin: *Solvitur 4. argum.*
- <sup>55</sup> In margin: *Signum Caimi fuit corporis tremor.*
- <sup>56</sup> Lyons reads: '215'.
- <sup>57</sup> In margin: *Solvitur 5. argum.*
- <sup>58</sup> In margin: *Futile ostenditur argumentum ex Angelorum locutione depromptum ad-versus traditam doctrinam.*
- <sup>59</sup> In margin: *Impugnatur approbata distributio.*
- <sup>60</sup> Lyons reads: 'obiecti'.
- <sup>61</sup> In margin: *Primum.*
- <sup>62</sup> In margin: *Ratio qua nituntur, qui negant species esse imaginem.*
- <sup>63</sup> In margin: *Secundum. Difficultas de conceptu solis respectu astrologi.*
- <sup>64</sup> In margin: *Difficultas de specie speculi.*
- <sup>65</sup> Lyons omits: '2'.
- <sup>66</sup> In margin: *Difficultas de conceptu medio.*
- <sup>67</sup> In margin: *Tertium.*
- <sup>68</sup> Lyons omits: 'a'.
- <sup>69</sup> In margin: *Bifariam concurrat obiectum cum potentia ad cognitionem ut principium scilicet, et ut terminus illius.*
- <sup>70</sup> In margin: *Species intelligibiles sunt signa formalia.*
- <sup>71</sup> In margin: *Species intelligibiles signa formalia sunt, esto imagines non sint.*  
Cologne reads: *Species intelligibiles signa formalia sunt, esto imagines sint.*
- <sup>72</sup> In margin: *Species esse imagines rerum cognitarum probatur.*  
*Ex Philosophis.*
- <sup>73</sup> In margin: *Ex Patrib.*
- <sup>74</sup> In margin: *Ex Scholasticis.*
- <sup>75</sup> In margin: *Ex sacra pagina.*
- <sup>76</sup> In margin: *Idem confirmatur ratione.*
- <sup>77</sup> In margin: *Evertitur fundamentum oppositae sententiae.*
- <sup>78</sup> In margin: *Enucleatur locus Arist.*
- <sup>79</sup> In margin: *Conceptus iuxta Thomistas est signum instrumentale.*
- <sup>80</sup> In margin: *Iuxta commune et veriolem sententiam est signum formale.*
- <sup>81</sup> In margin: *Divisio signi in formale, et instrumentale: seu in naturale et ex instituto est in opposita formaliter, non materialiter.*
- <sup>82</sup> In margin: *Exponitur difficultas de conceptu solis.*
- <sup>83</sup> In margin: *Divisio tradita est in membra essentialiter diversa.*
- <sup>84</sup> In margin: *Quod sit discrimen inter hanc, et praecedentem divisionem.*
- <sup>85</sup> In margin: *Enodatur difficultas de specie speculo impressa.*
- <sup>86</sup> In margin: *Species speculi non est signum instrumentale. Explicatur difficultas de speciebus per aerem diffusis.*
- <sup>87</sup> Lyons reads: '8'.
- <sup>88</sup> In margin: *Ad rationem signi satis est aptitudo repraesentandi.*
- <sup>89</sup> In margin: *Proponitur verus sensus sententiae D. Basilii.*
- <sup>90</sup> In margin: *Recte dividitur signum in actuale et aptitudinale.*
- <sup>91</sup> In margin: *Tradita signi divisio sumitur per ordinem ad potentiam.*
- <sup>92</sup> In margin: *Aptitudo specierum in aere ad repraesentandum est proxima.*
- <sup>93</sup> In margin: *Monstratur obscuritas de conceptu medio.*
- <sup>94</sup> In margin: *Nihil ducit in cognitionem alterius quin aliquid signum sit.*
- <sup>95</sup> In margin: *Non potest Angelus per suam essentiam non cognitam devenire in cognitionem Dei.*
- <sup>96</sup> In margin: *Essentia Angeli est signum instrumentale Dei.*
- <sup>97</sup> In margin: *Exponitur alia difficultas. De essentia divina concurrente ad cognitionem creaturarum.*
- <sup>98</sup> In margin: *De phantasmate rei singularis.*
- <sup>99</sup> In margin: *De phantasmate fumi ducente in notitiam ignis.*
- <sup>100</sup> Lyons omits: 'cum'.
- <sup>101</sup> In margin: *Quod est signum signi est signum significati.*
- <sup>102</sup> In margin: *Mittitur alio 5. difficultas de cognitione et assumitur non esse signum rei cognitae. Cognitionis non est imago obiecti.*
- <sup>103</sup> In margin: *Voces sunt signa conceptuum: scripta signa vocum.*

- <sup>104</sup> In margin: *Opinio Scoti, et Gabrielis conceptus non significari per voces.*
- <sup>105</sup> In margin: *Suadetur rationibus. Prima.*
- <sup>106</sup> In margin: *Opinio Boëtii vocibus solos conceptus significari.*
- <sup>107</sup> In margin: *Argumentis roboratur proxima sententia. Primo.*
- <sup>108</sup> In margin: *Secundo.*
- <sup>109</sup> In margin: *Vocem tum conceptus, tum res ipsas significare est sententia Arist. Probatur ex ipsius locis.*
- <sup>110</sup> In margin: *Probatur conclusio auctoritate Patrum in totum.*
- <sup>111</sup> In margin: *Probatur in partem quod significet rem.* Cologne reads: *Probatur in partem quod scilicet vox significet rem.*
- <sup>112</sup> In margin: *Probatur in partem quod significet conceptus.* Cologne reads: *Probatur in partem; quid significet conceptus.*
- <sup>113</sup> In margin: *Ratio 1.*
- <sup>114</sup> In margin: *Ratio 2.*
- <sup>115</sup> In margin: *Ratio 3.*
- <sup>116</sup> In margin: *Ratio 4.*
- <sup>117</sup> In margin: *An vox rem et conceptum immediate significet.*
- <sup>118</sup> In margin: *Prima sententia conceptus primo, et immediate vocem: rem vero remote significare.*
- <sup>119</sup> In margin: *Probatur proxima opinio.*
- <sup>120</sup> In margin: *Opinio 2. vocem prius, rem secundario conceptum indicare.*
- <sup>121</sup> In margin: *Probatur proxima sententia.*
- <sup>122</sup> In margin: *Tertia opinio vocem duplici significatione attingere immediate, et rem, et conceptum.*
- <sup>123</sup> Lyons reads: '37'.
- <sup>124</sup> In margin: *Probatur 3. 1. [sic] opinio.*
- <sup>125</sup> Lyons reads: 'proximo'.
- <sup>126</sup> In margin: *Anteponitur 3. opin. et satisfit argumentis primae opinionis.*
- <sup>127</sup> Lyons reads: 'conceptu'.
- <sup>128</sup> Lyons reads: 'vocés'.
- <sup>129</sup> Lyons reads: 'uxorem'.
- <sup>130</sup> In margin: *Exponitur locus Arist.*
- <sup>131</sup> In margin: *Diluuntur argumenta 2. sententiae.*
- <sup>132</sup> In margin: *Advertitur dividi signum in doctrinale, et non doctrinale.*
- <sup>133</sup> Lyons reads: 'in 2. quaest. commen. oratas,'.
- <sup>134</sup> In margin: *Signa doctrinalia sunt tria, conceptus, voces, et scripta.*
- <sup>135</sup> In margin: *Signum doctrinale non est univocum ad conceptus voces, et scripta.*
- <sup>136</sup> In margin: *Dissolvitur 1. argumen.*
- <sup>137</sup> In margin: *Solvitur 2. argumen.*
- <sup>138</sup> In margin: *Solvitur 3. argumen.*
- <sup>139</sup> In margin: *Quis conceptus vocem necessario praecedat.*
- <sup>140</sup> In margin: *Demonstratur conceptum vocis illam praeire.*
- <sup>141</sup> In margin: *An cum quis vult per vocem significare rem, necessario formet conceptum rei in mente.*
- <sup>142</sup> In margin: *Affirmat D. Thomas et alii.*
- <sup>143</sup> In margin: *Approbatur sententia D. Tho. et cum superiori doctrina conciliatur.*
- <sup>144</sup> In margin: *Solvitur. 4. arg.*
- <sup>145</sup> In margin: *Solvitur ultimum arg.*
- <sup>146</sup> In margin: *Solvuntur argumenta pro sententia Boetii allata. Solvitur 1.*
- <sup>147</sup> Lyons omits: 'verba'.
- <sup>148</sup> In margin: *Solvitur 2.*
- <sup>149</sup> Cologne reads: 'si'.
- <sup>150</sup> Lyons page is misnumbered as "49".
- <sup>151</sup> In margin: *Primum pronuntiatum, scripta et res et vocem significant.*
- <sup>152</sup> In margin: *Probatur ratione.*
- <sup>153</sup> In margin: *Secundum pronuntiatum scripta diversis significationibus repraesentant voces et res. Probatur 1.*
- <sup>154</sup> In margin: *Probatur 2.*
- <sup>155</sup> In margin: *Probatur 3.*
- <sup>156</sup> In margin: *Obiect. 1.*
- <sup>157</sup> Lyons reads: 'hic'.
- <sup>158</sup> In margin: *Occurritur obiectioni.*
- <sup>159</sup> In margin: *Obiect. 2.*
- <sup>160</sup> In margin: *Occurritur obiectioni.*
- <sup>161</sup> In margin: *Tertium pronuntiatum. Scriptura significat rem per eandem significationem, qua vox.*
- <sup>162</sup> In margin: *Obiect. 1.*
- <sup>163</sup> Lyons omits: 'et'.
- <sup>164</sup> In margin: *Solutio obiectionis.*
- <sup>165</sup> In margin: *Obiect. 2.*
- <sup>166</sup> In margin: *Solutio obiectionis.*

- <sup>167</sup> In margin: *In duobus conveniunt in tribus differunt voces et scripta in ratione signi.*
- <sup>168</sup> In margin: *Idem est conceptus esse eosdem apud omnes atque esse signa naturalia; voces vero non easdem, atque esse signa ex instituto.*
- <sup>169</sup> Lyons reads: 'est'.
- <sup>170</sup> In margin: *Obiectio 1. Quod conceptus non sint iidem apud omnes.*
- <sup>171</sup> Cologne reads 'Quo'.
- <sup>172</sup> In margin: *Explicatur obiectio, et supponitur conceptum esse imaginem obiecti.*
- <sup>173</sup> In margin: *Dubitatur, an conceptus negationum, entium rationis, et figmentorum sint eorum imagines.*
- <sup>174</sup> Lyons reads: 'Minor est D. Augustini lib. 5. 1. 74'.
- <sup>175</sup> In margin: *Defenditur pars affirm. dubitationis.*
- <sup>176</sup> Lyons omits: 'possunt'.
- <sup>177</sup> In margin: *Stabilitur ratione.*
- <sup>178</sup> In margin: *Solvitur prior pars argumenti in oppositum facti.*
- <sup>179</sup> Lyons reads: 'oppositionem'.
- <sup>180</sup> Lyons reads: 'affectiva'.
- <sup>181</sup> In margin: *Solvitur 2. pars argumenti in oppositum allati.*
- <sup>182</sup> In margin: *Proponitur pars affirmativa, et roboratur argumentis.*
- <sup>183</sup> Lyons omits: 'art. 2. ad 4'.
- <sup>184</sup> In margin: *Advertitur quae sit relatio signi naturalis.*
- <sup>185</sup> In margin: *Advertitur 2. per quid compleatur ratio formalis signi.*
- <sup>186</sup> In margin: *Pars negat. asseritur, et explicatur.*
- <sup>187</sup> In margin of Cologne: *Solvitur 2. ratio in oppositum.*
- <sup>188</sup> In margin of both Cologne and Lyons: *Solvitur 2. ratio in oppositum.*
- <sup>189</sup> In margin: *Respondetur argumento initio articuli facto.*
- <sup>190</sup> In margin: *Suadetur voces naturaliter significare.*
- <sup>191</sup> Cologne reads: '7 Politicorum. cap. 2'.
- <sup>192</sup> Lyons reads: 'voces'.
- <sup>193</sup> In margin: *Voces bifariam sumi possunt.*
- <sup>194</sup> In margin: *Voces pro sono sumptae sunt naturalia signa, pro significatione ex instituto.*
- <sup>195</sup> In margin: *Obiectio.*
- <sup>196</sup> In margin: *Solutio.*
- <sup>197</sup> Lyons reads: 'voce'.
- <sup>198</sup> In margin: *Solvuntur argumenta initio proposita. Primi argumenti enodatio.*
- <sup>199</sup> In margin: *Secundi argumenti enodatio.*
- <sup>200</sup> Lyons reads: 'vestes quae'.
- <sup>201</sup> In margin: *Quo sensu dixit Divus Thom. brutorum voces explicare eorum conceptiones.*
- <sup>202</sup> The punctuation here is from Cologne. Lyons has a question mark (?).
- <sup>203</sup> In margin: *Nervi sensationibus administrantes: oriuntur ex cerebro.*
- <sup>204</sup> In margin: *Memorabilis nostrae aetatis historia.*
- <sup>205</sup> In margin: *Tertii argumenti enodatio.*
- <sup>206</sup> In margin: *Confirmationis solutio.*
- <sup>207</sup> In margin: *Prima solutio Quarti argumenti.*
- <sup>208</sup> In margin: *Secunda eiusdem solut.*
- <sup>209</sup> In margin: *Quid sit veritas.*
- <sup>210</sup> In margin: *Veritas dividitur in veritatem rerum, et cognitionis. Quid sit veritas cognitionis. Quid sit falsitas cognitionis.*
- <sup>211</sup> In margin: *Sententia asserens veritatem esse conformitatem rei cum se ipsa.*
- <sup>212</sup> In margin: *Probatur 2.*
- <sup>213</sup> In margin: *Eius prima confirmatio.*
- <sup>214</sup> In margin: *2. eius confirmatio.*
- <sup>215</sup> In margin: *Secunda opinio docet veritatem in ipsa formali cognitione esse.*
- <sup>216</sup> In margin: *Probatur autoritate.*
- <sup>217</sup> In margin: *Probatur ratione primo.*
- <sup>218</sup> In margin: *Secundo.*
- <sup>219</sup> In margin: *Tertio.*
- <sup>220</sup> In margin: *Responsio ad primum.*
- <sup>221</sup> In margin: *Responsio ad secundum.*
- <sup>222</sup> Cologne reads: 'audendi'.
- <sup>223</sup> In margin: *Ad primam confirmationem responsio.*
- <sup>224</sup> In margin: *Responsio ad secundam.*
- <sup>225</sup> In margin: *Relatio veritatis fundatur in mensura.*
- <sup>226</sup> In margin: *Obiectio.*
- <sup>227</sup> In margin: *Solutio.*

- 228 In margin: *Veritas in entitate cognitionis proprie consistit.*
- 229 In margin: *Triplex est operatio intellectus. Quid sit prima. Quid secunda. Quid tertia.*
- 230 In margin: *Unica conclusio in omni intellectus operatione veritatem constituens.*
- 231 Lyons omits: 'est'.
- 232 Lyons reads: 'confirmationem'.
- 233 In margin: *Obiectio.*
- 234 In margin: *Eius confirmatio.*
- 235 In margin: *Responsio.*
- 236 In margin: *Ad confirmationem responsio.*
- 237 Lyons omits: 'inveniri veritatem'.
- 238 In margin: *In secunda intellectus operatione veritas esse ostenditur.*
- 239 Lyons reads: 'pertinent'.
- 240 In margin: *In prima sua inest veritas.*
- 241 Lyons reads: '56'.
- 242 In margin: *Probatur primo ratione.*
- 243 In margin: *Probatur secundo.*
- 244 In margin: *Simplicis cognitionis veritas varie oppugnatur.*
- 245 Lyons reads: '56'.
- 246 Lyons reads '16'.
- 247 In margin: *Primum argumentum.*
- 248 In margin: *Secundum.*
- 249 In margin: *Secundum.*
- 250 In margin: *Quid sit veritas formalis.*
- 251 In margin: *Veritas est duplex: simplex et complexa.*
- 252 In margin: *Responsio ad primum argumentum.*
- 253 In margin: *Alia responsio ad idem argumentum.*
- 254 Lyons reads: 'explicatur'.
- 255 In margin: *Responsio ad secundum.*
- 256 In margin: *Responsio ad tertium.*
- 257 Lyons reads: 'constituere'.
- 258 In margin: *Argumentis probatur in simplici cognitione dari falsitatem.*
- 259 Lyons reads: 'alter'.
- 260 Lyons reads: 'quia'.
- 261 In margin: *Secundum.*
- 262 In margin: *Eiusdem confirmatio.*
- 263 Lyons omits: 'nihil'.
- 264 In margin: *Tertium.*
- 265 Lyons reads: 'argumentum'.
- 266 In margin: *Communis sententia asserit non dari falsitatem per se in simplici cognitione.*
- 267 In margin: *Probatio 1.*
- 268 In margin: *Probatio secunda.*
- 269 Lyons reads: 'Hae'.
- 270 In margin: *Quid sit falsitas.*
- 271 In margin: *Quid difformitas negativa.*
- 272 Lyons reads: 'repraesentant'.
- 273 In margin: *Quid sit difformitas positiva.*
- 274 In margin: *Aperitur difficultas quaestionis.*
- 275 In margin: *Duplex est conceptuum genus.*
- 276 Lyons omits 'et' and inserts 'non'.
- 277 In margin: *In cognitione omnino simplici potest dari falsitas negativa. De qua cognitione intelligitur locus Aristotelis.*
- 278 In margin: *Bifariam inesse valet falsitas in simplici cognitione.*
- 279 In margin: *Primo modo.*
- 280 In margin: *Secundo modo.*
- 281 In margin: *Secunda explicatio est verissima.*
- 282 In margin: *Obiectio.*
- 283 In margin: *Solutio.*
- 284 Lyons reads 'ex'.
- 285 In margin: *Primi argumenti dilutio.*
- 286 In margin: *Ad probationem responsio.*
- 287 In margin: *Responsio ad exempla in argumento allata.*
- 288 In margin: *Responsio ad secundum argumentum.*
- 289 In margin: *Ad eius probationem responsio.*
- 290 In margin: *Eius confirmatio diluitur.*
- 291 In margin: *Ad tertium responsio.*
- 292 In margin: *Ad primam probationem responsio.*
- 293 In margin: *Responsio ad secundam.*

## Notes to the English

- <sup>1</sup> On Aristotle's reference here, cf.: "Great difficulty has been found in discovering any passage of the *De Anima* to which this can refer." *The Student's Oxford Aristotle*, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 16a, note 1.
- <sup>2</sup> That is to say, the genus under which the other items are subsumed; cf. St. Thomas: "Subdit autem et *enunciatio*, quae est genus negationis et affirmationis, et *oratio* quae est genus enunciationis." *In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum expositio*, I, lect. 1, editio secunda, cura P. Fr. Raymundi Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1955), n. 8, p. 8.
- <sup>3</sup> Cf. Ancii Manlii Severini Boethii, *In librum Aristotelis de Interpretatione*, libri sex, editio secunda, seu majora commentaria, L. I, [Praefatio], in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64, cols. 393-98.
- <sup>4</sup> Cf. *In libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Priori Resolutione*, I, cap. 1, qu. 1, art. 1, in *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Iesu in universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae* (Coloniae Agrippinae: Apud Bernardum Gualtherium, 1607), vol. 2, col. 247.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>6</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias*, I, c. 1, lect. 1, ed. 2<sup>a</sup>, R. Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1955), p. 8, n. 10.
- <sup>7</sup> Cf. Boethius, *In librum Aristotelis de Interpretatione*, I, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64, cols. 400-401. Also see the *Conimbricenses*, *In libros de Priori Resolutione*, I, cap. 1, qu. 1, art. 2; vol. 2, col. 250.
- <sup>8</sup> Cf. Albertus Magnus, *In librum 1 Perihermenias*, Tract. I, c. 3, in *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 1 (Parisiis: Apud Ludovicum Vives, 1890), p. 378b.
- <sup>9</sup> For these "suppositions of Aristotle," see the Summary of the Chapter just given above.
- <sup>10</sup> Cf. Boethius, *In lib. de Interpretatione*, I, 1, in *PL* 64, cols. 405-407; and St. Thomas, *In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias*, I, c. 1, lect. 2; ed. Spiazzi, p. 10, n. 14. On the no longer extant commentary of Porphyry on the *Peri Hermeneias* as in the background of Boethius here, cf. John Magee, *Boethius on Signification and Mind* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1989), pp. 3-4. On Aristotle's text in *Peri Hermeneias*, I, 16a3-9, and its translation by Boethius, see *ibid.*, pp. 7-63.
- <sup>11</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 3.4.429a14.
- <sup>12</sup> Cf. *In librum 1 De Interpretatione*, Tr. 1, c. 1; p. 381a, and Tr. 1, c. 3; p. 385b.
- <sup>13</sup> This and other italicized paragraph headings are marginal notes in both the Lyons, 1607 and Cologne, 1607 editions.
- <sup>14</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, I, c. 1, ed. Fr. Balbino Martín, O.S.A., in *Obras de San Augustin*, tomo xv (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1957): 112.
- <sup>15</sup> Cf. Augustine, *De Dialectica*, Chapter 5, translated with Introduction and Notes by B. Darrell Jackson, from the Text newly edited by Jan Pinborg (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing, Company, 1975): p. 86.
- <sup>16</sup> For instrumental signs, see below, this Question, Article 2. For instrumental as divided from formal signs, see Question 2, Article 1.
- <sup>17</sup> Magister Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctis*, IV, d. 1, cap. 2, editio tertia in *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum V* (Grottaferrata (Romae): Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1981), p. 232.
- <sup>18</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, qu. 56, art. 3, in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M., Tomus V (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. De Propaganda Fide, 1889), p. 67.



- <sup>19</sup> After the *Conimbricenses*, we can find this quasi-rejection of St. Augustine's definition just about everywhere among Jesuits in the seventeenth century. Cf. e.g.: Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, *Disputationes de universa philosophia, Logica*, disp. VIII, sec. 1, n. 3 (Lugduni: L. Prost et H. Roville, 1624), p. 106; Roderigo de Arriaga, *Cursus philosophicus, Logica*, VI, disp. 13, sec. 1, n. 1 (Parisiis: Apud Jacobum Quenel, 1637) p. 158; Francisco de Oviedo, *Integer cursus philosophicus, Logica*, Controversia VIII, punctum 1 (Lugduni: P. Prost, 1640), vol. 1, p. 137; and Augustinus Laurentius, *De triplici ente cursus philosophicus in tres tomos divisus*, Tomus I: *Logica*, Tractatus III, disp. 1, sec. 1, n. 1 (Leodici Eburonum: Apud Guilielmum Henricum Streeck, 1688), p. 269.
- <sup>20</sup> See St. Bonaventure, *Liber IV. Sententiarum*, Distinctio I, Pars I, Articulus unicus, Quaestio II, ad 3, in *Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae, Opera theologica selecta*, iussu et auctoritate R.mi P. Pacifici M. Perantoni edita, Editio minor, Tomus IV (Ad Claras Aquas, Florentiae: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1949), p. 8.
- <sup>21</sup> Cf. e.g. Pedro da Fonseca, S.J., *Instituições dialécticas: Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo*, I, c. 8; introdução, estabelecimento do texto, tradução e notas por Joaquim Ferreira Gomes (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1964), vol. 1, p. 34.
- <sup>22</sup> Cf. Ferrara, *In Summam Contra Gentiles* III, c. 73, § xvi, in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, Tomus xiii (Romae: Typis Riccardi Garroni, 1918), pp. 467-8.
- <sup>23</sup> Augustine, *De Dialectica*, Chapter 7; tr. Jackson, p. 100.
- <sup>24</sup> Cf. Joannis Duns Scoti, *Quaestiones in Lib. IV Sententiarum*, d. 2, qu. 2, ad 1 (Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639), vol. 8, p. 63.
- <sup>25</sup> John Poinset (a.k.a. John of St. Thomas [1589-1644]) has registered his opposition to the *Conimbricenses* in this; cf. Joannis a Sancto Thomae, O.P., *Ars Logica*, II, q. 21, a. 2, in *Cursus philosophicus thomisticus*, vol. 1, ed. B. Reiser (Taurini: Marietti, 1930), p. 656b; and *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinset*, interpretive arrangement by John N. Deely in consultation with Ralph Austin Powell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 136.
- <sup>26</sup> *Sententiae in IV libris distinctis*, IV, d. 1, cap. 2; editio tertia (Grottaferrata, 1981), p. 232.
- <sup>27</sup> Cf. *De Civitate Dei* X, c. 5, ed. José Moran, in *Obras de San Augustin*, vol. 16 (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1964), p. 522.
- <sup>28</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, XII, c. 8, n. 10, in *Obras ...*, vol. 15, p. 1200.
- <sup>29</sup> See possibly: St. Jerome, *Commentariorum in Evangelium Matthaei Libri IV*, cap. 28, vv. 19-20, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 26, col. 218.
- <sup>30</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* III, qu. 60, art. 1, Sed contra, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 12 (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. De Propaganda Fide, 1906), p. 4.
- <sup>31</sup> Cf. *Opera praeclarissima beati Alphonsi Thostati episcopi Abulensis summi et incomparabilis theologi hebraici grecique sermonis instructissimi: multis retro annis a doctis omnibus sacrarum litterarum pariter et iuris pontificii professoribus desideratissime expectata: ac iam demum cura et emendatione non mediocri: apostillis decoramentisque marginalibus annotata: et arte impressionis mirifica dextris syderibus elaborata: in lucem edita* (Venetiis, 1507-1530) *Comment. in Genesim*, Cap. IX, fol. 60r-62v.
- <sup>32</sup> Cf. C. Plinii Secundi, *Naturalis Historiae libri XXXVII*, L. XVII, 80 (35), ex editione Gabrielis Brotier (Londini: Curante et Imprime A.J. Valpy, 1826), vol. 7, pp. 2954-2955.

- <sup>33</sup> See L. Annaeus Seneca, *Naturalium Quaestionum libros*, I, q. 6, ed. H.M. Hine (Stuttgartiae et Lipsiae: In Aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1996), pp. 29-31.
- <sup>34</sup> Cf. Iulii Caesaris Scaligeri, *Exotericarum exercitationum de subtilitate ad Hieronymum Cardanum*, Exercitatio 80, n. 12 (Lugduni: Sumptibus Viduae Antonii de Harsy, 1615), pp. 246-7.
- <sup>35</sup> Cf. Petrus de Bruxellis, O.P., *Acutissimae quaestiones et quidem peritiles in singulos Aristotelis logicales libros*, Paris, 1509 and 1514. I have not been able to see this work.
- <sup>36</sup> Cf. *Summa Alexandri*, Quarta pars, Quaestio I, membrum primum, ad 1 (Papie: per egre. Joannem antonium de birretis et Franciscum gyrardengum, 1489), fol. aaaa 2 r.
- <sup>37</sup> This is probably Martin de Ledesma, O.P., *Commentaria in IV Sententiarum*, 2 vols., Coimbra, 1555-60; listed by Gonzalo Diaz Diaz, *Hombres y documentos de la filosofía española*, vol. 4 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1991), p. 624. I have not been able to see this work.
- <sup>38</sup> For some other Jesuits speaking of moral perseverance in the century after the *Conimbricenses*, cf. e.g.: P. Hurtado de Mendoza, *Logica*, d. 8, s. 2, nn. 15-18 (p. 108); R. de Arriaga, *Logica*, VI, disp. 13, sec. 1, subsectio 4, n. 21 (p. 161); and Augustinus Laurentius, *Logica*, Tr. III, disp. 2, sec. 3; vol. 1, p. 295. On the notion of moral perseverance, see Stephan Meier-Oeser, *Die Spur des Zeichens: Das Zeichen und seine Funktion in der Philosophie des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 197-205. On the comparison of words with money, which was common among the Scholastics and also classical modern philosophers such as Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and Leibniz, cf. Marcelo Dascal, "Language and Money: A Simile And Its Meaning in 17th Century Philosophy of Language," *Studia Leibnitiana*, VIII, 2 (1976), pp. 187-218.
- <sup>39</sup> On transcendental vs. categorial relations, cf. the *Conimbricenses*, in *Commentarii in universam dialecticam, in libros Categoriarum Aristotelis*, c. 7, q. 1, art. 2; ed. Cologne, 1607, vol. 1, col. 459. Also see the pages indexed by A. Krempel, *La Doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas: exposé historique et systématique* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, J.Vrin, 1952), p. 709, and especially, "Appendice, L'Intrusion de la relation transcendental dans l'école thomiste," *ibid.*, pp. 645-70.
- <sup>40</sup> On the question of whether a sign can be a sign of itself, cf. also F. de Oviedo, *Logica*, Controv. 8, punct. 1 (p. 137).
- <sup>41</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *De Magistro*, c. 3, nn. 5-6, in *Obras de San Augustino*, Tomo III, ed. P. M. Martinez, O.S.A. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1951): 690-4.
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 4, n. 10; pp. 700-702.
- <sup>43</sup> On this, see S. Meier-Oeser, *Die Spur des Zeichens: ....*, pp. 178-80.
- <sup>44</sup> The only reference in the works of St. Anselm of Canterbury to *Romans* chapter 4 has nothing to do with signs as such; cf. S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi, *Oratio ad sanctam crucem*, in *Opera omnia*, III, ed. F.S. Schmitt, O.S.B. (Edinburgi: Apud Thomam Nelson et Filios, 1946), p. 11, l. 20.
- <sup>45</sup> Cf. Sancti Ambrosii, *De Abraham Libri Duo*, L. 1, c. 4, n. 29, in *Patrologia Latina*, ed. J-P. Migne, vol. 14, col. 434.
- <sup>46</sup> Cf. Pauli Soncinatis, O.P., *Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissimae*, XII, qu. 59 (Venice, 1588; reprint Frankfurt: Minerva, 1967), pp. 389-91.
- <sup>47</sup> Aristotle's word (*De Interpretatione* 1.16a5) is σύμβολα, which is literally 'symbols.' William of Moerbeke, O.P. (d. 1286) translated it as 'notae,' which is the word used here by the *Conimbricenses*. Joannes Argyropoulos (d. 1486), the translator of the text used



- by the *Conimbricenses* rendered the one word of Aristotle with two words in Latin — ‘*signa*’ and ‘*notae*.’ Earlier, St. Thomas, in at least three places, told us that ‘*notae*’ is equivalent to ‘*signa*,’ which is ‘signs;’ cf. *In Peri Hermeneias*, I, c. 1, lect. 2, ed. Spiazzi, pp. 10-11, nn. 14 and 19.
- <sup>48</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, I, c. 1, in *Obras ...*, vol. 15, p. 112.
- <sup>49</sup> For this, see: Pedro da Fonseca, *Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo*, I, c. 8; ed. J. Ferreira Gomes, vol. 1, pp. 34-6. In so citing Fonseca by name here and elsewhere, Couto highlights the distinction between himself and his teacher.
- <sup>50</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 7, a. 2, ad 2; ed. R.P. Mandonnet, O.P. (Parisii: P. Lethiellieux, 1929), vol. 1, p. 185.
- <sup>51</sup> Ancii Manlii Severini Boetii, *Commentaria In Porphyrium, III, De specie*, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64, col. 111.
- <sup>52</sup> Cf. *Scriptum ...*; ed. Mandonnet, vol. 1, p. 1080. At this place (note 1) Mandonnet has rightly questioned the ascription of the whole doctrine here to Boethius.
- <sup>53</sup> Magister Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctis*, I, d. 27, cap. 3, n. 5, editio tertia in *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum IV* (Grottaferrata (Romae): Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1971), p. 207.
- <sup>54</sup> See St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VII, 1, n. 2, in *Obras de San Augustin*, Tomo V, ed. L. Arias, O.S.A. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1956), 460-2.
- <sup>55</sup> Cf. Peter the Lombard, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctis*, I, d. 27, cap. 4, n. 3 (Grottaferrata, 1971), p. 64. For Hilary, see *De Trinitate* III, n. 23, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 10, col. 92.
- <sup>56</sup> Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *De hominis officio*, c. 16, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 44, col. 183.
- <sup>57</sup> Cf. St. Athanasius, Ἐλεγχος τῆς ὑποκρίσεως τῶν περὶ Μελέτιον, καὶ Εὐσέβιον τὸν Σαμοσατέα κατὰ τὸν Ὁμοουσίον. *Refutatio hypocrisis Meletii et Eusebii Samosatensis, adversus Consubstantialitatem*, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 28, cols. 85-90. Migne regards the ascription of this work to Athanasius as doubtful.
- <sup>58</sup> See note 50, above.
- <sup>59</sup> For the distinction between real and rational relations, and various kinds of the latter, in Jesuit philosophy at the time of the *Conimbricenses*, cf. Francisco Suárez, S.J. (1548-1617), *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 54, sect. 6; tr. John P. Doyle, in *Francisco Suárez on Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis) Metaphysical Disputation LIV* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), pp. 116-22.
- <sup>60</sup> In another context, the inability of the senses to grasp a negation is adduced by Suárez as an argument for the fact that the natural law, which commands omissions (i.e., ‘Thou shalt not’s’), is something peculiarly human; cf. Francisco Suárez, S.J., *De legibus seu de Deo legislatore*, II, c. 17, n. 6, in *Opera omnia* (Paris: L. Vives, 1856-1866 [the *De Legibus* originally appeared at Coimbra in 1612]), vol. 5, p. 160. On the reality, intelligibility, and moral implications of omissions for 17th-century Jesuit thinkers, see Tilman Ramelow, *Gott, Freiheit, Weltenwahl: Der Ursprung des Begriffes der besten aller möglichen Welten in der Metaphysik der Willensfreiheit zwischen Antonio Perez, S.J. (1599-1649) und G.W. Leibniz (1646-1716)* (Leiden, New York, Köln: E.J. Brill, 1997): 168-98.
- <sup>61</sup> On the three classes of relation, cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b26-31.
- <sup>62</sup> Cf. Domingo de Soto, O.P., *Summulae* I, cap. 2, lect. 1, aeditio secunda (Salmanticae: Excudebat Andreas a

- Portonariis, 1554; reprinted, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1980), p. 2.
- <sup>63</sup> Bartolomaeus Torres, *Commentaria in XVII Quaestiones Primae Partis S. Thomae de Aquino: De ineffabili Trinitatis mysterio*, Qu. 27, art. 1, disp. 2 (Venetiis: In Officina Iuntarum, 1588), fol. 13v.
- <sup>64</sup> The distinction here between first and second act is basically between the power to act and the acting of that power.
- <sup>65</sup> *Summa Alexandri*, IV, q. 1, mem. 1, ad 2; fol. aaaa 2 r.
- <sup>66</sup> *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; ed. R.P. M.F. Moos (Paris: Lethielleux, 1947) IV, 13.
- <sup>67</sup> Cf. *In Lib. IV Sententiarum*, d. 2, qu. 2; ed. 1639, vol. 8, p. 59.
- <sup>68</sup> Cf. Clarissimi Theologi Richardi de Mediavilla, O.M., *Super Quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi quaestiones subtilissimae*, IV, d. 1, art. 1, qu. 3, ad 4, ed. L. Silvestrio a Sancto Angelo in Vado (Brixiae: Apud Vincentium Sabbium, 1591; reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), vol. 4, p. 7.
- <sup>69</sup> See St. Basil, *Commentarius in Isaiam Prophetam*, cap. 7, n. 198, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 30, col. 459.
- <sup>70</sup> Cf. Virgil, *Georgics* 1, 453, ed. Richard F. Thomas, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988), p. 50.
- <sup>71</sup> On this division, see Stephan Meier-Oeser, *Die Spur des Zeichens: ...*, pp. 180-81. For the division in the Jesuit tradition after the *Conimbricenses*, cf. A. Rubio, *Logica mexicana*, Pars II, cap. 1 (Lugduni: Sumptibus J. Pillehotte, 1620), p. 465.
- <sup>72</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber*, c. 16, nn. 57-61, in *Obras ...*, vol. 15, pp. 556-64.
- <sup>73</sup> Cf. Sancti Augustini, *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 74, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 40, col. 86.
- <sup>74</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana*, I, c. 1, n. 2, in *Obras ...*, vol. 15, p. 112.
- <sup>75</sup> Cf. *De doctrina Christiana* II, 2-3; in *Obras ...*, vol. 15, pp. 112-115.
- <sup>76</sup> On this, see Meier-Oeser, *Die Spur des Zeichens ...*, pp. 24-30.
- <sup>77</sup> Pedro da Fonseca, *Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo*, I, c. 8; ed. J. Ferreira Gomes, vol. 1, pp. 34-6.
- <sup>78</sup> Alberti Magni, O.P., *Ethica* IV, Tr. 2, cap. 3, in *Opera omnia*, cura ac labore Augusti Borgnet, vol. 7 (Parisiis: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1891), p. 318.
- <sup>79</sup> Cf. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, *Opusculum VIII: Responsio ad Fr. Joannem Vercellensem Generalem Mag. Ordinis Praedicatorum. De articulis centum et octo sumptis ex opere Petri de Tarantasia*, in *Opera omnia* (Parmae: Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1865), vol. 16, p. 152.
- <sup>80</sup> Cf. *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, p. 581.
- <sup>81</sup> Cf. *Super epistolam S. Pauli Apostoli ad Hebraeos Expositio*, Cap. 1, Lect. 2, in *S. Thomae Aquinatis, In omnes S. Pauli Apostoli epistolas commentaria*, ed. septima Taurinensis (Taurini: Marietti, 1929): vol. 2, p. 294.
- <sup>82</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, Qu. 4, art. 1, ad 7; ed. P. Fr. Raymundi Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1953), p. 78.
- <sup>83</sup> Cf. *In Lib. IV Sententiarum*, III, d. 14, qu. 3; ed. 1639, vol. 7, p. 305?
- <sup>84</sup> Cf. D. Egidii Ro. *Columna ...*, *Primus Sententiarum ...*, d. 27, qu. 2, arts. 2 and 4 (Venetiis: Impressus sumptibus et expensis heredum quondam Domini Octaviani Scoti, 1521) fols. 146r-147v.
- <sup>85</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones ...*, pp. 389-91.
- <sup>86</sup> Cf. *Primus Sententiarum*, I, d. 3, qu. 2, art. 3; ed. Venetiis, 1521, fol. 27r-v.
- <sup>87</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* III, qu. 60, art. 2, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 12, pp. 4-5.
- <sup>88</sup> See *Summa Theologiae* I, qu. 10, art. 2; in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 96. To reach the *Conimbricenses'* interpretation here some inference is needed.
- <sup>89</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* III, qu. 60, art. 1; in *Omnia opera*, vol. 12, p. 4.

- <sup>90</sup> On demonstrations from signs, cf. Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 2.27.70a6-8 and *De Sophisticis Elenchis* 167b8.
- <sup>91</sup> Cf. *De Veritate*, Qu. 9, Art. 4, ad 5; ed. Spiazzi, p. 186.
- <sup>92</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, qu. 4, art. 3, esp. ad 4, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 54.
- <sup>93</sup> cf. Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 9, nn. 6-7, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 3, col. 913.
- <sup>94</sup> *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, c. 29, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, pp. 89-90; for Ferrara, cf. *ibid.* 90-91.
- <sup>95</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* III, qu. 12, art. 3, ad 2; in *Opera omnia*, vol. 11, p. 169.
- <sup>96</sup> Cf. Sancti Hilarii, *Liber de Synodis*, n. 58, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 10, col. 520.
- <sup>97</sup> While an idea is not a natural sign, it is not precluded from being a natural image.
- <sup>98</sup> Cf. *Commentaria Cardinalis Caietani, In Summam Theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 16; in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 198.
- <sup>99</sup> Cf. *In Lib. IV Sententiarum*, d. 1, qu. 5, ad 3; ed. 1639, vol. 8, p. 107.
- <sup>100</sup> Cf. *De Magistro*, c. 10, n. 33, in *Obras*, vol. 3, p. 738.
- <sup>101</sup> For extrinsic denomination in Jesuit philosophy at the time of the *Conimbricenses*, cf. my article: "Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Work of Francis Suarez, S.J.," *Vivarium*, XXII, 2 (1984), pp. 121-160.
- <sup>102</sup> Cf. *Super primam Epistolam S. Pauli Apostoli ad Corinthios expositio*, c. 14, lect. 2, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In omnes S. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas commentaria*, editio septima Taurinensis (Taurini: Marietti, 1929), vol. 2, p. 375.
- <sup>103</sup> Coming close to this is *Epistle 36 to Pope Damasus*, nn. 2-3; cf. *Cartas de San Jerónimo*, edición bilingüe, introducción, versión y notas por Daniel Ruiz Bueno (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 260-61. For the same doctrine as that of the *Conimbricenses*, cf. Augustinus Laurentius, S.J., *Logica*, Tr. III, disp. 2, n. 10; vol. 1, p. 290.
- <sup>104</sup> Here, and elsewhere in what follows, the first person singular most likely indicates Couto. But it is possible that it is Fonseca from the original lectures.
- <sup>105</sup> Cf. *Quodlibetum* V, a. 2, ad 1, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, ed. R. Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1956), p. 104.
- <sup>106</sup> *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, c. 55, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, p. 157; for Ferrara, cf. *ibid.*, p. 158.
- <sup>107</sup> *Summa Contra Gentiles* IV, c. 11, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 15, p. 34; cf. Ferrara, *ibid.*, § vii, n. 3, and § ix, p. 38.
- <sup>108</sup> *Summa Contra Gentiles* IV, c. 13, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 15, pp. 48-9; cf. Ferrara, *ibid.*, esp. § iii, p. 51.
- <sup>109</sup> Also see Ferrara, *In Summam Contra Gentiles* I, c. 53, § i, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, p. 151.
- <sup>110</sup> *Commentaria Cardinalis Caietani, In Summam Theologiae* I, q. 27, a. 1, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, pp. 306-309.
- <sup>111</sup> Cf. *Commentaria in XVII Quaestiones ...*, Qu. 27, art. 1, disp. 5; ed. Venetiis, 1588, fol. 21v.
- <sup>112</sup> Torres (*ibid.*) has cited Cajetan (*In Summam Theologiae* I, q. 27, art. 1, dub. 4), Capreolus (*Defensiones* I, d. 27, q. 2, art. 3, ad 3), and Ferrara (*In Contra Gentiles* I, c. 53 and IV, c. 11) as having this opinion.
- <sup>113</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, qu. 56, art. 3, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 5, p. 67.
- <sup>114</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae*, I, qu. 58, art. 3, ad 1, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 5, p. 83b.
- <sup>115</sup> *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, qu. 20, art. 4, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 22, n. 2 (Romae: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1972): p. 581b.
- <sup>116</sup> Cf. *Commentaria Cardinalis Caietani, In Summam Theologiae* I, 56, 3, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 5, p. 68.

- <sup>117</sup> Cf. *In Lib. II Sententiarum*, d. 13, qu. un.; ed. 1639, vol. 6, p. 710. Actually, without terming it so, Scotus here seems to regard the species in the mirror as a formal sign. For he says that by a reflected ray of light 'a thing is seen in itself and not by some reflecting species which is impressed on the mirror' ('... *per illum radium videtur res in se, non autem aliqua species impressa speculo reflectente.*') Cf. also Duns Scotus, *In Lib. IV Sententiarum*, d. 10, qu. 9; ed. 1639, vol. 8, p. 576: '... in the mirror there is not seen the image of a body which is multiplied with respect to the mirror, but rather the body itself whose image it is' ('... *non videtur in speculo imago ipsa corporis multiplicata usque ad speculum, sed ipsum corpus, cuius est imago.*')
- <sup>118</sup> Cf. *Lectioinum antiquarum libri 30*, Venetii, 1516. I have not been able to see this work.
- <sup>119</sup> On the intermediate concept, cf.: "For there are two kinds of concept: the one intermediate and the other ultimate; the former is the concept of the word which is spoken, while the latter is the concept of the thing which is signified." Qu. 3, art. 3. Also cf. "... when we hear words, or read writings which are significative by institution, two concepts are generated in us. One is of the word or the writing, which can be generated even in someone who is ignorant of the language. The other is of the thing signified, which concept is generated only in him who knows the meaning of the word. ... The first concept is usually called non-ultimate, while the second is called ultimate. But more aptly the first is called intermediate and the second ultimate." ("... *cum audimus voces, aut legimus scripta significativa ex instituto, duo semper in nobis conceptus gignuntur, alter ipsius vocis, aut scripturae, qui in homine etiam ignaro idiomatis gigni potest, alter rei significatae, qui non gignitur, nisi in eo, qui*
- tenet significationem vocabuli. ... Ac prior ille conceptus dici solet non ultimus, posterior ultimus. Aptius tamen ille diceretur Medius, hic Ultimus.*" Petrus Fonseca, S.J., *Institutionum dialecticarum, libri octo*, I, c. 11; ed. Ferreira Gomes, I, p. 40; Also see D. Soto, O.P., *Summulae*, I, c. 3; Salamanca, 1554, pp. 5r. and 6v.
- <sup>120</sup> For this cf. Pedro da Fonseca, *Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo*, I, c. 11, ed. Ferreira Gomes, vol. 1, pp. 40-42. This appears to be evidence that Fonseca was the original author of the present work.
- <sup>121</sup> Cf., a little later, John of St. Thomas, O.P. (1589-1640), *Logica* II, q. 22, a. 1, in *Cursus philosophicus thomisticus*, ed. B. Reiser, vol. 1, p. 700b7-10; see also: *Tractatus de signis*, ed. John Deely, p. 235, ll. 45-47.
- <sup>122</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, qu. 56, art. 3, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 5, p. 67.
- <sup>123</sup> Cf. *Commentarii Collegiis Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*, Prima pars, L. I, c. 1, q. 2, art. 1, arg. 5; editio tertia (Lugduni: Sumptibus Horatii Cardon, 1602), p. 87.
- <sup>124</sup> See possibly: *De Trinitate* VII, c. 6, n. 12, ed. Arias, pp. 492-4.
- <sup>125</sup> Cf. St. Anselm, *Monologium*, c. 31, in *Obras completas de San Anselmo*, traducidas por primera vez al castellano. Texto Latino de la edición crítica de P. Schmidt, O.S.B. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1952), vol. 1, p. 268.
- <sup>126</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, qu. 12, art. 2; in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, pp. 116-7.
- <sup>127</sup> There is no Article 4 in this Question; and I have not been able to find the *Conimbricenses* explicitly treating this point elsewhere.
- <sup>128</sup> Cf. *De Memoria et reminiscencia* 1.450a26-451a18.
- <sup>129</sup> Cf. *De Trinitate*, VIII, c. 6, n. 9, in *Obras ...*, Tomo V, p. 520.

- <sup>130</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, XIV, c. 17, n. 23, pp. 818-20.
- <sup>131</sup> *Summa Theologiae* I, qu. 12, art. 9, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 132.
- <sup>132</sup> St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, c. 53, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, pp. 150-151; for Ferrara, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 151-4.
- <sup>133</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3; editio nova cura R.P. Mandonnet, O.P., tomus I (Parisii: P. Lethielleux, 1929), p. 185. For Boethius, cf. *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64, col. 111.
- <sup>134</sup> Cf. *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 373.
- <sup>135</sup> Cf. *De Memoria et reminiscencia* 1.450b20-451a4.
- <sup>136</sup> Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles* IV, c. 11, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 15, p. 34.
- <sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>138</sup> For the four principal rules of division according to Coimbra logicians, see Fonseca, *Institutiones*, IV, cc. 10-13, ed. Ferreira Gomes, vol. 1, pp. 272-82. For the point here, cf.: "The fourth rule is that the dividing members be opposed, if not in reality then certainly in concept." (*Quartum praeceptum est, ut membra dividenda si non re, certe ratione sint opposita.*), *ibid.* c. 13, p. 278.
- <sup>139</sup> The Latin literally translates as 'denotes.'
- <sup>140</sup> On this question, see my article, "The 'Conimbricenses' on the Semiotic Character of Mirror Images," *The Modern Schoolman*, 76, n.1 (November, 1998), pp. 17-31.
- <sup>141</sup> For this see: *Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu, In tres libros De Anima, Aristotelis Stagiritae*, II, cap. 7, qu. 8, art. 1, Editio tertia (Lugduni: Apud Horatium Cardon, 1604) p. 223. On this commentary of the *Conimbricenses*, cf. Eckhard Kessler, "The Intellectual Soul," in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. C. Schmitt and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 512-14.
- <sup>142</sup> For the same doctrine, see Augustinus Laurentius, *Logica*, Tractatus III, disp. 2, sect. 1, n. 19; vol. 1, p. 290.
- <sup>143</sup> On species in air, cf. Katherine H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250-1345* (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1988), esp. pp. 4-11, 30, 68, 174-5, 190-91, 258-9, 349-50. Also see André Hayen, S.J., *L'Intentionnel dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1942), pp. 122-41.
- <sup>144</sup> Cf. St. Basil, *Commentarius in Isaiam Prophetam*, cap. 7, n. 198, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 30, col. 459.
- <sup>145</sup> Cf. *Summa Alexandri*, IV, q. 1, mem. 1, ad 1; fol. aaaa 2 r.
- <sup>146</sup> St. Bonaventure, *Liber IV. Sententiarum*, Dist. I, Pars I, Art. unicus, Qu. II, ad 3, and ad 5, in *Opera theologica selecta*, vol. 4, pp. 8-9
- <sup>147</sup> Cf. e.g. D. Soto, *Summulae* (1554), fol. 3va, as cited by Stephan Meier-Oeser, *Die Spur des Zeichens: ...*, p. 124, n. 41. One later author has explained this point as follows: "Frequently, perhaps, you will hear the philosophical axiom which is that *the words in a definition must be taken 'aptitudinally.*' I think that the sense of this precept is that a definition expresses the nature or the natural exigencies, inclinations, or aptitudes of a thing, prescinding from whether it actually exists or not. For since the task of a definition is to declare the essences of things, and the essences of created or creatable things prescind as such from existence, it follows that a definition must present those characteristics which necessarily belong to a thing for all time or duration, and in every condition of either existence or possibility." (*Non raro audies forte axioma philosophicum respiciens definitionem, quod nimirum verba in definitione sumenda sunt aptitudinaliter. Cujus proloquii hunc esse sensum arbitror,*



*definitionem exprimere naturam ac naturales rei exigentias et inclinationes vel aptitudines, praescindendo ab hoc, quod actu illae existant, necne. Cum enim definitionis officium sit rerum essentias declarare, essentiae autem rerum creatarum vel creabilium praescindant, quantum est de se, ab existentia, reliquum est definitionem eas prae se ferre debere notas, quae rei necessario competunt pro omni tempore ac duratione, et in omni statu, sive existentiae sive possibilitatis.)* Joannes Josephus Urráburu, S.J., *Institutiones philosophicae*, vol. I, *Logica* (Vallisoleti: Typis Viduae ac Filiorum a Cuesta, 1890), pp. 214-215.

<sup>148</sup> See note 147, immediately above.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. *Summulae* I, c. 2, lect. 1, n. 6; ed. Salamanticae, 1554, fol. 4. On editions of Soto's *Summulae*, see Angel d'Ors, "Las 'Summulae' de Domingo de Soto: los límites de la regla 'tollendo ponens,'" *Anuario Filosófico, Universidad de Navarra*, XVI (1983), pp. 209-217; and E.J. Ashworth, "Changes in Logic Text-books from 1500 to 1650: The New Aristotelianism," in *Aristotelismus und Renaissance: In memoriam Charles B. Schmitt*, herausgegeben von E. Kessler, C.H. Lohr, und W. Sparr (Wiesbaden: In Kommission bei Otto Harrassowitz, 1988), pp. 75-87, esp. 77.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. *Commentaria Cardinalis Caietani, In Summam Theologiae* I, q. 34, a. 1, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 367.

<sup>151</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, qu. 56, art. 3, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 5, p. 67.

<sup>152</sup> Cf. *Super Epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos*, c. 1, lect. 6, in S. Thomae Aquinatis *in omnes S. Pauli Epistolas commentaria*, editio septima Taurinensis (Taurini: Marietti, 1929), vol. 1, p. 22.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. S. Bonaventurae, *In libros Sententiarum*, II, d. 2, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2; in *Opera theologica selecta ...*, vol. 2, p. 114.

<sup>154</sup> F. Joannis de Bassolis, O.M., *In quatuor Sententiarum libros*, II, d. 3, qu. 3, art.

2 (Parisiis: F. Regnault et J. Frellon, 1516-17), vol. 2, fol. 37r.

<sup>155</sup> Richardi de Mediavilla, *In IV Sent. P. Lombardi quaestiones*, II, d. 4, art. 1, qu. 1; ed. 1591, vol. 2, p. 67.

<sup>156</sup> For this see Augustini Niphi, *Dilucidarium Metaphysicarum disputationum*, L. XII, disp. 10 (Venetiis, Apud Hieronymum Scotum, 1559; reprinted: Frankfurt: Minerva, 1967), pp. 330-33.

<sup>157</sup> That is, a lack of distinction between a sign and what it signifies.

<sup>158</sup> See note 123, above.

<sup>159</sup> Cf. Joannis Duns Scoti, *In Primum librum Perihermenias Quaestiones*, Qu. 2, n. 3, in *Opera omnia*, collecta, recognita, notis, scholiis et commentariis illustrata, a PP. Hibernis, Collegii Romani S. Isidori Professoribus (Lugduni: Sumptibus Laurentii Durand, 1639), vol. 1, pp. 187-8. On this, cf. S. Meier-Oeser, *Die Spur des Zeichens: ...*, pp. 83-4.

<sup>160</sup> See below, Question IV, Article 1, A Section of the Article.

<sup>161</sup> Cf. *De Interpretatione*, c. 1, 16a 4-5. For some other seventeenth-century Jesuits addressing the issues here, cf. Antonio Rubio, *Logica mexicana*, II, cap. 1 (pp. 465-8), and F. de Oviedo, *Logica*, Controv. 8, punct. 3 (p. 141).

<sup>162</sup> Cf. *Ordinatio* I, d. 27, qu. 3, in Joannis Duns Scoti, O.F.M. *Opera omnia*, studio et cura Commissionis Scotisticae, praeside P. Carolo Balic, tomus vi (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1963), p. 88, n. 61; and especially: *ibid.*, p. 97, n. 83.

<sup>163</sup> Cf. *In Primum librum Perihermenias quaestiones*, Qu. 1; ed. 1639, vol. 1, p. 186.

<sup>164</sup> Cf. Gabrielis Biel, *Collectorium circa quatuor libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 22, qu. un., art. 3, ed. W. Werbeck and U. Hofmann (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1973), vol. 1, pp. 498-501.

<sup>165</sup> Cf. *De Interpretatione* 3.16b21.

- <sup>166</sup> Cf. *De Trinitate*, V, c. 3, n. 4, in *Obras...*, V, p. 396.
- <sup>167</sup> St. John Chrysostom, *Homilia II in Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, cap. 1, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 63, col. 19.
- <sup>168</sup> *De hominis opificio*, c. 13, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 44, col. 167.
- <sup>169</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* II<sup>o</sup>II<sup>ae</sup>, qu. 110, art. 3, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 9 (Romae, 1897), p. 425.
- <sup>170</sup> See Boethius, *In librum Aristotelis De Interpretatione, libri sex*, editio secunda, seu majora commentaria, lib. I, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64, cols. 402 and 405.
- <sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, cols. 405-408.
- <sup>172</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *De Ordine* II, c. 12, n. 35, ed. P.V. Capanaga, O.R.S.A., in *Obras de San Augustin*, Tomo I (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1957), p. 774.
- <sup>173</sup> Cf. *Primus Sententiarum*, d. 2, qu. 3, art. 1; ed. Venetiis, 1521, fol. 17v. On the issue of such concepts among Jesuits in the century after the *Conimbricenses*, cf. my article, "Another God, Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: A Seventeenth-Century Debate about Impossible Objects," *The Review of Metaphysics*, XLVIII (1995), pp. 771-808.
- <sup>174</sup> Virgil, *Aeneid* 3, 551, in *The Aeneid of Virgil*, Books 1-6, ed. R.D. Williams (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 68.
- <sup>175</sup> St. Augustine, *De Magistro*, c. 2, n. 3, in *Obras ...*, vol. 3, p. 686.
- <sup>176</sup> Cf. *Summa Alexandri*, II Pars, Qu. 27, mem. 6, ad 2; fol. hh 2 v. Also cf. Alexandri de Hales, O.M., *Summa Theologica*, Inq. II, Tract. III, Sect. II, Quaest. I, Tit. III, Cap. VI, iussu et auctoritate Rmi. P. Bonaventurae Marrani, Tomus II: Prima Pars Secundi Libri (Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1928), p. 198.
- <sup>177</sup> Cf. *De Trinitate*, XV, c. 10, n. 19, in *Obras ...*, vol. 5, p. 868.
- <sup>178</sup> For this see *De Interpretatione* 9.18a33-b12. We should remark that for the *Conimbricenses*, and throughout the Middle Ages, the *De Interpretatione* was divided into two books, of which the first comprised chapters 1 to 9 of the present day division and the second was made up of the present day chapters 10 to 14.
- <sup>179</sup> Cf. *De Sensu et sensili* 1.437a12-17.
- <sup>180</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 4.7.1012a23-4; also see Petri Fonsecae, S.J., *Commentariorum in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*, L. IV, Cap. VII (Coloniae: Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri, 1615; reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964), Tomus I, col. 920.
- <sup>181</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 8.4.1044b13-14; *ibid.* 8.6.1045a12-13.
- <sup>182</sup> *De Trinitate* VII, c. 3, n. 4, in *Obras ...*, vol. 5, p. 468.
- <sup>183</sup> Cf. Albert, *Liber I Perihermenias*, Tr. 2, cap. 1; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1 (Parisiis, 1890), pp. 380 and 382.
- <sup>184</sup> *De Trinitate* XV, c. 11, n. 20, in *Obras ...*, vol. 5, p. 868.
- <sup>185</sup> Cf. St. Basil, *Homilia in illud, 'In Principio erat Verbum'*, n. 2, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 31, col. 478.
- <sup>186</sup> Cf. *De hominis opificio*, c. 9, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 44, col. 150.
- <sup>187</sup> See Saint John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa, versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*, c. 13, n. 17, edited by E.M. Buytaert, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), p. 62.
- <sup>188</sup> Cf. Sancti Ambrosii, *Hexaameron Libri Sex*, L. 1, c. 9, n. 33; in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 14, p. 142.
- <sup>189</sup> Actually *Enneads* I, Book 1, which was treated as a separate work in the Middle Ages; cf. e.g. St. Bonaventure, *Collationes in Hexaameron*, Coll. 6, nn. 26-32, ed. L. Amoros, et al., *Obras de San Buenaventura*, edición bilingüe, Tomo III (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1957), pp. 314-316.

- <sup>190</sup> Cf. *Enneads* I, 2, 3, in *Plotinus*, with an English translation by A.H. Armstrong [in *Loeb Classical Library*], vol. 1 (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1966), p. 136.
- <sup>191</sup> For this, cf. Philo, *Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat*, nn. 39-40, intro., trad., et notes par Irene Feuer, in *Les Oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie*, Vol. V (Paris, 1965), pp. 46-47.
- <sup>192</sup> Cf. Averrois Cordubensis, *Aristotelis De Interpretatione, commentaria*, lib. I, cap. 1, in *Aristotelis omnia quae extant opera* (Venetiis: Apud Iunctas, 1552), vol. 1, fol. 68v.
- <sup>193</sup> F. Edward Cranz, in *Catalogus translationum et commentariorum: Mediaeval and Renaissance Latin Translations and Commentaries*, ed. Paul Oskar Kristeller, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1960), p. 79, calls Alexander's Commentary on the *De Interpretatione* 'lost.'
- <sup>194</sup> Cf. *In librum de Interpretatione*, editio secunda, I, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64, cols. 402, 405-408.
- <sup>195</sup> *Liber I Perihermenias*, Tr. 2, cap. 1; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, p. 380.
- <sup>196</sup> On this double signification of spoken words, see E.J. Ashworth, "Traditional Logic," in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. C. Schmitt and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 158-9. Ashworth notes (p. 159, note 104) that John of St. Thomas attacked this notion of a double signification. For this see the Reiser edition vol. 1, pp. 105-6.
- <sup>197</sup> Cf. *Cratylus* 389A.
- <sup>198</sup> Cf. *Politics* 1.1.1253a10.
- <sup>199</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *De Ordine* II, c. 12, n. 35, in *Obras ...*, vol. 1, p. 774.
- <sup>200</sup> Cf. 47C.
- <sup>201</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 9, p. 425.
- <sup>202</sup> St. Augustine, *Sermo 288, In Natali Joannis Baptistae II*, n. 4, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 38, col. 1306.
- <sup>203</sup> Cf. Joannis Duns Scoti, *In Primum librum Perihermenias Quaestiones*, Qu. 2, n. 3; ed. 1639, vol. 1, p. 187.
- <sup>204</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 139.
- <sup>205</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, Qu. 8, Art. 1; cura et studio R.P. Pauli Pession (Taurini: Marietti, 1953), p. 215.
- <sup>206</sup> *Liber I Perihermenias*, Tr. 2, cap. 1; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, p. 380.
- <sup>207</sup> Cf. Dominici de Flandria, O.P., *In duodecim libros Metaphysicae Aristotelis*, IV, qu. 7, art. 4 ad 2 (Coloniae Agrippinae, 1621), p. 204.
- <sup>208</sup> See note 35, above.
- <sup>209</sup> Cf. Joannis Duns Scoti, *In Primum librum Perihermenias Quaestiones*, Qu. 2, n. 8; ed. 1639, vol. 1, p. 188.
- <sup>210</sup> For the thought, if not the exact words, cf. St. Basil, *Homilia III in Hexaemeron*, n. 2, in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 29, col. 55.
- <sup>211</sup> *Summulae* I, cap. 2, lect. 1, ad arg. 1; ed. Salmanticae, pp. 2-3.
- <sup>212</sup> Cf. *Summae quaestionum ordinarium theologi recepto praeconio solennis Henrici a Gandavo tomos*, a. 73, q. 6 (Parisiis: In aed. I.B. Ascensii, 1520), vol. 2, fol. 272 v.
- <sup>213</sup> Cf. De Bassolis, *In quatuor Sententiarum libros*, I, d. 22, qu. 1; ed. Parisiis, 1516-17, vol. 1, fol. 132r-v.
- <sup>214</sup> I have not found any commentary on the *De Interpretatione* by John of Jandun.
- <sup>215</sup> Cf. Albert, *Liber I Perihermenias*, Tr. 2, cap. 1; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, p. 380-81.
- <sup>216</sup> For this, also see John of St. Thomas, O.P., *Logica* I, q. 1, art. 5, in *Cursus philosophicus...*, ed. Reiser, vol 1, p. 106a3-10; cf. *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot*, tr. Deely, p. 336, ll. 13-18.
- <sup>217</sup> Cf. *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 139.
- <sup>218</sup> Cf. D. Durandi a Sancto Porciano, O.P., *In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII*, I, d. 27, qu. 2, n. 8 (Venetiis: Ex



- Typographia Guerraera, 1571), reprinted: Ridgewood, NJ: The Gregg Press, 1964), vol. 1, fol. 77r.
- <sup>219</sup> Cf. *In Summam Contra Gentiles* I, c. 35, §§ iv-vi, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, p. 110.
- <sup>220</sup> Cf. Joannis Duns Scoti, *In Primum librum Perihermenias Quaestiones*, Qu. 4, n. 4; ed. 1639, vol. 1, p. 191.
- <sup>221</sup> The Lyons reading is ambiguous, but on its face it might seem to refer to a second Question of Duns Scotus. Taken in that way it would translate: "... besides the division of signs he has mentioned in his second Question, ..."
- <sup>222</sup> Although one could infer it from what Duns Scotus has said in his Commentary on *De Interpretatione*, I have not found him explicitly mentioning this division.
- <sup>223</sup> Cf. *Opera omnia*, vol. 5, p. 334-5.
- <sup>224</sup> See *Primus Sententiarum* ..., d. 27, qu. 2, art. 2; ed. Venetiis: 1521, fol. 146r-v.
- <sup>225</sup> Richardi de Mediavilla, *In IV Sent. P. Lombardi quaestiones*, I, d. 22 art. 1, qu. 3; ed. 1591, vol. 1, p. 205.
- <sup>226</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 2.8.420b34.
- <sup>227</sup> On the speech of parrots, cf. also P. Hurtado de Mendoza, *Logica*, d. 8, s. 2, nn. 10 and 23 (pp. 106 and 109), and R. de Arriaga, *Logica*, VI, disp. 13, sec. 2, n. 34 (p. 163).
- <sup>228</sup> On this cf. the Lutheran, Christoph Scheibler: "This distinction [between a mediate and an ultimate concept] is common and it is explained by Fonseca and the Conimbricenses. Thus, a mediate or a non-ultimate concept is a concept of a word or of a vocal sound, which can be formed by someone ignorant of a language, as when a nun reads a psalter, or when an idiot hears someone speaking in tongues." (*Distinctio haec frequens est, et exponitur a Fonseca l. I. Instit. Log. c. 11. & Colleg. Conimb. de Interp. c. 1. q. 3. a. 3. Conceptus igitur medius, sive non ultimus, est conceptus vocis, vel soni in voce, qui formari potest ab ignaro linguae, veluti cum Monialis legit psalterium, aut cum idiota audit loquentem linguas.*) C. Scheibler, *Opus metaphysicum*, Duobus libris, Lib. I, Cap. 24, Tit. 3, Art. 6, Punct. 5; (Giessae Hessorum: Typis Nicolai Hampelii, 1617), vol. 1, p. 813.
- <sup>229</sup> Cf. *De Magistro*, c. 13, n. 42, in *Obras* ..., vol. 3, p. 750.
- <sup>230</sup> Cf. Albert, *Liber I Perihermenias*, Tr. 2, cap. 1; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, p. 381.
- <sup>231</sup> Augustine, *De Dialectica*, Chapter 5; tr. Jackson, p. 86.
- <sup>232</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 9, p. 421.
- <sup>233</sup> I cannot find these exact words in Damascene's text. However, he does come close in the Prologue to his *Fount of Knowledge* which contains his *Philosophical Chapters*; see: ΤΟΥ ΕΝ ΑΓΙΟΙΣ ΠΑΤΡΟΣ ΗΜΩΝ ΙΥΑΝΝΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΔΑΜΑΣΚΗΝΟΥ ΠΗΓΗ ΓΝΩΣΕΩΣ, ΠΡΟΟΙΜΙΟΝ (S.P. N. JOANNIS DAMASCENI FONS SCIENTIAE, PROLOGUS), in *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 94, cols. 523-4; cf. "... the humble and obedient man ... receives from God the grace that illuminates, so that in the opening of his mouth he is filled with the Spirit. He becomes purified in heart and enlightened in understanding. When he opens his mouth, he receives the power of speech, ..." Saint John Damascene, *Writings: The Fount of Knowledge*, Preface, translated by Frederic H. Chase, in *The Fathers of the Church*, ed. Roy J. Deferrari, vol. 37 (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1958), pp. 4-5.
- <sup>234</sup> *In librum De Interpretatione*, I, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64, col. 402.
- <sup>235</sup> Cf. S. Ambrosii, *Hexaameron* ..., L. VI, c. 9, nn. 62-6; *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 14, cols. 268-9.
- <sup>236</sup> Cf. Joannis Duns Scoti, *In Primum librum Perihermenias Quaestiones*, Qu. 2, n. 3; ed. 1639, vol. 1, pp. 187.

<sup>237</sup> Cf. Joannis Duns Scoti, *Quaestiones in Lib. IV Sententiarum*, d. 2, qu. 2, n. 7; ed. 1639, vol. 8, p. 60.

<sup>238</sup> I do not know where the *Conimbricenses* may have treated this question either as one of theology or more widely as one of semiotics. In the latter sense it was explicitly discussed by seventeenth-century Jesuits; cf. e.g. my article: "Thomas Compton Carleton, S.J.: On Words Signifying More than their Speakers or Makers Know or Intend," *The Modern Schoolman*, LXVI (1988), pp. 1-28. For a similar question in regard to earlier Scholastic authors, see E.J. Ashworth, "Can I Speak More Clearly than I Understand?" *Historiographia Linguistica*, VII (1980), pp. 29-38.

<sup>239</sup> Cf. *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in tres libros De Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae*, L. III, c. 13, qu. 5, art. 4 (Lugduni: Apud Horatium Cardon, 1604), p. 497.

<sup>240</sup> That is, Chapter 13, of *De hominis officio*; cf. *Patrologia Graeca*, vol. 44, col. 167.

<sup>241</sup> Cf. *De Magistro*, c. 13, n. 42, in *Obras ...*, vol. 3, p. 750.

<sup>242</sup> For some other Jesuits discussing lying in this context, cf. R. de Arriaga, *Logica*, VI, d. 13, s. 2, n. 34 (p. 163); and F. de Oviedo, *Logica*, Controv. 8, punct. 3 (p. 141).

<sup>243</sup> The 'last king' would be Philip II, who died in 1598 at the Escorial in Spain. This reference most probably to him may signal some development of the *Conimbricenses'* work on signs between the lectures on which it was based and its first publication in 1606.

<sup>244</sup> For this I offer the following explanation. Objective being is the being of being known. It results from an act of knowing and consists in an extrinsic denomination from that act. That is to say, things have the being of being known as they are denominated 'known.' In the present case, things

known would be doubtful inasmuch as they are known with some hesitation. For some of the *Conimbricenses'* thoughts on objective being, cf. their *Commentarii in Isagogem Porphyrii, Quaestiones in Praefationem*, q. 6, art. 1-2; ed. Cologne, 1607, vol. 1, cols. 150-8. On the conception of objective being in Jesuit philosophy at the time; cf. Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, d. 54, s. 2, n. 13; ed. Vives, vol. 26, p. 1020; in Francisco Suárez *On Beings of Reason (De Entibus Rationis): Metaphysical Disputation LIV*, Translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes by John P. Doyle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1995), p. 74. In this passage Suárez has distinguished two meanings for 'being known' (esse cognitum) of which the second seems to be that intended in the present context by the *Conimbricenses*. For a distinction similar to that of Suárez, cf.: "To be an object means two things: (1) it means that being which is the terminus of knowledge and which is sub-ordered to knowledge and, as a result, sub-ordered to that extrinsic denomination from knowledge. (2) It means the object [itself] as denominated from knowledge." (*"Esse objectum dicit duo. 1. Dicit illud esse quod est terminus cognitionis, et quod subjicitur cognitioni, et per consequens denominationi illi extrinsecae a cognitione. Secundo, dicit objectum ut denominatum a cognitione."*) Martin Smiglecki, S.J. (1564-1618), *Logica*, I, q. 4 (Oxoniae: Excudebat Guil. Turner pro Hen. Crips, Edw. Forrest, Hen. Curteyne, et Joh. Wilmot, 1638; dedicatory preface date: August 15, 1616) vol. 1, p. 15.

<sup>245</sup> Cf. *Conimbricenses, In De Interpretatione*, Caput IV, commentarius c and d; ed. Cologne, col. 82; *ibid.* qu. 3, art. 2, cols. 121 and 123.

<sup>246</sup> *De Magistro*, c. 3, n. 5, in *Obras ...*, vol. 3, pp. 690-2.

- <sup>247</sup> This reference does not check out. For the thought, cf. St. Thomas, *Scriptum super lib. IV Sententiarum*, d. 7, qu. 3, art. 2, q. 3, ad 2; ed. M.F. Moos, O.P. (Parisiis: Lethielleux, 1947), p. 296, n. 190. Also see *Quodlibetum* I, qu. 6, art. 1; ed. Spiazzi, p. 11.
- <sup>248</sup> For a similar expression contemporaneous with the *Conimbricenses*, cf. "... but for mine own part, it was Greek to me." William Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar* I, ii, 281, ed. S.F. Johnson, in *William Shakespeare: The Complete Works*, general editor A. Harbage (New York: The Viking Press, 1986), p. 903.
- <sup>249</sup> Cf. Cato, *Collectio Distichorum Vulgaris*, Prologus, in *Minor Latin Poets*, ed. J.W. Duff and A.M. Duff in Loeb Classical Library, 284 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1978), p. 592. The Duff translation is interesting: "... for to read and not to understand is to give them" [i.e., my precepts] "the go-by." *ibid.* p. 593.
- <sup>250</sup> *In librum De Interpretatione, editio secunda* I, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64, col. 402.
- <sup>251</sup> *De Trinitate* XV, c. 10, n. 19, in *Obras ...*, vol. 5, p. 868.
- <sup>252</sup> Cf. *De Dialectica*, c. 5; ed. Jackson, p. 86.
- <sup>253</sup> Cf. *De Magistro*, c. 4, n. 8, in *Obras ...*, vol. 3, p. 696.
- <sup>254</sup> For this, see Fonseca, *Institutiones dialecticae* I, c. 10, ed. Ferreira Gomes, vol. 1, p. 40.
- <sup>255</sup> For a Jesuit, contemporary with the *Conimbricenses*, who considers such a rule in relation to a real distinction, but who also recognizes some nuances and problems associated with its extension, see Francisco Suárez, S.J., *Metaphysicarum disputationum, Tomi duo*. Disp. 7, s. 2, nn. 9-12 (Moguntiae: Excudebat Balthasarus Lippius, Sump-tibus Arnoldi Mylii, 1605), vol. 1, pp. 167-8. For some of the complexity involved between separation and real distinction, see Fonseca, *In Metaph. Arist.* V, c. 6, q. 6, sect. 1; ed. Cologne, 1615, vol. 2, cols. 396-8.
- <sup>256</sup> Cf. "The Turk, that two and fifty kingdoms hath, Writes not so tedious a stile as this." *The First Part of Henry VI*, 4, 7, 73-4, ed. David Bevington, in *William Shakespeare: The Complete Works*, ed. Harbage, p. 466.
- <sup>257</sup> See note 159, above.
- <sup>258</sup> For one of their Jesuit Order-brothers contradicting the *Conimbricenses* on this, see my article: "Thomas Compton Carleton, S.J., On Words Signifying ...," p. 11.
- <sup>259</sup> Cf. *Conimbricenses*, *In Praefationem Porphyrii*, Qu. 8, art. 4; in *Commentarii in universam dialecticam* (Lyons, 1607), vol. 1, p. 173.
- <sup>260</sup> See *Metaphysics* 4.2.1003a33b5; *ibid.*, 11.3.1060b32-1061aO.
- <sup>261</sup> Cf. Marsilii Ficini, *In Philebum Commentariorum*, Liber I, c. 29, in *Opera Omnia*, Tomus Secundus (Basileae: Ex Officina Henricpetrina, 1576; reproduced by P. Kristeller, Torino: Bottega d'Erasmus, 1962), p. 1236. Ficino in this place remarks that the god whom the Romans called Mercury was called Hermes Trismegistus by the Greeks and Theuth by the Egyptians.
- <sup>262</sup> This answer is interesting in view of the fact that the *Commentarii in universam Dialecticam Aristotelis* of the *Conimbricenses*, shortly after its appearance in Latin, would be translated into Chinese principally by Li Chih Tsao (1565-1630) and Francisco Furtado, S.J. (1587-1653). For this translation, see Carlos Sommervogel, S.J., *Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus*, tome III (Bruxelles: Oscar Schepens, 1892), col. 1068, and also the bibliography of the present work. For some of the difficulty translating Western religious and philosophical thought into Chinese, see Matteo Ricci, S.J., *The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (T'ien-chu Shib-i)*, a Chinese-English edition by Edward J. Malatesta, S.J. (St. Louis: The

Institute for Jesuit Sources, 1985), pp. 32-38; particularly interesting in this volume is the "Diagram of the Various Kinds of Being," reproduced from the first Peking edition of 1603, in which the categories of Aristotle are translated into and exemplified in Chinese characters; *ibid.*, pp. 192-3.

For the same doctrine as that of the *Conimbricenses*, cf. Augustinus Laurentius, *Logica*, Tr. III, d. 3, s. 13, n. 455 (vol. 1, p. 347). For a completely different understanding, which is that Chinese characters are "logographs," that is, *signs of words*, cf. William G. Boltz, "Early Chinese Writing," in *The World's Writing Systems*, edited by Peter T. Daniels and William Bright (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 191-99, and Victor H. Mair, "Modern Chinese Writing," *ibid.*, pp. 200-208.

<sup>263</sup> On numbers directly signifying things and a link of this with Chinese pictograms, cf. esp. R. de Arriaga, *Logica*, VI, d. 13, s. 2, n. 36 (p. 163). Also see Thomas Compton Carleton, S.J. (1591-1666) who has cited this place in Arriaga with approval but has added that "He would come closer to the truth who would say that arithmetical numbers by themselves signify nothing, but are rather syncategorematic terms." (*Propius tamen ad veritatem accederet, qui diceret numeros arithmeticos per se nihil significare, sed esse terminos syncategorematicos, ...*) *Philosophia universa*, *Logica*, disp. 42, s. 5, n. 10 (Antwerpiae: Apud Jacobum Meursium, 1649), p. 160. On Carleton in this context, see John P. Doyle, "Thomas Compton Carleton, S.J.: On Words Signifying ...," esp. p. 11.

<sup>264</sup> Here the reference is obviously to such things as the signs of the zodiac. Cf., e.g.: "Astronomers call the constellations, or the stars of heaven, 'heavenly signs,' and first of all those which are in the Zodiac, which they also call a

'signbearer.'" (*Astrologi, constellationes sive sidera caeli, vocant signa coelestia, et imprimis ista, quae sunt in Zodiaco, quem inde etiam vocant signiferum.*) Christoph Scheibler, *Opus metaphysicum*. Lib. I, Cap. 24, Tit. 3, Art. 4, Punct. 2; vol. 1, p. 781.

<sup>265</sup> *Liber I Peribermentias*, Tr. 2, cap. 1; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, p. 382.

<sup>266</sup> For some of the theological and philosophical issues here, cf. Sven K. Knebel, "Scotists vs. Thomists: What Seventeenth-Century Scholastic Psychology Was About," *The Modern Schoolman*, 74 (1997), pp. 219-26.

<sup>267</sup> See note 39, above.

<sup>268</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, Qu. 1, Art. 8; ed. Spiazzi, p. 17.

<sup>269</sup> Cf. *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 40, col. 86.

<sup>270</sup> Cf. *In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII*, I, d. 2, qu. 1, n. 6 (Venetiis, 1571), vol. 1, fol. 23v.

<sup>271</sup> Cf. *Primus Sententiarum* I, d. 28, prin. qu. 2, qu. 2; ed. Venetiis, 1521, fol. 151v.

<sup>272</sup> That is, by something which is either its efficient or exemplar cause.

<sup>273</sup> Cf. *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo doctoris solemniss*, Quodl. IV, qu. 2. (Parisiis: In aed. I.B. Ascensii, 1518), fol. 90r.

<sup>274</sup> Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles* IV, c. 11, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 15, p. 34.

<sup>275</sup> Cf. *In Summam Contra Gentiles* I, c. 71, § iii, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, p. 207.

<sup>276</sup> Cf. *Johannis Capreoli Tholosani, O.P., Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis*, L. II, dist. 39, qu. 1. art. 3, § 1; de novo editae cura et studio RR. C. Paban et T. Pègues, vol. IV (Turonibus: Sumptibus Alfred Cattier, 1903), p. 448.

<sup>277</sup> *Quaestiones ...*, pp. 278-80.

<sup>278</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 1.2.405b15-20.

<sup>279</sup> Cf. *Summae quaestionum ordinarium*, art. 1, qu. 5; ed. Parisiis, 1520, vol. 1, fol. 14 v.

- <sup>280</sup> Cf. *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, pars 2, q. 4, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, p. 309, n. 303.
- <sup>281</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, Qu. 1, Art. 8, ad 7; ed. Spiazzi, p. 18.
- <sup>282</sup> See *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu. in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, prima pars*, II, c. 7, q. 3, a. 3 (Lyons: Sumptibus Horatii Cardon, 1602), col. 332; *ibid.* q. 17, a. 1, cols. 380-381.
- <sup>283</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 1; in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, pp. 206-7.
- <sup>284</sup> Cf. *Commentaria Cardinalis Caietani, in Summam Theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 1;
- <sup>285</sup> Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quodlibet* 13, q. 3, ed. Felix Alluntis, O.F.M, in *Obras del Doctor Sutil Juan Duns Escoto: Cuestiones Cuodlibetales* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1968), p. 475.
- <sup>286</sup> Cf. *Primus Sententiarum* I, d. 27, qu. 3; ed. Venetiis, 1521, fol. 146v-147r.
- <sup>287</sup> Cf. *Categories* 7.7b23-34. Also see the *Conimbricenses'* commentary: *Commentarii in libros Categoriarum*, c. 7, q. 2, art. 2; ed. Cologne, 1607, vol. 1, col. 477.
- <sup>288</sup> For this, see Pedro da Fonseca, *Commentaria in libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, V, c. 15, s. 5, q. 4; ed. Coloniae, 1615, vol. 2, cols. 836-7. On the *Conimbricenses'* planned commentary on the *Metaphysics*, cf.: "Os comentários à metafísica de Aristóteles nunca foram publicados, apesar dos constantes esforços que os Superiores da Companhia em Portugal fizeram neste sentido. Achem-se dalguma maneira supridos pelos Comentarios à Metafísica de Aristóteles de Pedro da Fonseca, ainda que de facto não foram escritos para fazerem parte do Curso Conimbricense." Severiano Tavaras, "O Colégio das Artes e a filosofia em Portugal," *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, IV (1948), 227-38, esp. 234-5. Also cf. Pinharanda Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses*, pp. 59-61.
- <sup>289</sup> That is, transcendently related.
- <sup>290</sup> Cf. *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* I, d. 3, qu. 4, art. 2, ad 4; ed. Mandonnet, p. 117.
- <sup>291</sup> Cf. *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 370.
- <sup>292</sup> See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b30-31.
- <sup>293</sup> For an earlier equation of an adventitious or an extrinsic relation with a relation of reason, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas: *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1; ed. Mandonnet, I, p. 765; and *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 28, a. 2, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 321.
- <sup>294</sup> Cf. Boethius, *In librum De Interpretatione*, editio secunda I, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 64, cols. 402-404 and 415-419.
- <sup>295</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *In Peri Hermeneias*, ed. Spiazzi, pp. 11-12, nn. 19-20.
- <sup>296</sup> Cf. *Super lib. I Perihermenias*, qu. 4, ed. 1639, vol. 1, pp. 190-191. Scotus does not in this place mention St. Thomas, but neither does he make any distinction between simple concepts and propositions as common to all.
- <sup>297</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, n. 2, p. 190.
- <sup>298</sup> On the *Metaphysics* of the *Conimbricenses*, see note 288, above. Also, a check of Fonseca's *Commentaria* did not reveal this question.
- <sup>299</sup> Cf. *Politics* 1.1.1253a10-18.
- <sup>300</sup> Cf. Plato, *Cratylus*, 383A and 401D-402.
- <sup>301</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, 384, 385, 389, and 434E-435. For other Jesuits discussing Aristotle and Plato on the natural character of language, cf.: F. de Oviedo, *Logica*, Controv. 8, punct. 1 (p. 137); and M. Smiglecki, *Logica*, Disp. XII, q. 2 (vol. 2, pp. 438-40).
- <sup>302</sup> See Philo, *De Somniis*, I, § 108, ed. Pierre Savinel, in *Les Oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie*, vol. 19 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1962), pp. 68-9.
- <sup>303</sup> Cf. *Politics* 1.1.1253a11-14. For Aristotle cited in this context from *Politics* 7, 2, cf. Augustinus Laurentius, *Logica*, Tr. III, d. 3, s. 13, n. 461 (vol. 1, p. 348).



- <sup>304</sup> St. Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana* II, c. 2, n. 3, in *Obras ...*, vol. 15, p. 114.
- <sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>306</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *In libros Peri Hermeneias expositio*, I, lect. 2, ed. Spiazzi, p. 10, n. 15.
- <sup>307</sup> For this see: C. Plinius Secundi, *Naturalis Historiae libri XXXVI*, L. XI, c. 112 (51); ed. Brotier, vol. 5, p. 2143.
- <sup>308</sup> Cf. C. Iulii Solini, *Collectanea rerum memorabilium*, 1, n. 112, recens. Th. Mommsen, editio altera (Berolini: Apud Weidmannos, 1968), p. 28; also, cf.: *The Excellent and Pleasant Worke of Iulius Solinus Polyhistor*, c. 6, translated out of Latin into English by Arthur Golding, Gent. (London: I. Charleswood for Thomas Hacket, 1587; reprinted: Gainesville, FL: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1955), fol. e.3r.
- <sup>309</sup> Cf. Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, V, c. 9, ed. P.K. Marshall (Oxoniae: E Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1968), vol. 1, p. 199.
- <sup>310</sup> For this, see Herodotus, *Historiae*, I, n. 2, in *Herodotus*, with an English translation by A.D. Godley (London: William Heinemann, 1926), vol. 2, pp. 274-7.
- <sup>311</sup> Cf. *Liber I Perihermenias*, Tr. 2, cap. 1; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, p. 382.
- <sup>312</sup> Cf. *Politics* 1.1.1253a11-13.
- <sup>313</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I<sup>II</sup><sup>ae</sup>, qu. 50, art. 3, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 6 (Romae: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1891), p. 319.
- <sup>314</sup> Cf. B. Aegidii Columnae Romani, O.E.S.A., *Quodlibeta*, I, ed. M. Petri Damasi de Conninck (Lovanii: Typis Hieronymi Nempaei, 1646; reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966), p. 34.
- <sup>315</sup> Cf. *Cratylus*, 426C-427D.
- <sup>316</sup> Cf. Marsilii Ficini, *In Cratylum, vel de recta nominum ratione, epitome*, in *Opera omnia*, pp. 1309-1314.
- <sup>317</sup> Cf. *Politics* 1.1.1253a10-18.
- <sup>318</sup> Cf. *Liber I Perihermenias* Tr. 2, cap. 1; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, p. 382.
- <sup>319</sup> Cf. ΓΑΛΗΝΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΧΡΕΙΑΖ ΜΟΡΙΩΝ ΙΖ: *Galenus de usu partium libri xvii*, I, c. 2, ad codicum fidem recensuit Georgius Helmreich, vol. 1 (Lipsiae: In Aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1907) pp. 2-3; and Galen, *On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body*, I, c. 2, tr. M.T. May (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968), vol. 1, p. 68.
- <sup>320</sup> Cf. *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, in duos libros De Generatione et Corruptione Aristotelis Stagiritae*, L. II, c. 8, q. 3, art. 2, ad 5, editio secunda (Lugduni: Sumptibus Horatii Cardon, 1606), pp. 479-80.
- <sup>321</sup> All of the *Conimbricenses'* doctrine here regarding the utterances of animals seems reflected in the views of René Descartes (1596-1650), who, as we noted in our introduction, has declared that of the Jesuit textbooks he had studied at La Flèche he "remembered only the *Conimbricenses*, Toletus [Francisco de Toledo (1533-1596)], and Rubio [Antonio Rubio (1548-1615)]," *Epist.* 207, 30 Sept., 1640, à Mersenne, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. C. Adam et P. Tannery (Paris: L. Cerf, 1897), III, p. 185. For Descartes on the animals, cf. René Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, V, pp. 56-9, texte et commentaire par Étienne Gilson (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1947); also see the texts in Gilson's notes, *ibid.*, pp. 421-9, where Descartes' opposition in this to Montaigne and Charron is made clear.
- <sup>322</sup> On Attis, see also A. Laurentius, *Logica*, III, d. 3, s. 13, n. 464; vol. 1, p. 348.
- <sup>323</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Historia animalium* 4.7.536a20-33.
- <sup>324</sup> Cf. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, *In Aristotelis libros de Sensu et Sensato, De Memoria et Reminiscentia commentarium, De Sensu et Sensato*, lib. un., lect. 2, ed. A.M. Pirotta, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1928), p. 13, n. 32.

<sup>325</sup> Cf. *Problemata Aristotelis cum duplici translatione antiqua vz. et nova s. Theodori Gazae: cum expositione Petri Aponi. Tabula secundum magistrum Petrum de Tussignano per alphabetum. Problemata Alexandri Aphrodisaei. Problemata Plutarchi. In Problemata Alexandri*, Sect. I, n. 21 (Venetiis: Per Bonetum Locatelum, 1501), p. 275v. Also cf.: *Alexandri Aphrodisiae liber nonnullis Physicis dubitationibus Solutionum liber*, Angelo Politano interprete, n. 138, in *Aristoteles aliorumque problemata, cui de novo accessere Iul. Caesaris Scaligeri Problemata gelliana* (Amstelodami: Apud Ioducum Iansonium, 1643), p. 258.

<sup>326</sup> That is to say, their bleating.

<sup>327</sup> This may be compared to a Persian account contemporary with Akbar: "He ... had a *serai* (mansion) built in a place which civilized sounds did not reach. The newly born were put into that place of experience, and honest and active guards were put over them. For a time, tongue-tied wetnurses were admitted there. As they had closed the door of speech, the place was commonly called the Gang Mahal (the dumb-house). On the 9th August 1582 he went out to hunt. That night he stayed in Faisabad, and next day he went with a few special attendants to the house of experiment. No cry came from that house of silence, nor was any speech heard there. In spite of their four years, they had no part of the talisman of speech, and nothing came out except the noise of the dumb." from H. Beveridge, *The Akbarmania*, a translation, 3 vols. (Bengal: Bibliotheca Indica, 1897-1910), pp. 581-2, as quoted by David Crystal, *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 228. While there is a discrepancy regarding the date of Akbar's experiment between this account of it and that of the *Conimbricenses*, in main both ac-

counts are similar. The immediate source for the *Conimbricenses* was most probably Jerónimo Xavier (d. 1617), who headed the third Jesuit mission to the Great Mogul and who heard of the experiment from Akbar himself; for this see Pierre du Jarric, S.J., *Akbar and the Jesuits*, trans. with introduction and notes by C.H. Payne (New York & London: Harper & Brothers, 1926), 84-5; also: J. Stephen Narayan, *Acquaviva and the Great Mogul* (Patna: Catholic Book Club, 1945), 66. Finally here, we may remark the date of 1596 given by the *Conimbricenses* is ten years prior to the initial publication of their treatise on signs but twenty years after the lectures on which that treatise is based.

<sup>328</sup> See St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, VIII, c. 16, n. 35, in *Obras ...*, vol. 15, p. 986.

<sup>329</sup> See *Opera praeclarissima*, Genesis, Cap. XIII, Quaestio CCCXLI, fol. 125r-v.

<sup>330</sup> Cf. *Opera omnia quotquot in sacrae scripturae expositionem reperiuntur, In quinque libros Mosi iuxta sensum literalem commentarii, Commentarii in Genesim*, cap. 11, v. 9 (Lugduni: Sumpt. Jacobi et Petri Prost, 1639), vol. 1, p. 1639.

<sup>331</sup> On the *Conimbricenses'* discussion of Adamitic language as well as some of the implications and influence of this discussion, cf. E.J. Ashworth, "Traditional Logic," in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. C. Schmitt and Q. Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 156-7. For other Jesuits on Adam naming the animals, cf.: P. Hurtado de Mendoza, *Logica*, d. 8, s. 1, n. 5 (p. 108); A. Rubio, *Logica mexicana*, II, cap. 1 (p. 467); F. de Oviedo, *Logica*, Controv. 8, punct. 2 (pp. 138 and 140).

<sup>332</sup> Cf. *In Lib. IV Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 5, n. 10; ed. 1639, vol. 8, pp. 90-91.

<sup>333</sup> See *In Peri Hermenias* I, lect. 3; ed. Spiazzi, p. 16, n. 31.

<sup>334</sup> Cf. *Ethics* 6.2.1139a29.

- <sup>335</sup> Cf. *In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri III*, I, d. 19, qu. 5, n. 7 (Venetiis, 1571), vol. 1, fol. 66r.
- <sup>336</sup> Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *Quatuor quodlibeta. Quodlibetum* III, qu. 1, art. 2 [and 3, which is not designated] (Venetiis: Per Magistrum Raynaldum de Novimagio Theoticum, 11 July [die vero xi mensis Iulii], 1486), unmarked folios which should be 'i.3v-i.4r.'
- <sup>337</sup> Cf. Ioannis de Ianduno, *Acutissimae Quaestiones in XII libros Metaphysicae*, VI, qu. 8 (Venetiis: Apud Hieronymum Scottum, 1560), cols. 416-419.
- <sup>338</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones ...*, p. 125.
- <sup>339</sup> On this distinction between the formal and the objective concept, some of its provenance, and its use in the seventeenth century, cf. my article, "Suarez on the Analogy of Being," *The Modern Schoolman*, 46 (1969), esp. pp. 224-8.
- <sup>340</sup> Cf. *De Interpretatione* 9.18a28-30? Also see: *Categories* 9.10.1051b8-9.
- <sup>341</sup> See *De Trinitate* XV, c. 11, n. 20, in *Obras...*, vol. 5, p. 872.
- <sup>342</sup> Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum Expositio*, I, 1, lect. 1, cura et studio R.M. Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1964), p. 16, n. 31.
- <sup>343</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, pp. 206-7.
- <sup>344</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *Opera omnia*, vol. 13 (Romae: Typis R. Garrone, 1918), p. 173.
- <sup>345</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.
- <sup>346</sup> *Quodlibeta*, IV, qu. 7; ed. De Coninck, p. 214-18.
- <sup>347</sup> Cf. *Liber I Perihermenias* Tr. 2, cap. 2; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, p. 383.
- <sup>348</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones ...*, pp. 125-6.
- <sup>349</sup> Cf. *Commentaria Cardinalis Caietani, In Summam Theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 1; in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 207.
- <sup>350</sup> Cf. *Liber I Perihermenias* Tr. 2, cap. 3; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, pp. 386-7.
- <sup>351</sup> *Ibid.* p. 387.
- <sup>352</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate*, qu. 7, art. 3, editio ix revisa, cura et studio P. Fr. Raymundi Spiazzi, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1949), p. 131. An inference is required to reach the *Conimbricenses'* interpretation here.
- <sup>353</sup> For a similar argument, cf. Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 8, s. 1, n. 4; ed. Vivès, vol. 25, p. 276.
- <sup>354</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>355</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a30-35.
- <sup>356</sup> See, e.g., Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, d. 47, s. 13, nn. 8 and 9; ed. Vivès, vol. 26, p. 836-7.
- <sup>357</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 3.8.431b20-26.
- <sup>358</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 207.
- <sup>359</sup> *Commentaria Cardinalis Caietani, In Summam Theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 6; in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, pp. 213-14.
- <sup>360</sup> Cf. *Liber I Perihermenias* Tr. 2, cap. 3; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, p. 386.
- <sup>361</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, 16, 1, ad 3, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 207.
- <sup>362</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones ...*, p. 125.
- <sup>363</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b30.
- <sup>364</sup> Cf. *Categories* 5.4a25-4b13.
- <sup>365</sup> Cf. St. Thomas, *In Peri Hermeneias*, I, c. 1, lect. 2, ed. Spiazzi, p. 10, n. 12
- <sup>366</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, n. 14.
- <sup>367</sup> *Ibid.*, lect. 3; p. 15, n. 24.
- <sup>368</sup> Cf. *Categories* 5.4a34-36.
- <sup>369</sup> *Defensiones ...*, L. I, dist. 19, qu. 3, art. unicus, conclusio 3; ed. Paban-Pègues, vol. 2, pp. 158-9.
- <sup>370</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones ...*, VI, qu. 16; p. 125.
- <sup>371</sup> Cf. *Commentarii in universam dialecticam, in libros Categoriarum Aristotelis*, Proemium; ed. Cologne, 1607, vol. 1, cols. 301-302.
- <sup>372</sup> On the doctrine of the '*loci*,' which Cicero defines in his *Topics* as 'the seats of argument' and which goes back to the *Topics* of Aristotle, cf. Fonseca, *Institutiones ...*, VII, cc. 9-38, ed. Ferreira Gomes, vol. 2, pp. 472-600. On the '*locus*' of definition, cf. *ibid.*, c. 13, 488-90.



- <sup>373</sup> For the same position and reasoning, cf. A. Laurentius, *Logica*, III, d. 3, s. 15, n. 510; vol. 1, p. 353.
- <sup>374</sup> Cf. *Ethics* 6.3.1139b15-16.
- <sup>375</sup> Cf. *Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagiritae de Priori Resolutione*, I, c. 1, qu. 2, art. 1, in *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu, in universam Dialecticam Aristotelis* (Cologne, 1607), vol. 2, col. 255.
- <sup>376</sup> Cf. *De Interpretatione* 4.17a3-4.
- <sup>377</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.9.1051b22-3.
- <sup>378</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 3.6.430b28-30.
- <sup>379</sup> *De Anima* 2.6.418a11-16.
- <sup>380</sup> Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, IX, c. 9, lect. 11, ed. M.R. Cathala, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1950), p. 457, n. 1904 and *In Aristotelis librum de Anima*, III, c. 6, lect. 11, ed. Pirotta, p. 180, nn. 760-3.
- <sup>381</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 208.
- <sup>382</sup> *In Summam Contra Gentiles* I, 59, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, 169-173.
- <sup>383</sup> *Defensiones* ..., L. I, dist. 19, qu. 3, art. unicus, conclusio 3; ed. Paban-Pègues, vol. 2, pp. 158-9.
- <sup>384</sup> Cf. *Quodlibeta*, IV, q. 7; ed. De Coninck, p. 215-16.
- <sup>385</sup> Cf. *Quaestiones* ..., VI, q. 16; p. 125.
- <sup>386</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 5, ad 1, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 212.
- <sup>387</sup> Again, on the *Metaphysics* of the *Conimbricenses* see note 288, above.
- <sup>388</sup> Cf. St. Anselm, *De Veritate*, c. 6, in *Obras* ..., vol. 1, p. 508.
- <sup>389</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 208.
- <sup>390</sup> Cf. *Summa contra gentiles*, I, c. 59; in *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, pp. 167-8.
- <sup>391</sup> *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, Qu. I, Art. 3; ed. Spiazzi, p. 6.
- <sup>392</sup> Cf. *Liber I Perihermenias* Tr. 2, cap. 3; ed. Borgnet, vol. 1, p. 387.
- <sup>393</sup> That is, Question 16, Article 2.
- <sup>394</sup> See note 336, above.
- <sup>395</sup> Cf. *In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII*, I, d. 19, qu. 5, n. 14 (Venetiis, 1571), vol. 1, fol. 66r.
- <sup>396</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 3.6.430a27-8.
- <sup>397</sup> See *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b18-19. Note that in the text of the *Metaphysics* which the *Conimbricenses* possessed Book 6 was divided into only two chapters; cf. Peter Fonseca, S.J., *In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae libros*, tomus tertius (Coloniae: Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri, 1615), pp. 1-193.
- <sup>398</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 3.6.430b28-30.
- <sup>399</sup> See *Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b25-28.
- <sup>400</sup> Cf. *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 223.
- <sup>401</sup> For examples of this, cf. *Conimbricenses, Commentarii in libros Categoriarum*, c. 1, q. 1, a. 2; ed. Cologne, 1607, col. 314.
- <sup>402</sup> Cf. Aegidius, *Quodlibeta*, IV, qu. 7; ed. De Coninck, p. 215-16.
- <sup>403</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 3.6.430b26-30.
- <sup>404</sup> That is, in the *Conimbricenses'* commentary on Chapter 4 of the *De Interpretatione*.
- <sup>405</sup> Rather see *In Summam Contra Gentiles* I, c. 59, §§ xii-xiii, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, pp. 171-3.
- <sup>406</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 208.
- <sup>407</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b17-27.
- <sup>408</sup> Alexander's commentary on Book 3 of Aristotle's *De Anima* is no longer extant; cf. Athanasios Fotinis, *The De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias: A Translation and Commentary* (Washington: University Press of America, 1979), p. 155.
- <sup>409</sup> Cf. *Conimbricenses, In De Interpretatione*, Cap. IV, qu. 4, art. 1; ed. Cologne, cols. 134-8.
- <sup>410</sup> That is, sentences (*orationes*); cf. *Conimbricenses, In De Interpretatione*, I, c. 4, qu. 1, art. 2; ed. Cologne, 1607, col. 87.
- <sup>411</sup> Cf. *De Interpretatione* 4.17a1-4; also cf. *Conimbricenses, In De Interpretatione* I, c. 4, qu. 3, art. 2; ed. Cologne, 1607, col. 125.
- <sup>412</sup> Cf. 430b28.
- <sup>413</sup> Cf. *In Summam Contra Gentiles* I, c. 59, esp. §§ xii-xiii, in S. Thomae

Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, pp. 171-3. Ferrara's reasoning is that truth exists in any conformity of the mind with the thing but strictly it is in the second operation of the intellect that truth becomes known.

<sup>414</sup> The unexpressed fourth argument here would follow, I believe, from the inadmissibility of falsity for the first operation of the intellect. It would run something like this: if truth and falsity are contraries, then where falsity is inadmissible so also is truth. But falsity is inadmissible for the first operation of the intellect. Therefore ... For such an argument, see the immediately following Article.

<sup>415</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 2.6.418a16-17.

<sup>416</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 3.6.430b28-30.

<sup>417</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 4.6.1011a28-9.

<sup>418</sup> Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In Aristotelis librum De Anima commentarium* III, lect. 6, ed. tertia, A.M. Pirotta, O.P. (Taurini: Marietti, 1948), p. 162, n. 664.

<sup>419</sup> For some of the following examples, see Petrus Aureoli (ca. 1280-1322), *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 3, q. 14, a. 1, ed. E. Buytaert, vol. 2 (St. Bonaventure, NY, 1956), pp. 696-7; also cf. K. H. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: ...*, esp. pp. 91-3, and the places indexed under 'experience(s)' at pages 410-411. In the Jesuit tradition after the Conimbricenses, see A. Laurentius, *Logica*, III, d. 3, s. 15, n. 522, vol. 1, p. 354.

<sup>420</sup> Cf. S. Bonaventurae, *In libros Sententiarum*, II, d. 8, p. 2, a. un., q. 3; in *Opera theologica selecta ...*, vol. 2, p. 227. Bonaventure's example here is much less fanciful, inasmuch as he simply says that from the disposition of straw and the position of a candle the straw can without any diabolical intervention seem to be serpents.

<sup>421</sup> On drunken men seeing double, cf.: "Why do some drunken men see double? Because the muscles of their

eyes, more or less saturated, and for that reason more or less weakened, twist one of their eyes up and the other down. And from this it happens that the rays of the eyes do not not equally tend to the same thing but to different places and different bodies. And in this way one of their eyes employing its own individual power to see may cause a double vision. This seems to be indeed true from this that those who rub one eye with their finger and gradually push it up are drawn to see double." (*Cur nonnulli ebrii gemina vident? Quia oculorum musculi plus minusve repleti, atque eo ipso languidi, oculos, alterum sursum, alterum deorsum torquent: quo fit, ut oculorum radii eodem pariter non tendant, sed in diversa loca atque corpora, atque ita alteruter oculorum privato cernendi utens officio, duplicem efficiat visum. Id esse verum vel inde apparet: qui enim digito alterum oculum terunt, sensimque sursum trudunt, gemina videre coguntur.*) *Alexandri Aphrodisiae liber nonnullis Physicis dubitationibus Solutionum liber*, Angelo Politano interprete, n. 123, in *Aristoteles aliorumque problemata, cui de novo accessere Iul. Caesaris Scaligeri Problemata gelliana* (Amstelodami: Apud Ioducum Iansonium, 1643), p. 250.

<sup>422</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 5.29.1024b23-4.

<sup>423</sup> Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, qu. 17, art. 1, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 218.

<sup>424</sup> Cf. St. Augustine, *Soliloquia* II, c. 6, n. 9, ed. P.V. Capanaga, O.R.S.A., in *Obras de San Augustin*, Tomo I (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1957), p. 560.

<sup>425</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, c. 10, n. 18; pp. 570-2.

<sup>426</sup> St. Augustine, *Soliloquia* II, c. 15, n. 29, ed. Capanaga, in *Obras ...*, Tomo I, p. 588.

<sup>427</sup> See *Metaphysics* 5.29.1024b20.

<sup>428</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b26.

<sup>429</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 3.6.430b26-31.

<sup>430</sup> See Averrois Cordubensis, *Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De*

- Anima libros*, III, n. 26, recensuit F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953), pp. 463-4.
- <sup>431</sup> Cf. *In Aristotelis librum De Anima commentarium* III, lect. 6, ed. Pirotta, p. 162, n. 662.
- <sup>432</sup> Cf. Joannis Philoponi, *In Aristotelis De Anima libros commentaria*, III, c. 6, ed. Michael Hayduck in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, vol. 15 (Berolini: Typis et Impensis Georgii Reimeri, 1897), p. 553-7.
- <sup>433</sup> Cf. *De Anima* II, Tr. 3, cap. 5; ed. Borgnet, vol. 5 (Parisiis, 1890), p. 240.
- <sup>434</sup> Cf. Apollinaris Offredi, *Expositio luculentissima in libros Aristotelis de Anima*, II, qu. 14 (Mediolani: Philippus de Lavania, 1474), fol. 52v. We may note that Offredi in this same question (cf. fol. 50v) has listed examples of sensible 'errors,' such as the colors appearing on the neck of a dove, similar to those given by the *Conimbricenses* above and has answered the problems they raise about truth in regard to proper sensibles (fol. 51r-52v).
- <sup>435</sup> Cf. *Quodlibeta*, IV, qu. 7; ed. De Coninck, p. 215-16.
- <sup>436</sup> Cf. *In Summam Contra Gentiles* I, c. 59, §§ xii-xiii, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, pp. 171-3.
- <sup>437</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 221.
- <sup>438</sup> Cf. Joannes Viguierius, O.P., *Institutiones ad Christianam theologiam, sacrarum literarum, universaliumque Conciliorum autoritate necnon Doctorum Ecclesiasticorum eruditione confirmatae, ... ad naturalem et Christianam philosophiam, ... De Anima*, Cap. I, § 8, vers. 5 and 6 (Venetiis: Apud Camillum Francischinum, 1566), pp. 23-4.
- <sup>439</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b31-2.
- <sup>440</sup> Cf. *In Aristotelis librum De Anima commentarium* III, lect. 11, ed. Pirotta, p. 180, nn. 761-2.
- <sup>441</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 3.6.430b28-30.
- <sup>442</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 4.7.1011b26-7.
- <sup>443</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 223.
- <sup>444</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>445</sup> For further treatment of the *Conimbricenses'* teaching on error, see Leo W. Keeler, S.J., *The Problem of Error from Plato to Kant: A Historical and Critical Study* (Romae: Apud Aedes Pontificiae Universitatis Gregorianae, 1934), pp. 138-40.
- <sup>446</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b31-2.
- <sup>447</sup> That is, 'In what simple knowledge is falsity accidentally found?'
- <sup>448</sup> *Commentaria Cardinalis Caietani, In Summam Theologiae* I, q. 58, a. 5, n. 4; in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 5, p. 88.
- <sup>449</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 3.6.430b28.
- <sup>450</sup> Cf. *De Anima* 2.6.418a15-18.
- <sup>451</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 221.
- <sup>452</sup> Cf. *In Summam Contra Gentiles* I, c. 59, esp. §§ ix-xiii, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Opera omnia*, vol. 13, pp. 170-3.
- <sup>453</sup> Cf. *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* I, d. 19, qu. 5, art. 1, ad 7; ed. Mandonnet, p. 490.
- <sup>454</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 221.
- <sup>455</sup> *De Anima* 2.6.41816-18.
- <sup>456</sup> See D. Francisci Toleti, S.J., *Commentaria cum quaestionibus in tres libros Aristotelis De Anima*, II, cap. 6, text. 55, qu. 13 (Coloniae Agrippinae: In Officina Birckmannica, sumptibus Hermannii Mylii, 1615; reprinted, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1985), p. 79.
- <sup>457</sup> On this, cf. *Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu, In tres libros De Anima, Aristotelis Stagiritae*, II, cap. 6, q. 3, aa. 1 and 2; pp. 180-185. John of St. Thomas has incorrectly cited the *Conimbricenses'* as treating this in their Commentary at II, c. 3, q. 3, a. 1 and 2; cf. John of St. Thomas, *Ars Logica*, II, q. 23, a. 2; ed. Reiser, vol. 1, p. 732 and *Tractatus de Signis*, ed. Deely, p. 305. For some discussion of the issue prior to the *Conimbricenses*, cf. A.C. Pegis, "Matthew of Aquasparta and the Cognition of Non-Being," in *Scholastica*

*natione historico-critica instauranda. Acta Congressus Scholastici Internationalis* (Romae: Antonianum, 1951), pp. 463—80; Armand Maurer, "Francis of Meyronne's Defense of Epistemological Realism," in *Studia Mediaevalia et Mariologica Honore P. C. Balic* (Romae: Pontificium Athenaeum 'Antonianum,' 1971), pp. 203-225, reprinted in Armand Maurer, *Being and Knowing: Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990), pp. 315-331.

<sup>458</sup> See *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu, In tres libros De Anima Aristotelis Stagiritae*, II, c. 6, q. 6 (Lugduni: Apud Horatium Cardon, 1604), pp. 190-193.

<sup>459</sup> That is, the species in air; cf. note 143, above.

<sup>460</sup> For essentially the same doctrine, cf. A. Laurentius, *Logica*, III, d. 3, s. 15, n. 524; vol. 1, p. 354.

<sup>461</sup> On the conception of a chimaera in this context, cf. also P. Hurtado de Mendoza, *Logica*, d. 8, s. 2, n. 12 (p. 107)

<sup>462</sup> Cf. *In De Interpretatione*, cap. IV, qu. 3, art. 2; ed. Cologne, col. 127.

<sup>463</sup> *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 218.

<sup>464</sup> *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 17; in *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, p. 218.

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### The *Conimbricenses*

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[*Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis et Societatis Jesu. In universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae.* Chinese.]

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